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Abstract 
This thesis represents an attempt to make an original contribution to knowledge about 
transatlantic institutions and transatlantic governance. It investigates attempts in the 
1990s to foster a 'new transatlantic dialogue' between the EU and the US, through 
three bilateral agreements: the Transatlantic Declaration (1990), the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (1995) and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (1998). The 
thesis questions whether and to what extent the relationship has been institutionalised 
into a structure for transatlantic governance, and how the composition of transatlantic 
institutions impacts the way that transatlantic actors govern. Consideration is given to 
both 'who' governs in transatlantic relations and 'how', as evidence is sought to prove 
or disprove the claim that a decentralisation of decision-making powers has resulted 
in 'policy setting' and 'policy shaping' by lower level civil servants and non-state 
actors participating in trans govemm ental and transnational institutions. Three policy 
sectors- the EU-US anti-trafficking in women campaigns, the EU-US Mutual 
Recognition Agreements and the EU-US banana dispute- serve as case studies for the 
transatlantic policy process. 
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Understanding the 'New Transatlantic Dialogue' 
The transatlantic relationship is arguably the most significant relationship in the 
international system. Western Europe and the United States (US) have the largest 
concentration of individual and combined political and economic power, making the 
European Union (EU) and the US each other's most important partner world-wide. 
Common values, culture and history have combined to make them political partners. 
The EU and the US are each other's largest trading partner, accounting for 20% of 
each others' trade in goods and '13% of trade in services (Berry 2001). More 
importantly, in economic terms, they are the recipients of around half of each other's 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
Much academic attention in the 1990s focused on relations between the EU 
and the US in light of radical structural changes to the international economic and 
political orders (see Smith and Woolcock (1993) Featherstone and Ginsberg (1996) 
Peterson (1996) Monar (1998) Gardner (1997)). The end of the Cold War visibly 
reduced the security threat on which the transatlantic alliance previously hinged. 
However, geopolitical and economic shifts in the international system, caused'in part 
by increasing flows of people, capital, and goods, created a number of new incentives 
for EU-US co-operation and conflict. The transatlantic relationship was viewed as a 
way to promote xvestem ideas of democracy and security in an era of change and 
' In the last measurable year. US exports to Europe totaled S259 billion. while European exports to the 
US totaled $293 billion. Forei-n Direct Investment is an important tie between the EU and the US 
because it is such an important source of employment. For example, European investment in the US 
supports over 7 million American jobs (FABC 2001). American investment in Europe accounts for 
about 3 million European jobs (see European Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce's 
ý\ ebsite littp: '. '\\ \\, \, v. eucomrnittee. be) 
uncertainty. Deepening European integration, including the creation of Common 
Foreign and Security (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillars under the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), signalled to the US the growing capacity of the EU to act as 
a foreign policy actor in its own right. The 1990s marked the first time in the history of 
the transatlantic relationship that the EU and the US faced the task not only of keeping 
the 'alliance' together but of facilitating a partnership of - more or less- equals 
(Peterson 1996). 
This thesis represents an attempt to make an original contribution to 
knowledge about how and why the transatlantic partners chose to 'manage' the 
relationship by creating new transatlantic institutions in an era of rapid international 
change. It investigates attempts in the 1990s to foster a 'new transatlantic dialogue' 
between the US and the EU, rather than separate EU Member States. Central to the 
thesis is the question of why the EU and US chose to build bilateral institutional ties 
outside of traditional multilateral institutions such as North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). The focus is on three transatlantic agreements: the Transatlantic Declaration 
(TAD) (1990), the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) (1995), and the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership (TEP) (1998). The emphasis on transatlantic economic and 
political relations between the EU and the US in the thesis reflects the focus of these 
agreements on expanding the scope for policy co-ordination and co-operation under 
the agreernents. 2 It is not meant as an indication that multilateral or security issues are 
an), less important to the larger transatlantic partnership. Rather, the thesis seeks to 
gauge the significance of bilateral attempts to re-invent the relationship through these Z, Z-1 
I- Be term political rather than security here indicates the focus on 'soft' rather than 'hard' security 
issues. The scope for policies studied in this thesis is largely confined to those incorporated Linder the nI 
NTA. For transatlantic security studies see Haass ( 1999) Bronstone (1998), Geipal and Manning (1996) 
and van den Broek (1993). 
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transatlantic agreements, which themselves are both bilateral and focused almost 
entirely on policy areas other than traditional security. 
These transatlantic agreements warrant study because they mark, to a 
considerable point, a break from the pre-1990s past and together they form a new 
framework for managing the transatlantic relationship. The TAD, the NTA and the 
TEP are the first bilateral agreements signed between the EU and the US. Despite 
earlier attempts to foster EU-US rather than European-American relations in the 
1960s, and 1970s (see chapter 3) the 1990s was the first era to be characterised by the 
institutionalisation of a structure for transatlantic governance. Unlike President 
Kennedy's Grand Design or President Nixon's Atlantic Charter, the agreements were 
accompanied by institutional arrangements and specific policy commitments. The 
transatlantic agreements expanded the scope for bilateral co-operation to a range of 
new (largely) non-traditional security and economic policy areas. 
Specifically, the NTA commits the EU and US to approach jointly, where 
possible, rising transnational crime, terrorism and environmental degradation. it 
acknowledges the role that the transatlantic partners can play in promoting peaceful 
transitions to democracy world-wide. The NTA and the succeeding TEP contain 
strategies for facilitating increased economic integration and dispute management in 
direct response to competing. forces both to liberallse trade and protect domestic 
producers. In substantive terms, the agreements explicitly acknowledge the capacity of 
the transatlantic partners both to promote and undermine global economic 
libcralisation. EU-US trade and investment agreements have the potential not only to. 
open the transatlantic marketplace but also to lead the way for further liberalisation at 
the multilateral level. On the other hand. transatlantic trade disputes and a lack of 
solidarity at the WTO have the potential to undermine the multilateral trading system. 
In short, EU-US relations are significant because the transatlantic partnership can 
make or break the foundations of the western economic and political orders. 
What follows in this chapter is an introduction to a study of the capacity of the 
EU and US to respond to the challenges, or to effectively 'govern' the transatlantic 
marketplace and the international political order through bilateral transatlantic. 
agreements. The emphasis is on the creation of decision-making structures and a 
framework for transatlantic policy making. Section I discusses the primary research 
questions and sets out the main hypothesis, namely that these transatlantic agreements 
do matter because they have established a transatlantic governance structure. An 
examination of the existing literature on transatlantic relations in section two reveals 
that foundations for this thesis are found in earlier works. It also seeks to establish 
what light a decisionmaking approach sheds on EU-US relations generally and the 
NTA framework specifically. Section 3 outlines two sub-hypotheses, which are that 
transatlantic relations are determined not only by transatlantic structures but also by 
how transatlantic actors use them; and that transatlantic institutions - however fragile 
- persist because each side has a clear interest in ensuring that the other does not 
defect from transatlantic bargains. Section 4 outlines how subsequent chapters 
contribute to the discussion. 
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1) The Research Question and the Main Hypothesis 
This thesis seeks to establish what impact transatlantic agreements in the 1990s have 
had on EU-US relations. The main hypothesis, which is divided into two parts, is that 
these transatlantic agreements have altered the scope and depth of transatlantic co- 
operation. The thesis seeks support for the arguments that, 
* The EU-US relationship has been institutionalised in the 1990s through the 
three transatlantic agreements (the Transatlantic Declaration, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership), and 
e that the institutionalised networks and policy framework created by the 
transatlantic agreements form the basis of a transatlantic governance structure 
which has produced policy outcomes that would be unimaginable in the 
absence of such a structure. 
Further operationalisation of the hypothesis is needed to clarify precisely what kind of 
evidence is needed to prove or disprove the claim. The first part of the hypothesis 
seeks to establish the ýinstitutionalisation' of the relationship. The thesis employs a 
definition of institutionalisation that draws on the work of scholars such as Keohane 
and Nye (1993), Ruggic (1998) and Risse (1995), which suggests that by no means 
should vvc expect international institutionalisation always to result in supranational 
organisations. Rather many international institutions are in effect 'regimes* which can Z. - 
be broadly defined by 'patterned behavior' (see Puchala and Hopkins 19833) 'specific 
rules' (Keoliane 1989) and even 'principles norms. rules, and decision making 
procedures* (Krasner 198'1). Thus. for the purposes of this thesis, institutionalisation 
is a process whereby a co-ordination and pattern of behavior between actors is 
established and developed (see also Ruggie 1998: 54). 
The second part of the hypothesis seeks to establish what impact transatlantic 
institutions have on the wider relationship between Europe and America. A rich 
literature now exists that argues firmly that *institutions matter' and that they 
constitute the 'central component of political life' (Peters 1999: 150; see also March 
and Olsen 1989). However, most of this literature focuses specifically on politics in 
domestic political settings. Relatively little of the so-called 'new institutional-ism' is 
concerned with international politics. This thesis draws on Peters' (1999: 18) 
definition which argues that institutions generally are characterised by 
* formal and informal structures, including networks and shared norms 
* patterned and sustainable interaction between actors 
0 constraints on the behaviour of its members 
0 some sense of shared values. 
This thesis 'borrows' the central questions raised by the new institutionalism and 
applies them to international relations and transatlantic relations generally. These 
questions are: do institutions matter, particularly in determining the behaviour of 
actors - public and private - who are stakeholders in US-EU relations? If institutions 
do matter, how much do they matter? And how do we measure how much they 
matter? This thesis questions not only whether the creation of formal transatlantic 
dialogue structures can be construed as institutions, but also whether the institutional 
ties created in the I 990s comprise a process for policy co-ordination or joint policy 
making. In other xNords it questions the extent to which actors within these structures 
creat a policy aocnda or simply pursue a predetermined, established policy agenda. 
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The test for transatlantic governance is not only the existence of transatlantic 
policy output but also of attempts- both successful and unsuccessful- to accommodate 
the interests of different actors input in the policy process in order to facilitate 
integration and manage disputes. The examination of transatlantic institutions as 
decision- making forums for transatlantic policy making ultimately sheds light on the 
capacity of the EU and the US to manage the transatlantic dialogue and to govern in 
both the transatlantic marketplace and the international political order. 
2) Governance and Institutions in EU-US Relations 
'Governance' is a term that is now widely used to characterise the actions of actors in 
the international arena. What is ýgovernance' and how do we study it? Eising and 
Kohler-Koch (1999: 5) argue that, 
ýgovernance' is about the structured ways and means in which the divergent 
preferences of interdependent actors are translated into policy choices 'to 
allocate values', so that the plurality of interests is transformed into co- 
ordinated action and the compliance of actors is achieved. 
For his part, Rosenau (1992: 4) contends that governance, 'embraces governmental 
institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby 
persons and organisation within it purview, move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfil 
their wants'. Simply put, governance is 'the imposition of overall direction or control 
on the allocation of valued resources' (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 5). It is, in all of 
these definitions, seen to be a synthetic process in that a variety of actors - not all of, 
them uovernmental - are involved in decisions that determine who gets what. when 
and how. 
One strategy for understanding governance is to 'deconstruct' it (in a literal 
sense) and approach it as a process of making individual decisions. Peterson and zn 
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Bomberg (1999: 4) note that, 'All policies are the product of decisions about what to 
do, how to do it, and how to decide what to do. ' This thesis approaches EU-US 
relations as a process of decision-making because decision-making as an analytical 
approach helps us identify who governs and how, and who or what determines policy 
outcomes. The explanatory power of a number of variables in the process of 
transatlantic policy making is discussed throughout the text. Institutions and actors are 
considered as important factors of policy input, and agreements and declarations serve 
as final policy outputs. This approach to transatlantic governance is rooted in a number 
of earlier transatlantic studies. 
A host of literature in the early 1990s sought to explain the nature of co- 
operation and conflict in relations between the EU and the US, particularly in light of 
shifts in the balance of power between the partners and growing 'complex' 
interdependence. Interest in the nature of international regimes, a preoccupation of 
international scholars in the 1980s (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1989; 
Hasenclever etc all 1996; see also Peters 1999), was resurrected as institutional 
approaches to politics more generally began to flourish. The result was fresh interest 
in the prospects for fostering increased transatlantic co-operation - and international 
co-operation more generally -- through new institutions. Key to the discussion was the 
increased potential for conflict seen to accompany the breakdown of the hegemonic 
system, under which the US bad acted as a dominant partner over the Europe in a 
bipolar, Cold War international order. The rise of a multipolar order, it was argued, 
increased the likelihood that a united Europe had the capacity to act as a more equal 
partner but also as a more equal competitor. Scholars such as Featherstone and 
Ginsberg (1996) h1ohlighted the potential for diverging interests in a post-hegemonic Z-- -- Z-- ZD 
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system, but also for EU and US interest in common action prompted by economic 
interdependence. 
Earlier works on EU-US relations in the 1990s highlight a number of important 
themes that feature in the current study. Authors including Smith and Woolcock 
(1993) and Peterson (1996) noted that diverging interests were unavoidable given the 
growing importance of domestic actors in international politics. The question of how 
to manage the relationship was complicated by the tendency of the EU to boldly 
declare that it was ready to play an international role commensurate with its economic 
nower even as the Union's Member States showed themselves unwilling to vest the r 
EU with the resources and policy instruments needed to play such a role. The result 
was a wide gap between the EU's internal capabilities and the rest of the world's 
expectations (see Hill 19931 1996), with no international partner of the Union more 
acutely aware of the gap than the US. Meanwhile, the 'action capacity' of the US was 
also called into question as American foreign and trade policies became subject to 
more and more effective domestic pressures than had been imaginable during the Cold 
War, and also more prone to complication by the separation of powers between 
institutions at the federal and a state levels (see Smith 1997; NicolaYdis and Howse 
2001). 
Institutionalist approaches to EU-US relations in the early 1990s highlighted 
the importance of institutions in transatlantic relations (see for example Keohane and 
Nye 1993)). It was argued that institutional ties could manage the relationship and 
overcome diverging interests. Peterson (1996) argued that a genuine partnership would 
require 'better-or0anized exchanges'. Smith (1997) argued that policy co-ordination 
could not take place without a clear allocation of political authority or a clear legal 
frarneNAork. both of which required considerable institution-building. 
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A second wave of EU-US literature in the 1990s focused on how new 
transatlantic institutional structures created by the TAD and the NTA could manage 
the dialogue. Studies of the NTA including Krenzler and Schomaker (1996), Gardner 
(1997) and Monar (1998) and Bail et at (1997) linked policy co-ordination and co-, 
operation to transatlantic institutions, but mainly described the prospects for such co- 
ordination and co-operation under the NTA, in part because they were released before 
the N'TA had produced substantive results. Nonetheless, these studies helped provide 
a bridge to a new wave of (quite recent) studies, which concentrate more narrowly on 
transatlantic policy outputs and the role of the NTA in fostering actual co-ordination 
and co-operation. 
This thesis seeks both'to build upon and critique this most recent wave of 
literature, particularly works by Pollack and Shaffer (2001) and Philippart and 
Winand (2001). These works concentrate not only on the NTA as a framework for co- 
operation but as a structure of transatlantic governance. They explain what the NTA is, 
but also how the NTA works and how well it works. Shaffer and Pollack offer an 
actor based explanation for who governs in EU and US relations by describing 
different levels of intergovernmental, trans governmental and transnational networks 
which have been institutionalised by the NTA. Phillipart and Winand's examination of 
not only policy making but policy shaping opens the policy process up to a range of 
actors who have an input into the transatlantic policy process. Their policy-based 
study tries to measure the success of the NTA by applying numerical values to 
individual sectors based on the discrepancy between policy goals and policy output. 
In inany ways the decision making approach taken to EU-US relations in this 
thesis seeks to combine the logic of these two approaches. Chapter two outlines a 
decision-making, model as a ,,, aý of categorising actor input into the transatlantic 
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policy process. It argues that intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational 
actors have different roles in making, setting and shaping transatlantic policy. Unlike 
Philippart and Winand's study, however, this thesis does not try to present a 
quantitative measure of what has been achieved under the NTA, for a number of 
reasons. First, transatlantic co-operation or co-ordination was being pursued in many 
policy areas before the creation of specific transatlantic institutions, thus making it 
difficult to establish a causal relationship between the NTA framework and policy 
output. Second. it is difficult to measure the significance of policy agreements simply 
by rely;. -,,, on the public declarations of senior transatlantic policy-makers - 
specifically contained in so-called 'Senior Level Group reports' -- because of a 
tendency by transatlantic policy makers to 'recycle' and 'repackage' their 
announcement of policy successes. 3 'I'he sbort-ten-n pressure to produce results out of 
the NTA reflects the political cycles which govern the behaviour of governments on 
both sides: 'Quite simply, whilst the development of strategic direction in US-EU 
relations is a long-term exercise to be judged over a period of years if not decades, 
political leaders are judged over periods of five years at most' (Smith 2001: 271). 
Third, a numerical measure of successes in one area is not necessarily comparable 
with polices pursued in another. As one senior EU official interviewed for this study 
argued, 'how do you compare the levels of success? Is it more important that the EU 
and the US go to Russia with a common position on food aid or that they run joint, 
trafficking programmes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)? 
4 
L- 
Perhaps above all, this thesis eschews attempts to measure quantitatively the 
success, or not, of transatlantic policy-making because it is concerned with process as 
rriuch as policy: it emphasises the importance of not only policy output but also of the 
The St. G report is a stock take of co-operation under the NTA which is released before each summit. 
See chapter four. 
process of policy making. Policy agreements are important measure of the capacity to 
govern in the short term, but so too is the creation of dialogue structures and the ability 
to foster long term strategies of co-operation. As such, this thesis seeks primarily to 
make clear the perceptions of actors who participate in the policy process and to gauge 
the impact that different variables - including the creation of new transatlantic 
institutions -- have had on the policy process. This thesis primarily relies on elite 
interviews to determine the relevance of transatlantic institutional structures, their 
effect on the actors who participate within them, and the impact on the policies they 
seek to influence in the over2l] process of transatlantic governance. 
3) Transatlantic Governance: Decentralisation and 'Privatisation'? 
The validation of the first hypothesis opens up the discussion on transatlantic 
governance to a number of sub-hypotheses about the process of transatlantic decision 
making. If the relationship has been institutional i sed into a governance structure, what 
room has it allowed for different actors (as described by Shaffer and Pollack) to 
influence the policy process, which Phillipart and Winand note is not restricted only to 
making policy but also shaping? In other words, the interest is not only in the big 
decisions that establish the scope for transatlantic policy co-ordination, but also in the 
decisions that determine policy details and policy options (see chapter 2). To 
generalise. what space does the formal transatlantic structure leave for agents, both 
governmental and non -governmental. to influence the co-ordination, convergence or 
mutual recognition of transatlantic policy? Who exercises what type of power in the 
transatlantic process and NA-hen? Two further hypotheses are presented regarding the 
role of different actors involved in transatlantic policy making. 
Interview, Commission Delegation, Washin-ton D. C.. October 2000 (32). 1 Cý 
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0 The second hypothesis to be tested by this thesis is whether or not, and to what 
extent, the creation of an institutional framework by the transatlantic 
agreements has led to a decentralisation of decision taking powers to state 
actors. 
Put another way, how much responsibility for actual policy making has been delegated 
to transgovernmental, as opposed to intergovernmental, actors (see table 1.1; see also 
chapter _'Iý Tli; Q liynothesi-s us to be concerned not only with the making of . ... I .. v- 
'history-making' political decisions by so-called 'chiefs of government' to 
institutional ise the relationship or establish the scope for policy reach. Rather, this 
thesis seeks to determine the capacity of trans governmental actors to exercise powers 
in setting and shaping policies. Validation of this hypothesis requires demonstrating 
that a range of different civil servants have both participated in and had an impact on 
the transatlantic decision making process through formal, institutionalised channels. 
*A third hypothesis examined by this thesis tests whether and to what extent a 
decentralisation of decision taking powers has been devolved to privateas well 
as public actors. 
The study of non-state actors in international politics is not new. There is a growing 
literature on the impact that a 'third sector'. or the global civil society, has had on 
international governance (see chapter 2). 'the growing role of private actors is 
discussed b,,,, Keoharie and Nve (1977,1989) and Shaffer and Pollack (2001) as a 
transnational' phenonienon. 
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This third hypothesis has an interest in the capacity of private groups to 
influence transatlantic negotiations not only through national channels, but through 
transnational networks of European and American corporations and non-governmental 
organisations. The question here is not whether business groups and NGOs 'make' 
policy but whether there is evidence to support the claim that transnational networks 
ýshape' transatlantic decisions. Rittberger (2000) notes that a great problem for 
researchers is how to measure the impact of these actors. The thesis looks for evidence 
that non-state actors narrow policy options or 'load' the decision-making process in 
favour of some outcomes rather than others, through either advocacy and persuasion, 
or through the withholding or provision of valued resources. 
Table 1.1 Types of Transatlantic Actors 
Intergovernmental High Level contact between Chiefs of Government 
Transgovemmental Day to Day contact between Sub-Units of Government 
(Civil Servants) 
Transnational Contact between private actors- businesses and NGOs 
Based on Shaffer and Pollack (2001) 
To summarise, this thesis seeks to contribute to the larger debate on how the VU and 
US manage the transatlantic relationship. It focuses on the 'new transatlantic dialogue' 
established by the TAD. the NTA and the TEP as a process of institutional isation, 
%ýhich has created a formal structure of (governance. If the first hypothesis is correct. 
the transatlantic agreements have created institutional structures and an established 
policy forum through xNhich transatlantic actors ', govern'. It Is argued that 
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institutionalisation has taken place at multiple levels, thereby increasing the scope for 
different actors to influence transatlantic governance in different capacities. 
The second and third hypotheses seek to establish the role played by lower 
level civil servants and non-state actors in decentralised and privatised decision taking 
forums. Chapter 2 helps clarify these hypotheses by outlining a transatlantic decision 
making model which argues that intergovernmental actors 'make' decisions which 
establish transatlantic institutions and a policy framework, but that trans goverm. ental 
and transnational actors impact the decision making process by 'setting' and 'shaping' 
transatlantic policy. Finally, the role of bureaucrats and non-govemmental actors in 
transatlantic governance raises some questions about the transparency of decentralised 
decision taking. The debate on the legitimacy of transatlantic governance is a theme 
that is discussed throughout the thesis. 
4. An Overview of the Thesis 
The decision making model outlined in chapter 2 is the product of a broad theoretical 
debate about how to approach EU-US co-operation generally and transatlantic 
governance more narrowly. Chapter 2 draws on different lines of political theory for 
explanations as to why the EU and US would choose to pursue a policy of 
'institutional i sation ' and how they have subsequently chosen to operate within 
transatlantic structures. A number of themes are developed in this chapter which 
inform the discussion of EU-US policy making throughout the thesis. First, the trend 
towards decentralisation of' decision-making power, rather than the centralisation of 
power at the interl2overnmental level. Is highlighted. That this process has taken place 
is evidenced in later chapters. which describe the building up of interstate networks 
rather than the creation of any supranational 'transatlantic' organisation. Second, 
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chapter 2 highlights, following Peterson (1996) and Smith (1997), that domestic 
structures affect the capacity of the EU and US to co-ordinate action at a transatlantic 
level. It is argued that multi-level governance approaches to decision making, which 
are usually used to characterise the EU, also apply to the US which shares levels of 
decision-making competency between federal and state institutions. Finally, an 
exploration of the rational ist-constructivist debate within international relations theory, 
and examination of both global governance and multi-level governance approaches, - 
highlights the possibility that different actors may be capable of influencing policy at 
different levels. If all the hypotheses set out above are correct, it can be argued that 
different actors' actions are driven by different rationales. Rationalist explanations 
that explain top political decisions do not necessarily account for other parts of the 
decision-making process. If the decentralisation of decision making allows different 
actors to have a role in 'shaping' policy, then constructivist claims about the nature of 
communication according to agreed rules of behaviour (established by the NTA 
framework) may bear more explanatory weight. 
Chapters 3 through 5 set out evidence to support the three hypotheses. Chapter 
3 looks at the three transatlantic agreements and seeks evidence to support the claim 
that the relationship has been institutionalised. It concentrates on the build up of 
formal institutional ties, which serve as transatlantic decision-making structures. The 
extent to which policy issues have been placed in a bilateral forum is also discussed as 
a means of establishing the scope for transatlantic governance. The impact of 
transatlantic institutionalisation and the capacity of transatlantic institutions to act as 
(,, overning structures is not only measured by the output of policies or 'deliverables" 
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but also by the institutionalisation of communication, argued by institutionalists to 
foster co-operation. 
The remaining chapters seek to explore the sub-hypotheses. How is it that 
actors govern under the institutional framework created in the 1990s? Chapter four 
examines the process of transatlantic decision making, setting and shaping. It 
highlights the role of the intergovernmental EU-US Summit as both a beginning and 
end point of the policy cycle, but also concentrates on the role that trans governmental 
actors play in setting and shaping policies at a sub-summit level. The chapter 
highlight-, the coompplicated nature of EU-US decision taking which has become 
increasingly institutionalised in order to incorporate both domestic economic and 
political actors. Chapter four also seeks to test the second hypothesis by questioning 
the extent to which transgovernmental networks provide a forum for decentralised 
decision setting and shaping. Finally, given the implications of trans governmental 
decision setting and shaping on transatlantic governance, the chapter questions the 
legitimacy of a process which is both highly decentralised and primarily bureaucratic. 
Chapter 5 tests the third hypothesis against a number of formal interest based 
transnational networks- including the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the 
Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD) and the Transatlantic Environmental 
Dialogue (TAED)- which have been asked formally to participate in the transatlantic 
policy process. It seeks to establish whether the behaviour of actors within these 
networks provides support to the claim that decision-making powers have been 
extended to non-state actors. The legitimacy debate on transatlantic decision making is 
also considered in light of the unequal access that different actors have and the ZD 
S Deliverables' is a terin used by EU and US officials to describe policy output in the NTA process. 
Deliverables ran-e t-rorn agreements, to joint initiatives. to declarations. 
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increased demands for transparency in the policy process. It is argued that the capacity 
of actors to shape the process is varied, and thus too is support for the hypothesis that a 
decentralisation of decision tAing to private sector actors has occurred. 
Chapters 6 through 8 discuss three policy sectors, which serve as case studies 
for the three hypotheses and for EU-US decision making. The case studies were 
chosen to show the broad range of the new transatlantic dialogue and to incorporate 
political and economic issues as well as policy areas characterised by integration, 
interest diversion or 'system friction'. 6 Chapter 6 looks at the decisions that made, set 
and sbaped transatlantic policy co-ordination on trafficking in women in CEF. A case 
study of the EU-US information campaigns on trafficking in women highlights the 
type of low key, technical decisions that are facilitated by the NTA. The discussion on 
trafficking in women begins with an examination of the intergovernmental decision to 
include trafficking in women in the institutional framework of the NTA. It also 
questions whether there is evidence of decentralised decision setting and shaping by 
trans governmental actors and what role transnational actors have played. Trafficking 
in women is also examined as a case study for EU external co-operation on JHA 
issues, an area where the EU has normally been considered to be a less supportive - 
partner because of internal institutional gaps. 
Chapter 7 presents a second case study, this time in an economic policy sector. 
It examines intergovernmental. trans governmental and transnational actor input into 
the EU-US mutual recognition agreements (MR-As), according to which the regulatory 
standards governing the production of goods on one side of the Atlantic is accepted as in 
le, (-Yitimate oi-i the other side. Like the trafficking in women case, the MRAs point to the 
existence of multi-level governance in transatlantic policy making. This chapter seeks 
(' This term is used by Smith (2001 ) to describe clashing structures, for example between regulatory or 
industrial cultures. 
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to establish the impact that the institutional i sation of the NTA and the decentralisation 
of decision setting and shaping to state and non-state actors has had on actual policy 
agreements. The chapter also demonstrates a policy sector where the EU has the 
capacity to act more coherently than the US, thus revealing that the capabilities- 
expectations gap often ascribed to the EU, and held to be a major deterrent to effective 
EU-US policy co-operation, is mirrored by a similar gap on the American side. 
Finally, chapter 8 examines a trade dispute that raged for most of the 1990s. It 
considers the role that domestic actors on both sides have played in the transatlantic 
banana dispute and questions how effectively NTA institutions have been in managing 
this conflict (and other areas of trade friction). In short, it moves us towards an answer 
to the question: does the transatlantic decision making model apply to areas of dispute 
as well as agreement? The chapter develops the argument that the banana dispute was 
an ýoutlier', or a case where transatlantic institutions have been criticised for not 
effectively managing a dispute The banana case draws attention to the complicated 
task of facilitating 'governance' where interests diverge and where disputes become 
legal disputes under international trade rules. But, it also demonstrates the capaci ty of 
the transatlantic institutions to contain policy friction. The chapter asks what the 
banana case can tell us more generally about the capacity of the new transatlantic 
dialogue to overcome competition between domestic actors. 
To conclude. chapter 9 reviews the main findings of the thesis and 'broadens 
ouC to consider the wider implications concerning the role of the EU-US relationship 
in international politics and the place of institutions in international relations more 
generally. It the evidence presented in the thesis to determine whether the 
three hypothescs laid OLIt above point to an institutionalisation, clecentralisation and 
privatisation' of transatlantic decision making. It also questions what impact, or lack 
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thereof, new decision making processes have had on the overall cycle of transatlantic 
governance. In short, it asks not only who governs and how, but what difference it 
makes? To what extent has the decision making structure allowed the EU and US to 
manage relations characterised by co-operation and competition, and at what price 
does 'effective' management of the dialogue come? In other words, how does 
transatlantic decision making fare in the debate on technocratic governance? The anti- 
globalisation protests at the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle (1999), at the EU 
Summit in G6teborg (2001) and the G-8 Summit in Genoa (2001) demonstrate the 
general lack of popular support for governance structures which exist above the 
nation-state. Is the legitimacy of transatlantic governance undermined by the absence 
of a broad acceptance of transatlantic institutions? 
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Chapter 2 
Governing through the NTA: A Decision-Making Model 
Finding a single theory that can accurately characterise the new transatlantic 
relationship is difficult because the NTA encompasses a number of non-traditional 
security and economic policy areas. Moreover, EU-US relations span a number of 
realms of theory, including various international relations theories, regional integration 
theories, and transnational or global governance theories. This chapter seeks 
theoretical explanations tor EU-US institution 'building and policy making trom a 
number of different sources. The study examines transatlantic relations at the highest 
level of interstate negotiation while considering transatlantic policy making at the 
most micro level, thereby not limiting itself to the confines of either the international 
relations or comparative politics literatures. In order to address the multiple layers of 
analysis that exist in EU-US relations, it is necessary to draw on themes and concepts 
from multiple theoretical approaches. 
One aim of this thesis is to determine why the EU and the US decided to re- 
invent the relationship in the 1990s. On a general level, this means questioning how 
international relations are structured in the increasingly globalised, post Cold War era. 
More specifically, the focus is on the decisions that institutionalised the transatlantic 
relationship. What does the existing literature convey about why institutions emerge 
and the scope for co-operation through institutions such as the New Transatlantic 
Agenda (N'FA)'? Transatlantic institutions are characterised not just as a forum for co- 
operation but as a process designed f'Or conflict mana(Tement and policy output. 
A second anu of the chapter is to explore, within the literature, the scope for 
policy co-ordination through the transatlantic institutions. It Is argued that EU-US 
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relations extend beyond diplomatic agreement into the realm of global governance. An 
important part of the theoretical debate on EU-US relations thus extends past the 
question of why states co-operate to also address how states co-operate. How have the 
EU and US organised decision-making procedures and what determines how and 
which policies are pursued? To summarise, this chapter develops a number of themes 
including: the process of institution building, communication within transatlantic 
institutions, the output of policy co-ordination and the role of the NTA and TEP as 
governance structures. 
Section I examines the prospects and motivation for co-operation through 
institutions using the established IR debates between neorealists and neoliberal 
institutional i sts and between rationalists and contructivists. It argues that rationalist 
and constructivist approaches are not mutually exclusive, as demonstrated by the fact 
that rationalist approaches offer 'sound' social science explanations for interstate co- 
operation at high political levels, but that communication between other actors is 
under-emphasised. Section 2 examines EU-US relations not just as a process of co- 
operation, but as a process of governance. The reaction of states to globalisation is 
considered, as is the role of policy networks in the process of global governance. 
Section 33 extends the governance debate and questions the capacity of the EU and the 
US to govern at a transatlantic level under the constraints of domestic institutional 
structures. It is argued not only that the EU but also the US suffers from a capabilities- 
expectations gap. Finally, in light of the complexities of 'multi-level' or 'federal' 
governance, section 4 seeks to build a decision-making model for transatlantic 
om, ertiaiice which explains both who governs and how. Drawing on Pollack and Z__ 
Shaffer's (2001 ) three tiered model of transatlantic levels and Peterson and Bomberg's 
(1999) model of' (FLj) decisioii inaking, the new transatlantic decision making model L_ 
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describes a process whereby intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational 
actors make, set and shape transatlantic policy. It also acknowledges that different 
theories might 'best' explain different stages and different levels of the transatlantic 
policy making process. 
1) International Relations Theory: Institutions, Communication and Interests 
International relations (IR) literature is a logical starting point for a theoretical 
discussion on the transatlantic relationship, because ultimately transatlantic relations 
are the result of diplomatic-strategic relations, cross border transactions and 
communication between sovereign powers. 7 Broadly, international relations theories 
explain fragmentation (caused by political and economic conflict) and integration 
(through for example alliances, treaties and agreements) in the international system. In 
short, IR sheds light on what drives co-operation and conflict between the EU and the 
us. 
Different IR theories offer very different views of relationships in the 
international system, be they international, inter-state, intergovernmental or 
transnational. This thesis explores debates between international relations theories- 
about why states co-operate generally and why the EtJ and US chose to institutional i se 
the relationship in the 1990s. It questions further not only why they should choose to 
co-operate but how. What does the outcome of individual policy agreements and 
declarations tell us about the purpose of the new dialogue and how actors operate 
within it? 
I'liese characteristics are dra%ý n from Bro,, N, n's ( 1997) definition of international relations. 
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The Old Dehate: Neorealism and Neoliheralism 
Great changes in the international political and economic systems that marked the 
1990s launched international relations theorists into a frenzied search for a model 
qualified to explain structural shifts away from the Cold War towards a 'new world 
order'. The neoreal 1 st-neo liberal debate emerged in the early 1990s as an extension of 
the Cold War discussions about the prospects for co-operation and conflict as 
determined by the structure of the international system and the process of international 
negotiations. Most international relations theorists tried explaining post-Cold War 
transformations with concepts derived from realist and liberal international relations 
theories. The neorealist-neoliberal discourse revealed the first signs of a breakdown in 
the clear divide between realist and liberal paradigms (with realist conceptions of 
conflict on one side of the line and liberal notions of co-operation on the other), but 
the two theories have always maintained different assumptions about the nature of 
conflict and co-operation between the EU and the US. 
The logic of neorealism 
Neorealism is based on a clear set of assumptions. It is argued that the structure of the 
international system. rather than the decisions made by individual agents, shape 
changes and determine outcomes in international politics (Waltz 1986: 71). The state 
is the primary level of analysis, and because states are unitary agents, domestic and 
non-state actors are not considered major players in international negotiations. Waltz 
(1986: 89-90) argues that it is states that 'set the scene' and 'set the rules of the 
intercourse'. 
Neorealism rests on the logic that states are more likely to be in conflict than to 
co-operate because decisions are determined by the structure of the international 
24 
system which is characterised by unrest and anarchy. In a system that lacks order, 
conflict is inevitable because states are preoccupied with material gains such as 
security and power. 8 International institutions are deemed largely unable to mitigate 
the constraining effect of anarchy on interstate co-operation (Baldwin 1993: 8). 
However, neorealists concede that states may bargain mainly when they wish to avoid 
the high cost of conflict, to preserve the peace and manage economic conflict (Waltz. 
1979: 111-114,194-199; Henderson 1998: 15). Generally the scope for co-operation 
within neo-realist theory is limited. 
In the early post Cold War years neorealists argued that the transatlantic 
relationship was not defined by similar cultures, values, ideology and historic ties but 
by the relative distribution of power between the allies (Krasner 1993: 21). EU-US co- 
operation was viewed as a reaction to structural shifts which left the international 
system less predictable and more dangerous (Mearsheimer 1990b). European interest 
in pursuing the new transatlantic dialogue was seen as a way to keep America engaged 
in European security, amidst rising fears that it would return to isolationalism-9 The 
US's interest in co-operating with Europe was seen as a way to maintain 'a seat at the 
European table' and gain access to European markets in light of the growing threat of 
'Fortress Europe. ' 10 
Whether they portrayed the international system as hegemonic (see Keohane 
1984), unipolar (Huntington 1991) or multipolar (see Mearsheimer 1990a, 1990b), 
Waltz (1986: 99) argues that, 'among men as among states, anarchy or the absence of govemment, is 
associated with the occurrence of violence'. Grieco (1990: 40) adds, 'Wishing to remain independent 
aaents, states always assess relationships including cooperative arrangements based on common 
interests- in terms of their impact and their relative capacity. ' Power is also considered to be fungible, 
so it is argued for example that military power can translate into economic power. 
'Declinists' argued that the US has lost its 'competitive edge', due to imperial over-stretch (Kennedy 
1989: 472) and the relative power gains-such as monetary reserves, trade, technology of its allies (Japan 
and Germany) (Krasner 1993: 22-23) 
"' Fortress Europe \ý as a phrase used in the late I 980s and 1990s to illustrate the fear that the Single 
European Market would build a common external tariff wall around Europe that would block US 
imports. 
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neorealists tended to reject the possibility of a true transatlantic partnership, arguing 
that power-motivated behaviour would engender mostly conflict in EU-US relations. 
Because neorealists characterise the relationship in terms of specific deals rather than 
general principles (Krasner 1993: 41), their analyses stress individual disagreements 
rather than overarching agreements. Disunity in the Uruguay Round of the GATT 
provided ample ammunition for neorealist attacks on the transatlantic partnership, as 
did the EU-US failure to agree on a new approach for the Millennium round of the 
WTO. Neorealists tend to downplay the expanded scope of the transatlantic 
relationship through joint agreements, in areas of non-traditional foreign policy co- 
operation, such as human rights, energy conservation, trafficking in women, and the 
promotion of democracy world-wide. Rather they emphasise state attempts to maintain 
minimum sovereignty loss. In short, neorealism does not explain patterns of co- 
operation (Milner 1997: 7; Haas 1992: 2) and in doing so disregards the prospect for 
transatlantic institutional isation. The remainder of this chapter questions whether 
neorealism makes the relationship seem much more hostile and endangered than it 
really is. 
The logic of neoliberalism 
Neoliberal institutionalists share many realist assumptions. For example, they agree on 
the primacy of the state and of international over domestic politics. However, they 
contend that neorealists were too pessimistic about the prospects for co-operation, both 
during and especially after the Cold War (Keohane 1993b: 277; Baldwin 1993: 5). 
Institutionalists argue that states' actions are still very much interest driven but they 
are more willing to admit that co-operation is likely when states have mutual interests 
prompted by economic and ecological interdependence and that they will continue to 
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co-operate as long as global threats plague the international environment. 'Complex 
interdependence' connects states, and the build up of institutions, shared values and 
norms are seen as a way of facilitating co-operation in order to maintain peace and 
stability (Keohane and Nye 1977; 1986). 11 Neorealists and institutionalists hold 
similar views about the underlying rationale driving international co-operation. 
Institutional i sts borrow the realist conception of 'distribution of power' to explain the 
motivations of states. Keohane (1993: 288) argues that political leaders, in order to 
serve a state's interests, must anticipate the likely actions of partners or foes when 
seeking to maximise expected utility gains. 
So institutions are believed to be a way for leaders to make the international 
environment more predictable. Institutional i sts question Waltz's emphasis on the 
structure of the international system, preferring instead to concentrate on the process 
of international politics, which they see as a process for the management of conflict 
(Keohane and Nye 1993: 4-5). Where mutual interest exists, international institutions 
acting as 'brokers and negotiators' serve state interests by mediating policy co- 
ordination among powerful actors. They influence the policy agenda by opening 
channels of communication, creating value networks between states and providing 
focal points of co-ordination (Keohane et al 1993: 8, Keohane and Nye 1993: 3,7). 
International institutions also reduce the likelihood of conflict by creating 
opportunities for negotiations, reducing uncertainty about others' policies and 
affecting leaders' expectations of the future (Keohane 19933b: 284). 
The acceptance by neoliberals that collective action might be possible through 
institutions- albeit qLialiFied - helps explain why the EU and US would undergo a 
'' 'Complex interdependence' is defined by Keohane and Nye (1989: 249) as 'a situation among a 
number of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies (that is, states do not 
monopolize these contacts): there is no hierarchy of issuesý and military force is not used by 
uovernments towards one another. ' 
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process of institution building (through the TAD, the NTA and the TEP) and 
institution enlargement (of NATO and the WTO). Even during the Cold War, the 
development and survival of post war institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, 
the WTO, NATO and the EU validated institutionalism (Keohane 1993: 284). In the 
early post-Cold War years Keohane (19931: 285) predicted that international 
institutions would increase in number, scope and regulatory reach. NATO has not 
only remained involved in Europe but has undergone a process of enlargement and 
reinvigoration. The WTO broadened and deepened the economic principles upheld by 
the GATT. 12 The Treaty of Maastricht increased the scope and depth of European 
institutions, and made way for the institutional i sati on of the transatlantic relationship 
through the TAD, the NTA and the TER EU and US leaders have created institutions 
to try and diffuse conflict and much of the transatlantic dialogue is conducted through 
institutionalised networks. 
Institutionalism is a more logical analytical framework- than neorealism- for a 
thesis that seeks to explain why the EU and US would choose a strategy of 
institutionalisation. Institutionalism accepts that states have an interest in building 
'institutions' and that states choose to build institutional ties- such as networks- in 
order to foster co-operation. Institutionalism is more limited, however, in addressing 
the second question, which is how states interact within those institutions. By 
downplaying the impact that domestic actors' have on international politics, it fails to 
recognise the range of actors and multiple levels of networks which are involved in the 
process. 
For example. the WTO membership broadened in 2001 to 141 countries and opened up negotiations 
with China. The WTO also introduced dispute settlement mechanisms to the multilateral trading, system. 
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The New Debate: The Rationalist-Constructivist Divide 
A number of approaches to international relations emerged in the late 1990s that 
questioned the shared neorealist and neoliberal assumptions about the primacy of 
international decision making and of the unitary action of states. Milner (1997), Risse 
(1995a) and Putnam (1993; 1998) stressed the importance of multiple actors and 
multiple levels in international negotiations. The idea that domestic and international 
politics were not separable, and that domestic agents- be they political institutions, 
domestic groups, state or non-state actors- influenced international negotiations, united 
a number of emerging IR theories. Co-operation in general and the importance of 
international institutions specifically ceased to establish a clear distinction between 
paradigms. A new debate emerged in the late 1990s centring . around actors' 
motivations for pursuing institutional arrangements. Two factors contributed to 
rationalist-constructivist debate. On the one hand Legro, and Moravscik (1999) argued 
that the divide between realist and liberal camps became less structured as realist, 
institutionalist and liberal studies 'rallied' around the idea that states are rational actors 
motivated by self-interest.. It was argued, 'The category of 'realist' theory has been 
broadened to the point that it signifies little more than a generic commitment to 
rational state behaviour in anarchy- that is "minimal realism"' (Moravscik and Legro, 
2000: 184). 
On the other hand the rise of rationalism was countered by a resurgence of 
constructivist approaches to international relations. Pollack (2001) argues that 
contructivist theories. typically criticised by rationalists for failing to produce 
rigorous, 'oood social science" because they do not focus on empirical work or testable Zý -- 
hypotheses. had by the end of the 1990s significantly matured through "Torks such as 
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Hooghe (1999a, 1999b) and Checkel (1998; 1999). 13 Checkel (1998) noted that 
constructivists had demonstrated that social construction matters- if not when, how 
and why it occurs. Ontological, methodological and epistemological differences 
remained intact, if not overstated. But constructivists managed, at least, to broaden the 
theoretical debate about the role of culture, ideas and norms in international relations 
(Risse 2000). 
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The rationalist- contructivist divide is summarised by the distinction between 
the logic of consequentialism - associated with rationalists- and the logic of 
appropriateness - used by constructivists (who themselves have 'borrowed' the 
concept from institutionalism: see March and Olsen 1999; Peters 1999; Boekle et al 
2000). The two logics, explained below, offer competing explanations for why the EU 
and the US chose to establish new transatlantic institutions, and why under those 
institutions dialogue has been encouraged between policy makers as a means of 
attaining interest convergence or norm compliance in a number of policy sectors. Both 
constructivists and rationalists concede that institutions and communication 'matter' 
between agents but they offer different explanations as to why (Checkel 1998,1999). 
The 'logic of consequentialism' 
The logic of consequentialism is based on realist assumptions that ultimately the goal 
of actors is to maximise their material gains. Rationalist theories- which can 
incorporate both neorealist and neoliberal approaches to international relations- are 
united by claims that actors are motivated by self interest. They seek to realise 
Ile aroues that scholars like Checkel and Hoo-he have sou-1u. to understand conditions under which 
norms constitute actors and sutýject their hypotheses to falsification. 
14 Generally. rationalists ar-ue that there are ontological, methodological and epistemological n 
differences bemeen rationalism and constructivism. Constructivists are criticised for failing to maintain 
falisfiable h,, potheses or employ causal explanations. Onotoloaical and methodological differences stem 
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preferences and use strategic action to attain utility maximisation. Game theorists 
have attempted to bridge the gap between domestic and international politics to 
explain the outcome of interstate bargaining. Moravcsik (1998) argues in the context 
of the EU that preferences are formed prior to interstate bargaining between chiefs of 
government. Putnam (1993: 70-7 1) describes diplomacy as a 'two level' game where 
leaders simultaneously try to rationally calculate strategies that successfully appease 
both levels. Putnam's dual game theory envisions America's position during 
international negotiations as a. product of international and national interest and the 
E-ropean Union's as a reconciliation of the global, the Community and the national Ew 
levels (Putnam 19931: 80). The underlying thesis of the logic of consequentialism is 
that the EU and the US choose to co-operate only where it is in their best interest to do. 
so. The decisions to pursue the Transatlantic Declaration, the New Transatlantic 
Agenda and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership can be characterised as interstate 
bargains that represent both EU and US attempts to secure gains- be they security 
assurances or economic welfare. 
The 'logic of appropriateness' 
Constructivists argue that the logic of consequentialism oversimplifies the decision 
making process. While rationalists tend to focus on the behaviour and. policy 
outcomes, social constructivists tend to concentrate on the larger process characterised 
by communicative action and discourse between actors (Risse 1995b: 6-7). 
Constructivists argue that self-interest is not the sole instigator of international politics, 
rather they emphasise common values. norms and institutionalised decision- making 
procedures that determine the way democracies interact in the international system 
frorn constructivists' focus oil individuals rattler than state behaviour. Risse (2000) and Checkel (1998) 
araue however that the , ap between rationalist and constructivist methodologies is shrinking. 
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(Lumsdaine 1998: 6). 15 The logic of appropriateness suggests that actors are guided 
not by material gain but by a desire to adhere to 'rule-based' systems. The rules that 
actors follow are directly tied to their identities which are determined by shared ideas 
and norms. Like institutionalists, constructivists argue that norms and shared 
information can foster co-operation. Norms are not a product of actors' interests but 
rather precede them, and states' interests are defined through social communication 
(see also Boekle etal 1999; Ruggie 1998). Under the logic of constructivism, policy 
transfers - through the exchange of expertise and ideas - are part of a process of policy 
learning where agents' beliefs may be altered through the dialogue process (Stone 
2000). 16 
Constructivists emphasise the importance of communication and Risse (2000) 
argues that 'communicative action' extends beyond the logic of appropriateness to 
encompass a 'logic of truth seeking or arguing. ' He argues that, 'international 
institutions create a normative framework structuring interaction in a given issue area. 
They often serve as arenas in which international policy deliberation can take place' 
(Risse 2000: 15). The transatlantic community is viewed as sharing a collective. 
identity, as well as values and norms which arguably constitute the 'common life 
world' discussed by Risse. Transatlantic institutions, such as the NTA, which act as 
policy forums, make up the structured 'normative" framework *and the 'new 
transatlantic dialogue' fulfils a number of conditions which precede 'truth seeking' 
behaviour. One is the institutionalisation of issue areas; a conscious effort by actors to 
construct a 'common lifeworld' through the build up of dialogues. These dialogues 
seek to compensate for the uncertanity of interests or a lack of knowledge between 
1ý Norms are defined bN Peterson a rid Bom ber- (1999: 53) as 'principles of 'right action' saving to 
pide, control or regulate proper and acceptable behaviour in a group. 
Policy transfer refers to a process NNhereby actors learn frorn one another about 'best practices. ' 
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actors in certain policy sectors and the build up of non-hierarchical relations within 
dense, informal, network-like settings (Risse 2000: 19). 
Multi-level Communication, Multiple Motives? 
Both rationalist and constructivist approaches to international relations shed light on 
the transatlantic decisions under scrutiny, particularly those which established 
transatlantic institutions in the 1990s and sought policy convergence in areas of shared 
interest. Checkel (1999) argues that both rationalists and constructivists capture and. 
explain important elements of the norm compliance process-, and that the two 
paradigms are not mutually exclusive. Could it be that different levels of interstate 
interaction are driven by different rationales? 
Rationalist explanations for co-operation are more convincing than 
constructivist explanations at high political levels where, for example, institution 
building and overarching agreements arc clearly the results of interest driven 
cost/benefit calculations. It is argued in this thesis that these agreements are a way to 
maintain the alliance between Europe and America, which both sides had an interest in 
protecting. Transatlantic leaders worked under the knowledge that common values 
were not enough to keep the alliance together. Under a rationalist institutionalist 
approach to IR, it can be argued that transatlantic institutions were created as a wav of 
fostering shared interest in co-operation and establishing norms. The TAD, the NTA, 
and the TEP were stressed as ways to facilitate goals such as liberalising the 
transatlantic marketplace, burden sharing in Eastern Europe and combating 
transnational challenges. Chapter 33 discusses in more detail the establishment of these Z7 
institutions and the interests that drove them. 
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On the second point of interest- the conduct of dialogue and production of 
policies under transatlantic institutions- constructivist arguments are harder to dismiss. 
The NTA specifically outlines a number of policy sectors where the EU and US have a 
broad interest in co-operating. It can be argued, however, that this agreement forms the 
boundaries or establishes the rules, for actor compliance 17 on a number of shared 
norms. At the level of daily interaction between actors through transatlantic dialogue, 
the emphasis is on communication and information sharing. An important test for 
constructivism comes from examining the level of importance of the transatlantic 
dialogue. The distinction between rationalist and constructivist explanations for 
communication between actors is summarised by Checkel's (1999: 10) statement, 
Using different language to make the same point many rational choice scholars 
emphasise so-called simple learning, where agents acquire new information as 
a result of interaction. At a later point (that is, after the interaction), this 
information may be used to alter strategies,, but not preferences, which are 
given. Not surprisingly, all this rationalist theorizing reduces communication 2-1 
and language, which are central to any process of social learning, to the 'cheap 
talk' of agents with fixed identities and interests. The result is to bracket the 
interaction context through which agents interests and identities may change. 
One the other hand, 
Specifically, the contructivist value added should be to explore complex social 
learning, which involves a process whereby agent interests and identities are 
shaped through and during interaction. So defined, social learning involves a 
break with strict forms of methodological individualism. 
From a theoretical perspective this thesis seeks to test whether the construction of the 
NTA has resulted in a process xvIiere communication between transatlantic actors is 
, cheap talk" xNhich may be used to foster a general sense of co-operation but not to 
Compliance is defined by Checkel ( 1999: 3) as the extent to which agents act in accordance with and 
fulfilment of the prescriptions contained in international rules and norms- and not socialisation. 
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change preferences (as rationalists explain) or if, as constructivists contend, we find a 
complex social learning process whereby agents' interests and identities are shaped 
through and during interaction (distinction made by Checkel 1999: 10). The real 
question is whether actors have 'fixed' preferences in negotiating agreement under the 
NTA or whether the output of policy agreements under the NTA is actually shaped 
through transatlantic dialogue? 
To summarise, (see table 2.1) it is argued here that the decision to build a 
framework for co-operation is., as explained by rationalists, interest driven. However, 
the NTA common norms 2nd constnicted a rule based svstem within which 
the actors have communicated on specific issue areas. It is then possible that 
transatlantic policy decisions are the result of communicative action and fulfil norm 
compliance within a rules based system. In short, the argument is that the decision to 
establish a rules based system is rational (as discussed in chapter 3) but the jury is out 
on how actors operate within that system. The goal of this thesis is to determine 
whether the communication between transatlantic actors leads to a convergence of 
preferences or is simply a means of fostering co-operation through understanding. 
Table 2.1 Transatlantic Decisions in Theory 
Decision to Co-operate -NTA Agreement 00 Policy Making Decisions 
(Interest Driven) (Established Norms) (Goal: Norm Compliance) 
(Process of communicative action) 
2) The Governance Literature: Responses to Globalisation 
In both the comparative politics and European studies literatures, interstate co- 
operatiori is viewed not only as the product of political and economic shifts in the 
Compliance research locuses on centrally on short term processes coercion, sanctions etc. 
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international system, but also as a policy response to a structural shift in power from 
goverm-nents to markets. Increased transnational movement of goods, services, money, 
people, technology and ideas have made it increasing difficult to govern as individual 
states. Globalisation presents a number of economic and political challenges to the 
way that states govern as the movement of production and capital blurs the lines of 
control between the state and the market. It is not just the relative power of other states 
that matter, but the impact of market forces and transnational actors, such as 
multinational corporations and transnational terrorists. The literature on global or 
tr, qnsn. qtinn, 9l go-vernance questions how states balance the goals of economic 
liberalisation, through the deregulation of markets, without undermining the capacity 
of the state to deliver public goods such as social welfare and law enforcement. Global 
governance approaches to international politics shed light on why the EU and US have 
chosen to emphasise the importance of policy co-ordination in individual policy 
sectors, particularly dealing with economic liberalisation and 'global challenges', 
under the NTA. 
The new challenges that arise from globalisation have led some to argue that 
state is 'shrinking", (Sbragia 2000) or being hollowed out (Strange 1996). The reality is 
that individual states are becoming increasingly unable to govern alone in a world 
characterised by rising transnational challenges and increasing economic 
interdependence. Political integration is one way to secure collective action, however, 
state reluctance to give up sovereignty means formal integration arrangements- except 
and even in the case of the EU- are limited. Attempts to integrate the transatlantic 
marketplace cconornicalk, through various agreements have been r jected by states, Z- el 
mainly France. given the underlying fear of lost sovereignty (see chapter 3)). Looser 
Forms of 'governance" at ari international. regional or plurilateral level are a way of 
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coping with external challenges that the state cannot manage alone (Rosenau 
1992: 19). 18 International governance denotes a shift in authority from the state to the 
international level, but where is authority transferred to and what decision-making 
forums serve as means of governing? How do different institutional arrangements 
allow actors to perform the functions of governance at a global or transnational level? 
It is argued that global or transnational governance is conducted on three main levels, 
first through formal international institutions, second through government-to- 
government networks and finally through private and public policy networks. 
Governance without Government: State Extension, not Extinction 
Traditionally global governance was seen to emanate from international institutions. In 
the early post Cold War years, the concept of a 'New World Order' was promoted by 
President George Bush (Senior) who argued that a new form of collective governance 
would emerge in the 1990s based on co-operation within international organisations. 
International institutions were championed as a way to deregulate barriers to trade 
while regulating global markets in labour, money, goods, and ideas. Murphy 
(2000: 794) notes, however, that rising globalisation and integration did not coincide 
with a clear cut growth in the autonomy of international organisations. The putative 
ideological foundations of the New World Order -- democracy and economic 
liberalism -- were not enough to intluence states to give up sovereignty. Instead of 
shifting up to a supranational system of government, 'governing' functions were 
shifted down to public networks at both an intergovernmental and tra risgovernmental 
level (see section 4 below). 
The term plurilateral is used by Pel4,,. amns ( 1998) to describe co-operation between regions, in this 
case between the EIJ, which is a regional form of governance and the US. 
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The question of whether states could govern without a central authority has 
been confronted by scholars preoccupied with the idea of 'governance without 
government'. For example, Rosenau (1992: 51). holds that informal governmental 
mechanisms -- as well as international organisations -- can exercise governance. He 
argues that, 'Governance without government, based on shared norrns, does not 
require the exclusion of national or sub-national governments from the analysis, but it 
does presume the absence of some overarching governmental authority at the 
international level (Rosenau 1992: 7). The functions of governance may be limited 
when compared to goverm-nent's rules because networks lack soverei2n authority and 
are not established by law or. are enforceable through the police. Still, Finkelstein 
(1995: 357) agrees that global governance can encompass many of the functions that 
governments perform at home. 19 Furthermore, governance above the state can be 
conducted not only through formal rules and regulations (see Cable 1999) but through 
shared norms, values and ideas (see Haas 1992) even in the absence of formal 
international organisations. 
Given the lack of centralisation of authority at an international level, many 
scholars began to recognise that broader forms of institutionalised networks perform 
the functions of governance (see Ruggie 1998: 88). The emergence of public Z, 
networks- made up of state actors- reinforced the idea that the state was not, as the 
New World Order suggested, due to disappear but rather as Slaughter (1997) argued 
likely to disaggregate (see also section 4). That the NTA is an attempt to impose 
governance through national bureaucrats supports the argument made by NicolaYdis 
"' The list Of Such functions is quite a long one. It includes information creation and exchange-, 
forinUlation and promulgation of' principles and promotion of consensual knowledge affecting the 
,, eneral international order, re-ional orders, particular issues on the international agenda, and efforts to 
influence the domestic rules and behaviour of statesý good offices, conciliation, mediation and 
conipulsor\ resolution ot'disputes: regirne formulation, tending and execution: adoption of rules, codes, 
38 
and Howse (200 1: 1) that 'In the long term, the nation-state may prove to be more 
resilient than many argue, but -only if it is able to adapt, evolving or accepting modes 
of governance that permit both legitimate and effective accommodations with the 
many entities, both above and below the state which increasingly shape the public 
world in our centuryý. 
Delivering Public Goods via Private Actors 
One way states have adapted to the growing need for transnational governance is 
+1, --U- 
Lmo gh t1ne employment of private, or non-state, as well as public institutions. Modes 
of governance include decision-making forums such as policy networks which bring 
together state and non-state actors, particularly in regulating economic activity which 
is increasingly borderless. Murphy (2000: 795) highlights the role of private 
authorities in regulating transnational economic and social life through, for example, 
private bond rating agencies, global oligopolies, global and regional industry cartels, 
international mafias. He adds that 
much of the impetus for contemporary public international regulation comes from 
transnational interest groups, including associations of progressive firms 
attempting to impose the same costs for environmental and social standards on 
their competitors, and or course, traditional consumer groups, labour groups, 
environmentalists, and so forth. 
This thesis examines how these types of interest groups have played a role in 
regulating the transatlantic marketplace and influencing transnational governance . It 
should be noted that niany political as , vell as economic services are provided by non- 
state actors. For example NGOs run refugee camps, provide disaster relief and carry 
and reoulationsý allocation of material and programme resources, provision of technical assistance and 
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out development projects (see Murphy 2000). Ronit and Schneider (1999: 244) agree 
that 'where control by neither market nor state is possible or desirable, mainly because 
these forms of control are less cost effective or less legitimate, global governance 
mechanisms alternatively can be created by private organisations which make efforts 
to influence the policy process'. That concept is explored in chapter 6, where 
ccontracting out' to NGOs is examined in the EU-US anti -trafficking in women policy. 
'Effective' Governance: Private and Public Input in Policy Networks 
In order to 'govern' at a transnational level, actors usually must participate in 
institutional i sed forums. The decentralisation of global governance means that many 
public and private networks of actors perform the functions of governance. The policy 
networks literature tries to come to grips with the shift from a strong executive to a 
more segmented mode of governance characterised by bargaining within and between 
networks (Phodes 1997: 4), at the national and international levels. 
A policy network is a forum where numerous actors, all of whom have the 
ability to affect policy outcomes, exchange resources and information in order to 
facilitate reconciliation, settlement or compromise between different interests 
(Peterson 1995: 77; Rhodes 1997: 11). Policy networks are based on the premise that 
agents, be they regulatory agencies, interest groups, enterprises, think tanks or 
academics, participate in the policy process by working as partners on joint problem 
solving (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler Koch 1995: 9). A variety of specialised 
-communities* of agents may- form alliances and collectively try to control or influence 
decision-inaking xNitlun policy neoxorks. These include epistemic communities which, 
as Haas (1992: 31) explains, are networks 'of professionals with recognised expertise 
development programs: relief, h Liman itarian, energy, disaster activitiesý maintenance of peace and order. 
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and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area'. 
A strong case can be made to suggest that policy networks and epistemic 
communities can effectively become 'institutions', provided they are characterised by 
substantial stability, patterns of expectations between actors (that is, interest groups 
expect to be consulted and governmental actors may even relie on them for 
information and advice in policy making) and a membership that holds common 
values (see Peters 1990: 119). The test for transatlantic networks- at both a 
transgovernmental and a transnational level- is whether they display these properties. 
Another question this thesis asks is: of what significance is the organisation of 
actors in policy networks? The literature on policy networks and epistemic 
communities is consistent with the institutionalist literature insofar as all are 
fundamentally concerned with norms such as shared knowledge, information and 
communication. Institutions. policy networks and epistemic communities are all 
functionally similar in that they are believed to facilitate co-operation by defining 
problems, identifying compromises between different interests and devising 
international solutions for government (Haas 1992: 15; Peterson 1996: 29; Keohane et 
al 1993). Policy networks and epistemic communities are also identified by 
constructivists forums which can, in effect, institutional 1 se ýpolicy learning'. For 
example, Stone (2000: 66) notes that think tanks act as 'policy entrepreneurs' by 
providing some of the conditions for policy transfer: developing knowledge, assessing 
policy options and drawing lessons. In essence they try to promote policy learning by 
teaching' goý'ernrncnts about preferred policy outcomes. Policy networks are visible 
at the domestic level 2 ('ý the EU level2' and the transatlantic leve 122 (see below) as 
20 See Marsh and Rhodes 1992 and Rhodes 1997. 
2' See Peterson 1995, Peterson and Bomberg, 1999. 
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structures of governance (Rhodes 1997: 57). Policy networks are often considered to be 
a more 'effective' mode of governance than, say, formal international institutions, 
because they bypass political problems by concentrating on bureaucratic and 
technocratic policy collaboration. They bring different interest groups into the policy 
making process and provide a forum for many state and non-state -actors, thereby 
trying to compensate for the complexity of multi-level decision making. Peterson and 
O'Toole (2001: 46) note that policy networks are likely to remain and even increase in 
importance in both Europe and America because, 'Policies dealing with ambitious or 
comt)lex issues are likely to require networked structures for execution and complex 
issues will continue to be on the policy agenda. ' A growing interest in resolving 
technical disputes, for example over biotechnology, and in harmonising and mutually 
accepting regulatory standards, means that policy networks are also likely to remain as 
important features in transatlantic governance. 
If policy networks have become an important new mode of transatlantic 
governance, one effect is to raise new questions about the 'legitimacy' of EU-US 
decision-making forums. Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 269) argue that, 'governance 
by policy networks is not very democratic: the same type of 'democratic deficit' which 
plagues the EU is becoming visible in many of the world's most important zn 
international institutions'. Where policy networks are powerful, the policy-making 
process is typically very technocratic and yields debate that is high above the head of 
average citizens. It also shifts problems from the political arena, where they are dealt 
with by elected officials. to the technocratic arena, where bureaucrats have more room 
for rnanocu,, ýre. The technical need to facilitate 'effective' governance has been 
challenged by demands of legitimacy. and broader influence, particularly from private 
See Peterson 1996: 29. 
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interest groups (Peterson and O'Toole 2001: 328). In the case of transatlantic 
governance, the Commission and the US Administration have attempted to make the 
process more open and transparent by allowing a wider range of actors to participate. 
Chapters 4 and 5 show that these attempts are considerably undermined by an 
imbalance of power and resources between business and non-governmental 
organisations and by the limited participation and influence of legislators' networks. 
Nonetheless, as discussed in section 3 below, networks are an important means of 
facilitating co-operation between two polities that lack centralised authority to govern 
at either a domestic or international level. 
3) Transatlantic Governance: Capabilities and Expectations 
Transatlantic policy making is both a product of institutional i sation and a process of 
transnational governance. In order to understand how the EU and the US collectively 
govern at the transatlantic level, however, we turn first to the composition of EU level 
and US domestic decision-making processes in order to determine: who speaks for 
Europe and who speaks for the US in transatlantic negotiations? The nature of 
transatlantic decision making is complex because both powers are characterised by 
multiple layers of actors that impact on the capacity of the EU and the US to act as 
external actors. Two lenses can be used to characterise the complex nature of the EU 
and US systems of governance. 
First, multi-level governance approaches to the EU challenge rationalist, state- 
centric theories such as intergovernmcntalism (see Moravsick 1998) which presume 
that EU decision-making is dominated by Member States. Marks et al (1996: '342) 
argue that. 'An alternative vie,, N- is that European integration is a polity creating 
process xduch authority and policy-niaking influence are shared across multiple levels 
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of government -- subnational, national and supranational'. In this view decisions are 
the result of shared competencies between multiple layers of actors. Recently scholars 
have also begun to apply this approach, which has traditionally been restricted to the 
study of the EU, to the US. Thus, it is argued that it too can be considered a multi- 
level system of governance due to shared competencies between separate national as 
well as state institutions (Smith 1997; Peterson and O'Toole 2001). 
Another way to compare the EU and the US is through the 'federal vision' 
which according to NicolaYdis and Howse (2001) stresses the 'process of governance 
between multi-ole lavers of competency'. 'Cooperative federalism', in which powers 
and competencies are shared and treated as shared between levels, is another way of 
characterising the shared competencies of domestic actors, which the authors argue 
implies shared authority. Peterson and O'Toole (2001: 300) note that, 'federalism 
usually gives rise to less formal intricate structures within which a large number of 
actors, each wielding a small slice of power, interact. ý 
Both approaches stress multiple layers of decision making and the input of 
multiple actors into a process of 'shared' competency and 'shared' governance. The 
EU clearly has become a multi-level polity characterised by an intermeshing of 
European and national institutions and with competencies that are shared by actors at 
different levels (Blank et al 1994: 3-7,39-40). The US foreign policy-making process, 
contrary to state-centric decision-making models, is also characterised by a separation 
of powers between domestic institutions. The input of non-governmental groups is 
substantial and often formally guarenteed. meaning that multiple actors are involved in 17, 
the process of US preference formation. One important effect is to make transatlantic 
decision-making an extremely complicated process. 
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Who Speaksfor Europe? 
A revealing barometer of the extent to which competencies are shared 
between 
European institutions in foreign policy making is the number of articles that 
have the 
basic objective of determining 'who speaks for Europe' ? 
23 In external relations 
competency is shared between the Member States and the Community and 
between 
24 
the Commission and the Council (and to a lesser extent the EP) . In the 
Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Europe lacks a clear spokesperson - despite the 
appointment of a High Representative, Javier Solana -- because pillar two is 
fundamentally intergovernmental (see Allen 1998). From the viewpoint of this thesis, 
which deals primarily with trade or low politics, it is important to note that the 
Commission has more competence in foreign economic policy. On trade policy the 
Commission has exclusive competence to negotiate on behalf of the Community, but 
even then the EU does not speak with one voice when negotiating with US, or with 
any external actor (see table 2.2 and Meunier and NicolaYdis 1999: 482). While the 
Commission acts as trade negotiator, it is subject to the Council's approval of a 
negotiating mandate and then ratification. In areas of mixed competency the 
Commission is subject to more intervention by the Members States, including in a 
number of areas where it has agreed to co-operate with the US for example on services 
and intellectual property. Smith (1998: 79) has argued that shared competencies in the 
external trade policy of the Union result in a 'negotiated order' where responsibility is 
shared and action is the result of a *negotiated process'. 
21 See for example AI len (1998)ý Meunier and NicolaYdis (1999): Meunier (2000). 
2' See for example Piening (1998) Peterson and SJursen (1998). 
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Table 2.2 Competency in EU Decision Making 
Article 133 Authorisation Representation Ratification 
Exclusive Competence 133 Committee, Commission Council (QMV) 
*Most Trade Policy Council (QMV) informal veto 
Mixed Competence 133 Committee Commission Council, - 
*Services and IP Council Parliamentary 
ratification 
Based on Meunier and Nicoloadis 1999: 491 
Rivalry between the Commission and the Council and between EU institutions and 
the Member States compounds claims that the EU is a semi-formed polity because it 
lacks the political authority to conduct a coherent foreign policy (Laffan 1997: 4). 
Multiple layers of decision-making create problems of boundary control and boundary 
definition (Smith and Woolcock 1993: 19). Although the Commission is able to 
exercise strategic authority in some areas of policy making, it is clear that institutional 
deficits and the lack of a single EU negotiating authority adds to the EU's 
'capabilities-expectations gap' (see Hill 1993), 1996). 
Two sets of negotiations in particular highlight the incapacity of the 
Commission to 'deliver* in negotiations with the US in light of Member State 
intervention. For example in 1.992 the French forced a watering down of the original 
Blair House Agreement, on extending international trade rules to agriculture, after US 
officials leaked its content. Commissioner Brittan was reprimanded by the Council and 
reminded by the French Prime Minister of his role as a 'servant of the Council' (see 
also Meunier and Nicola*fdis 1999). Commissioner Brittan again ran into problems 
with the French when negotiating the New Transatlantic Marketplace Agreement of 
1998. After blocking the agreemcnt. the French Prime Minister accused Brittan of 
'runnim, off to negotiate a Free trade agreernent \, vithout a mandate. 
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In particular, the recent growth in the power of the European Parliament - 
including in EU relations with the US -- has made the governance of the transatlantic 
relationship a more ýmulti-level exercise'. A good recent example is European 
legislation, supported strongly in the EP, to regulate airline hush-kits, which prompted 
a bitter EU-US trade dispute (see chapter 4). In short, it can be argued that the EU's 
emergence as a multi-level polity considerably complicates transatlantic governance. 
Who speaksfor America? 
EU negotiators are not the only ones with their 'hands tied' in transatlantic 
negotiations. It can be argued that the US is also a multilevel system of governance 
because power is shared between federal and states levels (see Smith 1997). Power 
shifts take place between the executive and legislature and between state and national 
institutions. Political parties complicate US decision making by exerting power 
through separate institutions, exemplified by the friction between a Republican 
Congress and a Democratic executive during the Clinton era. 25 Many scholars have 
claimed that divided government in the US impedes international co-operation, 
undermines trade agreements and slows economic liberalisation (see also Milner 1997; 
Lohman and O'Halloran 1994). For example Karol (2000: 826) notes that the, varied 
levels of support political parties have for liberalisation affects US decision-making, as 
does Congressional approval of Executive powers, such as Fast Track negotiating 
authority. 
While the Executive has the capacity to make foreign policy, Congress has a 
role in shaping it (Peterson 2001 a). Congress passes the laws that are often at the heart 
of EU-US disputes. For example it introduced US extraterritorial legislation (see 
2ý For discussions on the role of US politics in transatlantic relations see Smith and Woolcock 1993; 
I'leuser 1996: Peterson 1994.19W Smith 1997. 
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chapter 3) and the Carousel Retaliation Act (see chapter 8) which exacerbated the 
Helms-Burton and banana disputes. Congress also has the power to 'make or break' 
projects which require approval of budget lines. Chapter 5 discusses for example how 
the Senate Finance committee undermined the State Department's attempts to fund the 
Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue. Finally, the federal system of government in 
the US means that state legislators also have the capacity to shape foreign policy. 
Again, the MRA negotiations were complicated by state control of the regulation of 
services sectors and by domestic regulatory agencies (see chapter 7). In short it is 
arv-ued here that the US also suffers from the capabilities-expectations gap which is 
usually applied exclusively to the EU, particularly when the administration is unable 
to contain disputes fuelled by Congress or Implement regulatory agreements. 
Overcoming the Capabilities Expectations- Gap? 
A basic argument developed in this thesis is that domestic politics matter in 
transatlantic negotiations. To understand transatlantic governance, the dialogue must 
be understood not only as a diplomatic interaction but as a complex decision making 
process, which takes place at multiple levels and involves multiple actors. Multi-level 
governance approaches are helpful in explaining how domestic actors influence the 
transatlantic process and why negotiations between the Commission and the US 
Administration are often much more complicated than they at first appear. 
Multi-level governance also reinforces the usefulness of policy networks as 
analytical tools. Networks are a way for EU and US negotiators to accommodate the 
interests of nianý domestic actors before final decisions are reached. Peterson and 
O'Toole (2001: 101) note that networks have become -default institutions', because 
both the EU and US are multi-level systerns of governance but also because both sides 
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are decentralised rather than centralised systems of governance, with the EU 
ostensibly governed by the principle of subsidiarity and the US governed by 
federalism. The next section examines in more detail the types of networks that have 
been facilitated by the new transatlantic dialogues and how those networks operate 
within a transatlantic system of governance. 
4) A Transatlantic Decision Making Model 
This thesis is not only interested in the potential for policy co-operation or the capacity 
fior nolitio, 91 ýolidaritv in transatlantic relations, but also with the transatlantic dialogue 
as an evolving process. To understand transatlantic governance it is essential to 
examine not only the big decisions that mould the contours of the process, but also the 
day to day decisions which determine the policy output. This section seeks to build a 
decision making model that can account for different levels of actor interaction and 
different stages of the policy process. The transatlantic decision-making model * 
outlined below seeks to explain not only who governs but also how they govern. 
To distinguish who governs it is useful to draw on and Pollack and Shaffer's 
(2001) model of transatlantic governance, which describes three levels of co-operation 
created by the NTA. At the intergovernmental level the high level contacts between 
chiefs of government (COG) lead to decisions which are constrained by the domestic 
process. The day to day contact between lower-level officials takes place at the 
trans governmental level. Here civil servants work with their counterparts to determine 
ways to co-ordinate and harmonise policies. Finally, the transnational level is occupied 
by the direct people to people links created by the *building bridges' chapter of the 
NTA. This is where private actors work through the civil society process to coordinate 
strategies through net,,,, -orks such as the'YABD. the TACD and the TAED. 
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To understand how these different types of actors participate in the 
transatlantic policy process it is useful to draw on Peterson and Bomberg's decision 
making model which argues that different types of decisions are made at different 
levels by different sets of actors exercising different rationale (see Peterson 1995). 
Peterson and Bomberg (1999: . 
10) explain in the context of the EU that history-making 
decisions transcend the day to day policy process, establish the scope for policy 
making and address questions of change in governance (see table 2.3). Policy setting 
decisions determine which choice of action should be pursued by policy makers. In 
other words policy setting decisions determine which policy option will be pursued. 
Finally, policy shapers determine how to address policy problems. By formulating 
different policy options they address the problem of 'how do we do itT (Peterson 
1995: 73-74; Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 16). The decision making. model outlined 
below argues that these intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational actors 
exercise decision 'making', 'setting' and 'shaping' capabilities through transatlantic 
institutions. 
Table 2.3 A Categorisation of Decision Making 
History- Making 
Decisions 
Policy Setting Decisions Policy Shaping Decisions 
Transcend the day to determine which involves decisions 
day policy process choice of action should about how policy 
Alter legislative be pursued by policy problems can be 
procedures, rebalance makers addressed 
the relative power of deal with specific involves day to day 
institutions details of policy communication 
take place at the are taken at the takes place at the sub- 
highest political level systemic level, deal systemic or meso- level 
and with very specific of policy making and 
are political decisions details of policy and can be shaped by state 
are thus as well as non-state 
are technocratic actors 
decisions 
tiasea on reterson anci tiomt)erg (1999) 
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Intergovernmental Policy Making 
In the context of transatlantic dialogue, intergoverm-nental actors represent the highest 
level of government at EU-US Summits (Pollack and Shaffer 2001). The President of 
the United States, the Commission President and the leader/s of the Council 
Presidency represent the intergovernmental level. It is at this highest level of 
exchange that the most significant transatlantic decisions are made. In the context of 
the transatlantic relationship these actors are policy makers, because they are 
responsible for 'history making decisions'. History making decisions in the 
transatlantic policy process are those which form the pillars of EU-US 
institutional isation. They create transatlantic institutions and establish the scope for 
policy reach by outlining broad intergovernmental commitments to co-operation in 
certain policy sectors. In other words history-making decisions in the context of the 
transatlantic relationship are decisions that conclude, 'we will co-operate. ' The TAD, 
the NTA and the TEP were all products of such decisions, even if these institutions 
now in themselves are largely responsible for determining where the transatlantic 
process will move and at what pace it would do so. 
High level political decisions made at the intergovernmental level are best 
explained in the transatlantic policy process by rationalists. 26 Decisions made at the 
transatlantic level are the product of rational decisions made on behalf of the 
Americans by the US President and of Europeans by the President in office of the 
Council and the President of the Commission. Power relations were obviously at play 
during the proposed New Transatlantic Marketplace agreement, in which a lesser 
agreement (or lowest common denominator bargain) was agreed to at the interest of 
'6 Peterson and Bomberg (1999: 9) identify liberal intergovernmental ism and neo-functionalism as 'best' 
theories for explaining and predicting decision-making at what they call the EU's 'super- system i c' 
level, where history-making decisions are taken. 
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the French. EU support for the TEP was used as a bargaining tool to get the US to 
make concessions on Helms-Burton (see chapter 3). 
Intergovernmental ism sheds light on one part of the transatlantic process, but 
cannot account for the whole of the transatlantic dialogue. While rationalists offer 
suitable explanations for big decisions taken at the highest level, they do not 
necessarily account for interaction between trans governmental or transnational actors. 
More emphasis needs to be placed on how decisions taken at the top are constrained 
by decisions at the bottom. Drawing on Moravcsik's (1993: 25) intergovernmental 
logic, Pollack and Shaffer (2001) note that COGs can restrain domestic actors 
(including Member States) by altering the domestic ratification process, or in the case 
of the NTA and the TEP by avoiding it altogether. They can influence domestic 
groups through side payments (for example making concessions on US sanctions in 
order to get member state support for the TEP) and through manipulating information 
about the agreements. Nonetheless, both sides are constrained by a lack of consensus 
at the top because EU and US negotiators often find their 'hands tied' in transatlantic 
negotiations by trans governmental and transnational actors who exert pressure on 
leaders' decisions and influence the process directly through policy setting and policy 
shaping. Intergovernmental ism is less suited for explaining the day to day process 
which determines policy options and policy details (Peterson 1995-, Peterson and 
Bomberg 1999). 
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Table 2.4 Actors in the New Transatlantic Dialogue 
Intergovernmental Transgovernmental Transnational 
Actors Actors Actors 
President of the US EU Ministers- US Cabinet TABD 
President of the SLG TACD 
Commission 
NTA Task Force TAED 
Council Presidency 





Transgovern mental Decision Setting 
The scope for influencing the transatlantic policy process extends well beyond the 
intergovernmental level because transgovernmental and transnational actors are -able to 
'set' some policies - that is, to make choices between policy altematives - as well as 
to shape policy, or to determine which options are permissiable (or not) and what their 
detailed content will be. The decisions to agree the TAD, NTA and TEP 'made 
history' in that they institutional 1 sed a number of trans governmental and transnational 
networks (see table 2.4-, chapter 4). In trans governmental networks, state actors on 
either side now work directly with their transatlantic counterparts. Slaughter's (1997: 
184) conception of trans governmental ism explains how states have adapted to new 
global challenges NAithout transferrim, authority to non-state actors. She argues that 
states have dissagregated into separate. functionally distinct parts. These parts- courts. 
regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures- are networking with their 
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counterparts abroad, creating a dense web of relations that constitutes a new, 
transgovernmental order. 
Between the EU and the US, these networks are formed by exchanges between 
the EU Foreign Ministers, the EU Commissioners, and the US Cabinet. These 
transgovernmental networks were institutionalised originally in the Transatlantic 
Declaration and have continued to take place on a regular basis. In addition, exchange 
has taken place between the Commission and the USTR, the European Parliament and 
the US Congress, and the FBI and EUROPOL under the NTA framework 
Trans governmental networks are responsible for policy setting and shaping 
decisions. The power to set policy typically rests with state actors such as agencies of 
the state in the US and EU ministries represented in the Council. The US Cabinet, EU 
Council Presidency and EU Commissioners effectively set policy, through for 
example (see also below) the MRA agreement (signed by the USTR and the then DG I 
Commissioner) and the Positive Comity Agreement (signed by the US Attorney 
General, the Federal Trade Commission, the Commissioner for Competition and the 
President-in-Office of the Industry Council). 27 Certain agency directors can also set 
policy in some capacities. For example, the Implementing Arrangement for Co- 
operation in the Fields of Metrology and Measurement Standards was signed by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Director and the EU Commission's 
D irector- General for Research (see chapter 4). 
In other cases the role of agency directors and DGs are confined to shaping 
policy throupli various EU-US dialoaucs. The SLG Steering Group shapes policy by 
settino the agenda for summits. as do the TEP Steering Group and the Troika political 
directors' dialogue. The *expert level' dialooues. (i. e. the transatlantic working groups, LI 
17 The Commission's *settin(,, ' decisions are still subject to ratification by the Council and the European 
Parliament tinder EU decisions makin- rules (see Peterson and Bomber- 1999). 
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the NTA Task Force and the TEP working groups) shape the agenda by identifying 
and working towards specific deliverables and by suggesting possible policy solutions. 
Other 'building bridges' dialogues also serve a shaping function. For example 
exchanges between Europol and the FBI have been launched with the intention of 
finding joint solutions to deal with transnational crime. Networks of aid officials have 
co-ordinated EU and US projects in Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. 







Policy Setting and Policy Shaping 
Policy Shaping 
Transgovernmentalism has been pursued by states because it is a pragmatic approach 
to international governance. It compartmental i ses the state into functional units that 
then serve as effective . problem solving mechanisms 
(Slaughter 1997:. 195). 
Trans governmental networks are effective because they bring relevant parties together, 
and they are more flexible than international institutions. Most importantly, they 
introduce a bias towards compromise in foreign policy making by expanding the reach 
z: 1 _, 
loss of sovereignty to a minimum. The logic behind of replations "Thile keeping 
transoovernmental networks represents a new mode of transnational governance, 
v, hereby networks of' sub-national and supranational counterparts, who performs the 
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functions of a world government, create a genuinely new world order (Slaughter 1997: 
195). 
Whatever the underlying rationale- to be determined later in this thesis- the 
creation of institutions below the intergovernmental level allows states to decentralise 
some parts of the decision making process. The decentralisation of decision making 
aids the process of transatlantic governance, because as Slaughter (1997: 195-196) 
argues the disaggregation of the state 'makes it possible to create networks of 
institutions engaged in a common enterprise even as they represent distinct national 
interests. ' It creates opportunities for domestic institutions to establish common causes 
with their counterparts, sometimes against the will of fellow branches of government. 
Still, these networks often do not reflect the growing scope and depth of the 
transatlantic policy making process. Strictly transgovernmental networks alienate 
important non-state actors from the policy making process, thereby limiting both their 
effectiveness and legitimacy (Slaughter 1997: 197). The fact that most important 
negotiations are now surrounded by a mixture of transnational and transgovernmental 
agents, working together as transatlantic policy networks, illustrates another growing 
trend. 
Transnational Decision Shaping 
Whereas trans governmentalism represents a disaggregation of the state, the rise of 
transnational networks highlights the increased role played by non-state actors. Non- 
(Yovernmental actors influence transatlantic decisions taken at the top by exerting 
pressure through the domestic process and participating in institut, networks. 
Tlic Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD). the Transatlantic Consumer 
Dialooue (TACD). and the Transatlantic Frivironment D'alogue (TAED) are all 
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examples of transnational policy networks. The transatlantic dialogues are 
transnational networks, in that they are composed of non-state actors who have an 
interest or an expertise in the given area. Their role is to advise EU and US state 
actors on problems and to provide expertise in respective policy sectors. These 
dialogues can also be characterised as policy networks because they bring government 
and interest groups to one table. Epistemic communities are also gaining prominence 
in transatlantic governance, due to the very technical nature of policies addressed at 
the transatlantic level, particularly within the regulatory sector. Peterson (1996: 76) 
recognizes as epistemic communities three bilateral working groups formed in . 1994 
on foreign policy co-ordination, Eastern Europe, and international crime and identifies 
joint panels of experts that have been assembled to devise cooperative strategies on 
issues related to trade, science, technology and environmental protection (Peterson 
1994: 418). Expert level meetings and seminars have also been employed to combat 
cyber-crime, the financing of international terrorism, organized crime in Eastern 
Europe and the informational society (SLG 1997). 
Transatlantic policy networks play an important role in 'shaping' transatlantic 
policy. Their influence is typically exerted in early stages of the transatlantic policy 
making process where decisions about the substance of the transatlantic agenda are 
decided. It is at the sub-systemic or meso level (see Peterson 1995) of policy making 
that policy shapers provide the government with specialised knowledge required to 
negotiate PolicY agreements. At the transatlantic level, the TABD, the TACD and the 
TAED each present the EU and US governments with suggested policy routes. The 
goal of these networks is to find areas where they feel the government can co-operate 
and provide tran so ov crn mental actors with 'ready made* policy solutions. 
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Different theoretical explanations explain the role played by transnational 
networks. Schaffer and Pollack concentrate on IR theory and the question of why 
transnational networks emerge. They draw on scholars such as Keohane and Nye 
(1977) and Risse (1995) who seek to explain the role of non-state or society actors 
with liberal international relations theories. Risse argues that domestic structures and 
varying abilities build coalitions between NGOs and international institutions affect 
the capacity for society actors to build transnational networks. Peterson's interest in 
policy-shaping decisions leads him to concentrate not so much on why networks form 
but what function they perform once they do. Peterson and Bomberg (1999) explain 
policy shaping in the context of policy network literature. They argue that this level of 
decision making is technocratic due to the specialised knowledge required to decipher 
policy details and formulate policy solutions (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 21). 
Drawing on both liberal international relations theory and policy network analysis 
helps one understand how transnational actors come together, and what benefits are 
reaped from governance through networks. 
Towards a Synthesis 
Rationalist and constructivist approaches within international relations theory agree 
that institutions matter. but they offer different motivations for why they are pursued 
by states. It has been argued that different types of decisions may be best explained by 
different types of rationale., so rationalists and constructivists' approaches may best 
offer explanations for different actors' decisions. Rationalists offer perspective on high 
level political or history-n-iaking decisions that are interest driven. while 
constructivists may better explain the role of lower level civil servants' 'setting' or 
shaping' decisions. 
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The existence of multiple types of actors and multiple types of decisions points 
to the difficult task faced by transatlantic actors trying to govern in an increasingly 
transnational world. Networks are one way that states seek to co-operate. In the case of 
EU-US relations, networks are formed to accommodate different levels of dornestic 
actors, including state and non-state actors, Multi-level governance in the EU and the 
US highlights the fact that negotiators have to contend not only with their foreign 
counterparts but with domestic rivals. One of the aims of the NTA has been to take 
domestic actors and make them transatlantic. The result, it is argued, is a complex 
structure of dialogues comprised of intergovernmental, transgovernmental and 
transnational actors who 'make, 'set' and 'shape' policies. In order for shaping 
decisions to take place, however, at least some logic of constructivist thinking must be 
present. In order for actors to jointly shape a decision, their dialogue must extend 
beyond the realm of cheap talk. Thus, EU-US relations offer an interesting test case 
for the rational i st-constructivist debate. 
Finally understanding how the EU and US 'govern' means exploring how 
different actors influence policy negotiations. Thus, the remaining chapters of the 
thesis are designed to track the input., and where possible the policy output, of different 
transatlantic actors. Chapter 3) starts by examining the role of intergovernmental 
decision 'makers' through three history making decisions - those that created the 
TAD, the NTA and the TEP -- and thus established the institutional and policy reach 
of the new transatlantic dialogue. Chapter 4 examines in more detail the role that 
transgovernmental networks play in policy negotiations. and chapter 5 discusses the 
participation of formal transnatiotial networks in transatlantic decision shaping. 
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Chapter 3 
Yhe Institutionalisation of EU-US relations in the 1990s 
This chapter traces the institutionalisation of the transatlantic relationship in the 1990s, 
focusing in particular on two factors. It assesses the extent to which policy issues have 
been placed in a bilateral policy forum. The chapter examines the creation of formal 
EU-US dialogue structures to underpin the 'new' transatlantic dialogue. Thus, the 
focus is on bilateral agreements between the US and the EU, which are the result of 
intergovernmental history making ulecisions, and on the bui-Ild up of interstate 
institutions, including formal intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational 
networks .28 Three questions are crucial to understanding the 
institutionalisation of the 
transatlantic relationship. First, how was the relationship institutionalised? Second, 
why was it institutionalised? And finally, what are the repercussions of the EU-US 
institution building strategy? 
We first consider how EU-US relations were institutionallsed. Three 
transatlantic agreements signed in the 1990s form the pillars of EU-US 
institutionalisation: the Transatlantic Declaration (1990), the New Transatlantic 
Agenda (1995), the Transatlantic Economic Partnership and the adjoining 
Transatlantic Partnership on Political Co-operation (1998). These agreements marked 
a shift in the focus of European -American relations. While the Cold War was 
characterised by either multilateral relations within NATO, the UN or the GATT, or 
by bilateral relations bet-ween the ITS and individual Member States, the creation of 
transatlantic IIIStItUtions in the 1990s marked the beginning of a formal bilateral Z:! 
dialogue bct, ýNeen the US and the EU. 
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The second question addressed in this chapter concerns the motivation for 
institutionalisation. Successive agreements expanded the relationship in scope and 
substance, suggesting that the political will and institutional capacity to pursue 
agreements increased over time. In that respect each subsequent agreement can be 
characterised as a step or 'building block' in a long-term process of institutionalisation 
and transatlantic policy integration. 29 Notably, this strategy reflects the nature of 
integration within Europe. As Frost (1997: 71) argues, 'Just as Jean Monnet's vision of 
a united Europe found initial expression in small practical steps, supporters of a 
building-blocks approach argue that more ambitious steps could be undertaken at a 
later date'. 
Finally, this chapter seeks to establish whether and how much transatlantic 
institutions matter. Here, we come to grips with the most basic shortcoming of 
institutionalist theory (see Peters 1999): the inability to gauge precisely how much the 
behaviour of social actors are shaped or altered by institutional structures. We are 
unable to provide a causal analysis of the effect of transatlantic institutions on the 
nature of co-operation between the EU and the US, but rather offer evidence based on 
interviewees' perceptions about the effect that institutionalisation has had on the 
transatlantic process. We rely not only on the capacity of the transatlantic dialogue to 
produce concrete policy output or 'deliverables, but also on the capacity of 
transatlantic institutions to forge the channels of communication which, according to 
institutionalist theory, act to foster co-operation. 
Is , The emphasis is on formal established decision-i-nakin! z networks rather than ad hoc contact between 
actors. 
'9 The term is embedded in jargon taken from a European Commission (1995) 
strategy paper (See also F. Uracorn September 1995. It refers to the transatlantic strategy to secure closer 
relations and increase the scope for co-operation gradually through the incremental removal of specific 
obstacles to economic liberalisation and modest committal to political projects. 
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The chapter is divided into four sections. Section I examines the 'old' 
transatlantic relationship from the post World War 11 period until the end of the Cold 
War. The following sections examine the three agreements that established the 
boundaries of a 'new' transatlantic dialogue. Section 2 examines the launch of the 
TAD, and the creation of the first formal, bilateral, transatlantic institutions. Section 3 
discusses the expansion of institutionalisation to the transgovemmental and 
transnational levels and the establishment of a more comprehensive framework for co- 
operation under the NTA. Section 4 considers the further institutional isation of EU-US 
relations via the blossoming economic dialogue through the TER Each section 
considers why transatlantic leaders chose to further institutionalise the relationship and 
how the agreements were designed to meet their preferences. Each also considers the 
significance of the new transatlantic institutional framework. 
1) European-American Relations through the Cold War 
America and Europe chose to co-operate under the Western Alliance throughout the 
Cold War, yet bilateral initiatives between the US and EU did not materialise despite 
the Community's agreements with numerous external actors (see table 3.1). Two 
attempts were made to forge a more equal 'partnership' first, through Kennedy's 
Grand Design and second, with Nixon's New Atlantic Char-ter, but both initiatives 
failed. 
American Hegemony in the Post War Period 
Europe and America set out in the early post War years to build a transatlantic 
partnership that would forge and subsequently reinforce multilateral institutions 
governed by western ideals and dominated by European and American power. 
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America took a leading role in the 1950s in constructing an international order based 
on democracy and capitalism. The US vision for Europe was one in which American 
ideals could be exported, and Europe became a partner, albeit the weaker or junior 
partner, in building the security, economic and political institutions that anchored the 
western order including the Bretton Woods monetary system (1944) 30 the GATT 
(1947), the UN (1944) 31 and NATO (11947). 
During this period American power superseded that of any other state. The 
dollar dominated the economic system. NATO, although technically an agreement 
between rnoýjor powers (Calvocoressi 1991: 175), was practically controlled by 
American military power. The US's leading role in the Western order led to the 
depiction of the early post-war years as a rising period of American hegemony (see 
Keohane 1984; 1989). The international economic system, according to hegemomc 
stability theory, was able to develop into a liberal order because of the presence of 
American supremacy (Ruggie 1998: 64; Keohane 1989). It was not only US 
leadership that defined the relationship, but also Europe's willingness to co-operate to 
protect its shared interests, as noted by Featherstone and Ginsberg (1996: 6). Thus, in 
the foundational period of the current transatlantic relationship Europe was a 
dependant partner (Smith 1990: 104,1996: 90). 
Diverl4inV, Interests and Kennedy's Grand Desil4n 
Western Europe gradually became a stronger partner within the Europ ean- American 
alliance. as it pursued economic and political integration through the Western 
The Bretton Woods system created in international financial order by establishing a systern of fixed 
exchanoe rates and the principle of currency convertibility. This new type of economic management 
introduced new institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which 
developed ne, ýv codes of conduct for international monetary and financial affairs (Eichengreen 1995: 26, 
James 1987: 95). 
63 
European Union (1948), European Coal and Steel Community (1952), the European 
Economic Community (EEC) (1957) and the atomic energy community (Euratom) 
(1957). The US supported European integration because American policy makers 
considered European unity crucial to strengthening democracies against communism, 
resolving Franco-German differences, reintegrating Germany, salvaging America's 
export markets and reinforcing efforts to build a new multilateral. trading system 
(Hogan 1984: 6). 32 
The US first began to take serious notice of the new EEC during the Dillon Round 
of the GATT when trade negotiators encountered the new Common Agriculture Policy 
(CAP), which imposed variable levies on certain sectors affecting foreign imports, for 
example the poultry trade. The US chose to pursue bilateral retaliation against the EEC 
during the 'chicken war' 33 (see Piening 1997: 106), but despite the ongoing disputes 
over this and other products, US negotiators chose to conclude the Dillon Round 
without securing a suitable compromise over the CAP. At this stage in European- 
American relations US commitment to European unity, the Western Alliance and the 
multilateral trading system took precedence over the domestic interests of American 
chicken farmers (Curtis and Vastine 1971: 23-25). 
The divergence of European economic interests was coupled with growing 
independence on foreign policy issues. The Berlin Crisis (1961) increased tension 
between the US and West Germany. 34 However, the most notable cause for drift in the 
" Despite Russian membership, the UN kvas perceived as a Western dominated society (Vadney 1987: 
41). 
The US promoted European integration through the Marshall Plan, an aid package worth S12.4 
billion. The US supplied financial aid for recovery and redevelopment in Europe on the condition that 
decisions about allocating the funds be rnade jointly by European states (see Calvocressi 1991 ý Duigan 
and Gann 1994: 34-60; Eichengreen 1995ý Frellel 1996: 25-44; Hoffman and Maier 1984ý Hogan 1984 
Curtis and Vastine ( 197 1: 21) note that the system of variable levies- the central idea of which is that 
the price of an import will always be raised to at least an equal level- is a barrier to trade because it 
creates uncertainty for US exporters who can never be sure of their costs of entry into the EEC market. 
ý4 While the latter strongly favOLired German unification. the American position recognised that a 
division between Fast and West Gernianý was crucial to maintaining stability in US-USSR relations. 
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Atlantic Alliance was the anti -Americanism of the French President Charles De 
Gaulle. Kennedy's vision of an outward looking Europe directly contradicted De 
Gaulle's 'protectionism' (Lundestad 1998: 61). De Gaulle's opposition to 'American 
imperialism' directly interfered with the American desire to see Britain become a 
member of the EEC. In 1963, De Gaulle rejected the UK application, questioned 
British motives for joining and described the UK as 'America's Trojan horse' 
(Lundestad 1998: 65-67). The transatlantic security alliance became subject to severe 
transatlantic tensions when De Gaulle withdrew France from NATO's integrated 
military command in 1966. 
Amidst concern about the weakening alliance, President Kennedy announced 
the 'Grand Design' in 1962, a two-part plan designed to foster 'a partnership of 
equals' between Europe and the United States. The first component of Kennedy's plan 
was the Trade Expansion Act (TEA) passed by Congress in 1963. The TEA was 
- 
35 designed to rapidly boost the liberalisation of trade in agriculture and industry . The 
second component of the Grand Design was an envisioned 'declaration of inter- 
dependence' between the United States and a united Europe. Kennedy's Grand Design 
was symbolic in recognising first, the new role of the EEC in the international 
economy and second, the need to re-forge the weakening security alliance. 
The Grand Design had only marginal effects. New trade measures helped make 
the Kennedy Round of the GATT a success. Tariff levels were cut by 36-39 percent 
as a result of the five-year negotiations affecting $40 billion of world trade (Curtis and 
Vastine 1971: 230). However, controversy surrounding EEC agriculture policy 
I lenry Kissinger ( 1994: 577) reports in his mernoirs that encounters with the West German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer, *painfullý served to bring home to me the extent of the distrust which the Berlin 
crisis had cri-endered between heretofore close allies. ' 
The TEA airned to facilitate a more comprehensive agreement on the reduction of tariffbarriers to 
trade. It created the position of Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, a cabinet level position 
desioned to deal with US trade interests and it established the office of the USTR. The position gave I -- 
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remained. A cohesive agriculture policy led to a strong European negotiating position, 
and it became increasingly clear that American and European interests diverged in the 
economic arena. The EEC's single voice in GATT negotiations marked the shift in the 
balance of power. Curtis and Vastine (1971: 23 1) explain that, 
The United States found itself seated across the negotiating table from tough- 
minded representatives of a strong and truly independent new economic unity. 
Perhaps the Kennedy Round was the first major post-war economic negotiation 
in which the United States found itself confronted with a bargaining partner of 
equal strength. 
On the other hand, the lack of overall political unity in Europe contributed to the 
downfall of Kennedy's political declaration (Peterson 1996: 36). While the President 
spoke of 'an alliance among equals', it was widely believed that the US had an 
interest in maintaining its position as world leader by making Western Europe a tightly 
integrated junior partner (see also Carroll and Herring, 1996). De Gaulle rejected the 
notion of an 'equal' partnership. The failure of the US and France to agree on a 
political framework agreement points to differing views of the international order. 
During this early period of fragmentation, Smith (1990: 107; 1996: 90) argues that the 
EU took on the role of a 'putative partner'. The alliance forged in the 1950s remained, 
but the 1960s marked an era of interest diversification and developing tension in the 
transatlantic partnership. 
Political and Economic Friction and the New Atlantic Charter 
European-Arnerican relations in the 1970s and 1980s faced further challenges that 
undermined communication and co-operation in transatlantic relations. Between 
1970-3 Nixon employed new economic policies to compensate for the baldrice of 
payments problem caused by US military spending in Vietnam. A unilateral decision 
US trade neg, otiators standin-g, equal to that of their European equivalent and gave the President new 
66 
to devalue the dollar and end the Bretton Woods system returned international 
currencies to a fluctuating rather than fixed rate system. The 'Nixon shocks' caused a 
rift in European- American relations and provoked a fresh attempt to reinvest in the 
transatlantic relationship. In 1972, the European leaders called for a 'constructive 
dialogue' between the US and the European Community. 36 
Nixon made another attempt to refocus transatlantic relations and put the 
partners back on track by declaring 19731 the 'Year of Europe'. In the spirit of the 
Grand Design he called for a 'structure of peace' and a 'New Atlantic Charter'. The 
+ wass intended too minimise contlict, einlimce securlLy Lies and -increase 
economic co-operation (Landes 1977: 22; Smith 1984: 17). Yet, like the Grand 
Design, the Year of Europe failed under the pressure of diverging economic and 
political interests (especially in the Middle East) and the breakdown of the 
international monetary system. In 19733 the decision to back different sides in the 
Israeli-Arab war soured US-Eyropean political relations, and the resulting oil crisis 
had adverse affects on economic relations not least because it was followed by deep 
37 global recession (Peterson 1996: 39; Smith 1984: 17; Tsoukalis 1986: 14). 
Trade relations were also bedevilled by large fluctuations in the value of the 
dollar. Europe faced high stagfiation 38 and grew short-tempered with the US policy of 
'benign neglect'. 39 Europe employed emergency protectionist measures to protect its 
industries, and trade wars broke out over cheese and textiles (Smith 19.84: 17; Wallace 
and Young 1996: 13 1). Meanwhile, the EC made attempts to consolidate its voice and 
tariff cutting powers which Kennedy hoped to use in the GATT Round (Curtis and Vastine 1971: 9-14). 6 In 1966 the EEC si, _, ned a treat% mer-in- the executives of the European communities. The result bein- one Commission and one Council but different rules (, overnin,, both. The narne of the EEC also 
changed to the European Community (FC). 
The US supported the Israeli g , overnment in the Israeli-Arab war, while European states chose not to follow suit in order to protect econornic interests in the Middle East. 
Sta-flation is used to describe a combination of hi-h inflation and high unemployment in an economy. 
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strengthen its foreign policy position in the early 1970s through the creation of the 
European Political Community (EPQ and the European Monetary System (EMS)40 
After the failure of the Atlantic Charter, EC-US relations in the 1970s 
resembled a 'partnership of rivals' (Mally 1974: xv) or, at best, an 'uneasy 
partnership' (Dahrendorf 1974: 67). The relationship became more competitive as 
American hegemony started to decline (Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996)4 1 and the 
roles of Europe and the US in the transatlantic relations shifted again. Smith and 
Woolock (1993: 5) argue that the US attitude towards the international system turned 
from one of guardianship to one of ambivalence. 
Discord in the 1980s 
Perhaps the most critical period in European-American relations came during 
Reagan's presidency (1980-88), a period that accelerated the shift away from the early 
post-war co-operation to a relationship polluted with more hostility, uneasiness and 
confrontation. Supply-side economics, the US budget deficit, high interest rates and 
the over-valued dollar met with opposition on Continental Europe (Smith 1984: 219; 
Tsoukalis 1986: 7-12). 42 Industrial and agricultural trade disputes over steel, Airbus, 
oilseeds, feed grain, pasta, citrus fruit and beef caused 'dangerous' levels of trade 
friction (Touskalis 1986: 2). The Uruguay Round got off to a shaky start in 1986 and 
fear of potential European protectionism heightened with agreement on the Single 
19 Tsoukalis ( 1986: 9) describes 'benign neglect' as the American failure to entertain European calls for 
international economic co-operation in light of the adverse reaction of European economies to US 
unilateral policies. 
4( ' The EMS was a systern of linked currencies often referred to as the 'snake'. This was an attempt to 
combat the disorder in European currencies brought on by the end of the fixed exchange rate system. 
11 As discussed in chapter two, the concept of US he-emonic decline is controversial. Some observers 
downplay the fall of American power. In response to claims of America's declining hegemony Susan 
Strange 1982: 119) argued that, 'The US authorities make decisions that rock the markets and dislodge 
foreign governments, but none of these can deflect the dollar from its course. ' 
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European Act in 1987 (Smith 1984: 219). The single market initiative was commonly 
suspected to be a device to create a 'Fortress Europe', which restricted market access 
for US imports. 
Furthermore, foreign policy differences arose over Afghanistan, the Middle 
East and martial law in Poland. The latter triggered a dispute over the use of 
extraterritorial legislation when the US, in an attempt to punish Soviet behaviour, 
contemplated extraterritorial sanctions against European companies involved in 
building the Siberian Pipeline. The EC protested over the American ban on trade with 
the Soviet Union, and as a result the embargo was lifted after a Jew months (see 
Demaret 1986: 133- 134-, Touskalis 1986: 12-14). 
Some argue that the 1980s were the 'coolest' period ever in EC-US relations 
(Lundestad 1998: 111). While the overarching security interests prevented a complete 
disintegration of the transatlantic partnership, the relationship in the 1980s bore little 
resemblance to that started in the 1950s. Thus, the end of the Cold War found the 
partners growing further apart rather than closer together. 
The Cold War 
To summarise, European-American relations underwent clear shifts throughout the 
Cold War. What started as -a solid foundation based on European dependency, 
developed into a more balanced partnership as the EC grew in size and strength. As 
the balance of power shifted, conflicts over trade disputes and foreign policy 
increased. These problems were exacerbated by the fact that little communication took 
place betAxcen European and American policy inakers. The need for dialogue was 
recognised through the creation of ad hoc structures in conjunction with European 
II Some monetarý co-operation did occur through the Plaza Agreement of 1985, whereby the G-5 
agreed to devalue the dollar, and the Louvre Accord of 1987, when the G7 which attempted to stabilise 
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Political Co-operation in 1974 (Frellesen 2001: 4). Dialogue was conducted through 
other fora such as NATO, the GATT or on the margins of the UN General Assembly 
(Gardner 1997: 9). However, both Kennedy's declaration of interdependence and 
Nixon's New Atlantic charter failed, leaving the transatlantic allies without fonnal 
bilateral channels of communication until the 1990s. 
Poor communication meant that tension in European-American relations went 
unmanaged; often policy disputes escalated because there were no mechanisms for 
containing them. Featherstone and Ginsberg (1996: 28) argue that, 'American policy 
flip-flopped between ign ring or discount ting Europeans and overpowering them with 
calls for co-operation. The EC for its part cried out for recognition of its interest but 
failed to develop a coherent policy towards the US'. 
Nonetheless. the partnership was held together by a common interest in 
protecting democracy and economic liberallsation. Multilateral institutions served as 
anchors for the western alliance and the international political and economic orders. 
An equally important source of cohesion was the common security threat and the 
military alliance built to safeguard western values. Common values and common 
threats formed the 'glue' that kept the partnership intact. 
2) Breaking Ground - The Transatlantic Declaration 
The remainder of this chapter focuses on the creation of new transatlantic institutions 
after 1990. What influenced the decision to build specific bilateral institutions? How 
did the Transatlantic Declaration, unlike the Grand Design or the Year of Europe, 
facilitate further steps to fortify the relationship throughout the I 990s? 
exchange rates (Sm ith 1984: 2 19). 
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The context of European-American relations changed in the late 1980s in 
direct response to radical transformations in the international political system. As 
noted in chapter I the geopolitical shifts resulting from the end of the Cold War (1989) 
and the international i sation of the economic system altered the playing field of EC-US 
relations. The withdrawal of Soviet power from Eastern Europe raised questions 
generally about the future of the transatlantic alliance and specifically about the role of 
NATO. Increased capital flows, global investment and foreign trade sparked greater 
interdependence. The single market programme enhanced the EC's effectiveness in 
international trade negotiations thus making, it a more competLILIVe partner for the US. C, 
These changes created uncertainties and transposed perceptions about how the 
transatlantic relationship should be defined. 
Towards Institution alisation 
Common ideas, values, culture and multilateral institutions were the foundation of the 
transatlantic relationship throughout the Cold War. When the Cold War -ended, 
however, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic recognised that 'nostalgia' could not be 
the only binding force. 43 The withdrawal of a common security threat widened the gap 
between the EU and the US. 
On the EU side fears arose over the possibility of an American return to 
isolationism. Isolationist tendencies in the US political arena represented by vocal 
minorities, particularly in the US Congress, were mostly exaggerated. Although 
President Bush was perceived as more Europe friendly than Reagan, the Deputy 
Secretary of State. LaNNrence Eagleburger dismissed the prospects for equal C, 
partnership: 
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Regardless of how big the EC gets, or what issues European governments 
devolve to common decision-making, the need for a strong American voice in 
Western affairs will not be diminished.... While we expect Europe to shoulder 
more of the burden for the West's defence... the (US) President will remain 
the pre-eminent spokesman for the free world in the decade ahead (quoted in 
Devuyst 1990: 13). 
Although education about the single market diminished American perceptions of 
Fortress Europe, there was recognition that the 1992 programme made the EC a more 
competitive political force in the international system. In contrast to the Cold War 
period, American politicians found it increasingly difficult to justify economic trade 
losses with Western Europe to the domestic population. The dissipated security threat 
of the Cold War meant that the US now held less bargaining power over its allies, but 
was also less willing to compromise its economic interests for the sake of the political 
alliance (Devuyst 1995: 15). 
While transatlantic leaders realised that common ideas by themselves could not 
be the basis of a transatlantic partnership, they identified mutual interests in promoting 
democratic transitions in CEE and the NIS and in protecting the multilateral 
institutions established to maintain the international political and economic order. In 
particular it was clear that EU and US co-operation clearly was needed to complete the 
Uruguay Round of trade talks, 'and both sides had incentives to encourage Japan and 
other Asian economies to liberalise and open their markets (Peterson 1996: 122). 
The TAD was not the first attempt to build a transatlantic partnership. but the 
first to emerge with the EU able to act as an actor in its own right (Frellesen 2001). By 
this time, the Eli had also extensively engaged in dialogue through bilateral co- 
operation. commercial and/ or frce trade relations with a number of third countries (see 
4', One of the most widely quoted persons on this point is the former US Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich. fie claimed in 1995 that, -we will drift apart unless we have projects large enough to hold us 
together... We're not (loina to stav together out of nostalgia... ' (quoted in Gardner 1997: 62). 
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table 3.1). Perhaps above all, the re-unification of Germany was a clear signal to the 
US that the EU could stand as a 'pole of attraction' for Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEECs), thereby promoting democracy and economic liberalisation in the region 
(TPN 1995: 4). The US welcomed the prospects of burden sharing due to constraints 
on its foreign affairs budget, which increasingly made it a ýsuperpower on the cheap' 
(Peterson 1996, Heuser 1996). President Bush recognised the important role of the EC 
in Central and Eastern Europe at the G-8 Summit in 1989, prior to the signing of the 
Transatlantic Declaration. He declared: 
We belfievc a sLrong, united Europe means a strong America .... a resurgent Western Europe is an economic magnet, drawing Eastern Europe closer, 
toward the commonwealth of free nations (quoted in Gardner 1997: 6). 
A month after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, Bush's Secretary of State, James 
Baker, made a memorable speech in Berlin outlining plans for a policy of 'New 
Atlanticism' to compliment Bush's 'New World Order' (see table 3.2). 
The concept of closer transatlantic co-operation was clearly supported by the 
President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, who wished to see Europe's 
political links upgraded along with the Commission's status in Washington. 44 The 
Irish Presidency of the EUs Council of Ministers also displayed great interest in 
closer transatlantic ties, with the Irish Prime Minister, Charles Haughey, engaging in 
negotiations with President Bush on a structure for consultation, which was later 
incorporated into the TAD (Deyuyst 1990, Peterson 1996). 
To surnmarise, there was widespread recognition in the early 1990s that better 
mechanisms ývere needed to manage a relationship characterised by complex L- 
interdependence (see Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996). A number of factors helped 
create a favourable atmosphere for the launch of a new phase in transatlantic relations 
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in the 1990s: the political will expressed by European and American leaders; the 
realisation of common interest in securing the multilateral trading system; and the 
need to tackle the security threat posed by Instability in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Table 3.1 
A HISTORY OF EC TRADE AGREEMENTS 
1975-1995 
1975 
The Lom6 Convention (including 65 African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries) Israel, M----,;, -o, Sri Lanalka 
1976 
China, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (the Magherb countries, 
Pakistan, Canada 
1977 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria (the Mashreq countries), Lebdnon 
1980 
ASEAN countries (Agreement of South East Asian Nations), 









Central and Eastern European countries 
1990 
The United States* 
* In contrast to the other agreements pursued by the Commission, 
the TAD was not strictly a trade agreement. 
II In contrast to its predecessors, Bush -granted 
Delors head of state treatment when he visited 
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The Transatlantic Declaration,, and its emphasis on bilateral consultation, marked the 
beginning of the institutional isation of the EU-US relationship. Signed on 23 
November 1990, the TAD is a short document that identifies common goals and 
transnational challenges. The partners recognised common interest in pursuing. 
economic liberalisation, educational, scientific and cultural co-operation and in 
fighting international crime, terrorism and environmental degradation. While it briefly 
identified goals and 'principles' of this partnership, it failed to provide even a 
proposed agenda for meeting those goals. Its significance lies not in its content, which 
has been described as cosmetic, (Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996) superficial, (TPN 
1999) 'minimalist', (Peterson 1996) and lacking in substantive innovations (Devuyst 
1990). Rather, the TAD served two important functions. First, it symbolically restored 
a mutual political commitment to transatlantic partnership. Secondly, it introduced an 
institutional structure to the transatlantic dialogue. 
Table 3.2 - Main Recommendations of James Baker's 'New Atlanticism' Speech 
(1989) 
foster institutional and consultative links that would keep pace. with European 
integration and institutional reform 
create regular and intensive bilateral consultations to contain trade disputes 
initiate consultation between EPC working groups and the US 
conduct more formal consultation on the environment 
secure greater US input on the discussion of common European technical 
standards 
instigate closer bilateral co-operation on the distribution of aid in East European 
economies 
Washington in June 1989 (Gardner 1997: 6). 
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An Infrastructure of Co-operation 
The political commitments outlined by the TAD were not 'new' ones. They had long 
been a part of western diplomatic jargon. The distinguishing factor of the TAD was 
found in the document's 'Institutional Framework for Consultation' where a bilateral 
structure of co-operation for transatlantic relations was outlined. The TAD gave birth 
to a number of transatlantic 'institutions'. First, it formalised three sets of bilateral 
meetings between the Presidents of the United States and the European Council, the 
EC Foreign Ministers and the US Secretary of State and the EC ComMission and the 
111, Cabinet. Second, it included provi-, i--. --- fior infon-nall ad 'hoc consultations beLween 
the Presidency Foreign Minister or the Troika and the US Under-Secretary of State. 
Third, it called for briefings made by the Presidency to US Representatives on 
European Political Co-operation meetings at Ministerial level. Finally it recognised 
the need for dialogue between European and US legislators (see table 3.3 ). 45 
Table 3.3 
The Institutional Framework Created by the Transatlantic Declaration 
Formal structure 
President of the European Council President of the United States 
EC Foreign Ministers US Secretary of State 
EC Commission US Cabinet (later sub-cabinet) 
Ad Hoe Dialogue 
US Under-secretary of State ý--> Presidency Foreign Minister 
(Troika) 
Briefings on European Political Co-operation 
Council Presidencv => US Representatives 
1ý Prior to the I 990s, ad hoc meetings were conducted between Troika political directors and US 
Under-secretaries and annual meetings between Troika political directors and the Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs (Gardner 1997: 9). 
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Although purely consultative in nature, the TAD constructed 'an infrastructure of co- 
operation', which laid the foundation for a stronger EU-US relationship in the 1990s 
(Smith 1997: 20; Smith and Woolcock 1993: 111). The logic behind the TAD 
assumed that the institutional framework for consultation would open lines of 
communication, create networks, result in information sharing and hopefully reduce 
the impact of disputes in transatlantic relations. It was the first step in the creation of a 
political framework specifically geared for EC-US relations, and it symbolised that a 
I new' era tin transatlantic relations had finally begun (see Gardner 1997). 
A Faulty Design? 
While the TAD did get the ball rolling. it shortcomings were clearly visible. In 
addition to lacking substance, the mechanisms introduced by the TAD were 
ineffective. Summits tended to be isolated events that did not build on one another and 
showed no clear line of progre. ss, not least due to the rotating EU Council Presidency 
and the changing priorities of different Member State S. 46 Bilateral cabinet meetings 
were abandoned in 1991, because they were found to be redundant of multilateral 
meetings. Consultations at this level tended to take the form of briefings rather than, 
exchanges of dialogue (Gardner 1997: 11-13). 
The lack of substance and relatively weak mechanisms were the result of 
domestic restrictions on both sides. Underdevelopment of the Community's first pillar 
and Member State sensitivity over national sovereignty undermined the TAD. 
Although the concept of a European 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' had been 
introduced prior to 1990, the mechanisms for CFSP were not negotiated until the 
-41 Gardner ( 1997: 12) notes that although Presidencies such as the Dutch, Luxembourg and Spanish 
ýNere positive for transatlantic relations, but the French delayed or blocked every concrete initiative to 
improve US-EU consultations, 'because of a Gaullist hyper-sensitivity about Washington's droit de 
regarýl over European affairs'. 
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Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1991, and pillar two's intergovernmental structure did 
not produce a unified European voice on foreign policy issues. Member States and the 
European Commission turned their attention towards pillar one issue s, most notably 
the internal negotiations on a draft treaty for EMU and the necessary directives for a 
unified common market (Featherstone and Ginsberg 1996: 32). The decision to sign 
the TAD but not to follow up on its pledges increased US perceptions of the EU's 
ýcapabilities-expectation gap'. 
Some Member States, led by France, showed a blatant lack of interest in a new 
transatlantic C-On"MitInent. Given the EEC's new status as a IlUreign policy actor, there 
was apprehension about being overshadowed by the US (Featherstone and Ginsberg 
1996: 32). A Commission official argued that, '(The EC) wanted to make sure it kept 
its own identity. There was no interest in looking for partners at the political level and 
no interest in what was being done by others' 47 
Despite its shortcomings, the TAD's architects acknowledged its role as a 
starting point. The TAD was created as a 'living document', in other words it 
encouraged the addition of further 'building blocks' to its foundation. 48 By 1994 
49 leaders on both sides were already discussing propositions to build on the TAD . 
Three expert working groups were set up at the Berlin EU-US Summit in July 1994 to 
identify political areas where the EU-US could pursue joint co-operation (see table 
3 3.4). A group on international crime, which was strongly supported by Germany, the 
US, and the European Commission., considered how EU-US co-operation could 
coi-nbat problems of drug traffickiiia. nuclear smuggling and money laundering in light Z_ I 
1ý Interview with Commission official, Brussels, September 1999 (6). 
48 In particular the Declaration states, 'Both sides are resolved to develop and deepen these procedures 
for consultation so as to reflect the evolution of the European Community and its relationship with the 
United States' (TAD 1990). 
41) See statements rnade by Clinton, Santer and Delors, to the EU-US Surnmit (1994). 
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of growing black markets in the former Soviet Union. 50 The CFSP group, pushed by 
the US State Department, sought ways to improve consultation and burden sharing 
with the EU on potential geopolitical hot spots. Finally, the group on Central and 
Eastern Europe assessed the capacity of the EU and the US to work together in 
promoting economic and political reform in CEE (Gardner 1997: 57-58). 
Table 3.4 The Berlin Working Groups 
Working Group Task 
7 
International Study the potential for EU-US co-operation on drug 
Crime trafficking, nuclear smuggling and money laundering 
Common Foreign Detect ways that the EU and the-US could react to the 
and Security outbreak of hostilities and co-ordinate humanitarian 
Policy assistance to troubled areas, particularly in the Third World 
Central and Assess the capacity of the EU and the US to encourage 
Eastern Europe political and economic reform through co-ordinated foreign 
aid and technical assistance 
The results were mostly disappointing. The working group on international crime 
immediately met with suspicion by EU Member States that feared it was an attempt by 
the Commission to exercise control over JHA. 'rhe CFSP working group was unable to 
agree on a inechanism for consultation, thus exposing the weaknesses of the second as 
SO Germaný favoured co-operation on international crime due to its close proximitý, to CEE and the 
Commission saw it as a means of-etting Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy in through the back 
door (Gardner 1997: 56). US State Department and Commission officials argued that the push for JHA 
co-operation came from the US side since its introduction into the EU through Maastricht. Interviews 
with US Embassy Official, Dublin July 1998 (1), the European Commission, Brussels, September 1999 
(6) and the US Mission, Brussels, September 1999 (7). 
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well as the third pillar. The working group on Central and Eastern Europe was able to 
identify areas of potential co-operation but backed down from making substantive 
proposals due mainly to internal EU divisions on the role of the Commission (Gardner 
1997: 57-59). Although the working groups were set up as a temporary mechanism, 
their failure to agree on concrete proposals exposed weaknesses in the dialogue 
structure and helped leaders recognise the need to tie together loose ends (Frellesen 
2001; Gardner 1997: 60). The consensus was that a stronger political commitment to a 
transatlantic partnership was needed. 
3) The NTA- The Cornerston. e of the Transatlantic Foundation 
If the TAD was the groundbreaking move to create a structured dialogue, the New 
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) can be described as the cornerstone of this transatlantic 
architecture. The NTA gave new structure, focus and drive to transatlantic relations. . 
It introduced new mechanisms for monitoring progress and implementing change, and 
produced a dedicated agenda, thereby adding substance to transatlantic relations. 
A Widening Gap 
The NTA arose amidst calls for the further development of transatlantic relations, 
based in part on the realisation that the TAD had failed to revolutionise the 
relationship as well as the emergence of new transatlantic tensions. The widening gap 
between the EU and the US was innamed by the obvious lack of transatlantic unity in 
the Gulf War and Bosma, both of xvIiich resulted in bilateral (involving the US and 
individual EU states) but not transatlantic political and military actions (Peterson 
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1996: 67- 73 ). 51 Old as well as new baggage interfered with attempts to close the 
Uruguay Round. Disputes over agriculture subsidies, beef, bananas, oilseeds, canned 
fruit and Airbus meant that there was much talk in the early 1990's of looming trade 
wars 
52 
The war in Bosnia was particularly damaging for Europe, because the failure to 
come to a common position exposed the weakness of the CFSP. The lack of European 
cohesion also spilled over into monetary and trade policy. The Maastricht Treaty was 
not ratified on the first attempt in Denmark and was controversial in other European 
countries. European monetary co-ordination was stalled by serious recession in 
European economies. As noted in chapter 2, France refused to sign the Blair-House 
agreement after the Commission negotiated a deal on agriculture subsidies with the US 
to facilitate closure of the Uruguay Round. One Commission advisor recalled, 'This 
was not a good time in EU-US relations. [Blair- House] created a very bad 
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atmosphere' . 
The 1992 US Presidential election also exposed a shift in the focus of 
American politics. Clinton' s domestically focused campaign, the lack of European 
experts in the Cabinet and the White House's failure to deal with the Union on an 
equal basis were seen as discouraging signs for EU-US relations. 54 For example, 
when President Delors asked for a meeting with President Clinton to resolve the Blair- 
House dispute he was initially granted only 15 minutes (Smith and Woolcock 1994: 
470). The capacity of the US to act decisively on the international stage was 
diminished further wheri the 1994 US Congressional election returned a Republican 
"I This point is disputed by Piening ( 1997: 45) who claims that Gulf War was a truly international action 
due to the fact that EC backing was an essential precondition for US-led military action. He notes, 
however, that a weak security dimension in European integration meant the EC's contribution was up to 
individual states rather than the Community. 
ý2 Interview, US Embassy London, Januarý 2000 (16). 
ý3 Interview Commission Secretariat, Brussels, September 1999 (16). 
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majority in both Houses of Congress, thus introducing institutional rivalry fuelled by 
party politics into US foreign policy (see also Heuser 1996: 77). Fears-arose in Europe 
once again of a shift to isolationism in US foreign policy (see also Peterson 2001 a). 
The New Transatlantic Agenda 
Domestic opposition on both sides to the idea of a comprehensive political or 
economic agreement discouraged the US Administration and the European 
Commission from pursuing ambitious proposals, including one for a Transatlantic 
Free Trade Area- iTAUTAI, ,z 
55 C": 11 : 
ý-. l,., m 111/11/1-411-5. Sull, irnportant actors on both sides 
acknowledged the need to at least reinvest in a more effective transatlantic 
relationship. They played a key role in the New Transatlantic Agenda negotiations. 
Perhaps surprisingly, given initial doubts about his commitment, Clinton himself 
emerged as an advocate of a transatlantic partnership. He generally engaged with 
European issues and was able to develop a personal rapport with Delors that had not 
existed with Bush (Gardner 1997: 6, Lundestad 1998: 117). Stuart Eizenstat, then 
Ambassador of the US Mission to the EU in Brussels, pushed both sides relentlessly to 
54 Clinton's campaign slo-an, 'It's the economy stupid! ', seemed to emphasise the shift in focus from nn 
foreign policy to trade policy. 
55 Although the TAFTA was the subject of a Commission feasibility study and supported by the US 
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, and Commissioner - 
Brittan it was not pursued because it was feared that TAFTA would not comply with international or 
domestic commitments. It was argued that the TAFTA ran the risk ofalienating Asian economies and 
creating an exclusive 'rich men's club'ý that it would have to have included difficult sectors such as 
agriculture and audiO-ViSLial services in order to comply NN ith GATT rules: and that domestic opposition 
to a comprehensive treaty curbed the debate on the TAFTA. FU Member States, most notably the 
French. feared 'Washington's insinuation into EU policy making' (Gardner 1997: 55), while Congress 
opposed infringements on American sovereignty. Peterson ( 1996: 115) notes that during the Uruguay 
Round, 'Congressional Republicans, led by Senator Dole, voiced alarm about the threat posed to US 
sovereignt) by the WTO, and initiated a debate which in some respects resembled Europe's struggle to 
ratifýN Maastricht'. For more oil TAFTA see Frost 1997ý Gardner 1997i 76-78; Heuser 1996: 82,105- 
107, Flindlev 1999. 
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sign the NTA. On the EU's side, the Spanish Council Presidency of late 1995 injected 
new enthusiasm into the process of negotiating the NTA. 56 
The New Transatlantic Agenda was signed at the EU-US Summit in Madrid in 
December 1995. It was a six- page document that recognised the need to strengthen 
the transatlantic partnership in light of new challenges. As depicted in table 3.5, the 
NTA created four chapters of EU-US co-operation that built on, but did not replace, 
the TAD. 
The NTA outlined a common agenda or framework for co-operation under 
each of the lhea-dings shown in t--kl-- 3.5. The J-.; -t Action Plan (JAIP) 
outlined specific areas where the partners could pursue deeper co-operation and 
identified priorities. The New Transatlantic Agenda had a significant impact on the 
process of transatlantic institutionalisation because it created new scope for policy co- 
ordination and new institutions to administer the policy making process. The 
individual chapters of the NTA established policy sectors and issue areas where the 
EU and US aimed to co-operate and produce 'deliverables', in the form of joint 
agreements, statements and initiatives. 
























S6 , Fhe Spanish are credited \N ith being verý' Supportive of the NTA, in part perhaps because it was seen 
as a -deliverable' and a merit to their Presidency. Interview, Commission official, Brussels, September 
1999(g). 
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The transatlantic partners have had varied success in producing deliverables under the 
NTA. Bilateral co-operation between the EU and the US under the first NTA chapter 
only became possible after the creation of the Community's pillar 2 (CFSP) in 1993, 
thus when the NTA was signed in 1995 the initial scope for joint action was limited. 
Since 1995 the EU and the US have issued a number of joint statements on co- 
operation (see table 3.6). However, the capacity of the EU and US to act on issues has 
been restricted. Phillipart and Winand (2001: 452) argue, for example, that projects in 
Africa were limited to areas of low politics, such as health care and democracy 
building. and that at its core the 'vinhal nartnershiln' k re-nily riqtrifti-ci to European 
regional issues. On the other hand development co-operation and humanitarian 
assistance are cited as two of the most successful policy sectors of the NTA. 
The EU and the US were also been able to pursue a number of low key projects 
under the global challenges chapter of the NTA, which like the first chapter, was pre- 
empted by the Masstricht Treaty and the creation of the EU Justice and Home Affairs 
Pillar. The scope for global challenges co-operation under the NTA is broad if not 
deep. Many initiatives, statements and declarations have arisen out. of the chapter, 
however the concrete rewards of individual projects are often limited (see below). 
Nonetheless, the partners have co-operated in creating the international law 
enforcement centre in Budapest, the Italian Judiciary Training Centre, the anti- 
trafficking in women information campaigns in CEE (see chapter 6) and regional 
environmental and energy projects in Russia, the Ukraine and Modlova. Efforts to 
fight drug trafficking included the Caribbean Drugs Initiative and the Precursor 
Chemicals A,, rcernent. A ina Jor set back. however, was failure to address 
environmental challenges by reaciiing an agreement over the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Table 3.6 Examples of NTA Deliverables 
NTA STATEMENTS, DECLARATIONS, AGREEMENTS 
CHAPTER 
-Joint Statement on South East Europe (2000) 
-Joint Statement on Northern Europe (1999) 
-Joint Statement on Chechnya (1999) 
-Declaration on the Middle East Peace Process (1998) 
-Joint Statement on Co-operation in the Western Balkans (1998) 
-Energy Research Co-operation Agreement (200 1) 
-Statement on Communicable Diseases in Africa (2000) 
-EU-US Biotechnology Consultative Forum (2000) 
-Declaration on the Responsibilities of States or, Transparency Regarding Arms 
Exports (2000) 
-Joint Statement on Common Principles on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(1999). 
-Statement on EU-US Shared Objectives and Close Co-operation on Counter --- 
Terrorism (1998) 
-Declaration on Common Orientation of Non -Proliferation Policy (1998) 
-Statement on Caspian Energy Issues 
-Precursors Chemical Agreement (1997) 
-Joint Initiative on Trafficking in Women (1997) 
-Caribbean Drugs Initiative (1996). 
-Regional Environmental Centers Ukraine, Russia, 
- Safe Harbour Agreement (2000) 
- The Veterinary Equivalency Agreement (1999) 
- The Positive Comity Agreement (1998) 
- Statement on Co-operation in the Global Economy (1998) 
-The Mutual Recognition Agreement (1997) 
-Customs and Co-operation Agreement (1996) 
IV: 
-Statement on Building Consumer Confidence in e-Commerce and the Role of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (2000) 
-Statement on Transparency and the New Transatlantic Agenda Dialogues (1999) 
-Science and Technology Agreement (1998) 
-Higher Education and Training Agreement (1997) 
-TALD (1998), TAED (1998); TACD (1998); TABD (1995) 
The economic chapter of the NTA was arguably the most ambitious and where the 
most concrete results have been produced. Under the NTA the EU and the US signed 
agreements to remove non-tariff barriers to trade in the form of certification and 
testing requirements through the Mutual Recognition Agreements (1998) (see also 
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chapter 7) and the Veterinary Equivalence Agreement (1999), of competition rules 
through the Positive Comity Agreement (1998), of customs requirements in the 
Customs and Co-operation Agreement (1996) and on data protection through the Safe 
Harbour Agreement (2000) . 
57 They made headway at the multilateral level through 
the TRIP agreements and the Information Technology Agreements. Economic co- 
operation was also re-enforced through the Transatlantic Economic Partnership 
(1998). 
Finally, the fourth chapter of the NTA focuses on 'building bridges' across the 
Atlantic -; -- tic ainwd to broaden science and technology co-operation, people to people links 
across the Atlantic, information exchanges and culture and parliamentary links (NTA 
1995; JAP 1995). Under the 'building bridges' chapter the EU and the US have 
fostered co-operation between scientists (through the Science and Technology 
Agreement, 1997)., 58 and educators (through the Higher Education Agreement, 1998). 
The main achievement of the chapter however, has been the creation of interest group 
'dialogues' such as the TACD, TAED and TALD to rival the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue (see chapter 5) and the strengthening of parliamentary ties through the 
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue JLD) (see chapter 4). 
To facilitate policy output under the policy framework for co-operation, the 
NTA also introduced new transgovernmental institutions to manage the new 
57 
a Each of these agreements seek to increase trade through the removal of NTBs to trade. The Customs 
and Co-operation Agreement (see above) simplifies customs procedures making it easier to import and 
export products with the transatlantic marketplace (EU Press Office 1996: 1 ). The bilateral Positive 
Comity Agreement ( 1998) enhanced co-operation between EU and US competition agencies. The 
Veterinary Equivalency Agreement ( 1999) applies the principle of mutual recognition to veterinary 
standards and increases exchan-c between the US Department of Agriculture and the EU Commission 
for Agriculture and Rural Development in order to increase the trade in animals through mutual 
reco-nition ofstandards. I-lie Mutual Recognition agreements seek to eliminate duplicate testing 
standards to -oods and services. 
The Science and Technolo-ý Agreement ( 1997) draws on a number of actors as it seeks a means of 
co-operation (be thatjoint task forces, studies. conferences. training. information exchanges) in a 
number ofareas where scientific standards form barriers to trade. for example in agriculture, fisheries, 
communication, intellectual property, and biotechnology policies. 
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transatlantic dialogue and to seek out deliverables. The NTA added two main 
mechanisms- the Senior Level Group (SLG) and the NTA Task Force- to help drive, 
co-ordinate, organise, monitor and implement the agenda for EU-US Summits (see 
chapter 4). 
The Scope and Depth of the NTA Framework 
The underlying purpose of the NTA is to generally fortify the transatlantic partnership 
and specifically re-enforce commitments to shared interests in promoting economic 
liberalisation, -Increascul 'SOILIC secumity and t-he spr-e-a-d --%. f' Does the NTA .1 
achieve this aim? Three factors serve as indicators of the success of the NTA: the 
proficiency for conflict resolution, the reach of bilateral policy co-ordination and the 
build up of institutions. 
First, the failure of the EU and the US to resolve or 'rnanageý transatlantic 
trade disputes within the NTA framework is widely believed to be a downside of the 
system. The NTA specifically re-emphasises the need to resolve bilateral trade 
disputes and to seek 'amicable and co-operative solutions to our disputes and to the 
smooth functioning of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. ' Despite attempts to 
create an 'early warning system' (see chapter 4) that could effectively curb differences 
before they become disputes, coverage of the EU-US relationship in the 1990s was 
overshadowed by talk of transatlantic trade wars on bananas (chapter 9), beef (see also 
Skogstad forthcoming), GMOs (see Young 2001). Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) Z71 t-- 
(see also Stehmann 2000) and hush kits (see also Peterson 2001 a). The EU and the US 
were accused of failin,, ý to manage potential trade wars and of undermining the C, 
multilateral trading, rules. 
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On the other hand, have trade disputes over bananas and beef, for example, 
threatened to sever ties between the EU and the US? The general consensus among 
interviewees is that while co-operation and conflict in transatlantic relations are 
inseparable, disputes have not undermined the overall effectiveness of the NTA. One 
US official argued that the disputes have had little impact on the NTA. 59 European 
officials have argued the importance of minding the discrepancy between first, the 
scope of disputes vis-d-vis co-operation and second, of media coverage for dispute vis- 
d-vis the NTA agreements. 60 A Commission (2001: 6-7) report states that, 
At most, 1-2% of the trade and investment flow is attected. Such questions, 
however, tend to attract media attention far beyond their economic importance. 
As a result, trade irritants are sometimes blamed for casting a shadow over 
other aspects of the relationship between the European Union and the United 
States. In reality there is little risk of negative spill-over from individual 
disputes into the overall political relationship which is broader and deeper than 
ever before. 
Another US official argued that the NTA has been useful for information exchanges 
on technical disputes, for example through the Biotechnology Consultative Forum. 61 
The NTA process has been less successful in resolving bigger disputes- such as 
bananas and beef-where EU and US domestic interests directly collide. A Council 
Presidency official argued, 'where there are disputes, our hands are usually tied at a 
political level. 62 The key, however, is in the capacity of transatlantic institutions to 
manage disputes in the *amicable' fashion outlined by the NTA. President Prodi 
acknowledged that this was one area where more work was needed when he admitted 
59 InterviexN, USTR, bý telephone. 2001 (58). 
60 Interview, FUrOpCan Commission. DG Trade, Brussels, 1999 (15)ý Council Presidency Official, 
Brussels, 1999 (5), Commission Delegation to the US, Washington 2000 (3 1). 
Interview, US Congress Staff Member, Washington 2000 (39), 
Interview. Finnish Council Presidency, BrLISSelS, 1999 (5). 
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after the June 2000 EU-US Summit that, 'We decided that megaphone diplomacy 
63 
would be replaced by telephone diplomacy' . 
Nonetheless, a positive attribute of the NTA process is that EU-US officials 
continued regular dialogue throughout the trade disputes, and that the NTA process 
continued to churn out 'deliverables. One EU Commission official argued, 'The NTA 
became the new 'glue' in transatlantic relations. ' 64 
The second measurement of the NTA's success centres on the substance of the 
transatlantic dialogue. Philippart and Winand (2001: 50) argue that the NTA creates a 
frqm, -Ixt%ru for -tion -4 wid- the wope of' the relafi -1- I. - "I" I L11 i lkill3illp. 
one of the main purposes . of the NTA is to seek out issue areas where EU-US co- 
operation is feasible, policy output is an important measure of the NTA. The result, as 
noted in table 3.6, is a mixture of joint agreements, statements and declarations. The 
quality of 'deliverables' has however been criticised first, because joint action is 
limited in comparison to joint consultation. 65 Donfried (1996: 8) indicates for example 
that, 'Even some officials have criticised the plan as a glorified laundry list that is long 
on rhetoric and short on substance. The two sides agree on many principles and 
general goals but few specific initiatives are outlined'. Second, an argument can be 
made that the NTA deliverables are fairly insignificant given that many of them were 
already being discussed in other policy-making forums. For example the Positive 
Comity Agreement builds on a previous competition agreement signed in 1991, the 
MR-As were under discussion as early as 1992 and one Council official argued that the 
SLG sin-iply hi lacked the success of individual departments. 66 Pollack and Shaffer 
6 ý" FilhHh'i(II Times (2000) 'NeNý Tact but EU-US Disputes Remain', I June. 
Interview, Commission Official, DG External Relations. Brussels 1999 (6). 
lntervie,, k, Commission Official. DG External Relations, Brussels 1999 (9). 
One Commission official notes in the case of competition policy, that many within the department 
preferred to remain separate from the NTA, fearing its broad agenda would undermine the departments 
specific agenda (2). 
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(2001) describe, 'a repackaging of existing bilateral initiatives. ' Thus, it can be argued 
that the NTA warrants claims that it is both broad and boring. 
The policy output is, on its own, an inadequate measure of the scope of the 
NTA. Officials argue that an over-emphasis is placed on deliverables. Some argue the 
document was specifically designed to be non-controversial in light of domestic 
opposition to a more comprehensive treaty. 67 Peterson (1996: 16) argues that, 'it 
(NTA) reflected a conscious effort by administrations on both sides- -particularly the 
American-to find and exploit as many productive areas of co-operation as possible 
without aMaLLilný--; -widei aLL(: IILI(-)Il I he NTA did not create a new bilateral 
organisation. Rather it stressed the need to funnel ideas through existing multilateral 
institutions such as NATO, OSCE, the G-7 (8) and the WTO where possible. On the 
other hand it sought to establish a common threshold of co-operation between the EU 
and the US in a range of policy sectors. Negotiating between bureaucrats, rather than 
legislators, increases the threshold for co-operation particularly on 'technical' policies 
as it de-politicises the process. 
Finally, the institutionalisation of the structure is arguably the most visible and 
most significant change brought by the NTA (see also chapter 4). Both EU and US 
officials stressed the important role of the NTA in 'bringing everyone to the table' and 
establishing dialogue through regular contacts. 68 A US official argued that increased 
information exchanges, brought more wisdom to negotiations. A Commission official z: 1 I 
argues that understanding one another's policies and preferences was a pre-requisite to 
acting on them. 69 Finally. one Commission official conceded that the NTA process 
served to manage the 'clay to claý' relations between the EU and the US suggesting 
Interview, EU Commission Dele-ation. Washington 2000 (3 1)ý US State Department, Washington 
2000(41). 
68 Interviews, Finnish Council Secretariat, US Mission and European Commission, (2,5,4) September 
1999. 
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that, 'Closer contact and more consultation slowly breeds more broad 
understanding. ' 70 
Overall, it can be argued that the NTA symbolised a renewed commitment to 
the EU-US partnership (see also Philppart and Winand 2001: 50). The new 
mechanisms in the NTA represented a shift from joint consultation to joint or parallel 
action. The NTA- JAP framework identifies areas of collaboration and sets an agenda 
for further increased transatlantic co-operation. The new institutional mechanisms 
gave new direction to the summits, making them more useful mechanisms. As a 
whole, the NITA placed re-iiewed locus on transatlaralc relations and increased 'the 
prospects for co-operation by creating an ever-increasing drive for deliverables. The 
institutional i sation of the relationship provides greater capacity for the management of 
technical disputes. In short, the NTA gives the relationship more shape and direction. 71 
Still, it has been widely acknowledged that there are gaps in the NTA. As an 
architect of the NTA, US Ambassador Eizenstat (1997) argued the NTA deserved ' a, 
'B+, a good solid grade with room for improvement'. An EU negotiator clarified in 
terms of substance that the NTA deserved a C, if not lower, but agreed that the 
institutional aspects of the NTA warranted an A. Thus, like the TAD the NTA is a 
living document, because it sets flexible goals in different issue areas. Although it 
does add a more or less permanent structure (Frellesen 2001), it is organic in the sense 
that the mechanisms in place ensure the agenda can grow with the dialogue. 
4) Adding On: The TEP 
Fhere \Nas a PLISII to facilitate doser co-operation in the economic chapter of the NTA. 
after the six month report card (May 1996) revealed that Madrid's expectations had 
') Interview 31 
'o Interview 6. 
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not been met in a number of areas, particularly in the attempt to build the New 
72 Transatlantic Marketplace . The lack of concrete deliverables prompted claims that 
the NTA had run out of steam. However, those working within the NTA process 
acknowledged the merit of further institutionalisation. Agreements, particularly in the 
economic sector, helped build confidence between EU and US negotiators and the 
TABD. Finally, the continued disputes over bananas, beef and extraterritorial 
sanctions reaffirmed the need for further transatlantic commitment as a means of 
facilitating trade and containing conflict. 
Deb-U-tes ragedd On throughout 11997 and 1197978 over how to deepen the 
transatlantic economic commitment. 73 On March 11,1998 the European Commission 
approved Brittan's proposal for a comprehensive trade treaty, the New Transatlantic 
Marketplace Agreement (NTMA). 74 The NTMA plan proposed a comprehensive 
agreement that would remove non-tariff barriers to trade across the Atlantic; commit 
the EU and the US to eliminate industrial tariffs through multilateral negotiations by 
the year 2010; establish a free trade area in services; and lead to further bilateral 
liberalisation in areas such as government procurement investment and intellectual 
property. Brittan argued that the NTMA agreement was an opportunity to adapt and 
71 Argued by US Mission official, Brussels, September 1999 (7). 
72 Gardner (1997: 89) notes that while these reports were premature given the scale of commitments and 
timely process, they exposed shortcomings in the following areas; the testing and certification on 
telecommunications equipment, telecommunications terminal equipment, information technology, 
electrical safety, electro-inagnetic compatibility, pleasure boats and veterinary biologicals, 
pharmaceuticals, telecommunications and international maritime transport. 7" ' Assistant Secretary of Economic Affairs Larson demanded a New Transatlantic Marketplace initiative 
that would secure open and honest markets and specifically liberalise the telecommunications, aviation 
and capital sectors (Larson 1997). US Secretary of Commerce, William Daley, spoke ofjoint efforts 
bet"een the political and business communities to define the meaning of a barrier-free 'transatlantic 
marketplace', to establish realistic targets and to designate further steps in the process (Daley 1997). 
Grossman ( 1998) pragmatically identified the need for consultations with Congress, the private sector 
and non-go,. crinnerital organisations in order to clarify an American position on the NTM initiative. 4- Flic initiative siý, Iits the advantages in a single comprehensive agreement, ... 
designed to use an 
economic instrument to (live a much broader inipetus to the overall political relationship; to produce 
important economic beriefits and to provide a new mechanism and stronger incentives to prevent and 
resolve disputes' (European Commission 1998: 3-4). The aggressive nature of Brittan's proposal 
represented his lon(, mg to see the EU display leadership in the international system. Brittan himself 
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apply the lessons learned form the SEM to the EU-US process of economic 
liberalisation. However, while the EU and the US had incentive to pursue further 
institutional i sati on, there was domestic opposition to anything that resembled first, the 
TAFTA and second, the Commission taking too much control of external negotiations. 
A decision taken by the EU General Affairs Council, one month before the 
London Summit, ensured that the Commission's NTMA proposal never made it onto 
the summit agenda. It was opposed by the Member States, mainly France, 75 who 
argued: 
9 th-at bilatcral. (mather than -multilateral) market opening, particularly 
through the use of a transatlantic dispute settlement mechanism, undermined the 
WTO; 
9 that the agreement was not feasible in light of the ongoing extraterritorial Helm- 
Burton dispute surrounding the US Helms-Burton law 
e that the agreement would carry negative implications for EC audio-visual services 
and agriculture policies 
* that the Commission did not have a mandate to negotiate the agreement. 76 
The French rejection ofthe proposal was troublesome for a Commissioner so intent on 
equalizing the credibility of the EU as a partner for the US. Brittan had'earlier 
claimed, *It is inevitable that we should now face the United States as an increasingly 
cited the unanimous approval of the proposal in the Commission as evidence, 'that the European tiger is 
beginning to roar' (Brittan 1998). 
75 But also Germariv, The Netherlands. Italy and Spain. 
-6 French President Chirac commented at a press conference shortly before the General Affairs 
Council's discussion that the NTMA represented 'a personal initiative by Sir Leon Brittan who all alone 
went off to negotiate a free trade area between the United States and Europe, without a mandate' 
Adding, 'It is unacceptable for a Commissioner to negotiate without a specific mandate from the 
Council. This must be clearly stated so it does not happen again' (quoted in Sheil 1998: 4). One 
government Source adds. 'The French felt like the whole thin(I was thrown in their face, ' Taken from an 
interview with a US Official conducted July 1998 (1). (See also That Awkward Relationship 1998: 1; 
Buckley 1998: 1) 
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equal partner, sharing world leadership more and more as we develop still our own 
capacity to act together in a united and effective way'. 77 Instead, the Commissioner's 
attempts to prove that the EU could take a leading role in transatlantic relations 
backfired, and his worst fears about the action capacity gap of the Union were brought 
to the surface by internal bickering. 78 
Table 3.7 THE THREE PRONGS OF THE TEP 
ACHIEVE NEAR MARKET ACCESS GAINS FOR 
GOODS AND SERVICES AND AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS 
PROMOTE MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL 
TRADE LIBERALISATION OF GOODS, SERVICES 
AND CAPITAL 
EXPAND AND DEEPEN THE TRANSATLANTIC 
DIALOGUE BETWEEN NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANISATIONS, PARLIAMENTARIANS AND 
GOVERNMENT ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT - 
The Transatlantic Economic Partnership 
The conflicting pressure (mainly from the Americans) to secure some type of 
economic agreement at the 1998 London Summit, coupled by the lack of domestic 
support for a comprehensive treaty saw the launch of another compromise, the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP). The TEP ensured that neither party went 
77 Quoted in Eurocorn, Maý 1997, available, 
http:, '/www. eurunion. ot,,,,, ý'llekvs/ I CUrecorn/l 997/ecomO597. htm 
g Had the dispute made it onto the May 1998 Summit Agenda. it would have been unlikely to pass US 
approval either. The initially positive American response to the NTMA proposal soon turned lukewarm 
because Brittan's proposal failed to address aggriCUlture. Interview, US Embassy, Dub-lin July 1998 (1). 
94 
away empty handed from the summit, and it maintained many of the goals of the NTM 
while avoiding the political controversy associated with Brittan's proposal. 
The TEP aimed to tackle bilateral regulatory barriers to trade and to find 
common positions for the Seattle Round of the WTO. It set the goal of reducing 
barriers to billions of dollars of trade through a three pronged market opening 
approach (see table 3.7). The year 2000 was set, somewhat over-ambitiously, for 
substantive developments in a number of specific sectors (see table 3.8). Finally, the 
TEP looked to the expansion and deepening of the transatlantic dialogue between non- 
gowl, ler. n. m. -Int-all 
-f'f-, t-i Ic c)n tra de and 
investment issues (US Mission 1998). In this sense the agreement complimented the 
market opening objective with a 'commitment to the highest labour, health and 
environmental standards' (Pickering 1998: 4). 
The TEP was followed in September 1998 by the TEP Action Plan, which like 
the NTA Joint Action Plan sets a more specific agenda but also includes target dates 
for actionable goals. Building on the success of MRA's, the TEP Action Plan 
highlighted the need for mutual recognition agreements in services, particularly in 
intellectual property, food safety and biotechnology. It also contained sections on 
regulatory co-operation and harmonisation of standards to facilitate the removal of 
technical barriers to trade. 
In addition, the TEP Action Plan added to the transatlantic institutional 
structure by creating the TEP Steering Group, a construct which is similar to. the NTA 
Task Force but which deals only with economic issues. The TEP Steering Group was 
charged NN,, ith monitoring. implementing and reviexing TEP objectives. providing a zl-- C, 
'horizontal" forum for transatlantic civil society and a mechanism for early warning on 
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potential trade disputes. It also established specialised TEP working groups at the 
expert level (see chapter 4). 
The TEP represented another compromise in the transatlantic partnership 
building. It was announced parallel to the Transatlantic Partnership on Political Co- 
operation (TPPC) agreement, which represented a commitment to intensify 
consultations for more effective political co-operation and established a new set of 
principles for applying economic sanctions. Specifically the TPPC secured a US 
commitment to end extra-territorial sanctions against EU companies. In an act of 
'rreativi- onnfliot mqnao, -m, -it' PT T-1 Ns If-qilprz rnqnq(ypti tri m it 
longstanding disputes over the US extraterritorial legislation and secondary boycott 
provisions of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) and the Helms-Burton Act in order 
to gain the Member States' approval for the TEP (Krenzler and Wiegand 1999: 14)79 
Under the TPPC the US maintained the right to use sanctions when diplomatic and 
political options failed and the EU agreed that maximum effort be taken to ensure that 
economic sanctions remained multilateral rather than unilateral. Consultation at senior 
levels was stressed as a prerequisite to imposing sanctions and a number of guidelines 
were set out to govern situations warranting action by the EU and the US. 
In return for the US compromise on Flelms-Burton, the EU also made further 
political commitments on JHA co-operation, an area that the US was eager to pursue 
further. Statements on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism lead to some joint 
efforts in Iran, but the majority of the language used only uttered vague commitments 
to pursue co-operation in other regions. There are still glaring foreign policy gaps in 
transatlantic relations, which surfaced most obviously during the crisis in Kosovo. 
ý9 The use of the word inana , ged, not resolved, should 
be stressed here because Helms Burton Act was 
not actualk repealed. That would have required an act of Congress. Krenzler and Wiegand (1999: 16) 
noteý 'Of course nothing guarantees that Congress will refrain frorn passing such sanctions, thus 
ignoring the Administration's wishes in conducting US foreign policy'. 
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Wh at good is th e TEP? 
The troubled TEP negotiations revealed something about its content and its 
implementation. The TEP-was criticised for its substance, particularly by Europeans 
who had favoured a more comprehensive agreement. It was argued that the TEP was 
ýnot overly ambitious, 80 that the agreement was the 'result of bad political thinking' 81 
and that 'it would never work properly. ' 82 
First, the TEP was scrutimsed for failing to manage trade disputes, in particular 
the hamn2 and beef disnutes which overshadowed the. December IQQx 
Summit (see also chapter 8). Unlike the NTMA, however, the TEP did not contain a 
dispute settlement mechanism, rather it committed both parties to jointly approach the 
WTO Dispute Settlement review in order to increase the transparency and functioning 
of the panel (FEP Action Plan 1998). Second, the TEP was perceived as a forum for 
reaching EU-U S consensus before the Seattle Round. Frost (1998: 3) argued that, 'The 
failure of the Brittan initiative may have cleared the way for more focused thinking 
about global trade liberalisation in the WTO', but here too the TEP failed as the lack 
of EU-US consensus in Seattle contributed to the demise of the Round. Finally, the 
TEP was opposed by NGOs who feared the lack of transparency in the decision 
making process. The controversy surrounding the content of the TEP led the 
transatlantic decision makers to promote two new 'civil society' dialogues- the TAED 
and the TACD- in con junction with the trade agreement under both the NTA's fourth 
chapter and the TEP's third prong (see chapter 5). L- 
Interview. British MEP. September 1999 (17) 
Interview, Commission, September 1999 (16). 
Intervie\N, Commission official. Washington, October 2000 (32). 
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Faith in the TEP was undermined further in the first years of its 
implementation. In 1999 it appeared that the TEP had either stalled or died. 83 The TEP 
demonstrated that the EU and the US were still grappling with different visions of the 
transatlantic partnership. Americans argued that the Europeans were ambivalent to the 
TEP because they thought the agenda should be more ambitious. One USTR official 
argued. 'It is hard to succeed when they load it with topics that are not going 
anywhere! ' On the other hand Europeans argued that the Americans were unable to 
deliver' particularly in the services sector. 84 MRAs negotiations were held up by the 
US because individual states, rather than any centralised body, had control over 
services certification and the US Administration was unable or unwilling to seek 
legislation from Congress to uphold the TEP (see also chapter 7). 85 EU officials also 
argued that US officials were stalling in working groups. 86 A British MEP 
complained, 'The US cannot guarantee that every state will be on board. The reality is 
the opposite of usual perception that the process is upheld by Community decision 
making. '8 7 
The limited scope of the TEP and the initial problems implementing it also 
pointed to a lack of political will in EU-US relations. At the time, it was argued that 
there was little interest in Brussels or Washington for new transatlantic initiatives 
(Frost 1998). The EU was preoccupied with enlargement and the launch of the Euro. 
American politics were divided between the Republican Congress and Democrat 
Administration over the Clinton scandal, and both sides were pre-occupied by the US 
election. 
ý 11 IntervieNN s at the Europcan Commission, Brussels, September 1999 (9,15) and the Comm ission 
Delegation, Washington, October 2000 (32) 
84 Intervie-, N. 2,6,17. 
8ý Interview 9,20. 




SECTORS COVERED BY THE TEP 
improving 
, science and regulatory 
co-operation 
reducing regulatory barriers 
lowering red tape costs to benefit 
consurners 
working to keep electronic commerce 
duty fi-ce 
e advaricing core labour standards 
developing common approaches to trade 
related environmental areas 
recoanising the central role of 
intellectual property rights as a basis for 
econornic, scientific, and artistic 
creativity 
opening transatlantic econornies to 
include a wider variety of interests 
Source: TEP 1.998. 
By the time President Bush took office, it seemed the TEP was back on track. The 
TEP Steering Group was making regular reports to the EU-US Summits, and the 
progress on science and regulatory co-operation overshadowed the fact that no 
progress had been made on agriculture or audio-visual services. Negotiations for new 
MRAs in goods and in services were underway in 2001 (see also chapter 7). The TEP 
process produced EU-US Gui del ines/Principles on Co-operation and Transparency in 




effectiveness of planning and developing regulatory proposals. In addition, the EU-US 
Biotechnology Consultative Forum was established to head off an upcoming dispute 
over GMOs. 
Conclusion 
The underlying thesis of this chapter was that EU-US relations have changed in the 
1990s as a result of three agreements the TAD, the NTA and the TEP. These 
im-el the institiltionalisation of the tranznthqntir relationshin C)n q MC)r agreements ens 
equal basis outside the confines of NATO. Each agreement added a 'block' to the 
transatlantic 'framework' by outlining principles and goals for co-operation and by 
establishing institutions to manage policy co-ordination. 
Domestic opposition to an overarching transatlantic treaty ensured that the EU 
and the US strategy for co-operation focused on relatively 'safe' or 'soft' policy 
objectives. As a result the NTA process is often criticised on the basis of that its 
deliverables are non-controversial . 
88 However, the real weight behind the TAD, the 
NTA and the TEP is not only its 'deliverables- which are an important part of 
'focusing' the dialogue (see chapter 4)- but rather in its capacity to forge a formal 
dialogue structure. The agreements ensured the creation of networks which foster 
communication between political leaders, officials and business and civil society on 
both sides of the Atlantic. In theory. it is these 'institutions' that increase the threshold 
for co-operation. One Commission official argued, 'The logic of the NTA is similar to 
8' The term 'NTA process' is used throughout the text to generalise about the transatlantic process, as it 
is the most comprehensive of the three agreements. 
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the thinking behind the EU. If we are constantly talking, it is less likely that we will be 
fighting. '89 
The reality is that the institutionalisation of the relationship in the 1990s 
created a new forum for transatlantic policy making. However, the TAD, the NTA and 
the TEP, as 'history making' agreements, only indicates a general direction for policy 
co-ordination rather than specific agreements. It is the transgovernmental and 
transnational institutions that are charged with 'setting' and 'shaping' transatlantic 
polices. The next chapters note that even where the political will exists at the top, the 
no inflnence. ci from the bottom up licy n------ 1- V, 
,0 IntervieNN, Commission Official. BrLISSeIS. May 2000 (29). 
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Chapter 4 
Setting and Shaping the Transatlantic Dialogue: 
The Transgovernmental Policy Process 
Transatlantic institutional i sation has altered the way the EU and the US interact. In 
contrast to the traditional style of international diplomacy that characterised the Cold 
War, there is now a 'political process' that surrounds EU-US decision-making. The 
transatlantic agreements created institutions for enhanced dialogue between the EU 
and the US. T. hese meellanisms -, vcrc designed Lo foster co-operation and curb conflict 
in the transatlantic relationship. Their olýjective is to produce 'deliverables', provide a 
forum for dispute settlement and foster co-operation through increased dialogue and 
information exchange. The institutions created by the TAD, the NTA and the TEP 
form the structure of the transatlantic policy process and the pillars of transatlantic 
govemance. 
This chapter examines both the mechanisms and the procedures that make up 
the trangovernmental policy-making process and the trans governmnetal actors that 
operate within it. In reference to the second hypothesis outlined in chapter 1, it seeks 
to establish the extent to which the new institutions provide a forum for decentralised 
policy setting and shaping. What role do transgovernmental actors play in the 
transatlantic policy making process? In other words what room has the 
institutionalised EU-tJS structure-establ i shed by intergovernmental decisions- allowed 
for other governmental actors to influence transatlantic formation? It argues that the 
scope for actor access is vast, given the corriplex nature of EU, US and transatlantic 
decision making structures. Z: ý
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This chapter is approached in the following way. Section I examines EU-US 
Summits, where intergovernmental and transgovernmental agreements are announced. 
The remaining sections evaluate the 'sub summit' procedures, in other words the 
mechanisms and process that deal with early stages of decision making. Section 2 
explores the 'political process', the 'economic process', and the 'NTA process', and 
describes the structure of dialogue created by these processes. Section 3 evaluates the 
trade dispute settlement process established in part by the 'Early Warning System' 
(1999). Finally, section 4 evaluates the impact of the transgovernmental process. It 
questions why the decentralisation of transgovernment-all decision setting and shaping I fn 
ýrnatters' in the context of transatlantic governance. 
1) The EU-US Summit 
The biannual EU-US Summit is the primary forum for intergovernmental exchange in 
the NTA process, consisting of the highest level of contact between the Presidents of 
the US, the Commission and the Council Presidency. As established under the TAD, 
these intergovernmental meetings were originally designed as stand alone events. 
However as the NTA process emerged, a number of ministerial level meetings held in 
conjunction with or in close proximity to the summits also became institutionalised. 
The preparation for summits became more complex with the creation of economic, as 
well as political institutions under the TER EU-US Summits developed into an event 
rather than a meeting whereby economic and foreign policy ministers, US Cabinet 
officials and EU Commissioners held separate, parallel talks, followed by a joint 
plenary session and finally, the actual summit meeting. 90 
90 The attendance of I- U-US summit fluctuates depending on where the summit is held. For example the 
US Secretary of State attends. but other US Cabinet members may not if the summit is held outside 
Washin. -ton D. C.. The Vice President attends only when the US hosts the summit. 
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The EU-US Summit has two important functions. First, it is a forum for 
intergovernmental consultation. It brings together top 'political' officials and places 
topical or timely issues, including disputes, on the table for discussion. The idea is that 
the EU and the US try to come to a common position on how to approach situations in 
third areas. They use summits to discuss means of co-ordinating diplomatic co- 
operation in hotspots such as the Balkans, Kosovo, East Timor, Chechnya and the 
Middle East and for discussing strategic issues such as the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) and its relationship with NATO. The summit is also used to 
d'-, cuss pendinp disnute-, over hnnnnn- hf-ef qn(i FTJ Airkiiz 
Summit was, for instance, crucial to the settlement of the Helms Burton dispute over 
US extraterritorial legislation. 91 
The second function of EU-US Summits is to both initiate and assess policy 
output in issue areas incorporated under the NTA framework. The transatlantic policy 
process is a cycle of decision making that begins and ends with the biannual summit. It 
is where decisions are 'made' about the general scope for co-operation and where 
deliverables are announced (see figure 4.1). Deliverables are an important part of the 
process and a major goal of summit leaders because they legitimise. the process by 
producing concrete results. As one US official argues, 'Advisors have to keep telling 
leaders why they are doing this (attending EU-`US SUMMitSy. 92 The summits 
encourage foreign policy and economic policy co-ordination because they create 
deadlines for progress reports and exert pressure on lower level officials to produce 
results. 
91 EU and US officials use the summit to flag Important issues for further 
91 lntervic\ý. Commission official Brussels, 1999 (1 1)ý US Mission Official, Brussels, 1999 (7). 
9, Interview, Commission Secretariat official, Brussels. September 1999 (16). 
g-, Interview. US State Department, Washington DC 2000 (33). 
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development. 94 In short, as one Council official observed, 'The summits are a good 
way to see where we arC 95 
EU and US officials generally describe the summit as a useful mechanism, at 
least rhetorically. 96 However the enthusiasm for the event varies depending on 
domestic political arenas, the quality of potential deliverables and the enthusiasm of 
the EU Presidency. For example, Clinton was accused of being distracted during the 
December 1998 Summit when Congress was simultaneously voting on whether to 
impeach him over the Lewinsky affair. 97 Similarly the EU's attention to the summit 
waned durinia the Santer Commission scandal and there was no real interest on the 1-11', 
side in meeting Commissioners before the hand-over to Prodi. 98 The December 2000 
Summit also served as more pleasantry than purpose, while the EU awaited the arrival 
of the new US Administration. 
EU-US Summits are a way to keep the EU Presidencies, and thus the European 
Council, engaged in the transatlantic dialogue because the host state actively prepares 
the summit, which is hosted in every other Presidencies national capital. 99 It is a 
mechanism for small states to assert their role as international actors. For example the 
Finnish Presidency was able to address 'Nor-them' issues in the December 1999 
Summit. 100 Many interviewees noted the varied importance that individual EU 
Presidency's attach to the EU-US Summit. For example the Irish, Dutch, and -British 
Presidencies were credited with successful summits given their good channels of 
communication with the US. Another US official argued that, 
94 lntervieýN. Commission official. Washin', ton DC 2000 (3 1 
lntervic\ý, Council Presidency. September 1999 (5). 
96 Interviews 1.2.3ý 4,5.6,7,9.11,15.16.18,22ý 3 1,33,4 1,44,45. 
I)- Similar accusations have been made about banana negotiations which also took place in December 
1998 (see chapter 8). 
98 Interview, Commission Brussels. September 1999 (11). 
91) Expressed in intcrvie, ýýs vith US State Department and Commission officials, Brussels, 1999,2000 
(7,33). 
100 Interview, Commission. Brussels, September 1999 (9). 
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Generally small Member States have better Presidencies. They recognise their 
limitations with resources, and prepare years in advance. The Finns are a great 
example. They are very good at organisation and set realistic agendas., 01 
Critics, on the other hand, have downplayed the importance of EU-US 
Summits, claiming they had become mere 'photo opportunities' rather than decision 
making forums. Reporting on the May 1998 Summit in London, the Economist 
claimed that EU-US Summits 'might normally be expected to produce a batch of 
dreary photo-calls and a heap of pointless platitudes. ' EU foreign ministers have been 
accused of participating in the summits because, 'it is fun to be in a picture with the 
US President. 102 Further scrutiny has come from NGOs who claim that EU-US 
Summits are a place for TR statements' and 'parade shows'. 103 Despite conflict over 
which private actors attend the summit (see chapter 5) it is acknowledged by NGOs 
that attendance is more of a symbolic gesture than a serious lobbying forum. 
EU-US Summits are also criticised for having too broad an agenda and not 
producing substantial joint action. A TAED official argued that, 'The summit is not a 
vehicle for getting things done, the agenda is too broad. ' 104 A limited number of 
themes are usually highlighted at the summits. However, issues receive only 
superficial attention at the intergovernmental level due to time constraints. Meetings 
usually end up being only 2-3) hours long, which, officials point out, is not enough 
time to work through the technical details of policies. Furthermore the frequency of 
summits is blamed for creating a 'trcad mill' process whereby deliverables arc 
recycled and resold (see also below). 10-5 A Commission Report (2001) argued that, 'to 
make co-operation rnore action-orientated, EU-US Summits need to become more 
lntervie, ýk, US Mission official, Brussels. September 1999 (7). 
102 Interviekk. Commission official, BrLISSeIS, September 1999 (2). 
liitervic, ýý, TACD Secretariat. London, January 2000 (23). 
Interview, US NGO, Washington. October 2000 (30). 
10ý Interview, Commission official, BrLISSCIS, September 1999 (9) (15). 
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focused and to define clear priorities. Efforts should concentrate on the most important 
challenges-strategic thernes- facing the EU and the US today. ' 
The point is, however, that EU-US Summits alone cannot facilitate the number 
of goals established by the NTA. In addition to the time constraints on 
intergovernmental actors, many heads of state, and even those in ministerial positions, 
do not hold the expertise required to formulate technical policies, for example in the 
area of regulatory co-operation. The consensus among interviewees is that while the 
summit is a focal point of the policy process, most contact takes place below the 
intergovernmental level. 106 One Commission official argued that the summit 'launches 
the practical arrangements' for seeking out specific policies. 107 It is argued here that 
EU-US decision making must be considered in the broader context of the policy 
making process. This process begins at a much lower, 'sub-summit' level where junior 
officials play an important role. The remainder of this chapter will therefore examine 
different types of 'sub-submit' ex6ange where policy proposals are scrutinised and 
debated by transgovernmental actors before final decisions are made. 
Figure 4.1 The NTA Policy Cycle 
Intergovernmental Actors 
'Make' Big Decisions That Establish 'Scope' for Policies 
Intergovernmental Actors 
Announce Summit Deliverables 
Transgovernmental Actors 
Set' Policies 
Transgovern mental Actors 
'Shape' Policy Agenda and 
Search for new deliverables 
106 Interview, TABD September 1999; Interview Commission official, Washington 2000 (3 1). 
107 Interview, Commission Delegation, Washington October 2000 (3 1). 
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2) The NTA Processes: Political and Economic Decision 'Taking' 
While intergovernmental actors make decisions that indicate where transatlantic co- 
operation will be pursued, it is trans governmental actors who decide how the EU and 
the US can co-operate through the decision-making processes established by the 
NTA/TEP framework. The 'plurality' of processes is stressed because the 
transatlantic decision making process mirrors EU decision-making structures. The 
TAD, the NTA and the TEP have established three branches of governmental dialogue 
to accommodate the different competencies of EU external negotiators. 
Generally, the idea behind the sub-summit process is that specific policies for 
co-ordination within the reach of the NTA/TEP framework are 'fetched' from the 
bottom ranks of the transatlantic dialogue and are passed up through lower levels of 
consultation, finally making their way onto the agendas of EU-US Summits. The 
economic ministerial dialogue, the foreign policy ministerial dialogue and the SLG 
form the head of three separate branches of transgovernmental dialogue (see figure 
4.2). This section explains these three transgovernmental processes and discusses how 
the TAD, NTA and TEP mechanisms have created a formal process for. decision 
setting and shaping at a sub-summit level. 
The Political Process 
The political process refers to the process of dialogue built upon TAD mechanisms. It 
begins when the new Council Presidency assumes its role in the Council of Ministers, 
shortly after the previous EU Surni-nit and EU-US Summit have concluded. Once the 
hand over takes place the political dialogue is initiated in a meeting between EU-US 
foreign ministers and the EU Commissioner for External Relations. Events and 
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circumstances may dictate further contact at the ministerial level (prior to the summit) 
either under this framework or through ad hoc Troika dialogues. 109 
A number of US-Troika dialogues were established after 1990 to support the 
foreign policy dialogue. In addition to the ministerial Troika dialogue, there is now 
interaction at the political director level and at working group level. These 
transatlantic working groups mirror the CFSP working groups in the Council and are 
significant because they are the only cross pillar working groups. 109 These groups 
were established in 1995 as an extra level of expert exchange, and they deal with a 
range of issues outlined in table 41110 Fin. 911v the Trt-)ikn ciinlnone i-, qnrhnri-cj hy 
regular exchange between Heads of Mission and US Ambassadors. 
Table 4.1 
The Transatlantic Working Groups 
*Law Enforcement Co-operation * Middle East Experts * United Nations e Security e 
OSCE *Iran Trilateral * Human Rights e Turkey, Cyprus and Malta 0 Consular Affairs 
Soviet. / Newly Independent States 41 Latin America e Non-proliferation East and 
South Asia * Conventional Arms Exports 9 Terrorism 9 Central Europe Western 
Balkans 9 Africa * Drugs 9 Disarmament 
Combined these dialogues form the 'traditional' political dialogue (see also Frellesen 
2001) and the first branch of EU-US co-operation. The traditional political dialogue is 
a unique process. The Troika dialogue reflects the complex structure of EU decision- 
making, and the foreign policy dialogue is particularly important because it covers 
issues that remain under Member States* control. 
"" The Troika f-orrnat traditionally included the Commission, the successor, the predecessor and current 
Council Presidency. Under Amsterdam, however the 'new' Troika includes the Presidency, the 
Commission and the nexN CFSP Ifigh Representative, Javier Solana Madariaga. 
109 Interview, Council Secretariat, Brussels, September 1999 (3). 
11o Interviews, Council Secretariat and Finnish Presidency, Brussels, 27 September 1999 (3,5). 
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The Economic Process 
According to Article 133 of the EU treaties, the Commission has the competence to 
act on behalf of the Union in trade negotiations providing it works within the 
Council's mandate. The TEP emphasises new areas of trade which fall into 'grey' 
areas, or areas of mixed competence in EU decision making. There was thus the need 
to add new mechanisms to the transatlantic economic dialogue. The TEP Steering 
Group (SG) and the TEP working groups were established by the TEP Action Plan to 
StWv Qpc-torc fc)r fiirther lihernliqqtion Thp.., ýe mechani-. ms form the economic hranch 
of the transatlantic dialogue under the ministerial level dialogue. 
The members of the TEP Steering Group hold a similar rank to participants in 
the NTA Task Force. The Steering Group consists of the US Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, the DG Heads of Unit for Trade and a Council Presidency Representative, 
usually the head of external relations for trade. It meets two or three times during the 
course of a Presidency and reports directly to the SLG. It can also filter into the 
economic ministerial dialogue through the structure of the independent agencies. 
The TEP Steering Group deals with economic points in detail, and its purpose 
is to fulfil the goals of the TEP by fostering multilateral as well as bilateral trade. In 
that respect, the TEP Steering Group was originally designed to find compatible 
strategies for the WTO round, to identify areas where transatlantic services could be 
liberalised and to act as an 'early warning' system (see section 3) by identifying 
possible areas of conflict. It also fulfils the task of fostering EU-US economic co- 
operation and prevcriting contlict more generally. In a style similar to the SLG report Z-- 
(see below), the Steering Group Report takes stock of EU-US economic relations and 
the progress in achieving TEP goals. cl Lý 
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Figure 4.2 The Structure of the Transatlantic Pialogue 
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The Steering Group is assisted by the TEP working groups which are sector specific 
and thus mirror the sectors laid out by TEP including, agriculture, trade, services, 
global electronic commerce, etc. These groups, like the transatlantic working groups, 
meet prior to the summits and their contacts increase as the cycle nears completion. 
Their main task is to find areas where the EU and the US can work together under the 
TEP framework and to report any progress or problems to the Steering Group. 
The NTA Process 
The NTA added new filter mechanisms to the trans2flantic policy prores, The level nf 
exchange and the capacity to produce 'deliverables' was stepped up by these new 
mechanisms. The Senior Level Group (SLG) and the Task Force serve as the contacts 
between the economic and, the political or Troika dialogues and as focal points of the 
process. They form the supporting branch of the transatlantic dialogue. 
It is the job of the SLG to 'shop for deliverables', determine what should be on 
EU-US Summit agendas and monitor the implementation of the NTA. Its purpose is 
therefore to help correct the problems that incurred under the TAD format by being a 
force of focus and continuity in-between EU-US Summits, thereby ensuring that 
summits do not become separate unrelated meetings. 
SLG membership is less exclusive than EU-US Summits but is nonetheless 
limited. There are roughly six members of the SLG. US representatives include Under- 
Secretaries for political and economic affairs in the State Department, and the 
Commission delegates are drawn from the Directorates General for external relations 
and trade. III The Council Presidency has political and economic delegates that 
represent the Member States. meaning, SLG membership varies depending on the 
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country holding office. Additionally representatives of the Article 133 committee, 
which deals with detailed trade issues, and foreign ministers may be present depending 
on the topics on the agenda. 
The SLG meets twice every six months. The first meeting takes place soon 
after the Presidency switches hands to 'get things moving'. The second is held closer 
to the summit date to finalise the agenda and confirm the contents of the SLG Report. 
The SLG report is a report card of EU-US progress that is compiled before the the EU- 
US Summit. In addition to scrutinising NTA progress, the report card has been 
employed as a means of drawing positive public attention to the. NTA process in order 
to combat negative media coverage of trade disputes. 112 The SLG serves an 
administrative function by taking a broader number of issues, 30 or 40 points, and 
slimming down the agenda prior to the summit. It identifies issue areas that are most 
likely to produce deliverables and slots these into the summit agenda. 
The SLG is aided in its quest for economic deliverables by the TEP Steering 
Group and for political deliverables by the NTA Task Force. The Task Force passes 
potential deliverables up through the NTA structure to the attention of the SLG. While 
the SLG is the link between both the political dialogue and the economic dialogue, the 
NTA Task Force is a fiision point between the traditional political dialogue and the 
NTA process. The NTA Task Force works closely with the transatlantic working 
groups in its search for possible deliverables. It may instruct the working groups to 
pursue co-operation in a particular sector or be alerted to progress by the working 
groups in advance. The Task Force then investigates and passes on details to the SLG. 
11 1 Before the Structural chan 'g es made 
by Prodi to the Comm ission in 1999, the Commission typically 
put torward the appropriate DGs Chef de Cabinet (Interview, Commission official, Brussels, September 
1999(9). 
112 This practice has not been overly effective, as fewer people access government web sites than media 
sources. One Commission official summed up the public scope of the SLG report by describing its 
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In addition to seeking out deliverables, the Task Force deals with the day to 
day monitoring of transatlantic relations. It meets four or five times per presidency and 
communicates via additional videoconferences. Other expert meetings are also 
conducted, usually on an ad hoc basis depending on events, and individual working 
groups have been set up by the Task Force to investigate potential co-ordination of 
specific policies. For example-there is a high level consultation on humanitarian aid 
and a Task Force on communicable diseases. 113 
Task Force meetings are much larger meetings than those conducted. at SLG 
level, and the membership for these meeting-, is not formalised. Regular attenclees 
include US Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the State Department, DG Heads of Unit 
and various Council Presidency representatives. 114 A number of aids, interpreters and 
departmental officials also tend to sit in on Task Force meetings. Thus, a system of 
rotating chairs is usually adopted to accommodate different participants depending on 
the nature of the topics being covered. 
Prior to the institutionalisation of transatlantic relations both the political and 
the economic processes were confined to the hierarchy of government structures 
meaning lower level civil servants influenced the summit agenda only through their 
own ministers. Now direct access has been designated to 'sub summit' level contacts 
through the Senior Level Group, which sets the agenda for the EU-US Summit. The 
TEP Steering Group and the Troika dialogues influence the summit by filtering into 
both the ministerial level and the SLG. The TEP Steering Group reports directly to the 
purpose as -all to convince the six or seven academies who care to read the report' (Interview, Brussels, 
September 1999 (6). 
1131 Interviews with EU and US officials, Brussels, 27-30 September 1999. See also Frellesen 2001. 
114 The Finish delegation sent the Director General for the Department of external economic relations, 
and the Germans were represented by the head of the external EU department and the head of bilateral 
desk for Gernian-Aincrican relations. The Austrian delegation sent the head of North America positions, 
and the British presidency was represented by Dick Stay, the head of external relations and the man 
who services council work. Interview Commission official, Brussels, September 1999 (9). 
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SLG as does the Troika political dialogue, and the Transatlantic Working Groups 
funnel into both the NTA Task Force and the SLG. The result is that the three 
branches of governmental dialogue work both separately and in sync and that a dense 
layer of networks has been created to support and assist transatlantic policy makers in 
seeking out new areas of co-operation. The NTA institutions, including the SLG and 
the NTA Task Force, are cross pillar institutions (see also Frellesen 2001), assisted by 
the Task Force the SLG 'monitors' or 'manages' the process in order to. facilitate 
increased co-operation. 
3) The Early Warning System process 
In addition to serving as forces of 'integration, a number of EU-US trade disputes 
have highlighted the need for transatlantic institutions to act as dispute settlement 
mechanisms. The concept of an 'Early Warning System' had been an underlying 
theme in the institutional i satl on process since the Transatlantic Declaration. In the past 
this simply meant that at sub- cabinet level meetings, items on the agenda were ear- 
marked for consideration. Under the NTA and the TEP, the SLG, NTA Task Force 
and TEP Steering Group meetings set aside time for raising 'friction points' before 
they become major disputes (Devuyst 2001: 296). The Bonn Summit (1999) tried to 
make the Early Warning System more pragmatic by establishing 'institutional ised' 
rules and procedures. 
It was agreed that existing institutions, the TEP Steering Group and the NTA 
Task Force. xvould serve as the primary mechanisms for early warning, with the 
Steering Group covcring trade and investment issues and the Task Force covering 
political issues. The Senior Level Group would review early-warning items in its 
preparation for the EU-US Summit. The TEP Steering Group and NTA Task Foree 
1 15 
were then charged with assigning contact points, facilitating consultations and 
agreeing on timelines for reporting back on items highlighted as potential transatlantic 
policy frictions (see figure 4.3), Early Warning 
Figure 4.3 The Early Warning Mechanisms 
The Senior Level Group 
Review Friction Points, 
Report to Summit or/and 
Refer back to TEP Steering Group 
or NTA Task Force 
NTA Task Force 
Identifies and Monitors 
Political Friction Points 
Statement 1999). 
TEP Steering Group 
Identifies and Monitors 
Economic Friction Points 
The logic behind the Early Warning System tits into the larger institutionalist thesis 
identified in chapter 2. First it is argued that by identifying conflict, exchanging 
information and creating awareness at an early stage, possibly contentious legislation 
may be avoided in order to prevent conflict in EU-US relations. One US mission 
official argues that, 'We need to tell people in advance that the problem is coming, 
then we will be ready when the regulation comes into effect. "' 5 
The case most cited by EU and US officials that highlights the need for early 
warning system was the dispute over -hush kits. The hush kit dispute revolved C, 
around EU legislation banning planes from being fitted with devices that reduced the 
noise levels emitted by older aircraft. By the time US industry and Washington woke 
'1ý Interview, US Mission official, Brussels, September 1999 (7). 
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up to the fact that this legislation hampered US trade (US companies exclusively 
manufacture hush kits), it was already in its second reading in the European 
Parliament (see Peterson 2001). Many officials contend that had the EWS system been 
in place, early dialogue could have prevented the dispute. One US official even claims 
to have been told by MEPs, 'that had they known they would have written the 
legislation differently. ' 116 The hush kits case highlights two important features of 
transatlantic dispute resolution, first, the role of the legislators in the transatlantic 
process and, second, the power of domestic economic interests. 
Another underlying feature behind the early warning concept is the desire to 
get both EU and US domestic policy makers to consider the external implications of 
internal policies. 117 Legislators are central players in the early warning system, 
because decisions made by them go far towards determining the capacity that 
international negotiators have to negotiate agreements, particularly in the US. Thus, 
the early warning system emphasises the need to 'beef up' the Transatlantic 
Legislators Dialogue (TLD), another product of the NTA's 'building bridges' chapter. 
The TLD brings legislators together at the committee level and creates awareness in 
Congress and the European Parliament of the impact of decisions made in either 
House. 118 EU and US officials argue that the TLD has a crucial role to play in the 
early warning system. 119 
The implementation of the early warning process was slow moving following 
the Bonn Summit statement. Initially, the strategy was to get people talking and to 
assess ways in which the Early Warning mechanisms might operate. The Commission 
'"' Interview. US Mission official. Brussels, September 1999 (7). 
j 17 Interview, EU Commission official, Brussels, September 1999 (4). 
118 In June 200 1a Commission official noted, 'The TLD is in a state of'impasse' after the election of tile 
new US Congress. The Ell is working to reactivate it. ' (interview 62). 
Interview with Commission and European Parliament September 1000 (10,18) and US TLD 
October 2000 (40). 
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discussed the possibly of employing a strategy of 'impact assessment'. 120 Derived 
from Article 133 committee discussions, impact assessment would mean having 
proposed policies stamped with a trade impact 'clean bill of health'. The idea was to 
increase communication between internal DGs and for US policy makers to ensure 
that national US interests were considered in the EU's internal policy processes. 121 us 
officials stressed the importance of transparency in the Early Warning System, 
suggesting that the Transatlantic Regulatory Guidelines (2000) were a means of 
furthering early dispute resolution. As one official stressed, 'We are interested in more 
regulatory to regulatory discussion of eventual trade disputes. it works into the early 
warning mechanisms by ensuring we catch things early on. ' 122 
The early warning system is also designed to keep both sides informed of 
potential threats posed by Congress and the European Parliament. 123 The system 
sparks an inter-agency process that identifies the domestic issues that should be raised 
for the Task Force, the TEP Steering Group, the SLG and the Summit. Officials on 
both sides stressed the importance of the early warning system as a means of 
developing contacts, comparing notes, exchanging information, pulling together a vast 
array of contacts, elevating issues from the bottom up and highlighting potential 
problems. 
However, the early warning system is criticised as an ineffective conflict 
resolution mechanism. Although the Commission (2001) report states that the early 
warning mechanism for trade and investment under the TEP/NTA mechanisms works 
-satisfactorily', the need for a more structured process of conflict resolution has been 
highli, Ated by EU and US officials. One US official argued that, 'The SLG gets L- Z1.7 
110 Interviews with Commission officials, Brussels, September 1999 (2,9). 
121 Interviews US Mission officials. Brussels, September 1999 (4,7). 
12' Interview. USTR, October. 2000 (41). 
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contentious issues on table, but neither side follows up on the Early Warning System 
to take things off the agenda. The system needs to be more action orientated, to 
concentrate on finding solutions. ' A TABD official observed that, 'On the practical 
application of the Early Warning System, the government had this great idea. It 
basically made a commitment to principles but has not followed through on it. ' 
124 The 
lack of concrete action has led a number of officials to argue that the system is 'hot 
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air , 'blown up to 
look big for the summit', and 'a publicity stunt'. 
Doubts surrounding the Early Warning System are rooted in a number of 
ath9ntic dispute resolution technical and political obstarles, to the application of trnn- 
mechanisms. On a technical level, it is questionable whether an impact assessment 
process would be either feasible or effective. Cross checking all new domestic 
legislation poses impossible time constraints and entails a large amount of paper work. 
As one Commission official notes, 'The real Early Warning System, if it were to work, 
would develop such close links, ' for example that the guys who make chimney 
regulations would know each other and sit down together before hand to work out 
regulations. This is unrealistic. ' 126 In addition US officials have noted resistance from 
the Commission and Member States to increased transparency in the early stages of 
domestic decision making. 127 A European Parliament official pointed out that the 
European environmental committee does not like the idea of catering to the US. 128 A 
Commission official, by contrast. notes that, 'no one wants to mark legislation WTO 
129 incompatible' . 
lntcrvicý, Ns at the US State Department, USTR. Council Presidency. and Council Secretariat 1999- 
2000 (33A 1.5,3). 
III Interview, US TABD. Washington, March 2000 (53). 
12 5 Interview, Commission officials, Brussels. September 1999. (6,11 
Interview with former member of the US deleoation to Washington, Brussels, September 1999 (6). 
Interview, USTR Official. October 2000 (41 
Interview, European Parliament Secretariat. September 1999 (10). 
129 Interview with Commission official. Brussels, September 1999 (9). 
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A more fundamental problem for transatlantic dispute resolution is the view 
that no amount of dialogue will eliminate conflict rooted in deep political interest. 
Specifically, the Early Warning System will not work in areas where disputes are 
interest driven because transatlantic dialogue will not change the domestic opinions of 
actors, particularly actors who do not participate in the transatlantic dialogue. The 
Financial Times reported that, 
The EU knew its ban on hormones-treated beef and its bananas regime would 
infuriate Washington- but imposed them all the same. Bill Clinton signed 
sanctions laws penalising investors in Cuba, Iran and Libya, even though the 
EU had repeatedly warned that doing so would strain relations. 130 
Likewise a Commission official notes, ' We are quite convinced that if we look at 
audio visual policy, problems with fundamental ethical issues, or consumer policy, 
that the Early Warning System will not take away conflict. ' 131 ' The consensus among 
officials is summarised by the statement of one UK official who argued that, 'The 
Early Warning System is only strong as the political will behind it'. 132 
The US Congress, as a staunch protector of US domestic interest, has been 
identified as a major obstacle to the Early Warning System. The potential to resolve 
conflict through early contact was disregarded by a Commission official who stated 
that: 
(The Early Warning System) won't control Congress. Early Warning works 
betweeri Administrations but not Congress. Congress is unpredictable. One or 
two Senators can wreck the system and Congress does not care about Europe- 
for example, they knew Helms Burton would upset Europeans but in Congress 
international relations do not change constitutional make up and domestic 
political habits are hard to overcome. 133 
1"0 Quoted frorn Jaw-. jaw. Financial Tinies. 23 June 1999. 
Interview, Commission official, Brussels 1999 (2). 
Interview, UK Foreim Office, January 2000 (2 1). 
Interview Commission delegation, Washinoton 2000 (3 1 
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A US official agreed that the Early Warning System was not tied to Congress 'but to 
the desire for the Administration to get in early and deal with things cooked up in the 
Commission. ' 1 34 
Nonetheless, many EU and US officials have argued that the TLD should be 
directly linked to the Early Warning System. It is argued that the shortcomings of the 
system are tied to the limited scope and weak institutionalisation of the TLD. As the 
TLD is mostly an extension of the permanent US and EU delegations in Congress and 
the European Parliament, membership is limited to members with a transatlantic 
interest. There is no contact between relevant committees- or between the Senate and 
the European Parliament, and insufficient contact between the TLD and the SLG. 135 
TLD officials have complained about the lack of access to the EU-US SUMmit. 136 The 
limited reach of the TLD in the US Congress is demonstrated by the fact that a senior 
staff member for the Subcommittee on Trade in the House was unaware that the TLD 
existed. It was argued that, 'If we are out of the loop as trade people, they may be mis- 
targeting resources. ' It can be argued that the TLD fails to raise awareness of relevant 
people and cannot compensate for the domestic interests of Congress, for example in 
the banana dispute (see chapter 8). Commission officials have described the TLD as a 
'dialogue of the dear and TLD officials admit that while the dialogue has the potential 
to defuse disputes, such as the hush kits case, it has not solved any policy disputes. 137 
In short, the Early Warning System is mostly a bureaucratic tool that seeks to 
raise awareness. It has yet to bring legislators together, thus undermining its capacity 
to act as a concrete dispute prevention or resolution forum. European and American 
policy makers accept that the Early Warning System, as exerci sed bN the NTA 
Interview, TLD Secretariat, Washington 2000 t40). 
Interview. US Congress. Washin(jon, October 2000 (40). 1 -- , lntervieýw, Luropean Parliament, September 1999 (10). 
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institutions, will not be a solution to all 'political' transatlantic disputes- such as the 
banana or beef cases- but argue that increased dialogue between experts could defuse 
technical disputes. Expert level contact through, for example, the Biotechnology 
Forum, is regarded as useful for preventing a fully blown dispute over GMOs. ' 38 At 
this stage of transatlantic integration it may well be, that the early warning system has 
done little more than 'give these experts a does of 'transatlanticism' (Frellesen 2001). 
4) Decentralised Policy Setting and Shaping 
To summarise, this chapter has outlined the existence of trans governmental actors and 
the roles they play in the transatlantic decision making process. This section seeks to 
determine the extent to which transgovernmental actors are involved in policy setting 
and policy shaping. It is argued here that the existence of dense, sub-summit level 
networks illustrates the important role that transgovernmental actors play in the policy 
process. 
First, while intergovernmental actors 'make' the decisions that establish 
policies through history making agreements, transgoven-Imental actors, at a ministerial C, 
level, 'set' transatlantic decisions by signing policy agreements between the EU and 
the US. For example, the Mutual Recognition Agreement was set by the USTR and the 
then DG I Commissioner); the Positive Comity Agreement was set by the US Attorney 
General. the Federal Trade Commission, the Commissioner for Competition and the 
President-in-Office of the Industry Council and in the case of the Implementing 
Arrangement for Co-operation in the Fields of Metrology and Measurement Standards, 
I,, - lntcrvicý%s with US, EU TLD officials and Commission officials, September 1999; October2000(10, 
4-0,11.18). 
1 "" Interview. I-louse Subcommittee on Trade, October 2000 (39). 
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agency directors for the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the EU 
Commission's Director-General for Research 'set' the transatlantic policy. 
The limited number of transatlantic agreements signed suggests that a small 
number of actors actually set agreements, but many more transgovernmental actors 
play a role in shaping transatlantic decisions through the institutions characterised in 
this chapter. When asked the general question, 'who shapes transatlantic decisions', 
interviewees returned a wide range of responses. Some pointed to domestic agencies - 
the USTR, the State Department, DG Trade, DG External Relations, and actors such 
as the Article 133 Committee and the Council Working Groups- others to indiyiduals. 
For example a Commerce Department official suggested that Charles Ludolph was 
instrumental in getting the MRAs moving in the US, while a US State Department 
official credits one anonymous official with keeping US interest in combating 
trafficking in women. Most indicated and went to great lengths to explain the roles 
played by NTA institutions. Thus, the second question addressed by this section, why 
do these transgovernmental institutions matter? 
The Intergovernmental Summit 
To recap, the EU-US Summit is the focal point of the transatlantic calendar. It has two 
main functions: Intergovernmental actors use the summits to discuss topicat issues, 
political hotspots and trade disputes. On a technocratic level it is the place for policy 
initiation and policy output. As an event., the summit creates the impulse to produce 
deliverables every six months. In short it is a decision 'making' forum. 
The EU-UJS Summit is highly criticised, particularly in the EU, where there has 
been a push to make it a more effective policy producer. It is argued that the summit 
structure undermines the quality of NTA deliverables. Deliverables lack substance 
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because the pressure to produce them leads officials to try to co-ordinate as long a list 
of potential deliverables as possible. ' 39 The pressure to produce deliverables every six 
months means that many statements and declarations are superficial or re-cycled. The 
frequency of the summits has been highlighted by a number of officials as a source of 
'NTA fatigue'. 140 Officials argue that time consuming preparation for meetings and 
the short time span between summits undermines the quality of deliverables. A 
Commission official argued that, 'We cannot deliver in six months! It turns the 
process into a conveyor belt; deliverables get resold or turned into sudo deliverables. ' 
14 1A Communication from the Commission to the Council (2001) suggested that an 
annual summit should replace the biannual format. 142 
EU-US Summits are where 'big decisions' are made, but the scope for 
intergovernmental decision taking is limited by time constraints. The Commission 
Communiqu6 (2001) made the case for summits being more focused, having clearer 
priorities and a limited number of strategic policy themes. The need to 'manage' the 
dialogue highlights the important role played by the NTA institutions at a sub-summit 
level, specifically the Senior Level Group. The densest level of contacts take place at 
lower levels between the political and economic working groups. In what resembles a 
pyramid structure the SLG connects the 'expert' level and the 'political' level. It pulls 
the NTA process together. Z71 
""' Intervie\N, Commission official, September 1999 (6). 
140 Arguments to this eff-ect made by Commission officials in Brussels (1999) and Washington (2000) 
(6,4,15.3 1.33.55) as well as a Finnish Council Presidency Representative, Brussels, September 1999 
(5) and a US State Department Official. Washington 2000 (44). 
"' lnterýie\ý, Commission official, Brussels, 1999 (9). 
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Transgovern mental Institutions 
The importance of NTA institutions is further highlighted by the fact that transatlantic 
decisions are complicated by technical as well as political differences. Even where the 
EU and the US agree at an intergovernmental level to pursue co-operation, facilitating 
joint action is difficult. Both the EU and the US have demonstrated 'capabilities- 
expectations gaps' in different policy sectors. For example, US officials argue that the 
weak EU JHA pillar blocks more aggressive EU-US co-operation under the global 
challenges chapter of the NTA, whereas EU officials argue that the US federal system 
blocks co-operation on TEP services. 143 
Given the many obstacles to policy co-ordination, caused by for example structural 
differences, the NTA institutions are designed to get experts talking and to get 
transgovernmental actors to assess how the EU and the US can co-operate under the 
I mandate' of the NTA. The vast range of working groups, which are unparalleled in 
any other dialogue, identify areas 'where the EU and the US can co-ordinate efforts 
(see chapters 6 and 7). The SLG is the filter of the process. It is a cross-cutting 
institution that brings together political and economic officials and facilitates 
interagency co-ordination. Overall, one Commission official argues, 'It means getting 
bureaucrats to work on new subjects and new challenges. ' 144 
Like the summit, there has been some debate recently on the effectiveness of the 
NTA institutions. In principle the SLG should serve as the 'engine' room of the NTA, 
driving the process by seeking out deliverables and elevating them to the political 
level it. Others have argued that the SLG is more like a waiting room or a 'mailbox' 
particularly for issues areas that do not make it onto the summit agenda. In addition it 
14' One Commission official aroued. however that the Council favours the biannual format so that each 
inember state has the opportunitý to head the FJJ-US Sunimit. (Interview 9).. 
14', Interviews, US Mission, Council Secretariat and Commission September 1999 (3,6,7, ). 
144 Interview, Commission Delegation, Washington DC, October 2000 (3 1 ). 
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has been argued that the SLG could be more fruitful if there was better follow up on 
deliverables. 145 However, enforcing the follow up of all issues Is time consuming and 
resource intensive. The Commission (2001) argues that the NTA process should be 
adjusted to increase the managerial role of the SLG and to give the NTA Task Force a 
more operational responsibility. The push from the Commission to decentralise more 
'shaping' duties is demonstrated by its argument that, 'The Senior Level Group should 
provide the oversight and drive while the Task-Force is responsible for monitoring and 
ensuring the operational follow-up' (Commission 2001). 
Finally the Early Warning System outlined in section 3 demonstrates the need to 
fortify stronger conflict resolution and prevention systems in EU-US relations. 
Although in theory the system is designed to foster dialogue and exchange information 
which may prevent future conflicts, over for example hush kits, in practice the system 
is most likely to on technical, rather than political, issues controlled-by bureaucrats. 
Although legislators can potentially play a crucial role in the early warning system, the 
system as it is designed does not foster enough contact between NTA institutions and 
legislators. The weak TLD and the domestic orientation of the US Congress is also 
blamed for the ineffective system. In reality it is legislators that have a more vested 
interest in protecting domestic over international or transatlantic interests. 
Trangovernmental networks, technocrats and transparency 
The new type of governance employed at the transatlantic level marks a distinct 
change from traditional diplornacy. Decisions are now being made by a variety of 
actors at various levels ot'decision making. What has developed is both a bottorn up 
and a top down process. Much more emphasis has been placed on decision 'shaping' 
14S Intervie\N, US State Depatinient. Washington DC. October 2000 (44). 
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and 'setting, thus a degree of control over the decision making process has been 
transferred to the transgovernmental level. 
Trans governmental communication is seen as a means of facilitating increased co- 
operation because technocratic decision setting and shaping lowers the threshold for 
disagreement between actors, in part because the NTA process is designed to find 
areas where the EU and the US can co-operate. In short it de-politicises issues by 
placing them in the hands of policy experts. Undemocratic decision making has been 
somewhat intentionally melded into the transatlantic policy making process. As 
discussed in chapter 3, some of the steps towards transatlantic institutionalisation were 
purposely designed not to attract attention. They are bureaucratic agreements that 
avoid legislation and the involvement of Congress. The method of institutionalisation 
used by the EU and the US is comparable to European integration by stealth. Thus, 
like the EU, transatlantic decision making encounters similar problems of legitimacy. 
The nature of the policies pursued by the NTA further illustrates the function of 
the bureaucratic decision taking. New technology and concentration on regulatory 
standards means that the policy making process has become very technocratic and 
tends to yield debates high above the head of average citizens. Policy networks and 
epistemic communities have been employed to assist decision-makers. The need for 
'expert , consultation and the employment of transgovernmental rather than strictly 
intergovernmental networks means that policy makers often rely on non-elected bodies 
to 'shape' decisions that affect the general population. Still, many transgoverpmental 
institutions deal with 'low' rather than 'high' security issues. Co-ordinating 
humanitarian aid. lav, - enforcement co-operation and education can be facilitated by 
dialogue between policy experts rather than politicians. 
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Technocratic decision making under the NTA has highlighted the need for 
transparency in the process and the input of civil society. The next chapter identifies 
how transnational networks have been brought into the NTA as a means of increasing 
transparency in the policy making process, thereby securing the wider legitimacy of 
transatlantic decisions. 
Conclusion 
The transatlantic mechanisms created in the process of institutional i sation have led to 
the creation of dense networks between the EU and the US. These networks, in turn, 
became transatlantic decision making forums. Here, communication between EU and 
US counterparts forms the closest thing there is to a transatlantic 'policy process'. 
The transatlantic structure, however, has had to accommodate different 
competencies of decision making in the EU and the US and thus separate processes 
have been established. As a result, there are multiple layers of contact in the 
transatlantic dialogue, represented by three different branches of governmental 
dialogue. While the EU-US Summit is the intergovernmental forum for decision 
making, many trans governmental actors influence the process in a shaping and setting 
capacity at the sub-summit level. These institutions, particularly the Senior Level 
Group, formulate the impulse for co-operation by seeking out deliverables, and by 
producing a forum for conflict prevention under the early warning system. 
As noted in chapter '), the capacity of the NTA process to facilitate co- 
operation and prevent conflict is highly criticised. This chapter discussed the limits of 
I isputes and to the NTA institutions. It was argued that the ability to defuse political di 
make transatlantic policies rests on the political will of intergovernmental actors. 
Many more actors liave a capacity to shape and set the policy details under the 
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'mandate' of policy reach established by history making decisions. The need to co- 
ordinate many different tiers of policy shaping highlights the important role that NTA 
institutions play in 'managing' the transatlantic dialogue. 
Finally, the technocratic nature of bureaucratic decision shaping and setting 
has raised some questions about the legitimacy of the process. The next chapter 
discusses transatlantic attempts to 'legitimise' the process by giving transnational 
actors an institutionalised role in shaping transatlantic policies. 
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Chapter 5 
Transnational Policy Shaping and the Transatlantic Civil Society 
The institutions created by the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) have increased the 
scope for transgovernmental actors to influence transatlantic decisions. This chapter 
examines how the NTA and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) have also 
encouraged the build up of transnational networks. Ad hoe dialogues between, for 
example, educators and scientists were sponsored through the NTA process as a way 
of 'building bridges' across the Atlantic. This chapter focuses on interest groups that 
were formally invited to participate in the policyrnaking process, including the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue 
(TACD), the Transatlantic Environmental Dialogue, (TAED) and the Transatlantic 
Labour Dialogue (TALD). The chapter discusses the implications of the input of 
business and 'civil society' into the transatlantic decision making process and 
questions whether these dialogues point to a 'decentralisation' of transatlantic decision 
'shaping' to private, transnational networks. It is argued that while all of these 
dialogues clearly participate in the process, only the TABD is a true policy 'shaper. ' 
The main aims of this chapter are to analyse the institutionalisation of the 
networks, the level of formal access they are given to transatlantic decision takers and 
the impact they have had in 'shaping' transatlantic decisions. The organisation and 
orientation of the dialogues is discussed, as is the frequency of contact with 
transgovernmental and intergovernmental actors. Measuring the 'Impact' of these 
dialognics is more dill-IcLilt. As this research is interview driven. the success of these 
dialogues is measured b) the impact that both their member and EU and US officials 
'perceive" them to have had on the transatlantic policy process. 
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Finally, in relation to the wider discussion on the institutionalisation of the 
transatlantic relations, this chapter questions why the transatlantic dialogues make a 
difference to the transatlantic policy process. What encouraged the transatlantic 
architects to offer government sponsorship of private networks, particularly in the US 
where this runs against the norm? It is argued that the dialogues were seen as useful 
additions to the NTA process first, as a way to gain effective policy solutions, and 
second, as a means of making the policy process more open and transparent. 
Section I examines the TABD. Section 2 looks at the TACD and TAED and 
section 33 discusses the TALD, or lack thereof Each section outlines the creation of the 
dialogues, their structures and policy recommendations, their access to, and impact on, 
the transatlantic process. Section 4 assesses the capacity of these groups to serve as 
policy advisors. It is argued that the inclusion of multiple groups with a variety of 
interests and varied access to the process creates problems for policy 'setters, ' but that 
issue orientated, multi-dialogue task forces are one way to facilitate consensus 
building between the dialogues. 
1) The Transatlantic Business Dialogue 
The Transatlantic Business Dialogue is the most established of the transatlantic 
dialogues. It was conceived (in 1994) and launched (in 1995) before the NTA, but has 
been hailed as a major success story of the new transatlantic dialogue. . 
The TABD was the invention of the late US Commerce Secretary Ron 
Brown. 146 A formal business dialogue was seen as a means of securing greater US 
business support for the Commerce department. which was under threat from 
Congress, and a way to boost the impact of European business on EU level 
1ý " Brown ( 1994) ar m aued, 
in a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels that EU-US 
business co-ordination on transatlantic trade issues was an important part ofliberalisation. 
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negotiations. The TABD was also conceptualised as a way to secure greater support 
for the US in transatlantic negotiations. As Cowles (2001: 232) argues, 'US 
government officials were convinced, moreover, that their negotiating position would 
coincide much more closely with the US-EU business communities stance than would 
that of the European Commission. ' 
Although the creation of the TABD was initially controversial in the US, the 
main challenge was to gain European support for the process. 
1 47 Cowles (2001: 238) 
notes that European business lacked organisation at the EU level. The Commission's 
DGI initially opposed the creation of a business dialogue without labour, consumer or 
environmental dialogues. The Transatlantic Policy Network (TPN), a dialogue 
between legislators and businesses, was influential in getting European industry and 
officials involved. The TPN was able to draw on its extensive European business 
contacts, and active TPN members, such as Ford, Xerox, Daimler Chrysler, EDS and 
AOL, also became heavily involveý in the TABD. 148 
In the end, it was the support of US Commerce Secretary Brown, 
Commissioner Brittan (External Relations) and Commissioner Bangemann 
(Enterprise) that facilitated the inauguration of the TABD. They invited industry 
leaders to comment on the creation of a transatlantic business forum. The Commerce 
Department and the Commission also actively participated in the first TABD meeting 
in Sevi e. 
149 
Despite differences European and American business approaches to the 
dialogue. the launch was deemed a success and the group reached consensus on over 
"- CoýN les (see 200 1 and 1996) argues that American businesses, the State Department and the USTR 
were initialk lukexarni to the idea. In particular the US a(, encies feared it was a way for the Commerce 
Department to shape trade negotiations. 
The close relationship between the TABD and TPN is demonstrated in part by the fact that they 
share office space as well as contact lists. 
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70 joint recommendations. A few months later roughly 60% of the TABD 
recommendations resurfaced in the NTA and the Joint Action Plan noted the 
governments' intent to take the recommendations of the TABD into consideration 
when creating the New Transatlantic Marketplace (see also Cowles 2001). 
How the TABD works 
The TABD is not a traditional lobbying organisation. Rather, it is a forum for 
consensus reaching between European and American business with the aim of 
boosting trade and investment. The overall purpose of the TABD is to assist the 
government in facilitating trade liberalisation. I ýOAs one TABD official argued, 
PoliC 'Industry consensus is a 'y tool. ý 
151 Since its creation the TABD has aimed to 
promote integration between the EU and the US by providing progress reports of 
where the American and European industry feel co-operation is both necessary and 
feasible. It produces biannual recommendations on specific policy sectors. 152 It exerts 
political pressure on USTR and the Commission to follow up on recommendations. 
Following the EU-US Bonn Summit (1999), the TABD also decided to participate in 
the Early Warning System, expanding its policy reach to areas of potential dispnte. It 
is credited with convincing the Commission to push back policy changes on metric 
labelling and a gelatine ban, both of which had the potential to erupt into EU-US trade 
disputes. 
Throughout the 1990s, the TABD became both highly institutional 1 sed and 
organised. Despite the insistence by its participants that the TABD is a process as 
""' Cowles (200 1: 243) notes. for example, that American business-people arrived at the mectings 
carrvin- Commerce Department briefing packs. 
I ntervieývv. TABD Participant, Brussels, September 1999 (20). 
"' IntervieNN,, TABD official, Brussels, September 1999 (14) 
"' These include but are not limited to the Information Technology Agreement, E-Commerce, 
Intellectual Property Ri-ghts and the Mutual Recognition A-g-reernents. 
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opposed to an organisation, it has nevertheless developed into a transatlantic 
'institution'. 153 It held annual CEO meetings since 1995 (see also table 5.1). 154 
established two small secretariats (with less than five permanent staff) in Washington 
and Brussels and appointed rotating company chairs (CEOs), one American one 
European, to lead the dialogue in annual terms. ' 55 
The TABD chairs are just a fraction of the many companies who have. a stake 
in the TABD. Growing participation, from an initial 60 to 200 CEOs, gave the process 
broader legitimacy. The TABD is carried by a number of companies who, as active 
members, participate more regularly in specific policy sectors through TABD working 
groups. A TABD official admits that in some sectors the number of companies 
involved is small, but that, 'in general if a corporation lends their CEO to something, 
they are highly engaged. ' Membership of the TABD is open, but it has been criticised 
in the past for excluding certain sectors- such as generic pharmaceutical firms and 
small and medium sized enterprises. 156 
The build up of TABD structures points to a growing interest in eff6ctively 
managing the process. 1 'ý7 Each of the TABD's company chairs (see table 5.4) has 
153 Interview, TABD participant Brussels, September 1999 (20). See also Cowles 2001. 
"' The meetings were held in Seville, in Chicago (1996), Rome (1997), Charlotte (1998), Berlin (1999) 
Cincinnati (2000) and Stockholm (2001). 
155 The TABD chair companies provide office space for the American secretariat (in Europe the 
secretariat is housed with the TPN) and provide the budget for TABD costs. The precise figure of the 
budget is difficult to pinpoint. It varies from year to year depending on the co-chair companies, and can 
vary from $250,000-$500,000. This sum funds the EU and US TABD offices, the secretariat salaries and 
TABD functions. However, the total costs of the TABD are difficult to quantify because the funding 
arrangement between the TABD and the participant companies are based on a 'loose structure'. Mid 
Year Meetings, receptions and conference costs often have separate sources of funding, in the case of 
the conference there is local sponsoring from the host cities. Interviews, US TABID, EU TABD and 
TABD participant, Brussels and Washington 1999,2000 (14,20,53). 
15 ' Generic firms initially complained that they had been kept out of the process, but were later brought 
into the TABD pharmaceutical working group and Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) were 
given a voice in the process through the Transatlantic Small Business Initiative and the priority group 
on SMEs. The Transatlantic Small Business Initiative was launched for companies that were outsized in 
the TABD. It holds summit meetings and operates on a working group structure, but is larpely 
represented in the political arena by the TABD. 
Originallý, the TABD was based on four workin groups- (I regulatory issues (2) trade 91, 
liberalisation (3) investment and (4) third country relations. Following the Seville meeting 15 working 
groups were established. The Tenneco and Mead leadership (1997) introduced more issue managers to 
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played a role in developing the dialogue. 159 In 2001, the TABD chairs created a CEO 
level 'Leadership Team' to deal with developing 'priority issue' areas (see figure 5.1). 
In addition, 17 4experC level groups, an expert Steering Group and Issue Managers 
were established to interact with working level government contacts in a range of 
policy sectors. 
The new TABD structure aimed to 'create more energy in the dialogue by 
focusing CEO and government attention on more defined and actionable issues. " 59 
The leadership team encouraged proposals from TABD members to bring forward 
proýjccts, that were specific and detailed. Business leaders feared that the TABD would 
develop into a chat shop rather than a decision shaping forum. 160 Thus, the TABD 
chairs stressed the importance of concrete action- through strategic action and detailed 
policy recommendations. The new structures were designed to take technical issues 
and elevate them to higher political levels. The goal was to produce 'ready made' 
policy solutions, thus increasing the 'impact' or shaping capacity of the TABD. The 
introduction of the Early Warning priority issues reaffirmed the TABD commitment to 
dispute management and the new expert groups demonstrated the focus on monitoring 
not only ongoing policy negotiations but also implementation. For example, six of the 
groups dealt with policy sectors where MR-As had been or were being negotiated (see 
chapter 7). 
(let more companies involved and put the working groups under three core areas- the Transatlantic 
Advisory Committee on Standards, Business Facilitation and Global Issues, By 2000 the structure of the 
TABD expanded to five working groups and roughly 40 issue groups, each of which was also co- 
chaired by an American and a European company. 
'ý' Cowles (200 1) notes for example that the Tenneco-Philips team (1997) tried to make the TABD 
more efficient by getting more companies involved at a higher level. Daimler-Benz AG and Warner- 
Larnbert (1998) focused on the implernentation of TABD recommendations and introduced the TABD 
Scorecard (see below). Xerox and Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux tried to re-enforce small informal contact 
between CEOs and hi-h level decision makers as well as expert level contacts between TABD 
participants and Agency Directors, such as the Secretary of Commerce. 
's" See wý, vv, -. tabd. Coiu 
'6" Interview, TABD participant. Brussels, September 1999 (20). 
135 
The TABD process centres around the annual CEO conference, which 
typically takes place a month before the EU-US Summit. The meeting is used first, to 
identify areas of business consensus, and second as a forum for CEOs to meet with 
high level officials in the US Administration, the Commission, Congress and the 
European Parliament. 161 TABD formally presents its recommendations to officials 
after the meetings. In addition. TABD chairs have had the opportunity to discuss 
issues with intergovernmental actors at numerous EU-US Summit meetings (see table 
5.2). 
While the EU-US Summits are useful for publicity and even for short 
discussion of key issues, the real point of access for TABD members lies elsewhere. 
The importance of expert level talks is demonstrated by the appointment of issue 
managers and working level government contacts, which also take place at the annual 
meeting. Expert discussions are incorporated, with the results of the CEO dialogue, in 
the CEO Conference Report. Another mechanism that incorporates both CEO level 
and 'expert level' input is the Mid Year meeting and annual TABD Scorecard, which 
monitors government follow up on TABD proposals. Further policy recommendations 
are produced as a result of frequent working group and issue group meetings. Each 
issue manager has an EU and US government contact and the US Administration has 
created an interagency task force to work with the TABD. The TABD structure results 
in dense levels of formal and informal government-business contacts. 
What an impact 
Establishing a causal relationship between TABD recommendations and transatlantic 
policies is troublesome. not least because much contact between the TABD and the 
16 1 Government attendees of the TABD surnmit have included the EU Commissioner for Trade, the EU 
Commissioner for Enterprise and Information Society. the US Commerce Secretary, the USTR, the US 
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EU and US goverm-nents is conducted informally or behind closed doors. 162 
Government response to policy recommendations is arguably important, but do the 
acknowledgement of those proposals, the initiation of policy changes, or 
implementations of recommendations define success? One accomplishment was 
simply the establishment of a European-American business dialogue. However, the 
many perceptions about the TABD, outlined below, emphasise the capacity of the 
dialogue to impact transatlantic policy making. 
The TABD Scorecard is one attempt to assess where the EU and the US have 
acted or failed to act on the basis of formal TABD recommendations. The 1999 
Scorecard estimated that the governments had taken concrete action on several of 
TABD's policy proposals. A TABD participant suggested, 'About one-third our 
proposals are solidly on their way. Another one-third have not necessarily 
implemented [yet] but are by definition successes. ' 163 US Vice President Al Gore 
reaffirmed the success of the TABD, claiming the governments had implemented 50% 
of 129 TABD recommendations. 164 The overall majority of interviewees argued that 
the TABD had played an important role in the NTA process. ' 65 A testimony to the 
value of the TABD is the continued business and government commitment. to the 
process five years on. 166 The TABD is arguably an important part of the business 
community, 
167 
a powerful lobby 
168 
and an important player in the NTA process. 
169 
Vice President and the WTO Director. 
162 Access to the annual meeting between officials and CEOs is closed to both the press and academic 
observers. Access became more restrictive with the Berlin CEO Conference as CEO demand for 
invitations increased. The author was offered access to the press core, but not to working group or 
plenary meetings in either 1999 or 2000. 
Interview TABD participant, Brussels, September, 1999 (20). 
Speech -iven to TABD at Charlotte Meetino 1998. 
Includin- TABD officials and participants. EU and US officials and NGOs. 
166 A Commerce Department official noted for example that at least three staff members in the Europe 
office devoted 50 per cent of their time to the TABD prior to its annual meeting. 
IntervieýN. Brussels, September 1999 (20). 
Interview TABD office and US Mission Brussels, September 1999 (14,4). 
169 Interview, US Mission. Brussels, September 1999 (7). 
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Officials argued that it provided leadership and direction in NTA negotiations and 
facilitated the MR-As (see chapter 7), the Safe Harbour Agreement and multilateral 
agreements on intellectual property rights and Information Technology. 170 A 
Commission official argued that, 'the TABD plays an important and positive role. It 
helps determine priorities, keeps us on track and makes us deliver on time or else 
explain why we cannot. ' 171 The Journal of Commerce stated, 'Organised, plugged-in 
and persistent, the business dialogue has been setting the tone for trade talks between 
Brussels and Washington. 172 Cowles (2001: 230) contends that, 'the TABD has played 
a critical role not merely in setting the agenda for transatlantic trade discussions, but 
also participating in US-EU negotiations and shaping domestic-level support for their 
agenda. ' 
A number of TABD members initially complained about the slow government 
response to many of its proposals, but they came to realise that full implementation of 
it recommendations would be timely (Cowles 2001). A TABD participant argued that, 
'traditionally members are permanently grumbling about the reaction time, but we are 
still on board. ' 173 Generally, TABD participants are impressed with the level of access 
that TABD membership allows and the impact that the dialogue has had on the policy 
process. The benefits to one company- EDS- were summarised by a representative 
who argued that, 'Taking TABD leadership has both provided credibility for EDS staff 
in their consequent and subsequent involvement in actual negotiations with 
government. and led to tangible results. For example, the ongoing moratorium on 
'-"See also Cowles (1996: 21). ar-ues, 'Lconornically. the TAB D has provided -government 
leadership 
with clear neg-otiating direction and has improved the prospects for trade liberalisation. Politically, the 
TABD has emerged as an important component of larger transatlantic relations'. 
Interview, Commission Dele-ation Washin-ton, October 2000 (35). 1 Zý 17' Journal of Commerce, 5 February 1998 
1, Interview, TABD participant, Brussels. September 1999 (20). 
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imposing tariffs on E-commerce would probably not have occurred without the TABD 
or some other vehicle. " 74 
A voice of dissent in the appraisal of the TABD comes in response to claims 
that business has played a dominant role in the policy process vis-ý-vis other dialogues 
(I see also below). In particular, Commission officials have argued that the TABD is not 
as important as it perceives itself to be. It has been accused of being self- 
congratulatory and a product of government rhetoric. ' 75 Another Commission official 
added that it was impossible to tell if transatlantic polices were the result of TABD. A 
USTR official agreed, stating that, 'things are not just happening because the TABD 
says so. " 76 Nonetheless, even sceptics agreed that the TABD was 'shaping' if not 
'making' policy. One NGO argued, 'even if they are not as powerful as they say, they 
still have extra CIOUt., 
177 
2) The Transatlantic Consumer and Environmental Dialogues 
Building 'people to people' links was identified by the NTA as an important tool for 
securing broad public support for the transatlantic partnership. Originally, the idea was 
to create a civil society dialogue that could incorporate business, trade unions and 
citizens associations. 178 The TEP invited consumer and environmental groups to 
participate in the process 4on issues relevant to international trade as a constru . ctive 
contribution to policy making. ' 179 
Intervie\ý. TABD Participant. Brussels. via ernail 1999 (27). 
Interview, Commission official, September 1999 (6). 
17(, Interview, IJ STR official, October 2000 (42). 
17,7 Interview, US NGO. October 2000 (50). 
178 The idea rose OLIt Of a 1999 NTA 'building bridges' conference. People to People Conference 
Report. 
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Figure 5.1 The TABD Structure (2001) 
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"I Italics added by author. 
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The decision to include consumers, environmentalists and workers in the 
transatlantic dialogue was the result of pressure from NGOs, the European 
Commission and eventually the US State Department. The success of the TABD 
sparked criticism from the NGO community who in 1995 argued that the decision- 
making capacity of the TABD within the NTA was unbalanced by an absence of civil 
society input. ' 80 The initial push from NGOs for access to the TABD was denied, but 
NGO lobbying efforts raised awareness in the EU and US administrations of the 
growing need to legitimise the Process. 191 
Consumers International (CI) lobbied the Commission, particularly DOI, who 
Cowles (2001: 242) contends, had previously advocated participation from the 'wider 
public interest. ' The Commission's mandate to support consumers and 
environmentalists increased with the Amsterdam Treaty, and DGI gained support for 
civil society dialogues from the Health and Consumer Protection and Environmental 
Protection DGs (Bignami and Charnovitz 2001: 24). Growing opposition from the US 
NGO Public Citizen to the TABD and increasing demands from environmental groups 
put pressure on the US State Department. 182 Finally, NGOs used formal channels to 
respond to the US Federal Register notice on the TEP. 1 83 
Although the main push for the civil society dialogues came from the 
Commission, the State Department was crucial in securing US funds for the consumer 
and environmental dialogues. Unlike the business dialogue, the NGO dialogues could 
not be launched without a financial commitment from the governments. Funding was 
found with relative ease on the European side where the Commission had a history of 
180 1 Fhe TACD (Doc 1-99) ar, --, Lies that public 
interest groups demands since 1995 to participate in the 
process did not result in formal, or even inconsistent informal dialogue despite government support for 
the TABD. 
... Interviews. TACD Secretariat. London, January 2000 (23-24). Commission Delegation, Washington, 
October 2000 (34). 
is, lntervicýk. TACD Secretariat, January 2000 (23-24). 
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funding NGOs. However, the US government does not generally fund the private 
sector. In this case the US Information Agency (USIA) within the State Department 
was able to find funds for both the TACD and the TAED under a scholarship budget 
line subject to approval by the Senate Finance Committee. ' 94 Consumer International- 
the designated grant receiver for the TACD- was given roughly $60,000 from USIA 
and 110,000 euros from the Commission. The US based National Wildlife Federation 
(NWF) and Brussels based European Environmental Bureau were . given $100,000 
from USIS and 200,000 euros from the Commission. 
Government sponsorship of the TACD and TAED in general and the use of 
public funds specifically enabled, but also undermined, the initial attempts to build 
both dialogues. Unlike European NGOs, many US groups were not accustomed to 
receiving public funds and few organisations allowed government funding: 185 us 
NGOs feared that the consumer dialogue and environmental dialogues were attempts 
to legitimise the liberalisation policies employed under the New Transatlantic 
Marketplace. The Corporate European Observer (CEO), which had developed into a 
NGO 'TABD' watchdog, argued that the consumer and environmental dialogues 
symbolised attempts to 'greenwash' the TER 186 TAED and TACD members objected 
to being hired to patronise government policies or to act as 'contracted civil 
societyý. 1 87 The TAED, which contained no pro-globalisation NGOs, stressed that its 
creation in response to bilateral government initiatives under the NTA was in no way 
intended to legitimise these procedures (TAED Press Release, May 3,1999). The 
'g' A NWF Trade Discussion Paper 1998 argues that the TEP seems to be largely the result of TABD 
input. 
N4 Interview, TAED participant, Washington DC, October 2000 (30). 
185 The TAED had problerns finding a US NGO to manage the grant before the NWF reluctantly agreed 
to accept the funds. Three quarters of the TACD original Steering Groups' charters prohibited public Zý funds. Interview, TACD Secretariat, via telephone March 2000 (24); TAED official, Washington 
October 2000 (30). 
186 CEO 1998aý I 998b. see also De Brie 1998. 
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European Environmental Bureau (EEB) stressed in its funding application to the 
Commission that, 'financial support for the TAED should not lead to management of 
the agenda of TAED by the sponsors, but rather by the participants. " 88 Public Citizen 
President Ralph Nader tried to block the creation of the TACD by arguing that it 
would create the 'illusion of consultation and participation' and be misused as a public 
relations ploy. 189 
The divide within the consumer dialogue on the issue of trade liberalisation 
surfaced at its first meeting in September 1998, which was attended by roughly 50 
consumer vroups. The meeting was overshadowed by the dispute between Public 
Citizen (led by Ralph Nader), which opposes trade liberalisation, and Consumer Union 
(led by Rhona Karpatkin), which supports it as a means of increasing consumer 
choice. 190 A 'devastating' speech by Nader and three outbursts from American 
consumer groups during the first meeting led one EU official to argue that, 'the 
meeting was a disaster. The groups needed to figure out how to organise themselves. ' 
191 In the end, the vote to establish the TACD was won by a narrow margin. Faced 
with the decision to be on the inside or outside of the process, Public Citizen became a 
Steering Group Member. 192 
The TAED experienced similar, if not as dramatic, challenges in getting off the 
ground. It held its first official meeting in May 1999. Again, there was some 
disagreement on whether government officials should participate (see Bignami and 
Charnovitz 2001). An American NGO indicated that, 'there was a lot of hesitation at 
"- Interview. European Commission Delegation, Washington DC. 2000 (34). TACD Secretariat, 
London, January 2000 (23). 
18s A Draft Political Assessment of on Year. TAED Mav 2000. 
See also Bignami and Charnovitz (2001). 
Interview European Commission Delegation and US State Department October 2000 (34,47). See 
also Bianami and Charnovitz 200 1. 
'9' Interview, Commission Delegation, Washington DC, October 2000 (34). 
Interview, Commission Delegation, Washington DC. October 2000 (34). 1 Zý 
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first about the TAED on the US NGOs side, and there is still a great deal of uneasiness 
about what the governments have in mind for these dialogues. ' 
193 
European NGOs pushed hard for the TAED. In the letter of invitation to join, 
the leader of the EEB, John Horletz, argued that the TAED could increase the 
effectiveness of co-operation and joint action among groups, provide highly effective 
mechanisms for challenging concerns to policy makers and enable NGOs to serve its 
members and the public with up to date information. TAED membership was 
officially opened to all NGOs, but no attempt was made to recruit 'free market' 
environmentalists (Bignami and Charnovitz 2001: 40). Public Citizen also took a 
TAED Steering Committee seat. Friends of the Earth (1999) argued that TAED 
participation members should monitor the use of the TEP to promote a new WTO 
Round and unbalanced power relations between actors in the process. 
The difficult birth of the TAED and TACD highlights differences in 
approaches to private-public relations in Europe and the US. Most problems setting up 
the dialogues stemmed from the culture of interaction between NG. Os and the US 
Administration, which is generally described as 'hostile', 'adversarial' and guided by 
great distrust'. 194 One US State Department official pointed out that, 'The concept 
that TACD should make decisions with the US government goes against everything 
US NGOs stand for. ' 19 - The US Administration is required to publicly seek and accept 
comments from non-governmental actors under the Federal Administrative Procedures 
Act, but many NGOs were not accustomed to receiving government response to their 
recommendations unless they had demonstrated the capacity to block trade initiatives 
or make a public impact (Bignarm and Charnovitz 2001: 41). The result is that 
11) ý11 April 1999, TIES intervicýN kNith Jake Caldwell. 
19ý lntervie\A TACD participant and USTR official Washington DC October 2000 (42,50). 
19ý Interview, State Department official, Washington DC, October 2000 (47). 
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American NGOs are more accustomed to using lawsuits than dialogue to shape 
po liCy. 
196 
The initial response of American officials to the TACD and TAED 
demonstrated the poor relationship between NGOs and the US government. 197 Early 
problems with the TACD were attributed to its management by USTR, which was 
accused of being critical and belittling of the dialogue. 198 Part of the problem was that 
the TACD co-ordinator was charged with fostering a dialogue that - at times- went 
against the grain of USTR's trade agenda. The shift of the TACD co-ordinator to the 
State Department- where the TAED was co-ordinated- helped to foster better dialogue. 
TACD officials argue that the State Department was more diplomatic and granted 
consumers more meetings. 199 The Bureau for Business and Economic Affairs, led by 
Tony Wayne, and the Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Frank Loy, are 
credited with supporting the dialogues and overcoming gaps between NGOs and the 
US Administration. 
Still, the general perception is that TAED and TACD were quickly able to gain 
a better rapport with the Commission. European NGOs were perceived to have a better 
working relationship with each other and with the Commission because private-public 
dialogue is arguably an important part of the European decision making process. 
European groups are described as having a more 'cordial' relationship with the 
Commission 200 and the Commission works under the assumption that it needs civil 
society input. -' 01 One US official argued tliat, 'there is greater sympathy among both 
196 Interview, TACD participant. Washington DC, October 2000 (50). See also Cowles 1997 
19" The comments of one official dernonstrate the extreme position that, 'There is nothing we can learn 
from TACD. TAED. ' Interview US Ernbassy London January 2000 (22). Others argued that the TACD 
and TAED simply existed to oppose the TABD. Interview, USTR Washington DC, October 2000 (4 1). 
lntervie, ýý, European Commission De)etyation, Washington DC, October 2000 (34). 
'9" Interview. TACD Secretarial, London. Januarý 2000 (23). 
100 lntervieý, ý, TACD Participant, Washington DC, October 2000 (50). 
Interviews, USTR, Washington October 2000 (42) and Council Secretariat, Brussels, September 
1999(3). 
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sides of consumers for the way things are done in Europe. The EC has a different way 
of dealing with consumers. US Consumers believe they get more access and respect in 
Europe. , 202 
Once more, the Commission exerted pressure on US actors in the NTA Task 
Force and SLG meetings to 'establish the consumer and environmental dialogues, 
because the interests of civil society coincided with European positions on several 
looming trade disputes with the US. The TAED and TACD have made 
recommendations that support many of the Commissions' policies on food safety, 
privacy, electrical waste and the Precautionary Principle. 203 A TACD official argued 
that, 'where there is EU-US policy stalemate, civil society comes nearer to EU 
positions. Politically it is in the interest of EU to have US consumer movement on its 
side. ' 
204 
Figure 5.2 The TACD Structure 




GMOs, Antibiotics, BST, Dietary Consumer Protection, WTO Economic Regulation, Fair 
Supplements, Consumer Participation, Safe Harbor, Children and E- Trade, Pharmaceuticals 
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Participation, Global Protection 
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Interview. USTR, Washington, October 2000 (42). 
Interviews, TACD Secretariat and US Embassy London. 2000 (23,22). Commission Delegation. 
TACD Participant, Washington 2000 (34,50) and Council Secretariat and Commissioner, Brussels, 
September 1999 (3,11 ). 
'04 Interview, TACD Secretariat. London, January 2000 (23). 
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In general, Commission support helped legitimise the TAED and TACD process in the 
eyes of US NGOs, as groups in America realised they could draw on the success of 
their European counterparts. 205 After initially releasing a joint press release that 
criticised the TEP Action Plan, the TACD and TAED began -making policy 
recommendations, on a range of issue areas, to EU and US officials (see figure 5.3, 
5.4). TAED focused on safe energy sources, biotechnology, waste management and 
emissions standards. 206 The TACD, despite its shaky start, was also able to make over 
20 concrete recommendations at its second meeting, focusing on e-commerce, food 
safety and multilateral investment rules (see table 5.5 ). 207 
Organisation in the TACD and TAED 
Institutional is ing the consumer and environmental dialogues was a complicated task. 
Suspicion of government involvement meant that the groups chose to organise 
themselves, but the shaky start to both dialogues delayed the establishment of 
organisational structures. American NGOs, who had less experience working at an 
205 Interview USTR and US State Department October 2000 (42,47). 
206 To summarise, the TAED recommended the removal of subsidies for environmentally unfriendly 
energy sources (such as coal), demanded that sustainability assessments be applied to a number of WTO 
agreements and expressed it opposition to the multilateral TRIPs, Technical Barriers to Trade and SPS 
Agreements. It aired concerns about biotechnology, eco-labelling and the Precautionary Principle, the 
MRAs and Chemical and Electrical Waste Management (WEEEs) It stressed transparency in 
transatlantic and multilateral decision making, urged both governments to support the Kyoto Treaty and 
to stop challenging environmental legislation at the WTO. The message to the EU-US Summit, Lisbon 
May 3 1,2000 was that, 'Until such time as parity exists between environmental governance and 
multilateral trade rules, we demand that both the United States and the European Union immediately 
agree to mutual moratorium on WTO challenges and threatened challenges. ' 
2" The TACD has had a more technical focus on the transatlantic process because many consumer 
concerns are with regulatory issues. It made recommendations on consumer protection and E- 
Commerce, and in particular urged the EU and US to abandon the Safe Harbour agreement. It sided 
with the Commission on disclosure information for E-Commerce, argued GMOs should be labelled to 
ensure consumer choice, opposed the use of animal antibiotics and Bovine Growth Hormones and stated 
that the precautionary principle should apply in scientific cases where the evidence is not conclusive. 
While European scientists argue that the hormone is associated with different types of cancer the FDA 
claims Bovine Sornatotropin, or BST presents a 'manageable risk'. The US supports using 
biotechnology while European governments have argued with consumer and environmentalists in 
favour of the precautionary principle and of mandatory labelling n, 
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international level, had to establish how to work together (Bignami and Charnovitz 
2001 ). 208 Moreover, financial and time constraints made it difficult to encourage 
groups to take on managerial posts. 
The TACD soon emerged as the most institutional i sed of the civil society 
dialogues. The group established one secretariat, at Consumer International (CI) in 
London, because Cl was an international NGO and was able to accept grants from the 
US government and the Commission. Individuals at Cl are credited for their role in 
managing the dialogue. 209 The creation of a Steering Group put a core group of NGOs 
in charge of leading the dialogue (see table 5.4). Most of the other 60 consumer 
organisations participate in the TACD in the three working groups on food, electronic 
commerce and trade and Issue Managers are appointed for each main issue in the 
working groups (see figure 5.2). Each working group is co-chaired by EU and US 
managers who are in contact before annual general meetings to discuss the agenda, to 
commission reports, or identify areas for action. Within the groups, joint EU and US 
Issue Managers are charged with monitoring specific policy sectors. In general the 
groups interact through email list-serves and are working towards having more direct 
contact. TACD officials describe a fairly constant stream of communication between 
210 members . 
The TACD leadership has worked to produce effective mechanisms capable of 
producing concrete policy recommendations. It holds annual summit meetings similar 
to those of TABD where working group and high level discussions are held with EU 
208 Interview, European Commission Delegation, Washington DC, October 2000 (32). 
Interviews, USTR and US State Department, Washington DC, October 200 (42,47). 
Email correspondence. TACD Secretariat, June 2001, (6 1), Interview, US NGO, Washington, 
October 2000 (50). 
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and US official S. The Steering Group publishes a report of summit findings and 
presents them to the appropriate government officials before the biannual EU-US 
Summit. The December 1999 Summit in Washington D. C. was the first to which the 
TACD was invited. 
The TAED established similar structures to the TACD. It has five working 
groups (see figure 5.33) who meet in conjunction with the annual general meeting and 
carry out infon-nal contact through Issue Managers. Certain working groups have 
designated issue co-ordinators for policy areas that overlap working groups. The 
Steering Group guides the dialogue and has decision making authority over funding, 
budget activities and the output of TAED documentation. It meets at an annual. general 
meeting, and holds additional strategy meetings throughout the year. Unlike the 
TABD and TACD, the TAED does not have a secretariat. Rather it has a system of co- 
ordinators who perform the administrative functions of dialogue. 212 In the past TAED 
grant holders (the EEB and the NWF) acted as co-ordinators. In 2000, however, the 
US TAED members failed to produce a co-ordinator or a number of working group 
chairs. 
Despite early objections to the participation of government officials, EU and 
US officials have been well represented at TAED meetings, where both high level and 
2.13 
expert level contact (between the working groups and officials) takes place . Like 
the TABD and TACD the annual TAED meeting produces recommendatiom, which 
2'' Government representatives at TACD meetings have included the US Secretary for Agriculture, the 
EU Commissioner for Health and Protection, US Congressmen, the Deputy USTR, Deputy Head of the 
Commission Delegation and NTA Task force level representatives. 
2'2 Discussion papers, articles and updates are provided on the 0 groups' web site, which 
is co-sponsored 
bý the Transatlantic Information Exchange Service Network (see xvw%A,. tiesweb. or,, ). 
Past participants include the EU Trade Commissioner, the EU Environmental DG, the Assistant and 
Deputý Assistant Secretary for the Environment in US State Department and EU Council Presidency 
representatives. Some TAED members have complained about the absence of the USTR. A Steering 
Group Member argued that the USTR had been asked to attend, given the attendance of Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy, but refused on the basis that the USTR was not the level as the EU Trade 
Commissioner. Interview, TAED, Brussels, May 2000 (27). 
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representatives had the opportunity to present to EU-US Summit leaders in 
Washington (1999) and Lisbon (2000) (see table 5.2). 
What Impact? 
The failure to fill vacancies in TAED posts demonstrates the lost momentum among 
US NGOs caused, in part, by TAED funding problems. In January 2000 the objection 
of Senator Jesse Helms, in the Senate Finance Committee, to funding for the TAED 
blocked the approval of funds, and stopped the State Department from issuing the 
grant. As a US State Department official argued, 'it would take a high level decision to 
fund grants over Helms' olýjection. We hope to convince him to release the funds. If 
that does not work, we will not fund over his objections. ' 214 The failure of the US 
Administration to produce funds has implications for the EU budget, because 
Commission funding is subject to the US's 'matched' funds. The lack of funds 
overshadowed the May 2000 TAED meeting in Brussels, where co-ordinators 
acknowledged that they had been without funds for months. 215 In November 2000, the 
TAED announced a suspension of activities. John Hontelez, Secretary General of the 
EEB and member of the Steering Committee of the TAED argued, 
We have to stop our activities because the US government has not been able to 
provide its part of the necessary finances to run this dialogue. It has faced 
opposition in the Senate, and apparently, it is not giving it enough priority. The 
US government has always pretended the TAED is of great importance to 
them. This failure however does not confirm this. 
The TACD and TAED were encouraged by the US Administration to seek private 
sources of funding before the suspension of the TAED. State Department officials 
indicated that the 2000 TACD grant, which managed to pass Congressional 
114 Interview, US State Department, Washington DC 2000 (45). 
215 Interviews, TACD Participants, Brussels, May 200 (27,28,30). 
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Appropriations, would be the last. Despite earlier claims that the US Administration 
and European Commission should work to fund the dialogue, US officials argued that 
public funding was never a permanent arrangement. One official argued, 'It is not US 
government policy to fund NGOs. ' 216 The future of the TACD hinges on the capacity 
of the group to find private funding, which EU TACD officials have argued that they 
are aiming to do in order to continue the dialogue. 217 US TACD members were less 
optimistic about the future, and argued the importance of first assessing the impact of 
the dialogUe. 
218 
Figure 5.3 The TAED Structure 2000 
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'16 Interviews, US State Department. Washington, October 2000 (45,47). 
217 lntervieývv, TACD Secretariat, London, January 2000 (23). 
2" lntervie\ý, TACD participant. Washington DC, October 2000 (50). 
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The future survival and success of these groups is directly linked to their capacity to 
add value to wider transnational social movements (see also Buck 2000). What, if any, 
gains were reaped through the creation of the dialogues? In accordance with their 
outlined objectives, the success of the TACD and TAED rests on the capacity of the 
groups to build dialogue between EU and US NGOs, to increase NGO access to EU 
and US officials and to shape policy output. The perceived access and impact of the 
consumer and environmental dialogues is divided into two responses: 1) the success of 
the TACD and TAED and 2) their relative success vis-d-vis the business dialogue. 
While NGO complaints about unequal access and impact are outlined here, the 
competition between the dialogues is dealt with more thoroughly in section 4. 
A major achievement of the TACD and TAED has been the build up of 
dialogues between European and American NGOs, which served as important sources 
of information sharing and. networking. The dialogues have been described by F. U and 
US officials as a 'learning processý. 219 American NGOs are learning from European 
NGOs about the EU and about European policies, and both sides are learning how 
they can harmonise strategies and simultaneously exert pressure on their governments. 
US NGOs have found an ally in European consumer groups and on many policies in 
the European Commission. 
Table 5.1 Dialogue 'Summits' 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
TABD X x x x x x x 
TAED xx x 
TACD x x x x 
TALD x x 
119 Interview, Commission Dele-, -, ation and USTR, Washington DC, October 2000 (34,42). 
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The TACD, in particular, has been praised for overcoming differences between US 
NGOs. 220 As one official argued, 'the success of the TACD is just overcoming the 
Consumer Union-Public Citizen gap and getting American consumer groups on 
speaking terms. ' 221 TAED representatives agree that the environmental dialogue has 
also jumpstarted co-operation. Another source suggested that, 'People are coming 
together. There is more common ground and no clear divide between European and 
American NGOs on trade. ' 222 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials 
agreed that transatlantic dialogue between the groups was significant, arguing that, 
'first they must get comfortable at the table with each other because goverriments 
223 respond when constituencies are united and focused' . 
In one respect the dialogues have successfully fulfilled the objectives of the 
NTA: they have 'built bridges' across the Atlantic. The real test for participants, 
however, is their capacity to act as 'policy shapers'. Here the results are less visible. 
First, members of the TACD and TAED have complained about the level of access 
vis-ý-vis the business dialogue. Second, consumers and environmentalists have argued 
that the civil society dialogues do not have the same influence in the decision making 
process to that exerted by the TABD. 
Table 5.2 Dialogues' Access to EU-US Summits 









X _ X 
X 
_ X 
TACD - X - X - 
TAED X X 
TALD X 
Interview, Commission Delegation, Washington DC, October 2000 (34). 
Interview, Commission Delegation, Washington DC, October 2000 (34). 
Interview, US NGO. Washington DC, October 2000 (30). 
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On the one hand TACD and TAED members have gained access to both high level 
and working level officials through the annual general meeting (see table 5.3). The 
TACD and TAED each have contact persons in the State Department and the US 
Mission in Brussels at a working level. The TACD and TAED have increased the 
formal level of access that consumers and environmentalists have to policy makers. 224 
Bignami and Charnovitz (2001) argue that: 
Groups like Consumers International have, for years, hammered out common 
positions among member groups and taken these positions to the Codex, the 
United Nations, and various other international organizations. They have had 
observer status in the United Nations and the Codex (but not the WTO). They 
have educated the public and campaigned on various issues. Never, however, 
had they been promised direct, formal access to policyrnakers in the course of 
intergovernmental negotiations. 
However, the access that consumer and environmental groups have gained is 
overshadowed by the comparable access allotted to, the TABD. Controversy arose 
before the 1999 Bonn Summit over TABD's access to EU-US Summits. Despite the 
fact that the TAED and TACD had written to summit leaders to request access, the 
Gennan Presidency, urged on by the US Commerce Department, refused invitations to 
the civil society dialogues. 225 The TAED and TACD- supported largely by the 
Commission- publicly denounced the unequal access given to the TABD. In response, 
the Washington 1999 Summit statement included an annex for equal handling' of the 
226 dialogues 
. 
In general the change in summit procedures was seen as a symbolic win for the 
non-business dialogues, as EU-US Summits are arguably not their best point of 
'24 
Interviews. Environmental Protection Agency 
, Washington DC, October 2000 (48,49). Interview, USTR, Washin-ton, October 2000, (42). 
22ý NGO groups argued that the Council Presidency was persuaded by the German Chancellor 
Schroeder, who hails from a largely industrial region. Interview, TACD Secretariat, January London, 
2000(23). 
-6 It was agreed that EU and US authorities should meet formally with all of the dialogues at least once 
every since months, that workin- level contacts should facilitate routine interaction and that a rotating 
schedule for summit attendance should be put in place. 
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access. 227 Commission officials argued that private sector input would be more 
effectively aimed at working group level and have pushed for dialogue access to SLG 
rather than summit level meetings. One official argued, 'it is not much use if you 
haven't got your point across before then. They need to concentrate on early stages of 
policy decision making where recommendations can be much more detailed. You have 
a better chance of influencing the expert than the political boss. ' 228 
However, access to transgovernmental actors is also a source of contention 
among the transatlantic dialogues. The TABD has both higher and more frequent 
access to officials. NGOs note that the TABD gets higher level officials at its 
meetings, including the US Vice President and the WTO Director. 229 The TABD has a 
designated 'agency' that acts as its partner- the US Commerce Department- while the 
TAED and TACD have a small number of designated people within the State 
Department. Unlike the Commerce Department a State Department official pointed 
out that, 'we cannot only take consumer or environmental consumers on board. 230 The 
TABD also has crosscutting support from the US interagency committee that deals 
with its issues. TABD members also benefit from informal contact with governmental 
officials. One NGO official argued that, 'where TABD has more access is at a daily 
working level- lunches and receptions, meetings every month. It is a huge policy- 
lobbying machine. 231 
III Rather, it has been ai-, -ued that the. Surrunits serve as photo opportunities Interview, TAED and 
TACD participants, London (1999) and Washin-ton (2000) (23,30). 
"S Interview, Commission, Brussels, September 1999 (15). 
-9 While government presence at TACD and TAED annual meetings has increased, NGOs argqe that 
they do not have the same level of representation. One US NGO contended, 'We did not have the Vice 
President at our annual inecting. We are luck) to get one US Cabinet member. ' Interview, (23,50). 
Interview. US State Department, Washington, October 2000. 
TACD Secretariat (23-24). Email correspondence (63). 
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Table 5.3 Formal Access for the Transatlantic Dialogues 
TABD TACD TAED 
Regular Attendance at Limited Access to EU-US Limited Access to EU-US 
EU-US Summit Summit Summit 
High level contacts at High level contacts at High level contacts at 
annual CEO meeting annual general meeting in annual general meeting 
plenary in plenary 
Working Group Working Group contact at Working Group contact 
contact at annual CEO annual general meeting at annual general . 
meeting prior to plenary meeting prior to plenary 
Mid Year Meeting Steering Group Planning Steering Group Planning 
Meeting Meeting 
US Interagency Co- TACD Contact Person in TAED Contact Person in 
ordinators State Department State Department 
Regular Issue Manager 
- Working Level 
Contacts 
The real problem with the NTA dialogue process is not just that NGOs do not feel like 
they have access to officials, because formal dialogue has increased through the 
TACD and TAED. Rather, the real gap between the TABD and the TACD is in the 
number of policy recommendations that have influenced transatlantic decision 
setters. 232 NGOs claimed that the success rates of the TACD and TAED- if measured 
against the TABD's 50 per cent rate- would be significantly lower. 233 Some argued 
that none of their proposals had been adopted. Others noted that NGO input had 
helped change the thinking on some policies. for example on the better access for 
2' A TACD official notes, 'It is not that the structures are not working well, but that they are working 
better I-or the TABD. ' lntervicýN, TACD Secretariat. January. London (2000) (23-24). 
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medications in developing countries and greater contact over GMOs and product 
labelling. Overall however, the dialogues have not produced the same concrete gains 
that the TABD has. The TAED Scorecard argued that government responses to 
recommendations (in grades from A-F) were significantly below average. 234 The 
TAED slammed the US government for its 'total failure to act or failure to act 
appropriately' on a wide variety of issues. 235 Sixty-five consumer groups echoed the 
same sentiment, that the EU and the US had largely ignored consumer trade policy 
recommendations, in an annual report (2000). 236 The message is that 'the overall 
impact of the TACD has not been enough, but we are encouraged by the achievements 
of the first few years and believe we can further establish the dialogue as an important 
part of transatlantic trade policy-making. ' 237 
To summarise, the TACD and TAED have increased formal access for 
consumer and environmental NGOs, but the quality of access has been called into 
question. As one NGO observes, 'they are telling us what they are doing, rather than 
taking our advice. We have access but we don't learn specifics. TAED participants 
argue that US officials seem to be just going through the motions. ' 238 The low key 
government response to TACD and TAED proposals fuelled claims that the 
governments were not taking the groups seriously - or as seriously as they take the 
TABD. Government officials stressed the importance of the TACD and TAED as 
dialogue structures. A State Department official argued, 'Whether or not their policies 
Interviews with European and American NGOs London, Brussels and Washington, January, May 
and October 2000 (23,24.27-30,50). 
Fhe Commission's response to GMOs received the high est mark (a C+). Interview (6). 
TAED-TACD Press Release "I ransatlantic Consumer Dialogues Release Annual Reports, Slarn 
Government for Lack ot'Responsiveness. '6 June 2000. 
116 TACD press release, 'US & EU Consumer Groups Call for Swift Action to Balance Trade Dialogue 
March 30 2000. 
2117 Email correspondence with TACD Secretariat, June 2000, (63). 
2,18 Interview, American NGO. Washington DC, October 2000 (24). 
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are adopted, they are widely understood and seriously considered. 239 To participants, 
however, faced with funding problems it is important that the TACD and TAED serve 
as more than 'talk shops. ' The consensus is that 'talking shops' are useful, but that the 
TACD can only gain support to continue as an efficient lobbying organisation. A 
TACD official argued, 'Consumers and environmentalists are not downplaying 
dialogue, but they expect more concrete results, in part because TABD gets them. 1240 
Table 5.4 Active Dialogue Members 
TABD TACD TAED 
Price Waterhouse Coopers Consumers * European Environmental 
Electrolux International Bureau 
Xerox Danish Consumer 0 Community Nutrition 
United Technologies Council Institute 
Corporation Consumer Federation of 0 World Wildlife Federation 
Lafarge America 0 German League for 
Suez-Lyonnaise US Consumers Union Nature and the 
Daimler Chrysler US Public Interest Environment 
Philips Electronics Research Group 0 National Wildlife 
Warner-Lambert EuroCoop Federation 
Tenneco Kepka 0 Edmonds Institute 
Ford Italian Consumer 0 Center for International 
Council Environmental Law 
Consumer Federation of Biodiversity Action 
America Network 
Public Citizen 0 Public Citizen 
2 ', 9 Interview. US State Department, Washington DC, October (2000). 
Interview. TACD Secretariat. London, January 2000 (23). 
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Table 5.5 Policy Positions of the Transatlantic Dialogues 
TABD Position TACD Position TAED Position 
Biotechnology Supports Supports Supports 
establishment of a establishment of establishment of 
science-based proof science-based proof science-based proof 
Li Safety that GMOs are that GMOS are not that GMOS are not 
harmful harmful harmful 
Lj Labelling Against Supports mandatory Supports 
GMO Labelling labelling Mandatory labelling, 
E-Commerce Supported Safe Opposed Safe 
Harbour Agreement Harbour/Supports 
vacy 
Precautionary Argues the PP should Favours use of PP in Favours use of PP in 
Principles' only be based only consumer, health, consumer, health, 
on sound science safety, safety, 
Environment Environment 
regulations regulations 
TRIPS Supports full Against using TRIPS 
implementation of to block production 
TRIPS of medicine in 
developin countries 
Climate Change Argues Kyoto Supports 
emissions standards implementation of 
are non-tariff barriers Kyoto Treaty 
The European Identified as an Early Supports WEEE and 
Waste Electrical Warning candidate industry 
Equipment responsibility for 
Directive (WEEE) safe waste disposal. 
Participation Supports Supports Supports 
And Regulatory Transparency and the Transparency and the Transparency and the 
Guidelines Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory 
Guidelines Guidelines Guidelines 
3) The Transatlantic Labour Dialogue 
The goal of promoting co-operation on labour issues is found in the NTA and TER 
The economic chapter of the NTA makes broad reference to internationally recognised 
labour standards and employment issues. In May 1997 the AFL-CIO and ETUC 
agreed to initiate the dialogue under government sponsorship at the Bridging the 
Atlantic 'people to people' conference in Washington. A year later the TEP Action 
Plan outlined a number of commitments to increased dialogue on labour between 
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workers, employers and NGOs and business and labour advisory groups (see. also 
Knauss and Trubek 2001). 
241 
The Transatlantic Labour Dialogue is the least developed formal NTA 
dialogue. The first meeting of the TALD, held a month before the TEP, coincided with 
an international labour summit. Its formal launch came with the submission of a joint 
statement to the EU-US Washington Summit in 1998. However, its second meeting 
was postponed until June 1999. Even then, the meeting took place at an international 
(G-8) meeting, and no official statement was ever released. The American Federation 
of Labour and the Congress of Industrial Organisations did issue a letter to President 
Clinton and Chancellor Schroeder before the Bonn Summit (June 1999). They agreed 
to support human rights clauses in international agreements and to broaden the labour 
agenda for the WTO. In December 2000, it issued its first real recommendations to 
EU-US leaders. Six months later, however, the TALD again appeared to be static. 242 
Hope for the recovery of the TALD was bleak, because its structure was 
flawed from the beginning. Knuass and Trubek (2001) argue that the TALD lacked 
substantive expectations; was set up only as a small and quasi-private dialogue; was 
neither bilateral nor transatlantic and was a low priority for labour leaders. 
First, although the TALD produced more substantive results in 2000, there 
was no sign of establishing an organisational structure, a secretariat or formal 
objectives. At the London meeting in 1999, labour leaders agreed to hold periodic 
reviews of the trade union dialogue, co-ordinate their positions on the planned Euro- 
American social and employment initiatives and initiate a Euro-American working 
group. None ofthese tasks was completed and there was no subsequent commitment 
2" It also included a commitment to end child labour. 
'4' The 2001 Eli-US Summit Statement from Gotenbur- stated, 'We support the Transatlantic 
Environment Dialogue and the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue in their efforts to rejuvenate their 
activities. ' 
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on behalf of the labour dialogue to pursue a transatlantic policy agenda. The TALD is 
basically a dialogue between the AFL-CIO and the EUTC. Its meetings have included 
only a handful of people and have not even been held as separate events. Knauss and 
Trubek (2000) note that, 'merely trying to find out what transpires at its meeting can 
be an exercise in frustration. In sum, there is little to indicate that either labor 
organisation has given the forum any serious attention. ' 
Those involved with the TALD agree that it is not a forum for policy shaping, 
and is only marginally a forum for dialogue. It is argued that the TALD is not 
transatlantic because the structure of international trade unions dialogue pre-dates the 
NTA. The international orientation of global labour movements creates diplomatic 
problems for EUTC and AFL-CIO, and it was feared that a transatlantic based 
dialogue stood the risk of getting 'their (affiliates) noses out of joint'. The 
international structure of the labour movement also explains the TALD's focus on 
multilateral rather than transatlantic issues. Most of the December 2000 statement 
focused on multilateral trade liberalisation, the MAI, sustainable development, the UN 
Rio +10 meeting and Aids Drugs to Africa (see figure 5.4). 243 There appears. to be a 
lack of interest in the transatlantic level, because the TEP is not viewed as a substantial 
policy forum. A TALD representative argued, 'Trade unions are exerting an inside 
track at the WTO level. If the bilateral level becomes more important, then the TALD 
will follow. ' 244 
Consequently, the TALD is little more than a modest exchange between a 
European and an American labour federation. Given its lack of commitment and clear 
lack of influence. the laboLir dialogues- even more so than the consumer and 
environmental dialogues- cannot survive without government support. The labour 
4 ", AlthOLIý1111 it should be noted that TALD did broach the subject of EU-US approaches to Burma. 14 Intervievv, TALD official, Brussels, September 1999 (13). 
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movement is not willing to commit the resources to fund a transatlantic dialogue. One 
European labour representative argued that, 'You are not going to reinvent the trade 
union organisation for a one-fifth the cost of a plane ticket. If they want us involved, 
they have to put their money where their mouth is. ' 245 
The labour movements' resistance to be drawn into the NTA process means 
that the TALD has had no impact on the transatlantic policy shaping. 246 One official 
even bluntly stated, 'There is no labour dialogue. ' 247 
Figure 5.4 
T he Transatlantic Labour Dialogue 
Co-ordinators: AFL-CIO- EUTC 
Meetings: London 1998 and Bonn 1999 
Statements: May 1998, December 1998, December 2000 Summits 
Interests. The MAI, GATS and public services, TRIPS and AlDs 
drugs in Africa, Sustainable Development 
4) Transnational Decision Shaping 
The creation of the NTA dialogues has ensured that private actors have more access to 
transatlantic decision takers at both a high political level and a working level. While 
business, consumer, environmental and labour dialogues have all gained a formal role 
hi the process, only the TABD has emerged as a true policy 'shaper'. A combination 
21ý lntervicýN. TALD, Brussels. September 1999 (13). 
'46 Interviews Commission. Brussels (1999) and US State Department, Washington DC (2000) (9,44). 
'47 Interview, US State Department, Washington, October 2000 (58). 
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of factors contributes both to the effectiveness of the dialogues and the wide-range of 
government responses to the recommendations. 
Organisation, Focus and Funding 
EU and US officials have, in the past, blamed a lack of cohesion, organisation and 
interest in the NTA process for the inequalities in actor access and policy adoption. 
The civil society dialogues, when compared to the business dialogue, have been 
characterised as weak, unorganised and plagued by internal bickering. There were 
claims that the TACD and TAED were less influential because they were new to the 
process. They have even been described elsewhere as 'toddlers in the policy 
playpen'. 
248 
The ability of the private dialogues to orgamse themselves is directly linked to 
their capacity to produce cohesive proposals. Consensus among domestic groups and 
between EU and US actors is considered a major strength of the dialogues. The TABD 
is undisputedly the most developed transatlantic dialogue. It is highly organised and its 
proposals carry weight because they bear the approval of 200 CEOs. 249 In 'Short, the 
TABD is arguably a'well oiled machine. ' 250 
In contrast, however, it has been argued that since the launch of the other 
dialogues, that the strong management of the social dialogues was needed in order to 
overcome differences between groups. 251 One US official argued that, 'the TABD 
plays a different role than the other dialogues, which is to come to a common position 
and give recommendations. This is not what the (TACD, TAED, TALD) have done- 
'48 Quoted in Peterson 200 1. 
'41) Interview Council Presidency and European Commission, Brussels, September 1999 (5,15). 
, so Argued by TABD official, Brussels, September 1999 (14). 
251 Interviews, Commission. Brussels, September 1999 (15,6). 
163 
they don't agree. ' 252 Reaching consensus between NGO groups is more complicated 
because they are constituency based and have funding commitments to other 
organisations. 253 The civil society dialogues also had more trouble getting off the 
ground because of internal policy differences. Initially, US consumers groups were 
unable to agree on whether to start a dialogue, let alone agree on policy proposals. 
To some extent the criticisms levelled at the civil society dialogues were 
warranted in the early days of their implementation, but the groups- not including the 
TALD- recognised the need to organise themselves. The TACD, which was arguably 
the most incoherent after its first meeting, subsequently emerged as the most. coherent 
civil society dialogue. Officials argued that the initial dispute between Public Citizen 
and Consumer Union was (mostly) set aside and that Consumer International and the 
Steering Group had worked hard to ensure that the consumer movement had a 
common face. The TACD - three meetings on- was described as very organised and 
very disciplined. 254 A dialogue that was earlier described as 'rude' and 
'confrontational' was argued to be proficient. A US official observed that, 
If they are tearing their hair out they are not showing the governments. By the 
time they sit across from us, they are very, very professional. They do not wash 
their dirty laundry in public. The Steering Committee presents a united front. 
255 They spend a lot of time co-ordinating and they are coherent . 
Before its suspension, the TAED co-ordinators had also argued that the'dialogue 
needed a more focused agenda, clear strategy and better organisation. A draft 
assessment of the TAED-presented at the 2000 meeting- emphasised the need to make 
the working groups more effective and criticised in particular the Trade Working 
IntervickN, US Mission, Brussels, September 1999 (4) 
See also Aaron et al (200 1) who argues that, 'when NGOS are brought together to discuss common 
issues but discover that they differ significantly in their political agendas and operating style, it can be a 
complicating factor I 254 Interview, USTR, Washin-ton DC, October 2000 (42). 
Interview. US State Department. October 2000 (47). 
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group for failing to overcome internal differences. In response to vacant US posts, the 
report noted that, 'there are bottlenecks with regards to willingness to and/or ability of 
lead groups to invest sufficient time in co-ordination. ' 256 
The orientation of the TAED and TACD's proposals has also distinguished 
them from the TABD. A credit to the TABD is its focus on policy details that are 
specific to the NTA institutions and the goal of the NTM. Although the TABD has a 
priority group that deals with the WTO, it has used global forums like the GBDe, to 
address multilateral issues. 257 The TACD and TAED, on the other hand, have debated 
the need to allow non-transat I antic NGOs into the dialogues. Like the TALD, there has 
been a tendency for these dialogues to focus on multilateral or domestic rather than 
transatlantic issues. They have been accused of presenting broad proposals and of less 
effectively providing ready-made solutions. This is in part because they concentrate on 
issue areas where the EU and US disagree, for example over GMOs, BVT and beef. A 
TACD representative argued that, 'TABD is doing the governments' job for them. 
Civil society is not as focused on technicalities. It is about following reactions of 
process. ' 
258 
In reality, however, the TACD- more than the TAED- has successfully shifted 
the focus of the dialogue to address a number of transatlantic 'policies. For example it 
has continuously emphasised the EU-US Safe Harbour Agreement and employed 
research staff to follow the transatlantic MRAs. On the TAED it was claimed that, 
*Broad proposals are still a problem. Contrary to business, many groups have less 
experience co-operating with each other. Each has its own agenda, and some 
'% - FAED Asscssment of the Dialogue 2000. 
257 At a global level, the Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce (GBDe) was launched in 
1998 to develop a global consensus on the industry principles for the policy debates on electronic I 
commerce. ., overlapping 
The GBDe share interests membership and secretariat staff. Interview, TABD, 
April 2001 (53) See also Cowles forthcoming. 
'59 Interviekv, TACD official, by telephone, 
ýune 2000 (24). 
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recommendations reflect that. ' 259 It was also argued that proposals- such as the 
demand to the end multilateral disputes dealing with environmental legislation- wuld 
not be seriously addressed in the NTA. Rather, 'to bring it to a stage where these 
dialogues can be used, we need to get to next stage to-have more concrete, operational 
proposa s. ' 260 
Officials acknowledge. that the quality of organisation and proposals is 
hindered by the funding problem encountered by the civil society dialogues. This 
obstacle is demonstrated by the suspension of TAED activities. A TACD official 
explained that NGOs cannot afford to hire researchers and lawyers to come up with 
policy setting details. 261 The lack of resources makes it harder for these groups to 
establish their own networks and to Penetrate the established networks of 'working 
lunches' and drinks receptions in Brussels and Washington. The funding problem is 
also most acute because the future of the dialogues-particularly the TAED and the 
TALD- depend on it. Still, funding will be a permanent source of inequality. One MEP 
argued that, 'They will never have the same influence (as TABD). They don't have the 
same money or clout. ' 
262 
Outsiders and Insiders in th e Policy Process 
In many respects, consumers, environmentalists and industry are competi ing to 
influence transatlantic decision making because they hold different- sometimes 
directly opposing- stakes in the process. The TACD and TAED share many of the 
same goals, which is reflected in a number of joint statements they have issued about 
the TEP and participation in the NTA process more generally. Furthermore, all of the 
'ý') Interview, Commission Delegation, Washington DC, October 2000 (32). 
160 Interview, Commission Delegation, Washington DC, October 200 (32). 
16' Interview. TACD Secretariat, London, January 2000 (23-24). 
2 62 ' Interview. European Parliament, Brussels. September 1999 (17). 
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groups have supported the implementation of the transatlantic regulatory gpidelines, 
which highlight the need for transparency- and thus increased access- for the 
dialogues. However, table 5.5 outlines a number of policy areas where the TABD 
holds different interests to the TACD and TAED. For example the TABD and TAED 
disagree over the implementation of the Kyoto Treaty, because the TABD argued that 
emissions standards would adversely affect the competitiveness of industries. The 
TABD and the TACD disagree over the Safe Harbour Agreement because the TACD 
believes that the agreement does not adequately protect privacy. The TABD has 
identified a number of European environment directives- including the WEEE as 
possible Early Warning System candidates (TABD 2000). 
Competition between the groups is fuelled by different policy interests. It is 
demonstrated by the aim of the NGO and business aims to counter the influence one 
another. Public Citizen helped organise protests of the TABD CEO meeting in 
Cincinnati 2000. Lori Wallach, Director of Public Citizens' Global Trade Watch, 
argued in a guest article in the Cincinnati Observer that, 'TABD does not stand for 
Truly Appalling Backroom Deals, but it should. , 263 Both the TACD and TAED have 
emphasised the importance of monitoring the TABD. The sentiment is returned by the 
business community. Cowles (2001: 263) argues that, 
Indeed, the US-EU business community tends to view the creation of 'other 
dialogues' in the US-EU relationship- the Transatlantic Labor Dialogue, the 
Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue, the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue- not 
merely as an attempt to introduce civil society into US-EU relations, but also to 
counteract the growing influence of the TABD. 
One ofthe biggest obstacles faced by consumers, environmentalists and labour is not 
only that the groups are competing xvith the TABD. but that many of the their interests 
Quoted in 'Closed-Door process needs chan,, e Guest Column in Cincinnati Enquirer 19 November 
2000. 
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conflict with the agenda of the New Transatlantic Marketplace. 264 The TAED in 
particular consists of many groups that oppose trade liberalisation. Although. there are 
many pro-liberalisation groups within the consumer dialogue, it has been noted that 
breaking down regulatory barriers- a goal of the NTA and the TABD- has the potential 
to undermine health and safety standards (see also chapter 7). One of the first actions 
of the TACD and TAED was to oppose implementation of the TEP Action Plan 
because of its inadequate commitment to sustainable development and transparency. 
As one official pointed out, 'the TABD says things the governments want to hear. Its 
interests are seen as more compatible with the goals of the TEP and the NTA. ' 
Adding, on the other hand that, 'TAED argues against the WTO. No one wants to hear 
this. 
265 
The TACD and TAED have also become 'outsiders' in the policy process 
partly because they challenge the legitimacy of the NTA. While all of the dialogues 
have argued the need for increased transparency in the transatlantic decision making, 
only NGOs have spoke out against the de-politicisation of issues, specifically under 
the TEP. It is argued that decisions related to TEP should be taken by democratically 
elected bodies in a transparent, participatory and accountable way in order to protect 
social standards. Opposition to the process as well as the policies means that, as one 
TACD official argued. 'they created monsters that do not now want to play by the 
rules. ' 
266 
264 One US official SLI-gested for example that, 'the governments have accepted that consumer views 
are valid, but NGOs have not accepted that liberalisation is good. 'Interview, USTR, Washington DC 
October 2000 (42). See also Aaron et a] (200 1 ). 
26ý Interview, F uropean Comm ission, Brussels, September 1999 (6), 
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Increasing Transparency, Finding Consensus 
The EU and the US have attempted to make the NTA process legitimate by bringing in 
different groups, laying out guidelines for equal access for groups and encouraging 
public participation and transparency under the Joint Regulatory Guidelines. In 
addition, NTA and TEP policies must follow domestic channels of decision making. In 
the US, public notices of agreements are posted in the Federal Register. The 
Commission uses formal channels of communication under the Commission's Social 
Forum to gage the wider public views on policies. 
Competition between actors has complicated transatlantic decision making. 
The threshold for consensus between groups is high because so many interest groups- 
with very different interests have been given a formal role in transatlantic decision 
making process. Some officials have argued that inviting participation from the civil 
society dialogues has weakened the process because it undermines ýefficient' d ecision 
taking. 267 In response to this problem, transatlantic actors have sought ways to 
encourage the dialogues to reach consensus amongst themselves. 
First, they supported the idea of 'multi -dialogue' meetings between business 
and civil society. 268 In 2000, the first multi-dialogue meeting was co-organised by 
European Partner for the Environment and the Luso Foundation with funding from the 
266 Interview, TACD Secretariat, London, January 2000 (23-24). 
267 Interview, Comm ission Secretariat, September 1999 (16). 
168 The principles for government relations with the Transatlantic Dialogues calls for dialogue between 
the dialogues. Despite the goverriment's encouragement, there was very little outreach between the 
dialogues bef-ore 2000. The Luso American Development Foundation (the secretariat of the Donors 
Dialogue) tried to organise a meeting in 1999 but failed to gain enough support from the dialogues or 
frorn the governments. The TACD argued that it needed to first get itself organised. Commission 
officials worried that the dialogue was exclusive. A TABD official argued that it clearly had different 
interests than the other dialogues. One participant (20) noted that, 'this would mean compromise- that is 
the governments' job not businesses. ' TAED and TACD members reiterated their suspicion of the 
TABD and the need for governments to strike a balance between interest groups. (Interviews with the 
Commission, Brussels, 1999, US State Department and US Commerce Department, Washington, 2000 
(9,42,52). 
169 
Commission. 269 The multi-dialoguc meeting was launched to increase awareness of 
each other's activities and to explore mechanisms for understanding. All of the 
dialogues, barring the TALD, attended. 270 The meeting's concentration on one policy 
sector- Sustainable Development- helped focus the dialogue. Groups were also pulled 
into the dialogue by assurances that the meeting would not be used to negotiate any 
common positions but rather to allow groups to exchange views. Participants in the 
meeting were cynical about gaining any concrete results from the first meeting, but the 
second meeting held in January 2001 is a testament to the multi -dialogue's continued 
support. 
Second, EU and US officials worked with different dialogues to establish cross 
interest policy networks or 'issue-orientated' task forces. The need to focus on cross 
cutting interest groups and specific policy problems was also addressed by the 
governments in the TEP. To date the most successful task force was the Biotechnology 
Consultative Forum which managed to produce agreed results from the science, 
business, academic and NGO communities. TACD members originally argued the 
Forum could not be used as a justification of consumer support. 271 However, the 
participation of an EU Steering Member helped balance the representation. 
Finally, officials argue that the Legislators Dialogue could be a potential 
instrument for closer dialogue between the dialogues. 272 As discussed in chapter 4, 
however, the TLD contact with the NTA process is under-dev eloped. To date, the 
TLD has had good relations only with the TABD and little to no contact with the 
2"' The European Commission (DG External Relations) provided support for the project. Additional 
contributions to help cover the costs of the two LIS resource persons were provided by the US State 
Department and the Heinrich B611 Foundation. In addition, each of the dialogues covered the travel 
costs of their respective representatives. 
The role of Ron Kingham- the former co-ordinator of the TAED- was influential in gaining TACD and 
TAED support for the meeting. Telephone correspondence, March 2000 (23-24). 
271TI 1e US had chosen a consumer representative who was opposed by US consumer groups for having n Zý 
previously been employed by the GMO giant Monsanto Corporation. Interview, TACD Secretqriat, via 
telephone, March 2000 (24). 
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TACD and TAED. Its capacity to balance the dialogues is also undermined by the fact 
that the TABD is perceived to have more direct access to the bureaucratic process than 
it actually does. 
Conclusion 
This chapter sought to establish if and how the private NTA dialogues have played a 
role in shaping transatlantic decisions. It discussed the interaction between private 
actors in ýnew transnational networks and between private and public actors at a 
number of levels- both transgovernmental and intergovernmental. Finally, it 
questioned the impact of private decision shaping forums on the overall process of 
transatlantic decision making. 
A number of themes arose in this examination of the transatlantic dialogues. 
The motivations for inviting participation from the TABD and TACD, TAED and 
TALD varied. The TABD was brought into the process to help the EU and US 
facilitate the goals of trade liberalisation laid out in the New Transatlantic 
Marketplace. It has been largely encouraged by the US government whose officials 
believe it to have been a good lobbying partner. The TALD dialogue was brought in to 
advise the EU and US on aspects of the marketplace relating to labour issues. The 
consumer and environmental dialogues were pushed by the Commission to balance the 
interests of the process. The Commission found an ally in the TACD and TAED on 
policies where it was in dispute, or about to enter a dispute with the US, for example 
over GMOs, the WEEEs. and data protection. Encouraging civil society participation 
,, vas also seen as a wav to increase transparency in the Transatlantic Economic 
'-2 
, Interviex. Luropean Parliainent. Septeinber 1999 ( 10). 
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Partnership after the US government came under fire from domestic NGO'groups 
worried about the de-politicisation of social and envirom-nental regulations. 
Increasing the participation of domestic groups at the transatlantic level has not 
necessarily made the process more balanced. Above all, there are wide ranges of 
interests covered by policy network. There is also a gross imbalance of power and 
resources between big business and civil society. While the TABD has been deemed 
largely successful in shaping policy and the TACD claims to have had some impact in 
shaping decisions, the TAED and TALD have been less effective. While the TABD 
has very much found itself an 'insider' in the process, civil society has remained 
somewhat on the 'outside'. The argument, thus, is that the TABD is the only formal 
dialogue, of the four, to support the hypothesis that there has been a clecentralisation of 
decision shaping powers to private actors. 
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Chapter 6 
The Transatlantic Challenge to Transuational Trafficking in Women 
Globalisation and political instability in newly democratised states have given rise to 
global challenges that cross borders and elude national efforts to curb trafficking in 
drugs, nuclear material and migrants. The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of 
economic instability in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Russia and the -Newly 
Independent States (NIS), creating social circumstances which gave rise to organised 
criminal networks. Weak democracies are unable to contain these networks, and 
Western democracies are increasingly unable to police their borders. The rise of 
transnational crime is problematic not only because it crosses borders, but because it 
crosses the borders of developed countries (Ruggerio 1 2000: 189). Trafficking does not 
stem from Eastern Europe alone, but the rise of criminal trade from Eastern to Western 
Europe means that criminal activity originating in CEE creates new challenges for the 
EU, the US, who as developed countries are the main recipients of trafficked women 
(I see figure 6.1 ). 
The increased mobility of capital and people means that individual states, both 
developed and developing, are unable to adequately target the problems of 
international crime and international terrorism alone. The idea that cross border crime 
must be managed through national, regional and international co-operation became 
accepted wisdom throughout the 1990s. The US government set up FBI training 
centres in Budapest and Bangkok to train local authorities to fight transnational crime 
and terrorism. The FU set Lip Council working groups to deal with terrorism. police C, Zý 
co-operation and organised crime under the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar. At the 
international level 189 states sioned the UN Convention on Transnational Organised L- 
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Crime in December 2000. A transatlantic framework for increased law enforcement 
co-operation was created under the global challenges' chapter of the NTA. 
This chapter examines EU-US co-operation in combating trafficking in women 
as a case study of joint co-operation in law enforcement, fighting global challenges 
and transatlantic policy-making. In 1997, and again in 1999, the EU and the US co- 
hosted two information campaigns. The first was in Ukraine and Poland and the 
second, in Bulgaria and Hungary. A third, Russian campaign is under negotiation. EU- 
US co-operation in trafficking in women is discussed in the context of this thesis 
because it is an important indicator of the factors that instigate and impede co- 
operation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs. Trafficking in women is not only an 
issue of transnational crime, but also of human rights, migration, and labour. 
Transatlantic co-operation in the area of trafficking in women is distinct, first 
because it is rather low key in terms of visibility when compared with economic co- 
operation under the NTA. EU-US policy on trafficking in women is much less 
integrated than it is for example in the case of the Mutual Recognition Agreements. 
Second, the implementation of joint projects in this area affects the EU and the US 
only indirectly, because the transatlantic anti -trafficking information campaigns are 
run in third countries. Thus, in contrast to the MRA case, the interest of outside states 
that are affected by the transatlantic information campaigns directly impacts how the 
EU and the US can co-operate. 
This chapter seeks to explain the decision making process that led the EU and 
the US to I , 
join forces in fighting trafficking in women. First, it questions why the EU 
and the US chose to co-operatc in this area: What informed the intergovernmental 
'political decision' to co-operate on trafficking in women? This question is addressed 
in section 1. -, AIicrc the national and international political climate on trafficking in 
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women is discussed in relation to the decision to establish a transatlantic policy on 
trafficking in women. Here it is argued that the EU and the US were able to co-operate 
on trafficking because it was framed as a human rights issue as well as a law 
enforcement policy. 
Once it is established why a joint policy on trafficking in women was pursued, 
the focus of the chapter turns to how transatlantic officials chose to co-operate. Here 
the two hypotheses introduced in chapter I are again tested. The chapter examines 
first, whether there is evidence of a decentralisation of decision making to 
transgovernmental actors. In other words, section 2 questions how prominent 
transgovernmental actors are in the setting and shaping the policy on trafficking in 
women. Second, this chapter asks if there has been a shift of decision 'shaping' 
powers to transnational actors. Section 3 examines the role NGOs played in shaping 
the decision making process. Section 4 questions the significance of transatlantic co- 
operation on trafficking in women, both in the context of the international movement 
against trafficking and the global challenges pillar of the NTA. What does this case 
study tell us about the larger NTA political agenda and the scope for co-operation in 
the field of Justice and Home Affairs? 
1) The Political Decision to Target Trafficking in Women 
At the May 1997 EU-US Summit in the Hague, US President Clinton, Commission 
President Santer and the Dutch Council Presidency agreed to co-operate on trafficking 
in NAomen and issued a statement committing both sides to work together to combat 
the problem. The details of the project were finalised six months later and announced 
at the following summit. Two years later the EU and the US endorsed a second 
prQlect. and in 2001 negotiations for a trafficking information campaign in Russia 
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were underway. This section seeks to explain the political or 'intergovernmental' 
decision to pursue co-operation in this area. The concern is not with the details of the 
transatlantic projects that were decided in between the May and December 1997 EU- 
US Summits, but rather with why transatlantic leaders chose to co-operate in the first 
place. 
Nor does the chapter give an in depth analysis of the nature of the problem of 
trafficking in women. Rather, it concentrates on the intergovernmental response to the 
problem. More extensive coverage of illegal trafficking in migrants and women is 
found mostly in the sociological literature. 273 For our purposes it should be noted that 
trafficking in women is a problem, which is both global and extensive. It is a 
governance problem that has been tackled at the national, EU, transatlantic and 
international level. The International Organisation of Migration (IOM)(1998a) 
believes that millions of women are trafficked each year, and it is estimated that 
trafficking in women and children is a business that generates $7-12 billion dollars 
annually (OSCE 1999). 274 The Congressional Research Service notes that trafficking 
in women and children is considered the largest source of profits for organised crime 
after drugs and guns (Miko 2000). 
In order to determine why the EU and the US have effectively addressed the 
problem of trafficking in women, we must first identify the problem. Defining 
trafficking in women is difficult, as many different interpretations exist. For some it is 
important to make a distinction between trafficking and smuggling, because 
trafficking involves a lack of consent. Martin and Miller (2000: 969-970) argue. 
Trafficking in persons means the recruitment, transportation, transfer harboring 
or receipt of persons, either by the threat or use of abduction, force, fraud, 
27" See rather Hu-hes 2000: Ruggerio 1997: Taylor and Jamieson 1999. 
274 1 luplies (2000: 627) ar-ues that it is diff-icult'to know exactly how many women have been trafficked 




deception or coercion or by the giving or receiving of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person. 
Figure 6.1 
Global 1 da womm am cküä-m« 
, Niaickr Souv-ce Regl, »m alid (t) 
Source: US State Department, Bureau on Population, Migration and Refugees. 
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A broader definition is given by Hughes (2000: 627-628) who acknowledges that 
many women initially consent voluntarily to work abroad in the sex industry, but 
without the knowledge that they face physical abuse, exploitation and enslavement. 
Her definition includes trafficking, which 'may be the result of force, coercion, 
manipulation, deception, abuse of authority, initial consent, family pressure, past and 
present community violence, economic deprivation or other condition of inequality for 
women. 
Varying definitions of trafficking highlight different aspects of the problem. 
The rise of voluntary illegal migration to the EU and the US creates problems of 
border control more generally. The desire of persons to migrate illegally due to 
economic conditions means a criminal market has emerged for smuggling migrants. 
The line between smuggling and trafficking is blurred in the trade in. women. 
Trafficking is an immigration problem because many women seeking work (both legal 
and illegal) in the West agree to be voluntarily smuggled across borders, only to find 
themselves trapped into trafficking schemes. NGOs, the IOM and academics question 
the voluntary nature of involvement in trafficking networks, because as Hughes 
(2000: 636) argues 'Even women who voluntarily travel to engage in prostitution do 
not anticipate the level of manipulation, deception, and coercion to which they will be 
subjected. ' The international definition of trafficking put forward by the UN Protocol 
on Trafficking acknowledges that trafficking in persons occurs even when payments 
are given or received to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person. 27ý - I-Jius. fraud and deception as well as coercion and abduction constitute 
trafficking, 
The full definition of-trafficking used by the UN Protocol on Trafficking (2000) includes, 'the 
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbOUring- or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of 
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The point is that trafficking is a multifaceted problem for states. First, it is 
linked to smuggling which means that it is a border control problem, particularly for 
the EU where the numbers of women trafficked from Eastern Europe to Western 
Europe are estimated to be around 500,000.276 The involuntary movement of persons 
aggregates the problem for states because trafficking is a violation of international law 
and international norms banning slavery. Trafficking in women is both a transnational 
crime and a human rights violation. In short, EU and US interest in combating 
trafficking in women is linked to all three dimensions of the problem: It is an 
immigration/migration issue, a law enforcement violation and an infringement of 
human rights. Still, to understand what drove the EU and the US to co-operate in 
combating trafficking in women, we have to first get to the root of the problem and 
examine the factors that drive the trade in women. 
A Criminal Market Built on Human Rights Violations 
One way to approach the problem of trafficking in women is to analyse it as a 
transnational crime, which is driven by the demand for an illegal market in women 
(Talyor and Jamieson 1999, Hughes 2000, Schoelenhardt 1999). In market terms, the 
trade is driven by a demand for women sex workers in the West and a supply of 
impoverished women and criminal networks in the East. The direct impact of the 
crime is not just that it crosses borders but that it crosses EU and US borders. The 
demand for trafficked women exists mainly in countries with thriving sex industries, 
force or other forms of coercion. of abduction. of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a 
POSitiOn Of VUlnerabilit) or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a 
person ha,, ing control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. ' 
Yhe number of women trafficked to the US from CEE countries is significantly lower. A CIA (see 
O*Neill 1999: 13) report estimates that 4,000 women are trafficked from Europe to the US each year. 
HokNeNer. the report notes that trafficking is a bigger problem froin certain states, claiming, -Sorne 
Florida law enforcement officials, for example, claim that the state is being inundated with trafficked 
\\; omen fi-orn Russia, Ukraine and Central Europe. ' 
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including Germany, the Netherlands and the US. 277 A criminal market exists for the 
involuntary trade in women because sociologists note that there is a demand for 
prostitutes that could never be supplied voluntarily (Hughes 2000). 
Three factors facilitate the criminal market for the trafficking trade. First, 
globalisation and political instability drive the supply side of the market. Globalisation 
increases the mobility of persons, which facilitates trade, and free capital allows 
criminal money to be moved easily throughout the world. In short, 'Privatisation and 
liberalisation of markets have created wider and more open marketplaces throughout 
the world' (Hughes 2000 630-631). New technology, specifically the internet, has 
increased communication and resulted in rapid and unregulated movement of human 
capital (Stoecker 1998,1999). 
The globalisation of capital has made it difficult for individual states to combat 
the problem of trafficking, but illegal markets have emerged within countries in part 
because there are not appropriate laws in place to prevent it (Schloehardt 1999). 
Newly developing democracies lack appropriate laws to protect trafficking victims and 
prosecute traffickers and demand countries have only a recent history of criminalising 
278 the traffickers rather than the trafficked . 
The free movement of capital and people and increased communication 
through advanced technology facilitates the movement of people and funds, which in 
turn propels the trade in trafficking in women. Trafficking is an attractive business 
because the profits from trafficking in human beings rivals that of drug trafficking but 
177 Hughes (2000: 646) notes that Germany and the Netherlands are the most popular destinations for 
trafficked women in Europe because prostitution is le-al. O'Neill ( 1999: 13) reports that the sex industry I 
is among the primary sources of trafficked women in the US. 
'78 An OSC E( 1999) report states, 'In the vast ina 
, 
jority of destination countries, trafficking is 
approached primarily as an illegal migration or prostitution problem. Consequently, most law 
enforcement strategies target the people who are trafficked, not the criminal networks that traffic them. 
Assuming the State intervenes at all, it is the victims who are arrested and deported while the traffickers 
continue to operate with near-impuniq. Few victims - in the destination country or upon return to their 
country of origin - receive an\ assistance. protection, or le-al remedy against their traffickers. ' 
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the penalties are minimal. For example while the sentence for drug trafficking in the 
UK is up to 20 years imprisonment, the sentence for trafficking in humans usually 
carries a two to three year sentence. 279 In the US the statutory maximum for 
involuntary servitude is 10 years, as opposed to a life sentence for trafficking 10 grams 
of LSD (O'Neill 1999: 43). The traders in this illegal market consist of amateur 
traffickers, small groups of criminals as well as international trafficking networks (see 
Scholenhardt 1999). However, it is widely acknowledged that organised crime largely 
fulfils the role of supplier (Taylor and Jamieson 1999). 
Organised criminal networks are able to exploit the trade in trafficked women 
because countries with developing economies and emerging democracies fill the 
supply side of the market. Traditionally Asian countries were the lead suppliers in the 
trafficking trade, but the post Cold War transitions to democracy and private market 
economies in CEE, the NIS and Russia created new markets for transnational crime in 
general and illegal trafficking in women specifically. Difficult economic 
circumstances fuelled illegal activity and forced people to seek work abroad. The 
illegal trade in women increased note Martin and Miller (2000), because women bore 
the brunt of economic restructuring. In Ukraine, for example, IOM notes that women 
280 represent up to 90% of the newly unemployed . 
Trafficking in women is a law enforcement problem, because it involves the 
illegal transport of people across borders as well as kidnapping, forced labour and 
281 slavery like practices . However, it is a difficult problem to confront on a criminal 
level, because international law enforcement co-operation is superficial and 
-') It Should be noted that there is no offence of traffickin-g under UK law. Rather, most 
traffickers get prosecuted under prostitution laws (livin, ' off the earnin-s 
of a prostitute) and the average sentence in 3ý ears (max. possible is 7) (Email Interview with UK NGO 
61). See also 'C apt ive Market' Kate fIo It, The Sunda% Times 11aga--ine 18 February 2001. 
180 IOM (2000) Ukraine Project Report. 
IS1 See Miko (2000) 
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international human rights laws are rarely enforceable (see below). Little to no action 
was taken against traffickers prior to the 1990s despite the United Nations' (UN) 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which claims 'No one shall be held in slavery 
or servitude. It is the classification of trafficking in women as a human rights 
violation, however, which helped gain momentum for international anti-trafficking 
movements. The international, national and indeed transatlantic responses to 
trafficking prior to 2000 addressed the problem through education and aid rather than 
criminal prosecution. It was the combined interest in trafficking in women on a 
migration, human rights and law enforcement platform that made bilateral, plurilateral 
and multilateral action possible. 
National and International Responses to the Problem of Trafficking 
International interest in targeting trafficking in women is demonstrated by its 
prominence on the agenda of the (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Co- 
operation in Europe (OSCE). 282 Trafficking is addressed in the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe (1999). The 2000 UN Convention Against Organised Transnational 
Crime includes a Protocol on Trafficking in Women, which is designed to help 
governments share information about organised crime and increase their ability to 
prosecute traffickers. 283 International organisations have encouraged national 
governments actively to target trafficking in women through human rights legislation, 
but the LTN Protocol represents the first international step towards criminalising 
trafficking in women. 
2'2 The OSCE's commitment to cornbat traffickino is seen in the Moscow Declaration (1991 ), the 
Stockholm Declaration ( 1997), the Human Dimensions Serninars ( 1997-1999), the 2000 Action Plan 
and the creation of an Advisor on Trafficking in the Office ot'Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR). 
191, The stated purpose ofthe UN Protocol on -1 rafficking in Women is to i) prevent and combat 
trafficking in persons, paying particular attention to women and children ii to protect and assist victims 
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A number of factors prompted US domestic action on trafficking in women. 
McBride Stetson (2000) believes that trafficking in women came onto the US public 
agenda from the top down. She argues that the international human rights, angle on 
trafficking in women prompted the Executive Branch's involvement, which eventually 
lead to Congressional action. Specifically, the characterisation of trafficking as a 
women's rights issue as well as a human rights issue helped push it onto the US policy 
agenda. Both Secretary of State Madeline Albright and First Lady Hilary Clinton 
repeatedly stressed their commitments to women's issues. The precedence for US 
involvement on trafficking in women was the creation, of an Interagency Council on 
Women in 1995 by President Clinton. The Interagency Council worked with the State 
284 Department in creating an anti-trafficking 'czarina' , and 
in establishing trafficking 
in women representatives in the Justice Department, Health and Human Services and 
the US Agency for International Development. McBride Stetson (2000: 18) argues that 
285 the Interagency Council, 'which is staffed primarily with femmocrats , 
is the linkage 
between the UN's Commission on the Status of Women ... on the one hand and the 
federal policy makers in Congress on the other. ' 
Interest in targeting trafficking in women also came from the bottom up 
through US NGOs. Women's groups and human rights' groups actively encouraged 
the US Administration and the US Congress to act on trafficking. The US 
Administration held briefings with members of the NGO community to discuss 
trafficking and many NGOs worked with Republican Representative Chris Smith, who 
sponsored the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act 2000, which passed the Senate 
ni November 2000. Finally. NGOs leaked information to the media in order to draw 
of such trafficking, with full respect for their human rights iii) to promote co-operation among State 
Parties in order to meet these objectives. 
184 1 Me formal title for the position is the Deputy Director and Senior Advisor on Trafficking in the US 
State Department. 
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public attention to the problem. The New York Times ran an article in January 1998 
based on a report by the Israeli Women's Network and a video documentation of 
trafficking complied by the Global Survival NetWork. 286 
The Clinton Administration's commitment to trafficking in women was 
secured in March 1998 when the President issued the policy document 'Steps to 
Combat Violence Against Women and Trafficking in Women and Girls'.. The 
document identified trafficking as a 'fundamental human rights violation' and outlined 
a three-tiered approach to combat trafficking in women and children. The Clinton 
Administration pledged to work towards preventing trafficking through the education 
of women and local authorities and job skills training, protecting victims through 
funding regional assistance of victims and finally prosecuting the traffickers. The US 
Administration worked abroad with source, transit and destination countries to. prevent 
trafficking and protect victims. At home Congress's Trafficking Against Women Act 
of 2000 incorporated the three p's into domestic legislation, with additional provisions 
for strengthening the punishment for traffickers and sanctions against foreign 
governments failing to meeting minimum standards in combating trafficking. 
Two less normative factors dictated an EU level response to the problem of 
trafficking in women. First, the new supply source of trafficked women affected the 
EU much more directly than the US. While the US was dealing with roughly 45,000- 
50,000 trafficked women a year, the EU had to contend with an estimated 500,000. 
The geographical location of this new supply meant the problem was right at the 
doorstep of the EU and compounded the challenge of maintaining external borders. 
One US oft-icial argues, 'For the EU trafficking is definitely an immigration issue 
McBride uses the ý, Nord -fernmocrats' to highlight the strong presence of women's rights supporters. 
Telephone Interview, US NGO. March 2001(56). 
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you cannot separate it from the political debate on asylum and harmonisation. ' 287 The 
influx of trafficked women added to the increased supply of illegal immigrants which 
were being smuggled into the EU. 288 
Table 6.1 A Chronology of the Trafficking in Women Policy 
Joint Action Plan 1995 committed the EU and the US to co-operate in the 
fight against trafficking in women and illegal immigrants. 
Ministerial Meeting April 1997 in the Hague Ministers agreed to begin work 
on trafficking in women information campaigns and put trafficking on the EU- 
US Summit agenda. 
EU-US Summit May 1997 EU and US Summit leaders agreed to pursue joint 
co-operation on traffICking in women. 
November 1997 The transatlantic information campaigns are launched in 
Poland and the Ukraine. 
EU-US Summit December 1997 The SLG report announced that the 
information campaigns had been launched in Poland and the Ukraine, and a 
trafficking in women statement is released as a summit deliverable. . April- June 1998 The first information campaigns were implemented. 
The SLG Report May 1998 stated that US law enforcement officials and the 
EU Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime should evaluate whether to 
expand the initiative to discourage trafficking. 
EU-US Summit December 1998 EU and US leaders formally agreed to extend 
information campaigns to Bulgaria and Hungary. 
Transatlantic Conference on Trafficking in Women July 1998 A 
transatlantic conference is held in Lviv, Ukraine was held to evaluate the 
success of the Polish and Hungarian information campaigns. 
SLG June 1999 reported that law enforcement co-operation continued to 
combat trafficking in women and children despite delays in planning the 
Bulgarian and Hungarian campaigns. 
October 1999 planning stage of Bulgarian and Hungarian campaigns began. 
January-June 2000 implementation of Bulgarian and Hungarian campaigns 
began. 
November 2000 US Trafficking in Women Act was passed. 
December 2000 The UN Protocol on Trafficking in Women was signed in 
Palmero. 
Felephone lritcrvicýN. US State Department Official. February 200 1 (54). 
Den Boer and Wallace (2000: 5 17) note that 'people si-nugpling' became a major preoccupation of 
EU law enforcement agencies in the late I 990s. They argue, 'Deepening resistance to further 
innni-ration from within the EU, and the consequence tightening of border controls and of conditions 
for entry, created an illegal market to supply this pent-up demand, smug-ling desperate people across 
the FU's eastern borders. ' 
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The precedence for EU immigration policy in general and trafficking in 
women policy specifically was set by the creation of the Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) pillar in the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a new 
institutional framework for dealing with organised crime at the EU level and moved 
migration policy for the first time into the Commission's competency. Although the 
Commission had issued communications on trafficking to the Council and hosted a 
conference on trafficking in Vienna in 1996, increased competence on JHA allowed 
the Commission to take more direct action. Two vehicles were used. The DAPHNE 
project supports non- governmental and voluntary organisations active in the fight 
289 
against violence towards women and children The STOP program (1996-2000) co- 
ordinates initiatives to fight against trafficking in human beings . 
290 European level 
policy in this area has been directly targeted at the applicant states, which are the 
source of trafficked women. 291 Finally, the Council was due to sign a Directive on 
Trafficking in 2001, which would harmonise Member States laws on trafficking. 
The Intergovernmental Decision to Target Trafficking 
We have established that trafficking is of interest to states because it is linked to 
migration, human rights and law enforcement policies and that the EU and the US 
289 The programme sets up and reinforces European networks and the implementation of pilot projects, 
the results of which can be disseminated and shared throughout the EU. Activities focus on two 
principal areas: exchange of information and co-operation networks on an EU level and the raising of 
public awareness and exchange for best practices (DG JHA, Fight Against Organised Crime, available 
at http: //www. europa). 
190 1 I"he STOP programme supports training and information measures, studies and exchanges for those tý -1 responsible for the fight against Such fornis ofexploitation, including judges, public prosecutors, police, 
civil servants or the public services responsible for prevention. victim support or fighting these 
phenomena. 
291 DG Justice and lJorne Affairs web page states, 'in the future, the Commission would like to see 
candidate Countries take a more pro-active attitude towards prostitution. givin worrien victims sonle 
support and helping to establish non-governmental or-anisations which can help these women' 
T 
,, ýIatemenl on organiscd crinic (Indprostiffition. 
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have demonstrated their interest in fighting trafficking at a regional, national and 
international level. The US has also pursued bilateral co-operation on trafficking in 
women with individual Member States including Italy and Finland. EU-US co- 
operation was secured at the transatlantic level through the NTA framework. The NTA 
Joint Action Plan identifies trafficking in women as a specific global challenge in the 
context of immigration and asylum in 1995. In 1997, post Amsterdam, EU and US 
ministers met in April and decided that trafficking in women was an area where the 
EU and the US could co-ordinate efforts. Both partners were already pursuing 
individual anti -traffi eking programmes and did not differ ideologically on the issue of 
trafficking. Thus, it was identified as an area where resources could be pooled and 
efforts organised to combat the problem. The political decision to go ahead with a 
joint trafficking project came from the intergovernmental level, as was evidenced by 
its prominence on the agenda of the EU-US Summit in May 1997 in the Hague. It was 
there that transatlantic leaders 'made' the decision to establish a transatlantic policy on 
trafficking in women. 
2) Setting and Shaping Transatlantic Policy on Trafficking in Women 
The intergovernmental decision to establish a transatlantic policy response to 
trafficking in women was addressed in the previous section in order to determine why 
the EU and the US decided to co-operate in this case. Transgovernmental level 
decisions are examined here in order to determine how the EU and the US decided to 
co-operate. The focus is on the administrative decisions that 'set' the transatlantic anti- 
trafficking policy. Although the political decision to co-operate on trafficking in 
women was taken at the interoovernmental level. transo ox-ernmental actors establ s hed 
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the details of the transatlantic projects. Thus, it is argued here that the EU-US policy 
resPonse to trafficking in women demonstrates the larger decentralisation of decision 
making at the transatlantic level. 
While the political decision to co-operate on trafficking came from the top, the 
details that established the infon-nation campaigns were derived from the bottom. The 
issue of trafficking in women rose the ranks of the dialogue structure, from the NTA 
institutions, to the ministerial meetings and finally the EU-US Summit. Co-ordination 
of EU and US efforts to co-operate were handled through NTA institutions such as the 
NTA Task Force and the Senior Level Group. The majority of contact, however, was 
made on an ad hoe and infon-nal basis. In reality, it was a small group of people* who 
co-facilitated EU-US co-operation in this area. 292 Key contact persons in the US 
Mission, DG Justice and Home Affairs and DG External Relations established and 
maintained the dialogue on trafficking. The concept of an information campaign and 
the details of the transatlantic project were derived at the working group level. 
Subsequent decisions to pursue trafficking in Bulgaria, Hungary and Russia were 
taken at sub-summit level and were the result of the transgoverrimental dialogue. For 
example, the SLG report states that close co-operation between US law enforcement 
and the EU Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime preceded the decision to 
expand the transatlantic anti-trafficking initiative (SLG 1998a). 
EU and US foreign ministers effectively 'set' the policy on trafficking in 
women, but their decisions was directly based on the input of lower level 
transgovernmental actors who were charged with finding a way that the EU and the 
US could work together. NTA institutions were key in providing a focus for 
transatlantic etTorts to combat trafficking in NN-omcn. The SLG tracked the progress of 
192 1 Interview with US State Department officials (54,33) and EU Comillission officials (3 1,26j. 
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the information campaigns and was thus able first, to keep momentum going for the 
process by highlighting ongoing work in Task Force and SLG meetings and second, to 
serve as a problem solving forum. One US official notes that when obstacles arose, the 
NTA Task Force and the SLG 'kicked in', and that the NTA process helped accelerate 
decisions on for example funding problems 293 . One EU official notes that it was the 
NTA Task Force that provided political guidance to the co-ordinators of the 
process . 
294 Policy 'shaping' decisions were affected by domestic structures, 
bureaucratic processes and the political will of both the EU and the US as major 
'demand' states along with the co-operation of the supply states where the information 
campaigns were run. The project thus required that officials accurately gauge the 
capacity for co-operation between the EU and the US on trafficking in women. 
Three key trans governmental decisions are addressed here; first the decision on 
where to target transatlantic efforts, second, the details of the transatlantic policies and 
third, who would implement the transatlantic campaign. 
Where to co-operate? 
The first trans governmental policy decision was the choice concerning where to co- 
operate. Why were Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia chosen as 
candidates for transatlantic information campaigns? The transatlantic information 
campaigns were run not only where they were needed but also where they were most 
likely to work. The criteria for the transatlantic campaigns included countries where an 
organisation was established to implement the campaigns and where local government 
officials were willing to co-operate with the project. 29 -5 First, the co-operation of local 
Telephone with US Mission official Brussels, February 2001 (54). 
'94 Interview \N ith EU Commission Official, DG External Relations, May 2000 (26). 
2ý)ý Interview, IOM official Budapest, April 2000 (25). 
Telephone interview with US Mission Official Brussels. February 200 1 (54). 
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government is needed because in addition to educating women on the risks of 
trafficking networks, the EU-US project is designed to train local authorities to spot 
the dangers of trafficking. Second, a non-govemmental body is required to run the 
projects, because it is not feasible to have EU or US authorities implement the 
campaigns within the supply states. Each country chosen for the transatlantic 
campaigns was either a source or transit country for trafficking networks, a country 
where local government authorities showed commitment to address the problem and 
where non-govern mental infrastructure existed to implement the campaigns. 
The campaigns target major supply or transit states responsible for the 
movement of women from Eastern to Western Europe. Ukraine was a candidate 
country for the information campaigns because of its role as both a transit and a source 
country. Similarly Russia was targeted because Russia, along with Ukraine are two of 
the poorest countries in Europe and the largest suppliers of the 'Natasha trade'. 296 
Trafficking networks to move women west, from Russia use Ukraine, and Russian and 
Ukrainian women are reported as the 'most popular and valuable women' in the sex 
trade (Hughes 2000). Bulgaria is another source country, where an estimated 10,000 a 
year are trafficked to Northern and Southern Europe. 297 Poland is both a demand and 
a transit country. The US Embassy reports that 70 percent of Ukrainian women 
working in the sex industry in Poland are there under duress and are controlled by the 
Agencija Tovazhyshka prostitution ring (Hughes 2000). Women from the NIS are also 
moved through Poland and Hungary into the EU. 
As noted above, government co-operation is essential in this type of EU-US 
project because implementation takes places within the territory of sovereign states. 
296 Hughes (2000) notes that trafficking of Ukrainian and Russian women is so widespread that these 
women have been labelled as 'Natashas'. 
190 
In short, government co-operation is necessary because host states can be sensitive 
298 
about law enforcement co-operation and foreign government funding. One US 
official notes that before the campaigns were run host states were sensitive to outside 
queries about the problem of trafficking. 299 Once EU and US intervention in host 
states was established, there were also concerns among some CEE and Russian 
officials that trafficking was taking up more time and attention than other areas of law 
enforcement. 3 00 Finally, there were concerns that the burden of targeting trafficking 
was misplaced. Source and transit countries have pointed the finger of blame back at 
the West and argued first, 'You deal with the demand ! 301 
The countries chosen for the first campaign were both states that expressed 
interest in addressing the problem of trafficking. IOM (1998) noted that the Ukrainian 
and Polish governments had shown a commitment to confronting migration problems 
and working co-operatively to protect potential victims. The Polish and Hungarian 
government's willingness to co-operate with the EU and the US on trafficking can be 
explained by their positions in the first wave of EU accession. Both governments had 
incentive to show the EU that it could address issues, which would compound the 
debate on border movement. The EU showed preference for working with countries, 
which were in the fast track for EU accession. The US chose to work with Bulgaria, 
which had a less established working relationship with the Co mmission than 
297 IOM press release notes that the trafficking routes from Bulgaria are established. Women are brought 
through the former Yugoslavia, Romania. the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to Austria, Zý -- Germarrv and the Netherlands. 
2"' Point argued by Commission official, DG External Relations, May 2000 (26). 
199 - Fhe inteFViC\Vee argued that until recently you could not mention the 't' (trafficking) word in some 
of these countries. Telephone. US Mission Official, Brussels, February 2001 (54). 
'00 , Felephone Interview, US Mission official. Feblliarý 2001 (54). Commission official, DG External 
Relations, Brussels, May 2000 (26). 
101 IntervielA. US Mission Official. Februarý 2001 (54). 
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Hungary. 302 The EU instigated co-operation with Russia, under the EU-Russia 
303 Partnership , proved to 
be more difficult. The low level of commitment to the 
problem, sensitivity to outside involvement and the bureaucratic structure of the 
Russian government held up the negotiations. EU membership is less of a 'carrot' to 
lure Russian co-operation. However, its willingness to accept the information 
campaign may be tied to new US legislation that warrants sanctions against countries 
not adequately addressing the trafficking problem. 304 
Finally, the existence of civil society, particularly a strong NGO presence or 
field level support for international organisations, was a prerequisite for running the 
anti-trafficking information campaigns. Each country where the EU and the US have 
co-operated had a non- governmental infrastructure capable of implementing the 
campaign at a local level and the support of the IOM. The IOM was able to draw on 
NGO subcontractors in Ukraine where more research and advocacy has been done on 
trafficking in women and advocacy by non-governmental organisations than in any 
other source country (Hughes 2000). The existence of the well-establ i shed anti- 
trafficking NGO La Strada was a factor in the EU decision to use Poland as a host 
state. Policy proposals submitted by IOM field offices in Bulgaria and Hungary 
shaped the transatlantic decisions to co-operate in those countries. Finally, although 
Russia has a less established civil society than other host states, Russian based 
advocacy groups such as the Mira Med Institute and the Moscow Center for 
International Defence have expressed an interest in working with local authorities to 
combat the problem of trafficking. 
US officials p0inted Out that the EU had expressed an interest in dealing directly with countries in 
the first wave of enlarement. Intervie%k US Mission Official, Brussels, January 2001 (26): US State 
Department Official, Washington D. C, August, 2000 (29). 
It should be noted that while the RJ's Partnership with Russia is designed to cross over into more 
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How to co-ordinate co-operation? 
Transgovernmental actors played a crucial rule in gauging what type. of co-operation 
was possible and how the EU and US could jointly address the problem of trafficking. 
First, EU-US co-operation on trafficking in women materialised in the form of an 
information campaign. The idea was to target trafficking in women on the supply side 
by raising avvarenessl of potential victimns and' Ilocal authorities. The awn of the 
information campaign was to train authorities and to build on the NGO structure in 
order to gain information about trafficking trends, recruitment methods and potential 
deterrents to the trafficking trap. 305 The concept behind the trafficking campaigns was 
prevention rather than law enforcement co-operation, the emphasis being on research 
and strategy definition in the first phase and information dissemination in the second. 
The second decision to consider is how the EU and the US chose to co-operate 
through the information campaigns. To claim that the EU and the US successfully 
pursued 'joint action' on trafficking in women is somewhat deceptive. It is more 
realistic to describe the campaigns as 'separate but parallel' projects. EU and US 
officials acted together to co-ordinate efforts, but the administration of each campaign 
was carried out separately. According to EU and US officials, different bureaucratic 
structures and funding arrangements dictated the way the EU and the US could jointly 
manage the problem. Logistically, it was easier to support different projects, but joint 
Paragraphs based on lntcrvic\ýs ý, Nith FU Commission Official, External Relations. Brussels. May 
2000, (26) and US Mission Official. Brussels, February 2001, (54). 
3 () ý Interview, FU Commission Official, Brussels, May 2000 (26) 
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co-ordination was desirable to avoid overlap. Parallel campaigns were chosen so that 
the comparisons could be made between the two. 306 
Joint co-operation in the transatlantic anti -trafficking campaigns did take the 
form of co-funding. The EU and US agreed to match funds (approximately), co- 
ordinate timing and effectively employ implementation partners. The US State 
Department's Bureau of Population and Migration put forward $382,000 in Ukraine 
and $400,000 for the Bulgarian campaign. The Commission matched the funds with 
250,000 euros for the Polish project and 268,000 euros for Hungary. 307 . The 
differences in internal funding mechanisms made co-ordinating payments difficult. 
Both EU and US officials agree that generally it is much easier for the US to deliver 
funds than it is for the EU. On the US side, the State Department was able to allocate 
funding for this project out of the Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration's 
budget. On the EU side, the Commission ran into problems with the original funding 
for Poland. They tried to fund the campaign using PHARE money set aside for human 
rights, but were subject to a number of conditions set out by the Council of Ministers. 
One Commission officials notes, 'There were all types of requirements by Member 
States which delayed the project for half a year'. 'O' While US officials were keen in 
the first case to distribute the money before the end of the fiscal year, the Commission 
was unable to match the funds in time and implementation of the project was delayed. 
To avoid later delays the subsequent project was funded through a Commission 
ý06 Paragraph based on interviews with a high-ranking DG External Relations Official, Brusselsý 
September 1999 (9)-1 EU External Relations Official, Brussels, May 2000 (26); US State Department 
Officialý Washington D. C. ý August 2000 (29)ý EU Commission official, Washington D. C October 2000 
(3 1); US State Department Official, Washington D. C October 2000 (33)ý US Mission Official, Brussels t, 1999 (7)ý US Mission Official, Brussels. February 2001 (54). 
7 FiIII-Ires are approximate. Taken from interviews, US Population Refugees and Migration website 
and EU JHA website. 
'108 Interview, Commission official. Brussels. May 2000 (26). 
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budget, a line that is approved by the European Parliament rather than the Council, and 
thus subject to fewer restrictions. 309 
Who to co-operate with? 
Funding issues also dictated why the EU and the US decided to use different 
implementation partners in the first information campaigns. The EU chose to work 
with the non-governmental organisation La Strada in Poland because the Commission 
had a history and practice of working with NGOs, and because the EU funding 
structure made it easier to fund NGO projeCtS3 10. The US chose to work with the IOM 
in the Ukraine because, as we saw with the case of the TAED, US goverment policy 
typically does not involve funding NGOs directly. The International Organisation on 
Migration was originally chosen because it had experience in Ukraine and a good 
working relationship with local officials and NGOs. The second campaigns ran with 
the same implementation partner, because it was decided after the first campaign that 
IOM, with its larger size and support structure, had done a more comprehensive job. 
IOM also had a better working relationship with the government, particularly in 
Bulgaria where La Strada has not had a habit of working with government officials. 
Finally, it was agreed that the projects would be more comparable if the same partner 
311 implemented them . 
In summary, the EU-US information campaigns against trafficking in women 
are an example of policies which were officially 'set' by high level transgovernmental 
actors (ministers) but heavily shaped by lower level trans governmental officials (US 
" () 9 Intervie"s with US Mission Official, Brussels, February 2001 (54); US State Department Officialý 
August 2000, Washington DC, (29). US Mission Official, Brussels, May 2000 (26). 
10 NGOs must go through a formal application process and compete for funding at the EU level, but La 
Strada %%as alread\ beim, funded b% the Commission n- 
Interview, US Mission Offlicial, Brussels February 2001 (54). Interview. US NGO, Washington D, C 
March 2001 (56). 
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Mission, State Department and Commission officials) transatlantic level. It was these 
transgovernmental actors who made crucial decisions on where, how and with whom 
the EU and the US would co-operate. The small number of staff dealing with 
trafficking, however, meant that government officials relied heavily on information 
from non-govemmental sources. Thus, it is important also to examine the role of non- 
governmental organisations and international organisations in 'shaping' policy on 
transatlantic trafficking in women. 
3) Shaping Transatlantic Policy on Trafficking in Women 
This section focuses on the role of transnational actors in shaping transatlantic policy 
on trafficking in women. It tests this case study against the hypothesis that a 
decentralisation of decision making- in the form of decision shaping- has taken place 
in the transatlantic policy process. Is there evidence that transnational actors played a 
shaping role in the transatlantic decision making forum on trafficking in women? It is 
argued that while private actors clearly have a role in shaping the global governance 
response to trafficking, there is no formal role for transnational actors in transatlantic 
governance. This is the case because the role of private actors is not institutional i sed 
under the global challenges chapter of the NTA. 
Transnational Shaping 
So far the decision making process for trafficking in women policy draws many 
parallels with the MUtual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). In both cases the political 
decision to pursue the policy carne from the intergovernmental level., and different 
levels of transgovernmental actors were active in setting and shaping the 'mutual 
recognition agreements and the anti-trafficking information campaigns. However, the 
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case of trafficking in women, set against the MRAs, highlights a divide in economic 
and political policy making over the use of transnational institutions. 
First, NGOs clearly participate in decision shaping at the national and 
international levels. On the US side, there is an active dialogue between government 
and human rights, women's rights and religious NGOs on trafficking in women. In 
particular the Global Survival Network, Human Rights Watch, the International 
League for Human Rights and the Coalition Against Trafficking in women have 
worked closely with both the US Administration and the US Congress. 312 Feminist and 
human rights NGOs worked with Republican Chris Smith of New Jersey, who 
sponsored the anti-trafficking bill in Congress, and the US Administration held 
briefings with members of the NGO community to discuss trafficking. 313 The Under- 
Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Frank Loy recognised the important role played 
by NGOs in a testimony to Congress in 1998. His department's web page provides 
links to roughly 10 NGOs, including Anti-Slavery International, the Traditional 
Values Coalition and the International Human Rights Law Group. 314 
The Commission's original communication on trafficking in 1996 also noted 
that combating trafficking would require the involvement of NGO's. That same year 
the Commission invited EU and US based NGOs to the anti-trafficking conference it 
hosted in Vienna. Many European NGOs including La Strada (in Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria and Ukraine), Phoenix in Germany, the Foundation Against 
Trafficking (STV) in the Netherlands and Payoke in Belgium have established a habit 
'12The Coalition Against Trafficking in Women formed including a number of women's rights groups 
including Equalitý Now, Planned Parenthood. International Women's Health Coalition, National 
Organization foi- Woirieiiý Women's Environment and Development Organisation; Catholics for a free Z, 
Choice, Sisterhood is Global Institute. National Black Women's Health Projject, Feminist Majorityý 
Center for Women Policy Studies See McBride Stetson (2000: 6). 
In a ineetin- held oil 
ýebruary 22 1999, the President's Interagency Council on Women held a 
briefing with over 120 representatives fi-orri the NGO community to discuss among other things the 
Council's initiatives to combat trafficking in women and girls. See US State Department, Highlights 
from NGO Public Briefing Meeting. Februar\ 22,1999. 
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of co-operation with the Commission. Under the Daphne project the Commission 
funded 49 different NGOs prQjects. 315 
At the international level, transnational networks work in both OSCE and UN 
forums. NGOs actively participated in the OSCE Human Dimensions Seminars and 
the Vital Voice Conference in 1997. The Human Rights Caucus was created of 
roughly 10 European, American and Asian NGOs to shape the negotiations of the UN 
Protocol on Trafficking. NGOs also keep each other informed on individual projects. 
One US NGO representative notes that email contact across the Atlantic is constant. 316 
In contrast to the TABD, TACD and TAED, which operate as private 
'institutions' in the economic chapter of the NTA, there is no formal role for human 
rights, women's, or religious NGOs at the transatlantic level. While NGOs may 
broadly shape the international and domestic decision on trafficking, there is no 
evidence of an institutional i sation of political non-governmental actors within the 
NTA. In short there is no Transatlantic Trafficking Dialogue. Despite the lack of a 
transatlantic specific NGO network, there is evidence that non-governmental actors 
shape the transatlantic anti-traffi eking campaign both from the top down and the 
bottom up. Networks of NGOs did participate in EU, US and international decision 
making forums, and the two implementation partners were directly responsible for 
shaping the transatlantic decisions. The main non-EU US policy 'shaper' however was 
not an NGO, but an international organisation. 
The IOM influenced the transatlantic decisions from the top down. It helped 
influence both where and with whom the EU and the US would co-operate. The IOM 
shaped the decision on "ho to co-operate with by submitting proposals for potential 
14 See ýN\v\\. usinFo. state. Lo\ topical -lobal/traffic 
It should be noted that there "as a large response to the Daphne project, 428 proposals were 
received. 
, 16 Interview, US NGO, Washington DC, March 2001 (56). 
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information campaigns across CEE and the NIS. The location of field offices capable 
of implementing the campaign helped shape the decision on where to co-operate. The 
IOM feedback on the first campaign also influenced the transatlantic decision to use 
IOM in both Bulgaria and Hungary. In the case of Poland, shaping came from the 
bottom up. It was the NGO La Strada whose proposal was accepted by the 
Commission. Other non-governmental organisations were also important because the 
IOM subcontracted work out to private actors in Bulgaria, Hungary and Ukraine. For 
example IOM relied on Winrock International to facilitate interaction among women's 
NGOs and worked with La Strada in Ukraine. While this case study supports the 
argument that private actors have played a role in shaping the decision making process 
on trafficking in women, it is less supportive of claims that a privatisation of decision- 
making has occurred. The strong role of the IOM, rather than NGOs, as a 'manager' 
of the information campaigns and the limited ad hoe or sub-contracted use of private 
resources at the transatlantic level is indicative of the fact that transnational networks 
play a less formal role in shaping decisions under the political chapters of the NTA. 
A Transatlantic Trafficking Dialogue? 
Co-operation with NGOs at the transatlantic level is ad hoc and indirect through the 
IOM, but is there justification for a more institutionalised role for NGOs? Would the 
transatlantic global challenges framework benefit from a Transatlantic Trafficking 
Dialogue, similar to the TACD or TAED? What, if any, would the benefits of a formal 
transnational dialogue be in this sectoi-9 
The role of NGOs in preventing trafficking and protecting trafficking victims 
is undoubted. In addition to providin- governments with information and raising ::!, C- 
axNareness. NGOs caii fulfil crucial services such as victim assistance. Gramegna 
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(1996) argues that NGOs have a 'leading role' to play in offering counselling, care and 
assistance to trafficked women. The OSCE notes that what limited assistance there is 
for victims of trafficking is provided almost exclusively by NGOs. One OSCE (1999: 
14) report states that, 'In countries where legislation and institutions are weak, or 
where police and other authorities are complicit to trafficking, NGOs may be the only 
institution taking effective steps to prevent trafficking or to protect victims. ' 
The role of NGOs is especially important because private actors are able to 
fulfil functions that governments and the IOM cannot always provide. In particular 
NGOs are needed to establish a direct link between victims and local authorities. 
Johnson (1999) argues that EU Member State governments should recognise the fact 
that private NGO's are sometimes more able to provide necessary services because 
they serve as a buffer between governments and victims. The OSCE (1999: 2 1) report 
notes that victims who receive support from NGOs are more likely to co-operate with 
law enforcement and serve as potential witnesses. In addition NGOs provide a crucial 
service to governments and the IOM by providing them with valuable information 
about traffickers and the trafficked. For example, a video produced by the Global 
Survival Network first shed light on the extent of the trafficking problem in 1998. In 
short, one European NGO argues, 
NGOs play a crucial role in the information campaigns because they are the 
source of first hand information, they have the direct access to victims of 
trafficking, but also have a broad based knowledge of local conditions- 
political, economic and social- needed to implement the campaigns'. 317 
The importance of maintaining a link between the public and private sector is an 
underlying theme iii the NTA. Maiiy NGOs have expressed the need to forge a formal 
dialogue bet,, Neen non-governmental and governmental actors similar to that which ZD 
', 1 Interview. European NGO, (via email) 2001 (60). 
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exists in the economic chapter of the NTA. Steve Warnath (1998) of the President's 
Council on women notes that, 
in discussions with NGOs, various government officials and others we have 
heard that it would be helpful to convene a series of meetings in different 
regions of the world to facilitate government, NGOs and private sector co- 
operation in developing of regional strategies of prevention, protection and 
enforcement. 
Speaking at the launch of the Hungarian information campaign, the EU Commissioner 
for Justice and Home Affairs Vitorino stated the campaigns should, 'stimulate the 
building up of important networks and partnerships between police, judicial and social 
authorities as well as with NGOs and other actors of civil society. ' NGO 
representatives have argued that groups like La Strada have to be integrated into the 
decision making process because they know the most. Although there is some NGO 
involvement in implementing transatlantic policy thTough the IOM, some argue that 
there needs to be a formal role in decision making because there is distrust between 
NGOs and the IOM. 
318 
Three barriers stand in the way of institutionalising a transatlantic trafficking 
dialogue. First some NGOs, particularly at the local level, are unwilling to work 
directly with governments or with the IOM. 319 There is some scepticism in the NGO 
community about the use of the IOM, given its mandate as a migration'organisation. In 
addition some organisations are sceptical of local authorities and feel they alone are 
better able to provide protection to victims for fear that victims, rather than traffickers, 
will be criminalised under domestic legal systems (OSCE 1999: 21). Second, funding 
a transnational dialogue could prove difficult, particularly on the US side where NGOs 
cannot receive over $25,000 "ithout undergoing a government audit. Here, it is worth 
I'his distrust stems from the fact that the IOM is a government sponsored body dedicated to 
or-anised rni, ýration. IntervieNN, US NGO, Washin-ton D. C, March 2001(56). 
Interview, US NGO, Washington D. C., March 2001 (56). 
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remembering the funding problems faced by the TAED in the US Senate. Finally, 
again as in both the TAED and TACD, there is an ideological split amongst NGOs, 
particularly in the US where feminist groups quibble over the language used in the UN 
Protocol on Trafficking. Some feminist groups disagreed with the words outlawing 
'forced prostitution', and accused the Clinton Administration of signing a Treaty 
which not only gives traffickers a safety net, through consent, but which advocates 
prostitution. 320 Despite these barriers to institutionalisation, however, building a 
stronger link with civil society on the political dialogue could reap the same benefits 
that the economic dialogue has from the TABD, the TAED and TACD. 
Institutionali sing the political dialogue further through, for example, a Transatlantic 
Trafficking Dialogue would elevate the NTA's policy of 'building bridges' in political 
sectors. 
4) Implications of the Transatlantic Information Campaigns 
After questioning why the EU and the US chose to co-operate on trafficking in women 
under the NTA, and examining how the policy was set and shaped, this section turns 
to an evaluation of the implications of the campaigns both in a transatlantic and an 
international context. It has two aims. First it seeks to explain the shortcomings of both 
the transatlantic and international response to trafficking in women, highlighting 
factors such as the sensitivity of international law enforcement co-operation and the 
weak JHA pillar in the EU. Second, despite these shortcomings, this section confirms 
the significance of the transatlantic information campaigns in light of efforts to fight 
global cliallen-es at an international and transatlantic level. Z-- 
, N) Ten leading ferninist organisations argued, 'The position taken by the administration suggests you do 
not consider prostitution to be a form ofsexual exploitation. ' See Wall Street Journal, 'The Clintons' 
Shrug at Sex Trafficking' 10 January 2000. Response to 'The Clintons Shrug at Sex Trafficking, 12 
Januarý 2000 (http: wý\ Interview with US NGO, Washington DC March 2001 (56). 
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Low-key co-operation 
The information campaigns run in parallel by the EU and the US are an example of 
fairly low key co-operation between states. Transatlantic co-operation against 
trafficking in women was limited in this case to dialogue and co-funding. Transatlantic 
efforts to combat trafficking were concentrated on education, or prevention, rather 
than protection of victims and prosecution of traffickers. EU, US, IOM and NGO 
officials agree that information campaigns cannot eliminate the problem of trafficking 
on their own, so why has such a limited approach been taken? The shortcomings of the 
project are rooted not only in the funding limitations discussed in section 2, rather 
there are larger political issues which limit the practical co-operation on trafficking in 
women. 
The three p- prevention, protection and prosecution- approach to combating 
trafficking outlined by the Clinton Administration has been described as an optimal 
strategy for dealing with the problem of trafficking. However, EU-US co-operation is 
limited to prevention. How do the other two p's figure into the EU and US efforts to 
combat trafficking in CEE? As noted above, NGOs have been the most effective 
providers of protection to victims of trafficking, and the EU and the US have both 
funded NGOs in the region for victim assistance. Individually the EU and the US have 
also introduced policies to prosecute traffickers through the US Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act and the Council Directive on Trafficking in Women. Together, the EU 
and the US have yet to co-ordinate transatlantic co-operation on protection for victims. 
In principle, this is a task, which might be addressed by a Transatlantic Trafficking 
Dialogue. 
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Trafficking in women is considered a law enforcement issue by the NTA, yet 
transatlantic co-operation does not include provisions for addressing the prosecution of 
traffickers. Co-operation between the EU and the US is lacking in this area in part 
because the institutional provisions for prosecuting traffickers at the national, EU, and 
international level are also weak. Transatlantic co-operation on trafficking began 
before the EU, the US or the UN had adequate legislative authority to prosecute 
traffickers. The OSCE (1999) reports that 'limited law enforcement capacity, lack of 
expertise at the judicial level, limited resources, and insufficient collaboration between 
law enforcement and other agencies results in inadequate or inefficient investigation. 
and adjudication of trafficking cases'. When the EU and the US pursued co-operation 
in the first and second information campaigns, institutional provisions for prosecution 
were not in place at the national, EU, international and transatlantic level. However, 
new law enforcement provisions have since been introduced. US legislation and the 
UN Protocol on Trafficking were only passed in 2000, and the EU was expected to 
pass the Council Directive on Trafficking in 2001. While, these new measures in no 
way guarantee a shift towards more in-depth law enforcement at the transatlantic level, 
they could well broaden the scope of EU-US collaboration on trafficking in women. 
Prevention campaigns will not curb the number of trafficked women from CEE 
and the NIS unless the root causes of trafficking are addressed. One NGO official 
argues, ' you can tell 1,000 women that they will be trapped in prostitution but it is 
counter-productive. Many knew they would be working in sex work, but they need the 
money to send back home. ' 321 Even prosecution will not deal with voluntary migration 
pursued out of' desperation. Trafficking in women is a problem that is directly linked 
to the poor economic and social circumstances that accompany the transitions to 
Interview. US NGO, Washington DC. February 2001 (59). 
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democracy and a private market economy. These are problems that the EU and the US 
are dealing with both individually and together under the NTA chapter on promoting 
human rights and democracy and through the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. 
Given the fact that co-operation between the EU and the US on trafficking was 
limited to prevention rather than protection or prosecution, the question remains, how 
significant was the campaign? The interviewee response to this question was m ixed. 
The information campaigns were criticised for not getting to the root of the problem 
by failing to address poor economic conditions and the lack of legal economic 
migration, 322 and for not providing witness protection and extended stays for 
trafficking victims. 323 One US official characterised the information campaigns as 
dominated by rhetoric rather than action. 324 Another added that the EU and the US 
would always be capable of doing more individually then together because funding 
restrictions on each side meant that independent revenue would be needed 
eventually. 
32-5 
Despite the limited nature of joint co-operation however, it is worth examining 
the EU-US campaigns in the context of the larger anti -trafficking movement. Policy 
makers argued that the decision to pursue a second and third round of the information 
campaigns is evidence that the projects have had worthwhile effects on the ground. 
One of the most significant aspects of the transatlantic information campaigns is that 
they increased awareness of the problem both externally and internally. First, the joint 
campaigns reiterated EU and US commitment to addressing the problem of 
trafficking. 326 An IOM official in Hungary noted that EU-US backing for the IOM 
information campaign in Hungarý raised the profile of the project. Another official 
Interview, US NGO. Washington DC, February 2001 (59). 
Interview, t JS State Department Official, Washington DC. October 2000 (33). 
Interview, Hi-h ranking US State Department Official, Washington DC. October 2000 (44). 
Interview, t JS State Department Official. Washington DC, October 2000, (33) 
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noted that the considerable coverage of the Ukrainian project had 'helped create a 
sense of urgency' about the problem of trafficking (Escaler 1998). The EU-US 
sponsored information campaigns also paved the way for further action on trafficking 
in women in the countries where they were run. The Commissioner for Justice and 
Home Affairs Antonio Vitorino (1999) argued at the launch of the Hungarian 
campaign, that 'previous campaigns have proved to have had considerable spin-off 
effects such as setting up of permanent co-ordination structures to work with the 
problem on a permanent basis. ' 327 One US official added that these campaigns helped 
ensure that the host countries acknowledged the problem of trafficking and lead to 
more 'open will' between the host states and the EU and US. 328 Finally, the 
transatlantic trafficking campaigns fulfilled greater NTA commitments, by helping to 
forge contacts between EU and US officials dealing with trafficking and with the IOM 
and local NGOs. The information campaigns have allowed officials to gain 
experience working with NGOs and governments and build further bridges in this 
area. The joint EU-US initiative is seen in the international community as part of a 
necessary step to strengthen co-operation and co-ordination efforts among relevant 
governmental, intergovernmental and non -governmental institutions (IOM 1998b). 
Trafficking and the NTA 
The trafficking in women case sheds some light on the nature of EU-US co-operation 
in the area of global challenges under the NTA. To recap, the Joint Action. Plan 
contains transatlantic commitments to combating global challenges such as organised 
crime. terrorism. and illegal immigration. These are policy areas where the EU and the 
US have a shared interest iii protecting national security. The transnational nature of 
'26 Interview, US Mission Official, Brussels, February 200 1 (54). 
Speaking notes. laurich of Hungarian int"orniation campaign November 1999. 
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these threats means that state responses are co-ordinated at different levels of 
governance. Co-operation on trafficking in women is a step towards fulfilling NTA 
aims to improve law enforcement capacities through joint action and the pooling of 
resources at a transatlantic level. The nature of law enforcement co-operation in the 
trafficking in women case, like co-operation on global challenges more generally, has 
been limited. This section seeks to explain what the trafficking case can tell us about 
global challenges co-operation and what the global challenges chapter can tell us about 
the trafficking in women case. 
As noted in chapter 3 3, co-operation under the global challenges chapter has 
been less integrated then under the other chapters of the NTA. Funkt (unpublished: 35) 
identifies two factors which limit the capacity of the EU and the US to co-operate in 
fighting global challenges. First, he argues the preservation of state sovereignty and 
the poorly defined institutional role of EU actors in the area of Justice and Home 
Affairs has obstructed international law enforcement co-operation. The trafficking 
case is a prime example. By focusing on prevention the EU and the US chose to 
pursue a policy that only affected the sovereignty of the host country. Co-operation 
between the EU and the US is kept non-controversial as to avoid member-state or 
Congress intervention. 
Second, the weakness of the EU's third pillar is blamed more generally for a 
lack of US co-operation on political issues. Justice and Home Affairs Policy was only 
established with the Maastricht Treaty and migration issues moved in community 
competence through the Treaty of Amsterdam. 329 On a technical level, funding co- 
ordination in the trafficking case was difficult due to multi-level decision making in 
the EU. Co-operatioii oii protectioii and prosecution was blocked by the lack of a 
, 28 Interview. US Mission Official. Brussels, January 2001 (59). 
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common policy on trafficking in women in the EU before 2001.330 However, it should 
be noted that the US also lacked effective legislation for criminalising trafficking until 
2000. 
Despite the limitations of the NTA's global challenges chapter, the trafficking 
case is significant in the context of the development of the NTA more generally. First, 
the information campaigns are the only co-funded policy project under the global 
challenges chapter of the NTA. Co-funding represents a deeper level of integration, 
and a more concrete deliverable than for example joint statements. Second, the anti- 
trafficking campaigns represent the first operational activity within the migration 
dialogue established by the NTA. Despite the limited nature of the co-operation on 
trafficking in women, the original campaigns have served as a stepping-stone to 
additional projects across CEE, and Russia. The inforination campaigns demonstrate 
how dialogue between Justice & Home Affairs officials in the US Administration and 
the EU institutions can produce concrete results. One US official argued, 'I would 
like to think the success of these efforts will help pave the way for other global 
challenges'. That said, it was added that, 'it will be hard to replicate the kind of focus 
we achieved on such a specific area. Part of this has to do with the complex 
relationships on other global Issues and the difficulty in matching specific goals. 1331 
The trafficking in women case is an example of how the EU and the US can pool 
resources and orgamse efforts to combat global challenges, even if only on a small 
scale. The co-operation on combating HIV/AIDS in Africa (discussed in chapter 3) is 
For a more comprehensive overview of the development of JHA policy see Den Boer and Wallace 
(2000). 
"('One US official argued, 'Because JHA co-operation on the FU level isjust being developed, the US 
still relies extensl\, ely oil bilateral relations with member states, making co-operation, particularly in 
law enforcement, very complex. ' Interview, US Mission Official, Brussels, February 2001 (54). 
Interview. US Mission official, via telephone, February 2001 (54). 
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a more recent example of how the EU and US officials have learned to share 
knowledge and co-ordinate resources to maximise their use. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the case of EU-US co-operation on trafficking in women draws many 
parallels with the other case studies discussed in this thesis. First, like policy making 
on mutual recognition agreements and banana subsidies, the trafficking case shows 
that the potential for co-operation is greater where bureaucratic control is exercised 
and Congress and member state involvement is minimal. The case analysed in this 
chapter is one in which the Commission and the US Administration have pursued a 
joint project that is both non-controversial and in the joint interest of Western states. 
By dealing with the supply side of trafficking through prevention campaigns in CEE, 
the EU-US information campaigns do not impinge on the sovereignty of either US 
domestic legislators or the nationalgovemments in the Member States. 
If one looks at the decision making process of the transatlantic policy on 
trafficking in women, it is also clear that this case study shares characteristics with the 
mutual recognition agreements. Both policies are the result of a complex, multi-level 
decision making process. Intergovernmental actors under the NTA framework 'made' 
the political decision to pursue both policies at EU-US Summits. In both cases 
transgovernmental actors carried out the details of policy 'setting' and policy Z7, 
'shaping'. Thus both cases support the hypothesis that transatlantic policies are the 
result of decentralised decision making. A major difference between the mutual 
recognition agreements and the transatlantic trafficking in women information 
campaigns, however. is the level at which private actors were involved in the decision Z:, 
making processes. In the case of the MRAs. the role of private actors was 
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institutionalised through the TABD (and to a lesser extent the TACD and TAED), 
however there is no formal role for transnational networks in decision shaping on the 
political side of the NTA dialogue. Nonetheless, private actors have exercised some 
functions of privatised governance, in particular by implementing the trafficking 
campaigns. 
This chapter also established that domestic institutions and the newness of 
Justice and Home Affairs policy in both the EU and the NTA limit how deeply the EU 
and the US can co-operate on political issues. The EU-US information campaigns are 
criticised for addressing only one of the three p's. However, it has been argued here 
that these campaigns are an important stepping stone both for the anti -trafficking 
movement and for the migration and law enforcement dialogue under the global 
challenges chapter of the NTA. New national, EU and international laws could 
increase the scope for co-operation on protecting victims and prosecuting traffickers 
on a transatlantic scale. The dialogue already established between Justice and Home 
Affairs officials in Europe and the US means that transatlantic policy on trafficking 
has room to grow under the NTA. 
210 
Chapter 7 
Regulating the Transatlantic Marketplace: 
The EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreements 
Ultimately the goal of the New Transatlantic Marketplace is to create a barrier free 
marketplace through further liberalisation of trade in goods, services and investment. 
A major part of that market opening strategy is to implement agreements that 
eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade. The Customs and Co-operation Agreement 
(1996); the positive Comity Agreement (1998); the Veterinary Equivalency 
Agreement (1999); the Science and Technology Agreement (1997) and the Mutual 
Recognition Agreement (1997) are examples of agreements that aim to reduce barriers 
to trade in the form of regulatory, customs and competition standards. 
This chapter examines the Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs), signed in 
six sectors in 1997 and under negoýiation in six additional sectors, in the larger context 
of the transatlantic partnership. The MRAs are of economic significance because they 
eliminate redundant testing and certification costs affecting $60 billion in trade. 332 
Politically, the MRAs represent a spillover of integration from the European single 
market. The MRAs have the potential to spark further integration within the 
transatlantic process because they symbolize confidence building between trade 
officials and regulatory authorities. These agreements arc important for understanding 
the nature of the interaction between the partners, because joint decision making in the 
MRA process carries wider implications for transatlantic governance. 
Decision making in the MRAs is examined here as a case study of economic 
policy making Linder the NTA fi-ame"'ork. The MRA negotiations are comparable to 
[S60,000 mi II ion] A framework agreement in services is expected to affect a further $130 bi II ion. 
Source: US Mission Website: http: ',! %ý, "ýw. useu. be/'isstiesý/mra0 I 16. html 
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the trafficking in women dialogue because both policies were established through 
intergovernmental and transgovernmental decision making. The MRAs were pursued 
under the NTA framework and monitored by transatlantic institutions. They represent 
a policy sector where transgovemmental networks of trade officials exercised 
considerable control over the development of the policy and where new networks of 
regulatory officials formed to shape policy details. The MRAs are also a test case for 
the policy shaping capacity of private, transnational networks, including the TABD, 
the TACD and the TAED in the transatlantic policy process. 
The mutual recognition agreements also highlight the importance of decision 
making in a system of multi-level governance. The MRAs, unlike the information 
campaigns, were controversial among domestic actors because they affect the 
enforcement of domestic health and safety standards. Transatlantic institutions, which 
are comprised mainly of political and trade officials, had to compete with regulatory 
authorities in the MRA process, particularly in the US, where actors were less familiar 
with mutual recognition. In this case, it can be argued that the US rather than the EU 
suffered from a capabilities-expectations gap. 
This chapter questions how the MRA process is managed and how the interest 
of actors is accommodated. It is argued that transatlantic institutions were key in 
facilitating decisions which made, set and shaped MRA policy. However, these 
different sets of actors were charged with finding a policy that could accommodate not 
only their transatlantic counterparts but domestic agents as well. In this respect the 
MRA case also bears resemblance to the banana dispute discussed in chapter 8. 
This chapter is approached in the following way. Section I examines the 
political decisiori to pursue the MRAs at a transatlantic level. Section 2 discusses how 
domestic actors and traiispovemmerital actors set and shape policy and section ') 
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examines the role of private networks in the process, examining NGO claims that the 
process lacks transparency and accountability. Section 4 looks at the significance of 
the MRA negotiations in the larger context of the NTA. 
I)- The Political Decision to Pursue Mutual Recognition 
This section seeks to explain how and why intergovernmental actors made the decision 
to Pursue the principle of mutual recognition as part of the larger transatlantic market 
opening strategy. The New Transatlantic Marketplace is based on facilitating trade 
between the EU and the US. Regulatory co-operation is crucial to improving 'market 
access as standards and certification procedures often form non-tariff barriers to trade. 
The purpose of mutual recognition agreements is to remove the barriers that result 
from additional or different regulatory requirements on either side of the Atlantic. The 
concept of mutual recognition denotes the acceptance of US product or service tests in 
the EU without duplicate testing, and vice versa. In theory this means products can be 
ý333 'approved once, accepted everywhere in the transatlantic marketplace . In practice 
this means that both EU and US regulatory agents must accept the standards of their 
counterparts. NicolaYdis (19974: 1) argues, 'The recognition' involved here is of the 
'equivalence', compatibility' or at least 'acceptability' of the counterpart's regulatory 
system, the 'mutual' part indicates that the reallocation of authority is reciprocal and 
simultaneousý. 
An Intergovernmental Decision 
'rhe political impetus for mutual recognition agreements came from the top. 
Intergovernmental actors laid out the intention to pursue an agreement on mutual 
This phrase was adopted by the TABD as a slo-an for the MRAs. See http: //www. tabd. com 
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recognition certification and testing procedures in the New Transatlantic Agenda 
(1995) and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (1998). The NTA included the 
aim 'to conclude an agreement on mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
(which includes certification and testing procedures) for certain sectors as well as the 
intention to identify other sectors for further negotiation. The first set of MRAs 
(signed in 1997) included telecommunications, medical devices, electromagnetic 
compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft and pharmaceuticals and 
concentrated on 'conformity assessment' meaning that testing, inspection and 
certification of goods for either the EU or the US market can be conducted once, 
locally (see table 7.2). Transatlantic leaders announced their intention to expand 
mutual recognition to the testing and approval of services- architecture, insurance, 
engineering- as well as new goods- road safety, cosmetics and marine safety- in the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership. The TEP outlined plans to extend mutual 
recognition to professional certification and in the case of marine safety to pursue a 
'full equivalence' agreement or MRA +, meaning that the EU must accept marine 




IA Chronolo2v of the MRA Neaotiations I 
(1995) NTA and NTA Action Plan outline the intention to pursue MRAs 
(1996) The Senior Level Group identifies eight sectors for possible MRAs 
(1997) The MRA Agreement is signed including 7 annexes. 
(1998) TEP and TEP Action Plan announce the spread of MRAs to new goods sectors and 
services 
(1999) The TEP Steering Group announces a draft framework agreement for services MRAs 
in architecture engineering and insurance as well as the intention to begin negotiations in 
marine safety. 
(2000) The first MRAs- in Recreational Craft, EMC and Telecoms- move into the operational 
phase while sectors such as pharmaceuticals and medical devices miss deadlines for 
implementation. 
Table 7.2 The MRA Annexes 
MRA Set I- NTA 
(umbrella agreement signed 1997) 
MRA'Set 11- TEP 
(under negotiation in 2001) 
Goods Goods 
Telecommunications, 9 Road Safety 
Medical devices * Cosmetics 
Electromagnetic compatibility * Marine Safety (MRA +) 
Electrical safety Services 
Recreational craft Architecture 
Pharmaceuticals. Engineering 
Insurance 
Ae Motivation for Mutual Recognition 
Mutual recognition is a method of trade liberalization that is both an alternate and 
complimentary approach to other methods of regulatory co-operation, but how did 
mutual recognition come onto the transatlantic policy agenda and why was it chosen 
over other market opening strategies. especially harmonization? Intergovernmental 
actors had a number ofmotivations for pursuing mutual recognition in addition to and 
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as an alternate for a strict harmonization strategy. Put plainly, the MRAs are a means 
of achieving increased market access at the lowest political cost. 
The transatlantic Mutual Recognition Agreements are expected to affect an 
estimated $170 billion of trade in goods and services. 334 The logic behind the MPAs is 
that eliminating redundant testing reduces the cost of exporting for manufacturers. 
Ambassador Ralph Ives of the Unites States Trade Representative (USTR) argued, 
'MRAs can also save regulatory agencies resources by enhancing regulators' 
confidence in products from MRA partners and reducing the need to test and inspect 
those foreign products' (Ives 1997: 32). A 1996 US government briefing reported that 
mutual recognition could save the Federal Drugs Administration $1.5 million in the 
pharmaceutical sector alone 335 . Nicola: fdis (I 997a: I is 3) argues that mutual recognition i 
more beneficial than harmonization in this respect because the latter does not always 
eliminate the cost of redundant testing procedures as governments often continue to 
require their own agencies to certify products. 
Politically the costs of MRAs are also lower than the harmonization of 
domestic standards. First, mutual recognition fits into the new transatlantic 
framework because it is a contractual norm rather than a legal proceeding, thus it is the 
result of negotiations between bureaucrats rather than legislative authorities 
(NicolaYdis 1997a: 1). Like the TAD, the NTA and the TEP, the Mutual Recognition 
Agreements bypass US domestic legislation, thus making them easier to negotiate. 
Second, harmonization is very difficult to achieve, because regulatory officials, 
particularly in the US. fiercely guard sovereignty 336 (see also below). Mutual 
33 -' The rough figures quoted from the US Mission and TABD are $50-60 billion in trade under the first n framework aareernent and $130 billion in a services framework agreement. 
5 Based on the assumption that each Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) pharmaceutical plant 
inspection the FDA performs costs the agency $100,000 and 150 such inspections are performed in the 
FU each year (see White House 1996b). 
-6 Interview UK Foreign Office official, London January 2000 (21). See also Cowles 1997. 
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recognition results in only a limited transfer of authority because it does not require 
regulatory agents to change their domestic rules. Specifically, MRAs do not require 
the transfer of authority to a supranational body (NicolaYdis 1997a: 4). Thus, they are 
less likely to attract negative attention from the US Congress or the EU Member 
States. Third, mutual recognition fits well into the practical transatlantic building 
block strategy because they are less time consuming that harmonization, which 
requires constant updating and amending of national regulatory systems (Nicol aYdis 
1997b: 3). 
Finally, support for mutual recognition stems from its external spillover from 
the European Single Market (Nicokffdis 1997a, 1997b; Egan 2001a, 2001b). Although 
MRAs are embedded in international law in both the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, they are not the result of 
a WTO 'top down' strategy of liberalisation, but rather an extension of the EU's new 
'Global Approach' to the internal- market (see also Egan 200 1 a; 2001 b). NicolaYdis 
(1997a; 1997b) argues that EU-US mutual recognition negotiations are an example of 
both normative and strategic spillover. In negotiating MRAs with countries outside 
the Union, the EU has made mutual recognition a symbol of European integration. 
Strategically, the EU was able to shape the envirom-nent of transatlantic negotiations 
because mutual recognition is an area where EU institutions have competency. Thus, 
it can be argued that the US was able to draw on the EU experience and 'ride the 
wave' of the internal market (NicolaYdis 1997a: 7). 
Not only has mutual recognition spread from a regional to a plurilateral 
setting, the onset Of Mutual recognition within the new transatlantic marketplace has 
sparked a further breakdown of regulatory barriers to trade. For example, the US 
National Institute of' Standards and Technology and the EU National Measures Z-- 
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Institute signed an agreement extending mutual recognition to test reports, calibration 
and measurement certificates provided for regulatory compliance. The Veterinary 
Equivalency Agreement extends the principle of mutual recognition to animal 
standards. Furthermore, the conclusion of the first phase of the MRAs enabled 
intergovernmental leaders to set the precedent for the negotiations in three new goods 
and three new service sectors. 
Political obstacles to the MRAs 
Mutual recognition in the transatlantic marketplace is not used with the same depth or 
scope found in the European single market. In the EU mutual recognition applies to 
the full equivalence of standards rather than conformity assessment certification. In 
other words within the EU each national government must accept the regulations of 
the Member States. 337 On the other hand the transatlantic MRAs, barring the MRA + 
in marine safety, require standards agencies to test products using both EU and US 
standards tests. A number of factors blocked further and faster integration. 
First, transatlantic institutions lack the depth to oversee and enforce the MRAs. 
European mutual recognition has been established legally in the EU through the Cassis 
de Dijon case, and is legitimately enforced by the European Court of Justice, but no 
overarching institution has the capacity to enforce mutual recognition. 
Second, distinct political and cultural systems different negotiating styles in the 
EU and the US. Drawing on the logic of the single market, the EU pushed for an 
agreement that would cover full mutual recognition of equivalence. Contrary, the EU- 
US MPAs refer only to testing and certitication competence (see Pelkmans 1998; 
Nicola*fdis 1997b. Egan 2001b) because US officials argued that in some sectors full 
See Nicoldfdis I 997aý 1997bý E-an 200 1 a: 200 1b 
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MRAs would not be compatible with domestic legal systems (Ives 1997: 28; Vogel 
1998). Instead US negotiators took the position that a less ambitious, but more 
pragmatic strategy should be pursued, assuming the basic requirement of limiting the 
duplication of testing standards was fulfilled. 
Third, in a situation that mimics the Seattle WTO negotiations, disagreement 
surfaced over where to apply mutual recognition. The US negotiators argued in favour 
of sector by sector negotiations on the basis that involving too many sectors would 
mean involving more regulatory agencies and thus increase the possibility of a higher, 
unreachable threshold for agreement. The EU favored a framework approach which 
trade officials hoped would encourage the spillover of mutual recognition to. further 
sectors (Ives 1997; NicolaYdis 1997a; 1997b; Egan 2001a; 2001b). The Commission, 
however, did insist on a 'balanced package'. Horton (1998: 648) argues, 'it would not 
agree to MRAs on telecommunications and recreational craft - viewed as 
advantageous to the United States- unless there also was MR-A coverage of 
pharmaceuticals- viewed as advantageous to the EU. ' 
Another barrier to MRA negotiations stems from the EU and US regulatory 
processes, which are defined by different institutional structures and legal 
requirements. For example, differences exist in the right of access for private actors in 
either system (see below). In terms of implementation the US federal structure has 
been blamed for blocking more comprehensive agreements and blocking 
implementation, because the national level is bound legally to respect the rights of 
individual states, particularly in services sectors. 338 Faced with this EU Commission 
officials have accused the US regulatory bodies of 'not being able to deliver. 339 
Interview, UK Forci-n Office, January, London 2000 (21). 
Interview. European Commission, DG Trade, Brussels ( 15). 
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As a result of two distinct and equally complex procedures, many actors- both 
private and public- play a role in setting and shaping regulatory policy. Although the 
impetus for agreements came from intergovernmental actors under the NTA and TEP 
340 frameworks 
, the policy details of the MRA's were derived from negotiations among 
and between transgovernmental and transnational actors with consideration to the 
political concerns addressed in this section. Sections 2 and 3 elaborate on the role 
played by these actors. Each points to competing forces at work in the MRA process. 
One consists of transgovernmental actors fighting over their sovereign right to control 
the regulatory process, the other is made up of transnational actors struggling to obtain 
information and subsequently exert influence over international standards. 341 
2) Transgovernmental Trade and Domestic Regulatory Authorities 
While the political decision to pursue MRAs came from the top, the policy was set and 
shaped by a number of transgovernmental and domestic actors. The MRA process 
demonstrates the important role played by these actors, particularly in the negotiation 
of policy details and the process of confidence building in the transition phase of the 
MRAs. 34" 
The USTR Charlene Barshefsky and former European Commissioner Leon 
Brittan signed the first EU-US Mutual Recognition Agreements in 1997, thus 
effectively setting the policy for MR-As. 34 -" The MRA is an umbrella agreement that 
340 One FDA official argued it was a 'political decision to have internal MRAs, there was no option on 
the part of technical agencies' (3 6). 
341 This point was made by a US Mission official in an interview conducted September 1999, Brussels. 
, 42 The MRAs undergo two phases before the agreements are operational in individual sectors. First, the 
negotiations follows the political decision to pursue MRAs but predates the signing of the agreement. 
The transition phase is a confidence building process, which follows the si ning of the agreement but 9 
precedes full implementation. The operational phase of the MRAs marks the point when the agreements 
are in working order. The negotiation and transitional phases are the primary focus of this discussion as n 
onk, three MRAs , ýere fulk operational at the time of \ýriting, 
, 03 EU decision inakino procedures require Council ratification which was given on 22 June 1998. The 
negotiation of the second set of MRAs has yet to be concluded. 
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allows mutual recognition to be implemented in seven annexes (see table 7.2). The 
Office of USTR and DG I (now DG Trade) aided by the US Commerce Department 
and DG III (now DG Industry) played a large role in setting and shaping the 
overarching agreement. However, the complexity of both EU and US regulatory 
systems dictated that many transgovernmental actors had a role in policy shaping in 
the individual annexes. The NTA and the TEP delegated the task of facilitating 
mutual recognition to trade officials within transatlantic institutions, but the 
technocratic nature of mutual recognition and the need for confidence building also led 
to the entrenchment of transatlantic regulatory networks. Examination of 
transgovernmental and domestic actors is interesting in the context of this discussion 
because it displays the interplay of interests between not only EU and the US 
negotiators but between domestic regulatory and trade officials, particularly in the US. 
Regulatory Autonomy in a Trade Driven Process 
Both EU and US regulatory systems involve a complex interplay between many 
different department agencies, standards setting bodies and legislative bodies. 
Negotiation and confidence building in the MRA process was complicated by the 
clashing interests of regulatory and trade officials and by the institutional 'mismatch' 
of the EU and US regulatory systems. Two main differences surfaced in the MRA 
negotiations: contrasting systems of regulatory accountability and cultures of tl 
regulatory autonomy (NicolaYdis 1997a). Institutional asymmetries were a source of 
conflict in the MRA process, because, notes Stuart Eizenstat, 'We found that we have 
entirely different regLilator,, reoirnes" (quoted in Cowles 2001: 225). The fierce 
protection over autonorny exercised by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in 
the medical devices and pharmaceuticals annexes, and to a lesser extent. the 
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), in the electrical safety 
annex, led to claims that US regulatory agents were, 'obsessed with giving up 
344 sovereignty' 
The accountability of EU standards was brought into question because EU 
regulatory authorities rely more on private conformity assessment bodies (CABs) for 
product testing standards than their US counterparts. US regulatory agents, 
particularly the FDA, were opposed to the EU system of private CABs. The medical 
device negotiations were prolonged because the FDA was initially unable and 
unwilling to transfer regulatory authority to third parties. While the EU argued that 
private third party assessment bodies should be able to certify in accordance with FDA 
standards, FDA officials claimed they could not delegate the ultimate authority to 
approve the private third party reports or manufacturing facilities inspections (Ives 
1997: 30). FDA opposition was only curbed when the FDA Modernization Act (1.997) 
altered the scope of FDA control and allowed delegation of authority to third party 
assessment bodies (Egan 2001 b: 15). 
NicolaYdis (1997b: 19) argues that contrary to US fears, there is a very 
symbiotic relationship in the EU between the private and public sector and that 
accountability is high because the European Organization for Testing and 
Certification- a government agency- oversees CABs. Two main organizations, Comit6 
Europ6en de Normalisation (CEN) and the ComA6 Europ6en de Normalisation 
Electrotechnique (CENELEC), coordinate various national standards bodies and over 
40 regulatory organizations (see also Egan 2001: 8-9). Z-- Zý 
On the other hand, it can be argued that accountability is not as visible in the 
US system where there is no authoritative body in charge of regulatory agents. US 
Quoted froni interview with UK Foreign Office Official, January 2000 (2 1). n 
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regulatory policy is both highly fragmented (see Egan 2001b) and decentralised. (see 
Cowles 1997). The US system relies heavily on voluntary conformity from over four- 
hundred federal and state, trade and industry associations, scientific and technical 
societies. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) does serve as an 
'administrator' and 'coordinator' of the private sector voluntary standardization 
system, however Egan (2001b: 24) notes that the ANSI does not set standards itself 
and that not all standards bodies are members. 345 Thus, EU officials worried about 
capacity of the US to guarantee regulatory quality given the lack of accountability (see 
also Nicola: fdis 1997b; Egan 2001 b: 14). To compensate for this problem the National 
Institute on Standards - an agent of the Commerce Department- created the National 
Voluntary Conformity Assessment Program to accredit conformity assessment in the 
us. 
EU officials believed US accountability was further threatened by the 
autonomous role of many US regulatory agencies. The Federal Drug Administration, 
the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Defense 
Department and the National Institute on Standards and Technology (NIST) all 
operate separately and are governed by individual statutes from Congress. The high 
degree of autonomy experienced by US regulatory agencies means that sovereignty is 
guarded very closely. According to Cowles (1997: 3 5) 'the statutory independence of 
the agencies meant that regulatory officials had their own independent mindset and 
turf to defend as well. ' 
Generally rivalry between trade and regulatory agencies stems not only from 
competition over regulatory authority, but because the trade and regulatory officials z: I I 
inherently perform different functions and have different goals. Ives (1997: 29) adds 
Including Prominent or,, anisation such as the American Society for Testing Material and the 
International Institute of EmOneers (IIE) (Egan 2001 b). 
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that negotiations were difficult because 'A successful negotiation requires regulatory 
authorities to cooperate with trade officials ... But the agencies almost speak 
different 
languages- the regulators in scientific terms, the trade agencies in economic terms. ' 
One US NGO simplified the divide by arguing, 'One builds things, the other knocks 
things down. ' 
346 
Conflict between trade and regulatory officials was particularly cumbersome in 
the US. A delicate balance between the European Commission (both DGI and DGIII), 
national regulatory bodies and the private sector had already been met within the 
single market requirement. US regulatory agents, on the other hand did not have the 
same experience with MRAs and some were 'less comfortable' with the notion of 
mutual recognition. 347 Clashes between trade and regulatory officials are most evident 
in the medical devices and pharmaceutical annexes of the MRA, where the FDA has 
US domestic authority, and in the electrical safety annex, which is under the 
jurisdiction of OSHA. While the FDA was not opposed directly to mutual recognition, 
it did express concern about the transfer of authority to private actors, EU regulatory 
agents and US trade officials. FDA officials were keen to demonstrate that the, 'legal 
authority to regulate is placed with FDA, not Commerce, not USTR. ' 348 The FDA 
argued that the statutory authority of the agency could not be delegated to other 
bodies. Within the NTA process, State Department and USTR officials sought to 
convince the FDA that MR-As did not affect their statutory mission. The 
Modernization Act of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (1997) outlined 
Congress's expectations for the MR-As. FDA was directed in consultation with the 
Secretary of Commerce to support the Trade Representative in reaching agreement 
316 Interview v,, ith TAED official, Washington DC, October 2000 (30). 
347 Interview with USTR official, Washington DC. October 2000 (43), 
, 48 Interview with FDA official, Maryland, October 2000 (38). 
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with the EU on all products under the FDA's jurisdiction given that there is no 
reduction in standards levels (Merrill 1998: 742). 
Regulatory officials were initially opposed to setting up a joint EU-US 
committee to oversee conformity assessment because of the potential opportunity for 
trade agencies to dominate (see Ives 1997) and opposed the negotiation of an 
overarching umbrella agreement or TU packaging' of the annexes driven by USTR. 
Sharon Holston, Deputy Commissioner for External Affairs for the FDA testified in 
front of the House Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations that, 'There were clearly times during the negotiations when DG-I 
negotiators operated under the assumption that trade issues were paramount in the 
negotiation. It was made clear to them, however, that for legal and policy reasons 
health and safety issues would govern. ' 349 FDA also requested a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with USTR to secure clear authority for the FDA in the 
sectoral annexes and a reserved 'observer' role for USTR in Joint Committee meetings 
where FDA annexes were discussed (see below) .3 
50 A FDA official argued, 'on 
anything that affected FDA, we were in charge. ' 351 
The MRAs are thus seen not a transfer of authority to from the FDA to EU 
regulatory bodies but as a 'contract for service'. 352 In such an agreement the role of a 
trading partner is not that of law maker but rather that of information source or service 
provider (Merrill 1998). Under the Modernization Act FDA is still responsible to 
Congress for the standards, thus interest in assuring that mutual recognition partners 
1119 Statement by Sharon Smith I lolston, Deputy Commissioner for External Affairs Food and Drug 
Administration Department of Health and Human Services, Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
In vest ityations Committee on Commerce. US [louse of Representatives, 2 October 1998. 1 
FDA official argued on the Joint Committee, that we wanted to make certain that we are 
spokesperson. 
Interview with FDA official, Maryland. October 2000 (38). 
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maintain the same level of equivalence. MRA negotiation and implementation was 
delayed, however, because the period of confidence building failed to convince FDA 
of the equivalence of all Member States standards. Some argue that the existence of 
regulatory culture in the FDA prevents the FDA from co-operating because the FDA 
believes in the high level of its standards. 353 One FDA official argued that, 'FDA has a 
proud history. (Initially) we felt no need to play in this- we are used to being 
authoritative. ' 354 Further, the FDA had problems accepting the equality and 
equivalency of standards across the 15 Member States. One FDA official commented, 
'FDA knew Europe was not 'whole'. ' A US trade official affirmed the American 
perception that, 'Portuguese standards are not the same as those in the UK. ' As a 
result of a lack of confidence between the FDA and member state regulatory officials, 
FDA was only able to approve testing certification in one member state, the UK, by 
2001 December deadline for implementation. 355 
Ultimately the MR-As seek to reduce the cost of exporting to producers and the 
cost of duplicate testing for domestic regulators, however, making domestic systems 
MRA 'ready' is also costly. FDA officials argue that the agency has spent 'significant' 
in promoting MRAs out of 'nominal budgets. 356 Misunderstanding over the cost of 
processing applications for conformity assessment under the MRA led to 'differences 
in interpretation' between OSHA and the Commission and delayed the approval of 
European CABs capable of implernenting OSHA assessments. OSHA claimed that it 
was able to charge fees for 'processing' applications for conformity assessment under 
, 52 The United States enters into an agreement with a trading partner under the expectation that the 
trading partner will take steps to help FDA perform its primary function of applying domestic legal 
standards to products imported into the United States. ' 
See Millen 1998, 
, i4 Interview FDA, Maryland, October 2000 (38). 
, 55 Alden 2001, Financial Times 
Interviews with FDA officials, Maryland, October 2000 (36-38). 
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the MRA, but the Commission argued that OSHA ran the risk of duplicating fee 
assessment (OSHA 2000). 
Further conflict in the MRA negotiations resulted from the domestic 
orientation of US regulatory agencies and their lack of experience with the EU single 
market system. Conflict arose over the FDA's refusal to accept European certification 
of testing reports in lieu of the full reports. 357 FDA officials argued their statutory 
authority required FDA officials to review the full reports, which caused 'enormous 
difficulties' with EU officials in the MRA negotiations. A FDA official argued, 'there 
was a lot of pressure not to hold to this position- they thought we were being 
arbitrary'. The problem was defused by language whereby the FDA accepted that it 
would 'normally' be able to accept certification and by new efforts to secure a 
common inspector report format. 358 One FDA official blamed delayed 
implementation of the FDA annexes on the fact that much documentation on the 
Member States legal and regulatory systems was provided in native languages. 
Language differences also arose in the electrical safety MRA. Although three 
European companies had applied for OSHA approval to certify products, two were not 
considered because the applications were made in French and Spanish. One OSHA 
official argued, 'We're a domestic health and safety agency, we don't do translations' 
(Alden 2001). 
Balancing the Trade and Regulatory Camps 
The conceptual i sation of an EU-IJS MRA did not originate within the NTA process, 359 
however the intergovernmental decision to pursue the agreements brought mutual 
3ý7 Interview with FDA officials, Maryland, October 2000, (36,37,38) EU Commission delegation 
official. Washington DC. October 2000 (35) 
FDA interviews, (36,37) 
"9 FDA began discussions with the Commission as carly as 1992. 
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recognition into the NTA decision making process and put transatlantic actors at the 
'steering wheel' of the negotiations. Transatlantic institutions played a key role in 
pushing negotiations ahead and striking a balance between trade and regulatory 
authorities. First, transatlantic institutions under the New Transatlantic Agenda drove 
the MRA process forward. The MRA's were the result of endless negotiations of 
experts through the transatlantic institutions before the EU-US Summit where the 
MRA framework agreement was announced . 
360 The Senior Level Group and the TEP 
Steering Group, which bring together trade officials, were charged with monitoring the 
process, identifying achievable goals on a sector by sector basis and setting a number 
of deadlines for practical tasks. The TEP Steering Group also takes recommendations 
from the transatlantic dialogues, and initiates information exchanges between EU and 
US experts, for example by holding meetings between architects and engineers (TEP 
Steering Group 2000). Under the NTA process regulatory agents in the annexes were 
tied into the umbrella time frame and trade authorities maintained control over the 
overarching process. One USTR official argued that the NTA, 'essentially put USTR 
in charge of what they should be, management of the issues. 361 The NTA process 
pushed domestic regulators to meet deadlines, and one FDA official notes, ' we've 
been able to accomplish much more than we thought. ' 362 
In addition, the MRA umbrella agreement created new transatlantic 
ýinstitutionsý to facilitate the existing MRAs. First, it established a new transatlantic 
process for designation of procedures for mutual conformity assessment. European 
and American domestic actors were joined in Designating Authorities which were 
assigned to each sector iii the MRA agreement. For example, in the medical devices 
sector the FDA and member state regulatory bodies were charged with approving and 
, 60 Interview Council Presidency official, Brussels, September 1999 (5). 
Interview USTR official, Washington DC. October 2000 (42). 
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then monitoring private conformity assessment bodies in the EU and the US and to 
exchange information on the acceptability of private conformity assessment bodies. 
Second, despite initial objections from US regulatory agencies (see above) and 
NGOs (see below) a Joint Committee was created of EU and US officials. This 
committee is responsible for making sure the agreement functions. It thus serves an 
administrative role and as an extra 'check' for conformity assessment bodies. The 
Joint Committee provides a forum for discussion and helps coordinate the negotiation 
of extra sectors. Finally, on a working level six Joint Sectoral Committees were also 
established to assist the Joint Committee and oversee technical implementation. 
Each of these played an important part in the confidence building process. It 
was the motivation of market access that drove the process forward and helped 
overcome the staunch protectionist positions of many domestic regulators. These new 
institutions are a forum for information sharing and problem solving. In short, they 
establish a pattern of co-operation between EU and US officials and trade and 
regulatory agents. 
Table 7.3. MRA Institutions 
Institution Role 
Designating Authorities Approve and monitor CABs 
Joint Committee Co-ordinate the negotiation, transition of 
annexes between trade and regulatory agents 
Joint Sectoral Committee Oversee technical implementation 
Conformity Assessment Bodies (CABs) Conduct certification testing 
The argument being made here is this: trade officials and regulatory agencies clashed 
in the MRA negotiations because each had a different stake in the process. Regulators 
, 62 Interview. FDA official, Maryland. October 2000 (38). 
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sought to protect the level of domestic standards and the authority to establish these 
standards. Trade officials fought to reduce different testing procedures as a barrier to 
trade and to keep the MRA process moving. Despite these centrifugal forces, the new 
level of transgovernmental institutionalization provided a forum for managing the 
process. 363 A working relationship was established whereby trade officials maintained 
control over the umbrella agreement and regulatory agents retained authority in the 
individual annexes. 
3) Transnational Input: The Role of the Transatlantic Civil Society 
The MRAs are a case that also demonstrates the capacity of private and non- 
governmental actors to shape transatlantic policy. The TABD, the TACD and the 
TAED endeavoured to shape MRA decisions. Given their conflicting goals, the 
business and social based dialogues formed separate alignments with the regulatory 
and trade camps. The TABD agenda naturally aligns with trade authorities ambitions 
to eliminate redundant testing procedures. On the other, consumers and 
environmentalists have reiterated regulatory agents' fears about a reduction in the 
level of health, safety and environmental standards. 
The Role of TABD 
The TABD has been a staunch supporter of the MRAs and has been actively involved 
364 
with the agreements since its creation in 1995 . MR-As benefit industry because they 
seek to reduce duplicate testing procedures. The bottom line is that these tests are 
costly. and the MRAs are a means to reducing the cost of exporting. This reduction 
benefits the exporters directly. as a TABD advisor argues that a typical US 
Argued by TABD official, interview, Brussels, September 1999 (14). 
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manufacturer may spend $50,000-100,000 annually complying with foreign regulatory 
requirements (Stern 1997). 
The TABD took an active interest in MRA negotiations on a political and 
technical level. First, it created the Transatlantic Advisory Committee on Standards 
(TACS) made up of industry experts from the working group on regulatory co- 
operation Ao investigates ways that regulatory standards could be harmonised on a 
sector by sector basis. Within four months of its creation the TACS was able to 
provide EU and US officials with a clear outline of where EU and US industry felt 
MRAs were feasible. 365 Thus, on a technical level, the TACD was able to provide the 
EU and US governments with specific information that could facilitate mutual 
recognition in a number of sectors. 
On a political level, the TABD exerted constant pressure on the EU and the US 
to meet these proposals. 366 At the TABD conference in Chicago EU and US officials 
agreed to a deadline for agreement on MPAs in the original sectors by January 31 
1997. When this deadline slipped, TABD publicly criticised the US Administration 
and the Commission for failing to conclude the agreement. The TABD chairs sent 
letters to Clinton and Santer and stepped up their campaign through frequent meetings 
with officials, exerting pressure on the Administration through the US Commerce 
department. The TABD became deeply embedded in the MRA decision making 
process (see also Cowles 2001a; 2001b), and had representatives present when the 
agreements were finally signed in June 1997 (TABD 1998). The Financial Times 
While some officials (interviews 38,39,41) have argued that MRA neaotiations existed before the 
TABD was created. arguably the most progress was made after the creation of the TABD. 
'6' In May 1996 it released a progress report listing priority areas for regulatory co-operation (see 
wxNkv. tabd. gov). 
366 Interview, USTR official, Washington DC, October 2000 (41); US Commerce official, Washington 
DC. October (52). 
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reported 'The key to final approval of the MRA was the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue' (June 19 1997). 
The TABD has continued to monitor the progress of the annexes in the 
transitional phase of the MRAs. The TABD Scorecard (issued mid year since 1998) 
identifies government successes and failures in the individual MRA sectors. The 
TABD (1999,2000) has publicly criticised the delayed implementation of the medical 
devices and electrical safety annexes, and warned that failure to implement all of the 
annexes on time would undermine credibility of the entire process. 
Trade officials have continually praised the TABD for its role in the MRA 
process. Numerous high-ranking officials have highlighted the role of TABD, and 
even the TEP agreement notes its contribution. Commissioner Brittan (1997), " noted 
the vital input of TABD'. US Commerce Secretary Daley argued, 'TABD said it was 
important, we heard them and we acted. ' President Clinton (1996) thanked the TABD, 
'for their leadership in achieving these agreements' and USTR Barshefsky (1997) 
claimed, 'We could not have achieved this (MRA) package without the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue. EU Trade Commissioner Lamy (1999) told TABD members, 'It is 
quite clear that I have much less influence over the process now than when I 
participated in it as a member. ' 367 
TABD's influence in the MRA process was most recognised among trade 
officials at a political rather than a technical level. Commerce and USTR officials 
argued that TABD played 'a huge role' in the MRA process. 368 On the other hand, 
FDA officials have downplayed the role of' TABD in the negotiations, referring to 
FDA and TABD interaction as 'briefings' rather than dialogue. 369 The TABD has an 
, 67 For a list of more supportive comments for TABD see. 'What They've Said About TABU available 
ýN'wxN'. tabd. coiii/resoLii-ces/content, /qLiotes. htiiiI 
, 68 Quoted frorn FU Delegation Official. Washington DC, October 2000 (35). 
, 69 FDA interviews (38,39). 
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ally in USTR and Commerce, because its goals are trade, not regulatory in nature. The 
divide is a natural phenomenon because trade officials, businesspeople, regulators and 
the civil society dialogues do not have parallel interests in the MRA process. 370 For 
example, TABD pushed for the decentralisation of regulatory co-operation between 
the EU and the US, a policy directly opposed by the FDA and the NGOs. 371 A TABD 
advisor argued that US regulatory agencies and civil society networks, who oppose the 
transfer of authority to business, were obstacles to the international liberalisation of 
regulatory standards (Stern 1996). 
The role of TACD and TAED 
The EU-US MRAs have been controversial among the NGO community in the US. 
Whereas European NGOs have had experience with mutual recognition in the single 
market, one US Trade officials notes, 'American NGOs do not understand the MRAs. ' 
372 An EU official argued that American NGOs are learning from European through 
373 the TACD and the TAED , but many US members have opposed the MRAs on a 
political and technical level. On a political level, these groups have teamed up with 
FDA in opposing 'delegated governance', trade control over the regulatory process, 
and the influence of TABD. 374 On a technical level the TACD and TAED has 
expressed concerns about a downward spiral of health and safety standards and the 
cost to consumers and government agencies. 
370 Interview, US Commerce official, Washington DC, October 2000 (52). 
37 ' TABD supported FDA reforms, in order to make the agency more compliant with the EU regulatory 
system of private conformity assessment (Stern 1997). 
372 One EU official argued that on the 'European side everyone knows about MRAs because of the' 
single market, but US NGOs believed the US Administration was telling lies. ' Interview, European 
Commission Delegation, Washington, 2000 (34). 
373 Interview, EU Commission Delegation, Washington, 2000 (34). 
374 one TACD member argued, 'we have better communication with FDA'. Interview, US NGO, 
Washington DC, October 2000, (50). 
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Despite attempts by the trade official-TABD coalition to convince NGOs of 
the safety of MRAs 375 , many groups 
hold 'deep reservations' about the agreements 
(see CEO 1998b). In short they argue that MRAs could lead to a downward spiral or 
lowest common denominator of health, safety and environmental standards (de -Brie 
1999, TACD 1998: 3). Environmentalists and consumers have continually argued that 
international standards must not be harmonised down, but rather improved (TACD 
1998: 3). Not all consumer groups are against MRAs completely, 376 but the TACD has 
specifically asked the government to distinguish between standards which effect health 
and safety and those that do not. A TACD (2000) briefing paper states, 'Equivalence- 
377 based mutual recognition is inappropriate for use with substantive standards. ' . 
A second opposition to the MRAs is the cost of negotiation and 
implementation. It is estimated that just one sector (pharmaceuticals) cost the FDA 
$10 million to comply with the MRA agreement . 
378 NGOs argue that the benefits of 
MRAs are direct to producers, thus cost should be shifted to the private, rather than 
public sector. One TAED (2000) paper maintains that, 'Given such a hefty price tag 
for this annex and the MRA as a whole, a case must be made directly to consumers on 
both continents who must be assured that there will be an improvement in their public 
health and safety protection to justify this cost. ' 
Government officials have actively tried to portray the MRAs as environmental, consumer and 
labour friendly. When the MRAs were signed Barshevsky argued, 'The real winners today are 
manufacturers, workers, and consumers, both in American and in Europe who will see reduced costs, 
increasedjobs, and a better standard of living' (1997). At the TACD's second meeting in February 
2000, the EU head of Unit for DG Trade argued that by facilitating trade MRAs would benefit 
consumers by creating lower prices and greater choice (Petriccione 2000). 
376 Interview, TACD official, January 2000, London (24). 
377 EU and US officials have argued that MRAs do not undermine health and safety because they do not 
change existing domestic standards. However, a TAED (2000) draft paper states that 'mutual 
recognition allows for imprecise, subjective comparison of what may be vastly different democratically 
achieved regulatory standards. ' In addition, it is argued that there are no adequate provisions for 
amendments, termination, dispute resolution, public participation or congressional oversight. 
378 TACD (2000). 
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The TACD has also vocalised opposition to the transfer of authority away from 
regulatory agencies and the domestic system. NGOs fiercely opposed. incorporating a 
voluntary conformity assessment system where the transfer of regulatory authority 
would shift from agencies like the FDA to private conformity assessment bodies in 
third countries (CEO 1998a; 1998b TAED 2000). It is argued that, 'The delegation of 
tasks under the MRA to conformity assessment bodies in another jurisdiction runs the 
risk of defacto privatization of government responsibilities' (TACD 2000). 
Consumers and environmentalists have teamed with US regulatory agents in 
supporting strong national regulatory bodies. Furthermore, TACD and TAED 
members sided with US regulatory agencies against the creation of the Joint 
Committee. Like the FDA and the FCC, consumer and envirom-nentalists were hesitant 
to create an influential body that had the potential to be dominated by trade concerns 
rather than social standards (TACD 2000). A TAED official argued that at the core of 
their concerns was the fact that 'suddenly trade negotiators are in charge of regulatory 
policy. ' 
379 
A TACD briefing paper also raised concerns about the transfer of MRAs from 
the domestic regulatory policy to the sphere of international trade policy. It is'argued 
that moving MRAs into the scope of foreign trade puts a cloak of secrecy over the 
negotiations (TACD 2000) and leads to a lack of Congressional oversight because the 
MRAs are an executive agreement and are thus not subject to ratification in the US. 
The MRAs were negotiated outside the scope of the EU or US legislative process and 
Congress and the European Parliament had only marginal involvement in the 
negotiations. 380 
379 Interview, US NGO, Washington DC, October 2000 (30). 
380 The European Parliament has supported the MRAs, but continually fought for more input and 
consultation with the European negotiating team (European Parliament 1998). A Senate staff member 
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Non-govermnental organisations have also directly opposed the privileged 
access that TABD had to the MRA negotiations. The special relationship between the 
TABD and the Commerce Department in MRA negotiations was a particular fixation 
of US regulatory officials and NGOs. Supported by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, they argued that the role of the TABD in the MRAs bordered on violating the 
US Administration Procedures Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (TACD 
2000; 1998; TAED 2000). One TACD member argued, 'Our biggest fear is that the 
MRAs are TABD. 381 
Contrary to the TABD, the perceived input of TACD and TAED in the MRA 
negotiations is limited. Not one interviewee argued that either dialogue played a 
significant role in the output of policy. These groups became involved in the MRA 
discourse late in the game because they were created only after the first set of MRAs 
had been agreed. The TACD did not produce a briefing paper on MRAs until late 
2000. A TAED statement was drafted for the May 2000 annual meeting, but MRAs 
were not picked up as a major 'issue area' by the Trade Working Group. 382 The 
resource gap discussed in chapter 5 highlights differences between business and civil 
society. Whereas the TABD has a specific committee with extensive industry 
resources that concentrates on regulatory co-operation, TACD relies on a small 
number of recently hired full time research staff and TAED on two 'issue managers'. 
argued that the MRAs are not an issue that have been focused on, Interview, Washington DC, October 
2000(51). 
381 Interview, US NGO, Washington, October 2000 (50). 
392 Although a earlier Commission response to the TAED's 1999 recommendations about the 
MRAs received a response from the Commission stating, 'Due to then vary natur 
,e of 
the 
MRAs (they avoid the duplication of testing and certification), they do, per se, affect the 
environment. ' 
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Transparency and Accessfor Civil Society 
The TABD, TACD and TAED agree on two aspects of the MRA negotiation and 
implementation process, albeit for completely different motives. First, both consumer 
and business groups favour the US position of sector by sector negotiations. 
Consumers feared a framework approach would result in the spillover of MRAs to 
additional sectors whereas the TABD worried that the difficulty of negotiating an 
overarching strategy would prevent agreement in all or additional sectors. 393 Second, 
both pushed for more transparency in the rule making process in order to -gain 
increased access to government negotiations. The TABD wants access to joint sectoral 
meetings and to be included in the process to set up monitoring mechanisms (TABD 
1999). The 2000 mid year report suggested that the rule making process should be 
more open to industry and that TABD should be able to comment on government 
guidelines before they are implemented (TABD 2000-midyear). It was also argued that 
TABD should play a formal role in the formation of a monitoring body for compliance 
with the agreements (TABD 1999). TACD and TAED members complained about the 
lack of adequate time for response for public comment. A TACD (2000) paper states, 
'MRAs remove important regulatory processes and issues from the public realm and 
place them behind the opaque screen of foreign affairs. ' 
Government officials recognise the need to promote transparency, but deny 
conducting closed negotiations. Rather they stress that TACD and TAED have been 
briefed on MRAs. that Federal Register Notices have been published, that general 
public meetings have been held by USTR on the TEP and on auto safety and that the 
TEP Steering Committee (2000-report) calls for proposals from all dialogues. Cowles 
(1997: 13-14) notes the problem is not with either domestic system. Any person can 
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comment on ongoing regulatory procedures due to the US Administrative Procedures 
384 Act by Congress because notices have been published the Federal Register. , and 
different parties are invited to provide input to Commission officials, for example 
through the Social Policy Forum in the EU. Rather she argues the problem is with the 
transatlantic regulatory process, because there are no rules governing access. To gain 
credibility Egan (2000b: 32) argues MRAs must be put into a legal framework which 
is approved by the European Parliament and the US Congress. 
4) The MRAs in the context of the NTA 
The MRAs have been hailed the most concrete deliverable produced by the NTA 
process. Economically and politically the MRAs represent a step towards integrating 
regulatory systems in order to'produce an open transatlantic marketplace. Conflict in 
negotiating and implementing the MRAs, however, demonstrates the obstacles faced 
by MRA negotiators. 
First, the limited scope of the MRAs, especially when compared to mutual 
recognition within the EU, highlights fundamental differences in the EU and US 
regulatory systems. Delays in the transition and implementation periods of the MRA 
annexes can be attributed to a 'mismatch of systems' and the struggle for autonomy 
not only between EU and US regulators, but between regulatory bodies and trade 
officials, particularly in the US. A number of officials on both sides of the Atlantic 
expressed concern with delayed implementation of the agreements, particularly in the 
medical devices and pharmaceutical annexes. In both of these sectors the FDA was 
responsible for holding up negotiation and implementation of the MRAs 'due to 
383 Egan (2001 a) notes this is already the case with the umbrella agreement, where problems with 
sectors such as medical devices and pharmaceuticals hold up negotiation and implementation of other 
sectors. 
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conflict over certification reports and levels of equivalency. 385 In the services sector 
negotiations of a framework agreement have been delayed because the US federal 
government did not have the authority to override state certification standards. One 
Commission official explains, 'it is frustrating for Europeans who say you (the US) 
agreed to do it and now you cannot deliver. ' In this respect, it can be argued that the 
US, not the EU suffers from the capability-expectations gap, which is usually 
attributed to the EU. 
Still, the MRA process is an important case study that provides insight into the 
capacity of NTA institutions to produce policies or concrete deliverables. One EU 
trade official argued that the NTA structure was crucial to the MRA negotiations 
because the process needed political oversight. EU and US political officials argued 
that the NTA process was a way of 'getting technical people to do technical things. ' 
NTA institutions are a way of managing the dialogue between regulators and trade 
officials and accommodating the international interests of trade and political officials 
as well as the interests of domestic actors. 
Another benefit of the MRAs is the bridges the process builds between EU and 
US regulators and trade officials as well as the business and NGO communities. The 
confidence building process between EU and US officials is arguably an important 
part of the process. An EU official argued, 'Slowly, slowly we build dialogue. To get 
MRA convergence we build trust between regulators on equivalency assessment. ' The 
MRAs are also an example of a learning process where US regulators, businesses and 
NGOs learn from EU regulators, business and NGOs who already have experience of 
, 94 Federal re(,, istcr notices posted by the FDA and USTR are available on their websitesý 
http: //xvwxv. ustr. (Tov 
To surnmarise, the problem steins from the fact that the FDA does not recognise the certification and 
regulatory requirements of the internal market as a single system. Whereas US officials criticised the 
EU for it lack of a single European FDA. EU trade official argued that the FDA was too stringent in 
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working with Mutual Recognition Agreements in the single market. Building 
confidence between regulators, trade officials and civil society is a step in securing 
and expanding the mutual recognition and harmonisation of standards that affect trade. 
The agreements themselves are a step in building the new transatlantic marketplace. 
Phase two or the 'next generation of MRAs' builds on confidence established between 
the EU and the US and goes further than the first phase by implementing full 
equivalency in marine safety and the MRA in services. A Commerce department 
official argues, 'The MRAs are the first step in broader liberalisation of trade through 
mutual recognition and harmonisation of health and safety, environmental 
standards'. 
386 
The MRA process is of interest in this discussion on the transatlantic dialogue 
because the interaction of actors under the framework of transatlantic institutions and 
through transgovern mental and transnational networks upholds the hypotheses made 
in chapter I of this thesis. Like the trafficking in women information campaign, the 
MRAs demonstrate a delegation of decision setting and shaping to a range of 
transgovernmental actors thus supporting the argument that the NTA has led to 
decentralisation in the decision making process. The role of transnational actors or a 
privatisation of decision shaping is also apparent in the MRAs because of the role 
played by the TABD the TACD and the TAED. Unlike the trafficking in women case, 
the MRAs also represent a more controversial policy, which is characterised by 
competition between domestic actors and international negotiators. In this respect the 
MRAs also share characteristics with the banana dispute (see chapter 8). 
requesting specific language rather than general principles. Interview, US Trade official who supported ZI 
a policy of 'assurne it is equivalent until I know it is not'. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the institutional 1 sation of new dialogues, the decentralisation 
of decision setting and shaping and the increased influence of private actors in MRA 
negotiations and transitions. Regulatory policy is a tricky sector because it deals with 
two politically sensitive subjects: the autonomy of regulatory authorities and the 
sovereignty of states to control domestic standards. 
The role of domestic, transgovernmental and transnational actors in MRA 
negotiations were outlined above. What emerged during MRA negotiations were two 
coalitions: one made up of US regulatory agents and the TACD and TAED, the other 
of trade officials and the TABD. The first fought against decentralisation and 
privatisation of standards for fear that agencies like the FDA and the OSHA would 
lose authority to foreign private companies, thus leading to reduced levels of social 
protection. The TABD and trade officials supported the reduction of costs in order to 
facilitate trade and fulfil the goals of the New Transatlantic Marketplace. 
In the end the influence of the latter is more visible. The FDA was forced to 
modernise, and thus accept the authority of EU private conformity assessment bodies 
and MRAs were negotiated in areas addressing health and safety issues despite NGO 
objections. TABD was deemed a success story and the USTR and Commerce had a 
big deliverable to report to the EU-US Summit. 
Conflict between and among trade and regulatory officials highlights the 
importance of the NTA process. Although MRAs had been discussed before 1995, the 
creation of NTA institutions and the political commitment to MRAs outlined in the 
agreement inýjected focus into the negotiations. NTA institutions such as the Senior 
Level Group and the TEP Steering Committee provided political oversight for the 
186 Interview, US Commerce Department official, Washin-gton DC, October 2000 (52). 
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negotiation and transition phases of the MRAs. However, while trade officials drove 
the process forward and were responsible for setting the overarching umbrella 
agreement, agencies such as the FDA and OSHA retained control over policy details 
in annexes where they had regulatory authority. The MRAs did not transfer authority 
from regulatory to trade officials, but rather gave USTR and NTA officials the job of 
delegating tasks to the appropriate domestic actors. 
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Chapter 8 
The EU-US Banana Dispute 
The main focus of this thesis has been on the new co-operation between the EU and 
the US. Although the NTA has been established as an administrator and facilitator of 
transatlantic agreement, it has not eliminated conflict between the partners, 
particularly on the economic front. Trade disputes cover less than 2 per cent of total 
transatlantic trade 387 , 
but media coverage of dispute, -, is far more extensive than. ; it is for 
EU-US Summits or transatlantic agreements. 388 Hush kits, bananas, beef, genetically 
modified crops and foreign sales corporations have overshadowed the TEP, the MRAs 
and indeed the larger transatlantic partnership. Despite increased transatlantic 
dialogue between EU and US actors, these disputes have prompted warning reports of 
looming trade wars throughout the 1990s. 389 
The transatlantic banana dispute has attracted world-wide media attention. 390 
Generally the case is of interest because it has erupted over a product which is not 
grown in significant quantities in either the EU or the US. It is a case that appears, at 
least on the surface, to pit big American corporations against small Caribbean farmers. 
Ultimately the dispute is of both economic and political consequence. On an economic 
level, the dispute represents a struggle for market access. On a political level this 
, 87 EU and US officials regularly quote this figure. A US Commission official (9) argued that disputes Zý in terms of the total economic relationship amounted to 1peanuts'. Another (15) noted that disputes 
covered I-21, o of trade but 95% of media coverage. 
For example, a search in the Financial Times Archive cite for 'EU banana' between 1996 and 2001 
retrieves 750 mostly 'ver\ strong' matches. A search usina the same dates and the term 'MRA' retrieves 
onlý 2 relevant articles (see http: -www. ft. com). 
191) See for example Guardian 13,16 April 1999; The Independent 8 April 1999; Financial Times 8 April 
1999' Irish Times 6 April 2001 ý BBC News Online 5, December 1997ý 17 December 1998-, January 1 
1999ý 4,5 March 19K 23 March 1999ý 24 April 19K 30 September 2000. 
""'A search for 'EU banana' on the Financial Times '-Iobal archive' which includes world-wide news 
sources returns 2993 h its between 1996 and 200 1. 
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dispute is about the rules governing the internal trading system, and thus concerns the 
legitimacy and capacity of the institutions that manage it. The dispute is of interest to a 
broader analysis of EU-US relations, because it tests the capacity of both transatlantic 
and multilateral institutions to diffuse conflict. 
Again, the interest lies with the institutionalisation of the dialogue in general 
and of transatlantic decision making specifically. The banana negotiations differ from 
the MRAs and anti-trafficking information campaigns because there appears to be a 
lack of decentralised decision 'shaping' by transgovernmental actors. Further, private 
actor input is limited to traditional lobbying through domestic institutions. NNW. ] - 
multinational corporations and transnational networks of, for example Caribbean 
farmers and EU banana operators, have shaped decisions, private, transatlantic 
dialogue structures have not. 
The constraints of existing bilateral and multilateral trading arrangements and 
the avid interest of domestic actors on both sides of the Atlantic are key to 
understanding why the EU and US entered a trade dispute over bananas and why the 
dispute spiralled out of control for almost a decade. Section I maps the development 
of the dispute through five EU banana regimes. Section 2 focuses on domestic input 
into the US negotiations, while section 3 considers the Commission's negotiating 
mandate in light of commitments to ACP countries, the Member States and domestic 
banana operators. Section 4 considers the wider implications of the dispute by 
questioning what impact the banana dispute had on the larger transatlantic partnership 
and the WTO. 
1-he balance between 'fair trade* or 'free trade', as championed by the two 
partners. is a highlighted theme throughout the chapter. Two popular views of the EU- 
US dispute are examined: one depicts the US as a *bilateral bully', the other portrays 
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the EU as a multilateral 'rule breaker' (see table 8.1 ). The chapter seeks to test which, 
if either, scenario accurately illustrates the role each side played in the dispute. 
Table 8.1 Depictions of EU and US roles in the Banana Dispute 
Scenario I- Bilateral Bully versus Third World Protector 
EU officials have described the EU banana regimes as development policy, not trade policy. 
Throughout the banana dispute it was argued that the banana regime protected the economies of small, 
third world banana producing states. Among its supporters the EU was regarded as a 'third world 
protector', an image which becomes more vivid when one considers that the villain is the United States 
and US banana producing multinationals in Latin America. According to this logic the US has been 
deemed a 'bilateral bully' for pushing around not just the EU, but small Caribbean States and even its 
'partners in crime', the Latin American banana producers. The US decision to impose 'unilateral' 
sanctions before the WTO ruled on the revised banana regime and to introduce Carousel Retaliation 
met harsh reaction in the public arena. The media, particularly in countries that strongly supported the 
regime, such as the UK, generally supported the governments' decision to support 'poor Caribbean 
farmers' and supermarkets reacted to public opinion by introducing voluntary labelling of free trade 
bananas 
. 
39 ' The EU banana regime also gained general support from non-governmental organisations 
mobilising against globalisation and brought the implications of the banana dispute into the larger 
debate on the cost of free trade. 
Scenario 11- Multilateral Trade Enforcer versus Rule Breaker 
US officials rejected the idea that the EU was acting as a third world protector92 and instead portrayed 
it as the enemy of multilateral rules. It was argued that that the EU was not protecting the Caribbean, 
but rather EU banana operators who benefit from the EU licensing scheme. The USTR Barshefsky 
argued, 'This is absolutely a trade issue. This is nothing morý than the taking a number of import 
licenses from US distributors of Latin bananas and handing them over to European companies in a 
discriminatory manner"9'. Under this scenario the EU image of a third work protector is replaced with 
that of a 'multilateral rule breaker'. The EU was chastised for failing to produce a WTO compatible 
regime despite three multilateral rulings. US officials claimed that the EU side-stepped, stalled and at 
worst defied the WTO. US President Clinton argued, 'We cannot maintain an open trading system, 
which I am convinced is essential for global prosperity, unless we also have rules that are abided by'. 394 
The Dallas Morning News agreed, 'It is fundamentally about whether countries will respect he rules 
governing international trade- or slice them as they see fit and thereby encourage a return to the law of 
the jungle where no rules apply. 395 
1) An Overview of the Banana Dispute 
The banana dispute stems from the European Community regulation on banana 
imports initiated by the Lome Convention in 1975, which established preferred access 
to the European market for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) bananas. 
See also BBC News, UK Gets *Fair Trade' Bananas, 17 January 2000 
'92 Interviews conducted in USTR, Washington 2000 (57) and the House Subcommittee on Trade, 
Washington, 2000 (39). 
39 11 Quoted in European Union Magazine (not dated). 
Quoted in BBC News ( 1999) Clinton: It's about Rules not Bananas, 6 March 
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Subsequent re-negotiation of Lome and several EU Banana Protocols ensured that 
ACP states maintained their traditional access to the European market. Five separate 
banana regimes were renegotiated during the dispute (see table 8.3). Each regime used 
tariff quotas and licensing schemes to alter market access for Latin American and 
Caribbean banana producers and transformed the practices of banana operators within 
the EU (see table 8.4). 
Banana i: Member State Regimes 
Although Lome established access for ACP exporters, the lack of an EC 'Policy' on 
bananas prior to 1993, meant that the level of access was determined separately by the 
Member States. 396 Three tariff regimes were created in accordance with different 
Member State preferences (see banana i). 397 First, Germany had duty free imports, 
which did not discriminate between ACP and Latin American producers. Second, 
Benelux countries, Ireland and Denmark imposed a 20% duty on all imported bananas. 
Finally, it was the duty free imports for ACP states in France, Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Portugal and the UK that enabled Caribbean and African banana producers to stake 
out a share of the European market. 
In 1993 Latin American banana producing countries requested a GATT panel 
to challenge the legality of the ECs banana regimes. The main source of contention 
was the third regime. The system gave preference not only to ACP states, but to 
domestic producers and operators. 399 Sutton (1997: 7) notes that in the UK, for 
ý9' Quoted in the Guardian ( 1999) Bananas: the view from America, 9 March. 
, 06 Bananas \N ere not covered b) EC Common Agricultural Policy, nor by the Commercial policy (see 
Stevens 1 9W 2000: 327). 
See also Stevens 20W Sutton 1997. 
Latin American banana producers controlled virtually 100% of the market in Germany, Denmark 
and Belgium and 90% of the Irish and Dutch markets under the other two regimes (Sutton 1997: 7) 
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example, domestic companies Geest and Fyffes controlled 65% and 25% of the market 
share while Spain imported all of its bananas from the Canary Islands. 
The first banana regime was found inconsistent with GATT rules in May 1993. 
However, the decision was of little consequence because the EC was able, under 
GATT rules, to block the panel decision from being adopted and because the Member 
States were already undergoing reform to create a single European policy on banana 
imports. The search was for a regime that could comply with the internal requirements 
of the Single European Market and the external requirements of the 4 th Lome 
Convention. 399 
Banana ii: The Restrictive Tariff Rate Quota 
In July 1993 the EC began implementing a single market in bananas under Council 
Regulation 404-93 (banana ii). It set up a three tiered banana regime with duty free 
quotas for ACP banana producers and a two tiered tariff structure for Latin American, 
or 'dollar bananas' (see table 8.4). The single European policy on banana imports 
sought to retain the traditional divide in the market. Latin American producers were 
encouraged to keep but deterred from trying to increase their share. ACP countries had 
a substantial tariff advantage, but faced new competition from Latin American 
producers (see also Steven 2000: 342-43). 
Latin American producers opposed the regime on the basis that quotas reserved 
for ACP states restricted their level of access to the European market. 400 Five Latin 
American countries. this tirne supported by the US, took the new banana regime to the 
Under the Lonie Convention the EC a-reed that 'no ACP state shall be placed, as regards access to 
its traditional markets and its advantages in those markets, in a less favourable position than in the past 
or at present'. 
""' For a more detailed discussion of the history of the banana dispute see Stevens 1996; 2000 who 
ar-ues that Latin American producers were angry first, that the single market for banana restricted 
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GATT in late 1993. In reality it was the licensing system, not the tariff rate quotas, 
401 
that were directly opposed . US multinationals, particularly United 
Fruit 
Corporation, and some Latin American states opposed the 'B' quota system, which 
allocated part of the free market to EU producers. The restricted access of certain 
producers to the market was heightened by the allocation of category 'A' licenses, of 
which nearly ninety percent were given to Latin American countries (including Costa 
Rica, Columbia, Nicaragua and Venezuela) who had cut a deal with the EU to settle 
their dispute through the Framework Agreement on bananas. The result, however, was 
that the licensing scheme further restricted market access for the remaining Latin 
American banana producing countries, including Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico and 
402 Ecuador . The allocation of 
import licenses also created a monopoly for European 
firms, and further restricted the quantities that US companies operating in Latin 
America could distribute in Europe. 
In January 1994 the GATT panel ruled that Regulation 404-93 was 
inconsistent with international trading rules, but again the EC blocked the panel report. 
The completion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks and the creation of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 marked a major turning point in the 
transatlantic banana dispute. New rules prevented the EC from blocking panel findings 
and provided new procedures for dispute resolution, which included approving the 
challengers use of retaliatory sanctions. 
Thus, the challenge to the EU banana regime made by the US, Mexico, 
Guatemala. Honduras (and later Ecuador) in April 1996 carried more weight then 
access to Geririaný which had previously been duty free and second that access was restricted because 
the tariff quota for Latin American bananas was too low. 
401 This argument ýN as made bý a USTR official, interview, Washington DC, 2000 (57). The US argued 
that import licenses took avay US business because of their allocation to French and British companies 
and EU ripening Firms. USTR Press Release ( 1997). 
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previous complaints made to the GATT. In May 1997 the WTO found many aspects 
403 
of the EC banana regime violated WTO rules , and the Dispute 
Settlement Body 
(DSB) gave the EC until January 1,1999 to comply with its ruling. Faced with the 
threat of US sanctions, the Commission was again charged with finding a regime that 
could fulfil internal commitments to the SEM and external commitments to both ACP 
states and the multilateral trading regime. 
Banana iii: The Non- Restrictive (or Less Restrictive) Tariff Quota 
After internal negotiations the European regime was revised in July 1998. On January 
1,1999 the EU began implementing the revised tariff quota regime (Regulation 
1637/98 and 2362/98)404 . The regime would continue to operate on tariff quota system, 
but the allocation of licenses was less restrictive. Moreover, the Latin American quota 
increased vis a vis the ACP quota. The re-allocation of licences on a global rather than 
individual basis was introduced to increase competition amongst ACP producers. 
Although the licensing scheme did not distinguish between ACP and Latin American 
producers per se, license distribution was still restrictive, because allocation was based 
on a historical reference period (1994-1996) when ACP imports were guaranteed by 
the EU regime. 
The new regime again met with opposition. Caribbean states felt the global 
allocation of licenses would not guarantee individual states' traditional export levels 
and that the less restrictive licensing scheme would offer no incentive to import ACP 
bananas . 
405 The Americans believed that the licensing scheme discriminated against 
third country operators. US officials argued that the changes to the regime were 
402 Essentiallv, the Framework All greement on bananas mana--ed to divide the previously united front from Latin American banana producing states (Sutton 1997: 22). 
The EC did exercise its right to appeal, but the decision was upheld in September 1997. 1 
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cosmetic and accused the Commission of making only a token gesture to bring the 
regime in line with international trade laws. 406 Believing it was still not WTO 
compliant, the US proceeded first, to publish a list of intended sanctions in the Federal 
Register and second, to file another request for a WTO panel in November 1998, two 
months before the new EU regime was implemented. Following its implementation, 
the US sought WTO authorisation to impose over $500 million in retaliatory tariffs. 
In March the WTO DSB announced it needed more time before ruling on the 
compatibility of the new EU regime (see section 4). The US proceeded with plans to 
imPose 100% tariffs on a range of items, but agreed not to collect the tariffs until after 
the panel ruled. However, the Commission argued that the tariffs, which would be 
backdated, would effectively prohibit (particularly small) companies from exporting. 
USTR Charlene Barshefsky, however, was so confident of the illegality of the EU 
regime that she argued: 'If you believe the regime is WTO consistent- then ship'. 407 
In April the WTO ruled that the EU banana regime was still inconsistent with 
multilateral rules and authorised $191 million in sanctions. 408 In addition to reducing 
the level of retaliatory tariffs, the Dispute Settlement Panel ruled that the US had acted 
too early in imposing sanctions. Decrying the use of 'unilateral sanctions', the EU 
filed a WTO dispute challenging US domestic trade legislation, Section 3.01 (see 
below). 409 A panel was convened on 2 March 1999, but later ruled in favour of the 
us. 410 
404 See 'The US/EU Banana Dispute: Modifications to the EC Banana Regime', DGI, External 
Relations 10 November 1998, www. europa. or- 
40ý See the Caribbean Banana Exporters Association website at http:,,, 'I/www. cbea. org 
406 See US Administration Press Release (1998) 
407 Quoted in Guardian 9 March 2000. 
108 This was a significantly lower figure than that requested by the US. 
409 See Commission Press Release, EC Request for establishment of a panel on Section 301 of the US 
Trade Act 1974. Available httlL (e -ýuro)a. eu. 
int. downloaded 29 November 2000. 
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Banana iv. - First Come First Serve Licensing 
The Commission came under further pressure to find a compatible regime when in 
May 2000 the US Congress passed legislation designed to maximise the impact of US 
sanctions on the EU in both the banana and the beef disputes. The Carousel Retaliation 
Act (2000) requires the USTR to rotate items on the sanction list, thus imposing 
constant fear on EU exporters (see section 2). 
In December 2000, in the aftermath of the EU-US Summit and after a year of 
extensive I 
internal negotiation, EC Agriculture ministers agreed to a radical overhaul of 
the banana regime. The fourth. regime would mark the end of the tariff quota svstem 
which had more or less been in place since 1992, but would first allow for a 
transitional period governed by three tariff quotas and a 'first come first serve' 
allocation of licenses (see tables 8.2; 8.4). 
Table 8.2 The Transitional First Come, First Serve Licensing 
U Licenses allocated to the first boats to reach EU shores. 
LI Shippers would have to commit bananas to the vessel before submitting 
' declaration of intent to import and to lodge a high security deposit to deter 
speculation. 411 
0 After declaring their intention to import specified quantities, pre-allocatiOn would 
be determined when vessels were within sailing distance from Europe to avoid 
discrimination against countries that were further away. 
The fourth banana regime was both highly controversial and short-lived. The 
Commission argued that eliminating the quota system would make the EU regime 
WTO compliant, but internally, it was the subject of difficult internal and external 
negotiations. 
410 The WTO See Agence Press (1999) Controversial US Le-islation Does Not Violate WTO Rules, 22 
December. 
41 ' This provision was introduced as a means of trying to maintain stable prices of the banana market, 
thus ensuring the protection of European consumers and domestic producers. 
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Banana v: Historical Reference Licensing 
The first come first serve licensing scheme was replaced in April 2001 Oust three 
months before it was due to be implemented) with a historical reference licensing 
system, similar to that used in third banana regime. The new regime (banana v) 
marked the end of the banana dispute between the EU and the US. European Trade 
Commissioner Lamy and USTR Zoellick brokered the deal on April 18,2001, which 
included provisions for the end to first come first serve licensing and US retaliatory 
sanctions by I July 200 1. 
Under the deal, the plan to move to a tariff only system by 2006 remained, but 
the first come first serve licensing scheme was scratched. The EU-US agreement 
established two phases of three-tiered tariff rate quotas for the transitional period (see 
table 8.4). It was decided that a historical reference period (1994-1996) would 
deten-nine interim banana licenses. The EU-US deal offered 'something for everyone' 
(see table 8.5 )412 Non-traditional operators, such as Chiquita, gained access to tariff 
rate quotas, while traditional operators maintained the majority of Category A and B 
licenses. ACP producers were protected by tariff rate-quotas in the transitional phase, 
while Latin American producers were guaranteed the move to a tariff only regime, and 
the possibility of higher access to the EU market during the transition. 
'11' Two strong supporters of the first come first serve regime- Ecuador and Dole Foods Corporation- 
were the only losers in a compromised designed to make multiple winners. See Financial Times, EU 
Calls on Ecuador to Support Banana Deal, 18 April 200 1. 
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Table 8.3 Chronology of the Banana Dispute 
1993 
May GATT panel finds against EC Member States (banana i). EC blocks panel report 
from being adopted by the GATT Council 
July The single market in bananas is launched with EC Regulation 404/93 
1994 
January o The GATT panel finds against Regulation 404/93 (banana ii) 
February * The EC blocks the GATT panel report on Regulation 404/93 from being adopted 
1995 
January The new WTO dispute settlement provision prevents one member from blocking 
panel findings 
1996 
September The US, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico challenge banana ii under the 
WTO dispute-settlement mechanism. 
1997 
May The WTO panel rules against the EC regime. 
July The EC appeals 19 findings in the WTO panel report. 
September The WTO Appellate Body upholds panel findings of EC GATT/GATS violations. 
1998 
January WTO arbitrator gives EC until January 1,1999 to comply with WTO rulings. 
June * European Agriculture Council adopts modifications to banana regime. 
o The EU adopts a revised banana import regime (banana iii) to be implemented 
July January 1999. 
* The US argues that the new EC regime is not compatible. USTR publishes 
November its retaliatory sanction list in the Federal Register and seeks a WTO panel on the 
EU Banana Regime 
1999 
January Banana iii is implemented on I January 1999 and the United States seeks 
WTO authorisation to impose $500 million in retaliatory tariffs on the EU under Article 
22 of the DSU. The EU requests a WTO panel to rule on the compliance of banana iii 
under Article 21 of the DSU. 
March o The WTO panel announces it needs more time to rule on the EU banana 
regime. The US imposes sanctions and announces that customs duties will not be 
collected until the panel rules. 
April * The WTO panel rules that the EU banana regime is still inconsistent, and authorises 
US retaliatory tariffs amounting to $191.4 million a year. 
May o The Commission requests a Dispute Settlement Panel on US Section 301. 
2000 
May o Carousel Retaliation is passed by the Senate as part of the Afro-Caribbean trade bill 
December 9 The WTO rejects the EU request for a panel on Section 30 1. EU agriculture ininisters 
agree to a new banana regime (banana iv). 
2001 
April Banana deal struck between the EU and the US (banana v). EU agrees to drop first 
come first serve licensing and implement historical references system by July 1,2001. 
US agrees to drop retaliatory sanctions on same day. 
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Table 8.4 The EU Banana ReLyimes 
Non-preferential duty free imports in Germany 
20% duty on imported bananas in Benelux countries, Ireland 
Banana I Member State and Denmark. 
Regimes Duty ffee imports in France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK 
maintained duty free imports for ACP states 
Two- Tiered Tariffs 
ACP states: 857,000 tonnes of duty free imports from 
Restrictive traditional 
ACP countries 
BananaH Tariff Rate 
Latin America: 2 million tonne quota at 100 ecus per tonne, 
Quota rising to 
850 ecus. 
Three- Tiered Licenses 
Category A licenses (66.5 %) of the 2 million tonne quota 
allocated to traditional operators. 
Category B licenses (30%) of the quota, awarded to operators 
with history in ACP trade 
Category C licenses created for new producers. 
Two-Tiered Tarfs 
ACP: 857,000 tonnes of duty free imports (to be filled 
globally) 
Banana Less Restrictive Latin American: 75 ecu for the first 2.553 million tonnes. A 
III Tariff Rate new provision, however, was that this quota would be filled 
Quota globally by ACP states. 
Licensing 
Three-tiered system remained 
No distinction between ACP and Latin American producers for 
the allocation of import licenses, but license distribution based 
on historical reference (1994-1996) for 1999 and 2000) for a 
period when levels of ACP bananas had been guaranteed by 
the EU regime. 
Tariff Only System 
Transition to Move to tariff only system by 2006 after transitional period Banana Tariff Only 
IV System/FCFS 
First Come First Serve Licensing (Transitional Period) 
Licensing Three quotas would be managed fortnightly or weekly to 
control banana prices 
All categories of licenses would be allocated on the First Come 
First Serve basis 
Tariff Only System 
Move to tariff only system by 2006 after transitional period. 
Interim Three-tiered licensing (two phases) 
Phase I (I July 2001) 
ý- Category A- 2.2 million tonnes 
Banana Transition to Category B- 353,000 tonnes 
V Tariff Only Category C- 850,000 tonnes 
System/ Phase 11 (1 January 2002) 
Historical Category A- 2.2 million tonnes 
Licensing Category B- 453,000 tonnes 
Category C- 750,00 tonnes 
Historical Reference Licensing 
Historical Reference licensing based on the distributions 
between 1994 and 1996.83% of A and B licenses for 
traditional operators and 17% for non-traditional. 
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2) The US negotiating position 
The focus in this section turns to the motives driving US decisions in the -banana 
dispute. It questions whether the US acted in the interest of the multilateral trading 
regime or multinational companies? Four US decisions in the banana dispute are 
considered below including the decision to file the GATT/WTO cases; to impose 
sanctions before the WTO ruling on the EU's less restrictive tariff quota; to target EU 
Member States with sanctions using Section 301 and Carousel Retaliation; and finally, 
to accept the banana deal. 
The WTO Challenge 
In both Europe and the US it is widely thought that the Clinton Administration was 
initially hesitant to get involved in the WTO dispute. A trade war with Europe over a 
product with little domestic agricultural significance conflicted with Clinton's plans to 
strengthen the US relationship with Europe. Why would the US enter the banana 
dispute when it is not a large exporter of bananas to the EU? Many EU officials have 
argued that the US decision to enter the dispute was dictated by Chiquita Corporation, 
the American based multinational banana producer operating in Latin America. US 
trade officials have argued that the decision to pursue the dispute was prompted by the 
need to accommodate a range of actors including the US Congress, Latin American 
banana producers and Chiquita. In the early stages of the dispute, one USTR 
representative stated, 'We did not consciously enter the GATT dispute. In part we did 
so at the request of Latin American countries. ' 413 The direct US link to Latin 
American banana producers. however, is Chiquita. Chiquita's role in the dispute is 
crucial to understanding the US decision to file a WTO complaint against EU banana 
subsidies. 
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USTR involvement in the WTO dispute was secured when Chiquita applied 
for a Section 301 petition, requiring USTR to investigate the EU banana regime under 
the US 1974 Trade Act. It was the Section 301 petition that subsequently led to the US 
decision to join other Latin American countries in requesting the Dispute Settlement 
panel in 1996. Section 301 requires USTR to act if a trading practice is in violation of 
bilateral or multilateral trade agreements. Thus a USTR official argued that, 'There 
was little flexibility on this, USTR had to take the 301 Petition because GATT had 
found the EC in violation of rules'. 414 
The main beneficiary of USTR's investigation into the EU banana regime was 
Chiquita. Chiquita reported over a billion dollars in lost revenue since the second 
banana regime was established in 1993, and in January 2001 it sued the European 
Commission for $519 million in damages incurred as a result of the EU ba. nana 
subsidies. 415 Despite the fact that American multinationals controlled three-fourths of 
the EU market, Chiquita's share'dropped from roughly 40 to 20 percent after the 
implementation of the single market regime. In addition, while Chiquita's market 
share dropped roughly 20%. two other US banana multinationals, Del Monte and 
Dole, managed to increase their market share over Chiquita. 416 Both refused to enter 
the dispute despite their shared interest in Latin American banana plantations. 417 
413 Interview USTR official, Washington D. C. and by telephone 2000.2001 (57,58). 
414 Still, it should be noted that the decision was unprecedented. Prior to USTRs decision to launch the 
301 investigation, one USTR official argued it 'would break new ground, as this would be the first time 
that USTR had ever used Section 301 in connection with a product that was not exported from the 
US. 'Quoted in Barlett and Steel (2000) 
it 15 Sutton (1997) reports Chiquita's pre-1993 market share at 43% and post 1993 at 18%. See also 
Alden and Bowen (Financial Times) 200 1. 
"6 Chiquita claims its loses are a direct result of the EU banana regime, however, it has also been Zý 
argued by the international consulting firm, Arthur D. Little International that Chiquita's losses are due 
to its earlier policy of oversupplyincy (see Sutton 1997: 25). 
417 It appeared that Dole and Del M onte wished to avoid the negative press attention that Chiquita 
received for battling against small Caribbean producers. Both companies publicly offered their support 
for ACP states (despite their endorsement of first come first serve licensing, deemed detrimental to ACP 
states). Dole claimed that, 'precipitous change in current trading regime arrangement would cause 
disproportionate amount of harm to ACP and European banana producing regimes'. Del Monte reported 
that it activities in Cameroon, 'were part of a corporate strategy recognising the EU's need to provide 
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While USTR is commissioned to protect US businesses, its avid interest in the 
banana dispute at the beset of one company against the rest of the industry drew heavy 
criticism. It was widely argued that Chiquita's privileged position was secured by its 
CEO, Carl Linder, who had made heavy campaign contributions to the Clinton 
Administration 418 
. 
Time Magazine reported that Chiquita's CEO 'got Washington to 
launch trade war for him' (see Barlett and Steel 2000). Commissioner Brittan argued 
that US involvement in the dispute settlement process was 'driven by the fact that 
419 Chiquita is a company that gives money to political parties' 
Chiquita managed to lobby support not only from the Clinton and Bush 
Administrations but also from Congress. Twelve US Senators called for a formal 
inquiry into the EU banana regime, and USTR came under heavy pressure from 
Congress to exert maximum pressure on the EU to end to the dispute. Congressional 
interest in bringing an end to banana subsidies was also tied to the larger goal of 
curbing unfair EU trading practices, a particular irritant of both politicians and lobbies 
linked to domestic agriculture. 
some form of protection to EU growers and to honour the commitments made under Lome. ' See 
Caribbean Banana Exporters Association, EU Banana Regime: Position of Del Monte and Dole 
Corporations: available at httpL_'/cbea. or-, downloaded 22 November 2000. Dole corporation refused to 
comment, claiming their position was well documented in the press. In reality, both companies were 
less affected by the EU banana regime because they had taken steps to diversify their markets. Dole 
invested in ACP producing states such as Jamaica, Cameroon and the Ivory Coast, and bought up 
European importers that field the import licences, thus, ensuring that Dole-Europe benefits from EU 
quota-rents. 417 Del Monte expanded European distribution, increasing its European business by 30 per 
cent, with half of its $2 billion in revenues coming from the continent. Chiquita, who had sold its 
interests in the Irish based banana operator Fyffes, suddenly found itself in direct competition with 
companies who held European licenses. Interview USTR official, Washington DC 2000, (58); See also 
Alden and Bowen (Financial Times) February 16,2001. 
419 see Laurance, B( 1999) The Bi-, Banana In Sunday Guardian, 7 March 
419 Quoted in BBC News (1999) Banana War exposes old trade divisions, 5 March. The argument over 
Chiquita's campaign contributions gave rise to speculation- mostly in the European Voice- that. Doles' 
position would be more heavily protected Linder the Bush Administration because it had given more 
money to the Republican party (see European Voice 2000). However, this was disproved when the Bush 
Administration supported a deal opposed by Dole. 
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Sanctioning the EU regime 
The decision to sanction the regime prior to the WTO ruling raised the stakes in the 
dispute and increased tension between the transatlantic partners. In late 1998 USTR 
came under heavy pressure to retaliate against the EU in the banana dispute. Members 
of Congress were frustrated with the EU's failure to implement a WTO consistent 
regime despite the 1997 ruling. Congress and USTR agreed that changes to the EU 
banana regime, which were set for implementation in January 1999, would not make 
the EU regime WTO compatible. In November the House approved Resolution 213 
calling for the Administration to actively pursue EU compliance in the banana and 
beef disputes. The Resolution, later approved by the Senate states that, 'the President 
should develop a trade agenda which actively addresses agricultural trade barriers in 
multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations and steadfastly pursues full compliance 
with the dispute settlement decision of the World Trade Organisation' (US Congress 
1998). 
The decision to sanction the EU gained cross party support from influential 
Democrats and Republicans in Congress, and featured lobbying by many heavy 
weights including the Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, Senator Trent Lott and 
Senator Bob Dole as well as Minority Leader Richard Gephardt. 420 Congress exerted 
pressure on the Administration who in turn agreed to pursue 'all necessary action to 
ensure full and timely EU compliance in these cases. ' White House Chief of Staff 
Erskine Bowles (1998) outlined in a letter to several Congress Members in November 
1999 the Administration's commitment to utilising (1) domestic, (2) bilateral and (3) 
multilateral channels to end the dispute. '121 First, bilateral discussion with the 
410 These politicians favoured the 'free trade' stance, while a movement of less influential Democrats 
has opposed the US challen'. e to subsidised Caribbean bananas in Favour of 'fair trade* (see also below). 421 The letter stated. 'The Administration shares your view that the World Trade Organisation cases 
involving bananas and beef hormones are important tests of whether the European Union (EU) intends 
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Commission would continue in accordance with commitments made under the NTA. 
Second, USTR would reserve the right to challenge the regime in the WTO. Finally, in 
keeping with domestic commitments, retaliation against the EU would be instigated 
under Section 330 1 of the 1974 Trade Act. Bowles also announced the Administration's 
intent to publish the list of sanctions in the public register for comment in November 
1998 and to impose sanctions no later than March 3,1999. The commitment to 
Congress locked USTR negotiators into a time frame for retaliation. 
US decision-makers appeared fairly united in their decision to sanction the 
EU. 422 However, the decision to pass the Carousel Retaliation Act, ironically as part 
of the Afro-Caribbean Trade Bill, highlighted differences between Congress and the 
US Administration. It also illustrated how Congress was able to impact US trade 
policy directly, and how Chiquita, as a strong supporter of Carousel, was able to exert 
additional pressure on USTR indirectly. Carousel Retaliation gained popular support 
in Congress because it was designed to maximise pressure in all trade disputes with 
423 
the EU . 
Two factors helped maximise the lobbying efforts of Chiquita on Carousel 
Retaliation. Again, the hefty campaign contributions made by Carl Linder (around $5 
million) to both parties in Congress came under scrutiny. Moreover Chiquita's 
interests coincided with many in Congress who were interested in putting an end to 
other trade disputes where agriculture subsidies and tariff rate quotas formed non-tariff 
to implement WTO rulinos issued against it'. The widelý publicised letter is available from 
jmpý,, Jlill. heefor-ft \Ntos. hun 
422 Although it should be noted that some members of the House were opposed to sanctions and 
introduced House Resolution 1361 (sponsored by Democrat Representative Maxine Waters) to 'bar the 
imposition of increased tariffs or other retaliatory measures against the products of the European Union 
in response to the banana regime in the European Union. ' The resolution stated that US consumers and 
Caribbean farmers should not pay for losses to one US company. The resolution never re-surfaced from 
the House Subcommittee on Trade after it was logged there in April 1999. 
42 33 Views expressed by interviews with House and Senate staff members, Washington D. C. 2000. 
259 
barriers to trade. 424 Chiquita gained wider political support by teaming up with the 
beef lobby, who had much more broad-based constituency support. 425 The US Beef 
Cattlemen Association and Chiquita Corporation ran an ad campaign drawing 
attention to domestic opposition to the EU's banana and beef regimes (see figure 8.1). 
The 'Message to Congress' was that US companies were paying the price for EU non- 
compliance with WTO rules 426 . 
The idea that the European Commission was dodging the WTO decision was 
popular in Congress. One Senate staff member noted that Senators felt that despite 
three WTO rulings the Commission, 'was doing nothing! 427 That viewpoint was also 
held in the House, where one staffer noted that, 'Once the banana case was won, 
Congress expected the Europeans to comply. That they don't is an affront. ý428 US 
Congressman John Thune argued that, 
The EU-US beef and banana disputes were important tests for these new 
(WTO) procedures. The EU's refusal to live with the consequences of the 
decision is unacceptable. It defies the purpose of the WTO and breeds further 
scepticism among those who want free and fair trade. 429 
Carousel Retaliation was seen as a way offiorcing the Commission to comply with the 
WTO ruling, thus putting an end to the dispute. However, it was highly controversial 
both in transatlantic relations, where it was unanimously condemned by European 
institutions, and domestically where the US Administration publicly voiced concerns 
over the new legislation. USTR Barshefsky testified before the Senate Finance Trade 
-124 See European Union- Germany- France Report, June 1998, US Congress, Committee on Aýgriculture, 
Agriculture Trade Expansion Delegation. 
12ý Tile US Beef Cattlemen Association has the support of beef farmers, who are present in most US 
states, whereas Chiquita has no domestic agricultural base. Rather, its only direct constituency link is to 
its headquarters in Cincinnati Ohio. 
426 See also US Beef Cattlemen 1998. 
117 interview, Washington DC 2000 (5 1). 
1-1ý interview, Washington DC 2000 (39). 
Available, http: house. gov/thune. wto. htm 
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Sub-Committee that she opposed Carousel Retaliation . 
430 Another USTR official 
noted that USTR already had the power to change the sanction list, adding, 'if we 
thought changing the list would do it, we would. ' 
Carousel Retaliation highlights institutional rivalry between USTR and 
Congress on foreign trade policy. While USTR was more tuned to the external, 
bilateral and multilateral implications of using sanctions, Congress was acting solely 
in interest of domestic businesses. One House Staff member noted with irritation that, 
' Business argued that USTR should look at the products on the list to have full 
impact... we were baffled that USTR refused to look at it... ' 431 One Senate staff 
member stated the view that officials in USTR simply 'oppose authority for 
Congress. ' 432 
The decision to sanction 
The decision concerning which products to sanction, including a range of cheese, 
wine, clothing, appliances and beauty products increased the complexity of US policy 
towards the EU banana regime. Two factors were crucial to determining the sanctions 
list. First, officials asked where sanctions would most likely have an impact, and 
second, where minimum damage would be caused to US companies. 433 UltimatelY, the 
decision lay with USTR, however the list of sanctions was available for public 
comment in the Federal Register. A comparison of the original and final lists sheds 
some light on which other influences shaped the US decision on 'who' to sanction. In 
addition it points to domestic casualties of the banana war. 
4"M See US Administration Press Release (2000) Carousel Revised Retaliation List in EU Disputes 
Delayed, 20 June. 
13 1 Interview, Housc Staff, Subcon-unittce on Trade, Washin,, ýton DC, 2000 (39). 13 20 Interview, Senate Staff, Senate Finance Committee, Washinz., ton DC, 2000 (5 1). 
4 ', 3 lntervieýý, USTR official, Washington 2000 (57). 
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The internal economic repercussions of US sanctions became apparent when 
US manufacturers, farmers and retailers reported lost exports and lost imports.. For 
example, US farmers faced lost sales of raw ingredients to EU cookie producers, and 
434 
Whirlpool halted shipments of certain coffeemakers . US department stores such as 
Nieman Marcus 435 were forced to find alternative sources of cashmere and small 
retailers of, for example. bath products were unable to import products for distribution. 
The damage to US companies had internal political repercussions. First, the 
viewpoint that US trade policy was dictated by large companies was reinforced by the 
fact that many large multinational companies, such as Gillette and Mattel, were able to 
lobby their European-made imports off the sanction list, while small companies 
without lobby facilities, which were often unaware of the dispute, were not. 436 Second, 
damage to US companies involved in foreign trade instigated backlash from 
companies who condemned the use of unilateral sanctions. A spokesperson for the 
American Association of Exporteks and Importers in New York argued that, 'We 
would like to see rule of law rather than [the US] acting as jury and judge. ' 437 
US policy decisions in the banana dispute also had external repercussions for 
bilateral US relations with other states. The decision to strategically target sanctions at 
the regimes strongest supporters threatened bilateral relations between the US and 
certain Member States. In particular, the banana dispute soured the 'special 
relationship' between the US and the UK. While the UK had been spared from 
4 ', 4 See Cox, J (1999) Punitive Actions by US Felt World-wide' In US Today, March 11. 
131 ý One USTR official notes that Neiman Marcus tried to lobby Scottish cashmere off the list by arguing 
that Chinese replacements were of lower quality (57). 
1 ', 6 See Barlett and Steele 2000. Members of Congress also lobbied to get some industries off the list. Zý 
For example Congressman Bill Delahunt, a strong supporter of US sanctions, actively lobbied USTR on 
behalf of NeýN England candle makers and Greetin Card Makers whose imports were on the original 
sanction list (Press Release 16 April 2001 
437 Quoted in CNN (1998) US-EU Trade War Looms. 10 November. 
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retaliation in the beef dispute, its strong support of the EU regime ensured it was one 
438 
of the countries hardest hit by US sanctions . 
The US challenge to end the EU banana regime also threatened the US-Caribbean 
relationship. In March (1999) the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(Caricom) suspended the Caribbean-US 'Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the 
Caribbean' or the Bridgetown Accord (1997) in protest of US sanctions. A Caricom 
spokesman confirmed that the suspension of the Accord was a means of 
communicating its disgust to the White House. 439 
Finally, the banana dispute put a strain on US-Latin American relations. In 
particularly, the relationship with Columbia and Costa Rica was threatened when the 
two states signed a pact with the EU in which they withdrew their complaint against 
the banana regime. The deal was met harshly in the US Congress, where Senator Bob 
Dole [unsuccessfully] called for sanctions against these countries to be included in a 
budget bill (Greenwald et al 1996). The tension between the US and Ecuador, who 
chose to accept the EU's first come first proposal, was exemplified by the comments 
of Ecuador's Ambassador to the EU, Alfredo Pinoargote, who argued that 'Ecuador 
and the EU have been virtually taken hostage by the [US]., 
440 
438 The sanctions placed heavy pressure on the UK government because they threatened to shut down 
the Scottish cashmere industry. US industry and members of Congress strongly supported targeting Z' Z' Z" 
cashmere because threatening an already fragile textile industry would maximise pressure and hopefully 
convince the UK government to use its influence within the EU. Instead, the UK government turned and 
sharply criticised the US. In protest, the Department of Trade and Industry took the rare opportunity 
twice to summon the US Ambassador to the UK. 
4 39 Wilkinson, B (1999) Caricom Suspends Treaty with US Over Bananas, One World News, 9 March, 
Available at http:. wLN-W. 0ne, ývorld. on-, "" Quoted in BBC News (2000) Ecuador turns on US in trade war. 6 October. Ecuador's decision was 
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Why accept this deal? 
Three months into Bush's Presidency, the US government agreed to end the banana 
dispute with the EU. Why did the US govemment choose to accept this deal? From the 
start, the US had favoured the use of historical reference licensing over first come, first 
serve licensing, but a sticking point in previous negotiations had been the reference 
period used to determine banana licenses. It was argued that a post 1993 reference 
period upheld the distortions of the EU banana regime because it issued licensing on 
the basis of volume distribution at a time when tariff-rate quotas existed fqr ACP 
bananas. The pressing questions is why the US agreed to a deal that included a 
historical reference period of 1994-1996 for license distribution, the same period used 
in the third banana regime and how was USTR able to sell the deal at home? It is 
argued that the compromise was struck in order to avoid the implementation of first 
come, first serve licensing and the subsequent use of Carousel Retaliation, which 
USTR had avoided using thus far. 
A number of factors helped influence USTR's decision to accept the historical 
reference licensing scheme. First and foremost noted one official, 'We wanted to end 
this dispute. ' The close pre-existing relationship between Commissioner Lamy and 
USTR Zoellick arguably incited compromise. 441 Still, despite early meetings between 
the two, Zoellick testified in front of Congress in March 2001 that the EU would face 
sanctions unless it could show greater flexibility on bananas. It was widely believed 
that the Bush Administration- like the Clinton Administration- was under pressure 
from Congress to implement Carousel Retaliation, which the Clinton Administration 
111 lntervieývvee (57) argued that Commissioner Brittan and USTR Barshefsky had mismanaged the 
dispute. A Financial Times Editorial stated that, 'Much ofthe deterioration in transatlantic trade 
relations since the mid- I 990s was due to personal frictions between their predecessors, Sir Leon Brittan 
and Charlene Barshcfsky. Messrs Larny and Zoellick have had the maturity and good sense to rise 
above petty squabbling in the interests of bigger shared goals. That bodes well for the handlin of future 9 
disputes. ' 
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had shelved. 442 One USTR official argued that the perception of Congress was'similar 
to the Administrations. They wanted the dispute solved, 'they were sick of 
bananas. 
443 
USTR's mission was to find a compromise that could 'best' accommodate the 
interests of Latin America, the Caribbean and Chiquita. 444 Despite earlier objections 
from the Latin American producers and Chiquita, the historical reference system met a 
fundamental requirement of all three parties: it replaced the first come first serve 
system. The threat of first come first serve was particularly persuasive in convincing 
Chiquita to accept the historical references period of 1994-1996. Although it stood to 
gain a few licenses (overall the tariff quota for dollar bananas was increased by 
100,000) under the banana v regime, the numbers were not drastically different to 
those upheld by previous regimes. However, one USTR official noted that, Thiquita 
actually mortally feared [first come first serve]. It fought until it became abundantly 
clear that it would be a reality. ' 445' In addition, Chiquita was guaranteed a definitive 
date for the end of the tariff rate quota system. 
3) EU Decision Making in the Banana Dispute 
While US involvement in the banana dispute can be mainly attributed to domestic 
interests, at first glance the EU position seems to be the product of external factors, 
most obviously its relations with ACP states. US officials have argued, however, that 
the EU front as third world protector is a cover for its real interest in protecting EU 
banana operators. This section considers the decision to maintain the tariff rate quota 
44' A Senate Staff Member argued in October 2000, that 'Congress has been put pressure on the n -- Administration to get rid of these disputes. ' Washington (5 1 
14 ', lntervie%ý, USTR official. Washington 2000 (58) 
4-14 Interview, USTR official, Washington 2000 (57) 
1 ý5 Interview, USTR official. Washington 2000 (58). zn 
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system, to change the regime, and finally to introduce first come first serve licensing 
and a tariff only regime. 
Table 8.5 
Favoured First Come First Serve Favoured Historical Reference 
Licensing Licensing 
(Bananaiv) (Banana v) 
US Multinationals US Multinationals 





Latin American Producers 
* Ecuador 
EU Banana Operators 
e None 
Latin American Producers 
*All barring Ecuador 
EU Banana Operators 
e All 
Pressure to Maintain the Regime 
The main lobbies that fought to keep the EU regime were Caribbean farmers and EU 
banana operators. 446 EU operators favoured the historical reference period used in the 
regime's licensing scheme, because the time period used guaranteed more licenses for 
447 EU companies who were already trading with ACP states . 
The tariff quota 
441 Through, for example, lobby groups such as the Caribbean Banana Export Association and the EU 
Banana Operators Association. 
447 The Financial Times (I 999a) reported that the regime 'largely benefit[ed] EU banana traders. ' 
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maintained secure access for Caribbean and African bananas. Both lobby groups were 
able to maintain the support of Member States, particularly those with colomal ties, 
who in turn fought to keep the tariff rate quota regime. 448 
The Reaction to US Sanctions 
The European Commission, the Member States and the European Parliament 
unanimously condemned US sanctions. Nonetheless the WTO approval of sanctions 
acted as a catalyst of change. Carousel Retaliation increased pressure on decision- 
makers to revise the regime. Although European leaders such as Blair argued that 
Carousel was totally unproductive, the threat of increased sanctions had the intended 
affect. First, some Commission officials admitted that Carousel Retaliation forced the 
EU to reconsider its plans for change more quickly. Second, sanctions not only 
instigated a backlash against the US, but also against the EU as European companies 
and member state governments became stuck in the crossfire of the transatlantic trade 
war. 
In September 2000,16 months after the WTO ruled that the EU banana regime 
was inconsistent with WTO rules, a number of European companies announced that 
they were taking legal action against the Commission. Arran Aromatics, a Scottish 
manufacturer of bath products, reported that it was seeking legal consultation on 
reclaiming damages of E2 million in lost export orders to the US (Eaglesham 2000). 
The Italian based Fiamm Spa, producers of batteries, announced it would be seeking 
L'15bn compensation (11 Sole 2000) and Scottish cashmere producers threatened to 
4-18 It should be noted, however that Germany opposed the new regime, because it previously had duty 
free imports for all bananas, be they Latin American, Caribbean or African. Germany challenged the 
single banana re-ime in the European Court of Justice, but the court upheld the EU wide tariff rate 
quota system. 
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sue the Commission for f5 million (Chisholm 2000) . 
449 European companies argued 
they should not have to pay the consequences of 'the European principle of preference 
for our former Caribbean colonies. 450 The companies backed the US argument that 
the Commission had failed to handle the dispute in a 'reasonable time span'. 
In response to the threatened litigation, European Commission trade 
spokesman Anthony Gooch argued that these companies lacked 'a legal leg to stand 
on'. 451 It was argued that the blame was misplaced because the Commission had taken 
action to change the banana regime (including three major communications to the 
Council). Renegotiating the banana regime had been timely because of the interests of 
the Member States. While the UK and Germany pushed for a compromise, the 
southern Member States, including France and Spain, voted against the Commission's 
proposal for compromise. 452 
Negotiating First Come, First Serve 
The negotiations on the fourth banana regime were held up by internal disagreement 
between Member States and the European Parliament and external opposition to both 
phases of the fourth banana regime. First, some Member States, 453 EU banana 
operators, ACP and some Latin American states opposed the move to a tariff only 
system. The Commission (1999,2000), the Council (1999) and the European 
Parliament (2000) argued against ending the tariff rate quota system. However, it was 
449 This claim was made before cashmere was temporally removed from the list. 
450 Quote made by Ian Russell, managing director of Arran Aromatics, in Eaglesharn (2000). 
4SI Quote found in Wall Street Journal (2000) European Firins Seek EU Damages, for Banana War, 30 
August. 
1ý2 Germany and the UK Nvere two of-the member states hardest hit by US sanctions. While Germany 
had traditionally opposed the banana regime. the UK had been an avid supporter. Some argue the UK 
sold out to the US to protect the cashmere industry. After bilateral lobbying by Tony Blair US officials 
took cashmere off the list arguing that the UK because it was less aggressive in its support for EU 
banana re-irric ten other countries. See Mac Farlane (2000). 1 4 Particularly, Spain, France, Portugal, Ireland and Greece: the former having strong colonial ties and 
the latter bcin(, small scale banana producers. 
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decided in July 2000 that the move was the only way to satisfy the US and -end the 
WTO dispute. The Council asked the Commission to pursue more definitive plans for 
the transitional licensing scheme. However, internal conflict was publicised when 
agriculture ministers refused to grant the Commission a mandate to negotiate a direct 
move to the tariff only system should the transitional system fail to solve the 
dispute 454 
Most parties favoured the historical preference system, but there was 
disagreement over which reference period would determine the licences. The US and 
Latin American countries preferred pre 1993 levels, but Caribbean producers and EU 
banana operators preferred post single market levels. There was also a ques tion of 
whether the auctioning system, which was opposed by ACP states and the US, would 
be WTO compatible. 
The decision to move ahead with first come first serve licensing met with 
backlash from EU banana operators, ACP states and some Latin American Countries. 
Banana operators from many Member States, Caribbean and Latin American teamed 
up in an advertising campaign protesting against the first come first serve system (see 
figure 8.2). 455 They argued that this system would lead to serious disruption in the 
market. Atlanta (2000), the largest German fruit wholesaler and leading operator and 
distributor, told the European Community Banana Trade Association that, 'first come 
first served systems would force the operators to break up their shipping schedule 
which now are in line with the ripening cycles and the general requirements of the 
market'. Furthermore, it was argued that free lance traders would be able to block 
454 See Smith, M 2000 (Financial Times) and EU Business 2000. 
455 Run in European Voice, 23-29 November 2000, those countries included Austria, Belgium, 
Columbia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Netherlands, 




To whom it may concern 
Statement on the 
Future EU Import 
Regime for Bananas 
The undersigned companies and (sub-) national organisations, 
together representing the vast majority of banana trading 
companies in the European market, reaffirm their strong 
opposition to the Commission's proposal to introduce a 
transitional import regime based on a "First Come - First 
Served"-system. 
That system is in no respect suited to the characteristics and 
requirements of marketing a perishable product such as 
bananas and would lead to a serious disruption in the market 
Austria 
ADEG Osterreich Handelsgesellschaft - Fruchtexpress 
Grabher GmbH& Co. KG -Johann Ischia &Co. Im- und 
Exportges. m. b. H. - Josef Ahorner Geselischaft m. b. H. - 
Josef Mathy Ges. m. b. H. & Co. - Obst Huber Fruchtimport 
Gesellschaft m. b. H. - ZEILBERGER fruit service AG 
Belgium 
Banacol Marketing Belgium BVBA - BANANIC 
INTERNATIONAL N. V. - Geest Europe 




Brdr. Lembcke AIS 
Ecuador 
COSTATRAOING S. A. 
Finland 
inex Partners Oy Veikko Lame Oy 
France 
AGRUPRIM S. A. COBANA IMPORT S. A. R. L. 
Compagnie des Bananas - Pomona 
Moreover. thatproposal has been rejected by the United States, 
seven Latin American supplying countries and the Caribbean. 
If it was enacted, this longstanding dispute would not he 
resolved. 
The undersigned companies therefore join the call by the 
United States, seven countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean for the prompt introduction of a different system, for 
instance based an historical references of banana trading 
companies. 
Germany 
Afrikanische Frucht-Compagnie GmbH - Atlanta AG - 
BANATRADING mbH - Cobana GmbH & Co. KG 
Edeka Fruchtkontor GmbH - Internationale 
Fruchtimport Geselischaft Weichert & Co - 
T. Port GmbH & Co. 
Ireland 
Central Banana Importers Ltd. - Keelings Ltd. 
N. Smyth & Co. Ltd. 
Italy 
ABC - Bariba - Chiqufta Italia - Co-Frutta Dal Bello 




Bruigam & Visser - Chiqufta - Jan van den Brink b. v. 
Velleman & Tas 
Portugal 
Frulegue-Agricultura, Comercio a Industria, LDA. 
Frutban-Agrotecnica, Comercio de Frutas a Produtos 
Horticoles, LDA. - Paniberica-Agricultura, Comercio a 
Inclustria, LDA. 
Spain 
Angel Rey S. A. - BARGOSA, S. A. - Cesar Pis6n a 
Hijos, S. A. - Hispafrut S. A. - Garvic, S. A. - 
Hijos de Martin Moreno, S. L. - MARTIMAR Hijos 
de Enrique Martin, S. A. - Meneu Distribuci6n, S. A. - 
Marcadistribucion S. A. - Mundifruit Import Export 
S. A. - Reybenpack, S. A. - 
Everfresh AB 
United Kingdom 
Fyffes - Geest Bananas Ltd. - JAMCO - Mack Multiples 
- S. H. Pratt & Co. (Bananasl Ltd. 
Windward Islands 
Wibdeco 
For further information contact: info@atlanta. de 
European Voice 30 November -6 December 2000 
regular operators and that consumers would be hurt by the quality of the fruit, because 
companies would be unwilling to ship expensive high quality fruit given the risk of 
securing a license. 
Caribbean banana producing countries also lobbied against first come, first 
serve licensing, which they believed would have disastrous effects on their economies. 
It was feared that the 'ship race' for licenses would disadvantage small operators and 
rapidly push the Caribbean growers out of the market. American multinationals also 
had an advantage over Caribbean exports because their established markets in Eastern 
Europe provided the option of shipping on to other countries, should their bid for a 
license be rejected near EU shores (CBEA 2000a; 2000b). 
American countries also opposed the first come, first serve system. Wilson 
(2001) reported that, 'They fear Ecuador, the biggest exporter, will further increase its 
market share at its neighbours' expense because of its low production costs. ' The US 
was not on board either. USTR officials argued that the system was not compatible 
with WTO rules. 456 In short, as one US trade negotiator argued, 'First come, first 
serve will not end the dispute. Latin Americans oppose it. Caribbean producers oppose 
it. The Africans don't like it. Companies except for Dole don't like it. ' Even the 
Commission admitted that 'The first come first serve system has very limited support 
and constitutes a particular heavy administrative burden for the EC. ' Morever, 'small 
time smaller operators which are not 'primary importers' could be eliminated from the 
markets' (European Commission 1999b). Why, then, was the banana fourth licensing 
scheme pursued? 
456 See Financial Times (1999) 'US rejects Brussels' proposal on bananas', II November; Alden, E 
(2000) 'US and EU still split on beef and bananas' In Financial Times; December 19; The Independent 
(1999) 'US Rejects Banana Trade Deal', II November. 
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The decision to implement the first come first serve licensing scheme can only 
be explained as a compromise made in the face of internal and external pressure. 
Consistent WTO rulings and the threat of US sanctions meant that the regime needed 
to change, but negotiators had their hands tied at a political level by the Member States 
and the lobbies behind them. 457 Commission officials argued that they had very little 
option in revising the banana regime; they believed that the tariff quota regime would 
458 have to be eliminated to end the dispute 
EU Member States insisted on a transitional system tariff-rate quota system to 
protect ACP states. The tariff rate quotas required a licensing scheme, but finding a 
system which satisfied EU operators, Caribbean exporters and the WTO complainants 
was an impossible task. Member states were forced to choose the 'least worst' option 
when the Commission announced in July 2000 that without an agreement on a 
licensing system, a transitional shift to a tariff only regime would not be practical. 
Many were opposed to the first come first serve licensing, but many had stronger 
objections to scrapping the transitional period and moving directly to a tariff only 
system. 459 In the end it was the Member States preference for a slow transition to 
protect those who had gained from previous banana regimes which placed'on the 
agenda a licensing scheme so avidly opposed by the same. 
Why a deal now? 
The Commission's decision to abandon the first come first serve system was a 
compromise aimed at balancing multiple interests. By implementing the controversial 
Jý- Viewpoint also expressed by Finnish Council Presidency officials, Interview, Brussels, 1999 (5). 4ý8 Need to interview a couple of people in Brussels to see why the Caribbean Framework proposals 
(which had gained support frorn some Latin Americans and the US) was used other than the fact that it 
lacked concrete details. One USTR officials argued that if the EU was concerned with the Caribbean it 
would have taken its proposal on board. 
1ý1) See Smith, M 2000, T-inancial Times. 
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license system, the EU stood to alienate the banana operators and ACP farmers it had 
originally tried to protect. Even so the reaction of these parties to first come, first serve 
licensing was well noted before the Council agreed to it. So, why, in the end, did the 
Commission revert back to a historical reference system? 
First, there were questions about the WTO compatibility of the first come first 
serve system. The challengers to the regime indicated that they would continue to 
challenge the EU banana regime at the WTO. The US threat of Carousel Retaliation 
implementation increased the risk of damaging sanctions on EU companies. In 
addition the EU-US banana deal secured US support for the EU's WTO waivers for 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status under Article I of the DSU, which the 
Commission feared it would not be able to secure. 460 
Second, the Commission played a crucial role in ending the dispute because it 
had wide discretion on the type of licensing system to be used during the transitional 
period. The threat of first come, first serve was originally designed to force the 
Member States to agree to a historical licensing system. The Commission only 
accepted the first come, first serve system when the Member States could not agree on 
461 
a historical reference period . Further, Commissioner Lamy argued that first come 
first serve was used to pressure the US to make a deal. 462 Rumours in the banana 
community suggested that the Commission would have abandoned the controversial 
licensing system either way. However, preliminary work on the system suggested 
contrary. 
The Commission's final decision to relinquish the first come first serve system 
also stems froin the problematic implementation of the system. One Commission 
Although consensus is not needed to secure a waiver, if a number of countries were willing to 
continue fi-hting, the dispute would continue. 
161 See Commission Communication on FCFS, 4 October 2000. COM (2000) 621. Interviews with 
Commission official (via einail) 2001(59): and USTR official (via telephone) 2001 (58) 
274 
official noted that, 'when it came to actually putting First Come First Serve into 
practice, there were all sorts of technical problems - the whole system had to be 
created from scratch. There were serious doubts as to whether the system would be up 
and running by I July 2001 (it had already been put back from I April). ' 463 Failure to 
implement the regime, noted one official, 'would create a real blot on the 
Commission's record. 
ý464 
To summarise, it can be argued that the EU's decision to revert back to the 
historical reference license system was a means of 'best' accommodating interested 
parties. EU banana operators and ACP farmers accepted that they were losing the 
privileges of the previous regime, and favoured historical referencing for the interim 
period. The EU abandoned its ally in Latin America (Ecuador) in favour of more 
broad based support from other banana producing states and US agreement that the 
WTO challenge would not continue. Finally, given the complications of first come 
first serve, it can be argued that the banana deal was a means of maintaining the EU's 
credibility. 
465 
4) The Wider Implications of the Banana Dispute 
The transatlantic banana dispute is such an important case study, because it highlights 
the capacity of transatlantic disputes to undermine relations with third states. It 
demonstrates how conflict in the transatlantic relationship distracts from co-operation 
under the NTA. Finally, these combined factors illustrate the capacity of transatlantic 
disputes to threaten the stability and legitimacy of the multilateral trading system. 
462 See European Voice, April 13,2001 
16" Interview Commission official (via email) 200 1 (59). 
464 Interview USTR official (via telephone) 2001 (58). 
46N Aq, ued bN/ Commission official (via email) 2000 (59) 
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Relations with the Caribbean and Latin America 
In the end, it can be argued that both the EU and the US acted like 'bullies'. 
Strategically they used the position of smaller states to gain support throughout the 
dispute, and domestic decisions taken in the banana war carried greater implications 
for the smaller banana producing states. 
First, the EU defended its position as 'third world champion' by arguing that 
the US was bullying it into a policy that would undermine Caribbean economies. 
Ultimately it argued that the US challenge undermined efforts to prevent illicit activity 
in the region, because the lost market access for Caribbean bananas would result in 
employment loss, drug trafficking and high levels of illegal immigration to the US. 466 
Thus, EU officials argued that the US challenge to the banana regime undermined EU, 
US and transatlantic efforts to curb drug production in the Caribbean through for 
example, the Caribbean Drugs Initiative (1997). A Council Secretariat official argued 
that the, 'The EU spent a lot of money fighting off drugs in Caribbean. The US is 
acting to destroy farmers. ' 467 
Ironically, it can be argued that the EU's commitment to the Caribbean was 
temporarily abandoned when it agreed to implement first come, first serve licensing. 468 
The decision also threatened to undermine efforts to curb economic instability in Latin 
America. It was argued that lost employment in the banana industry could increase 
social tension, which in turn would fuel guerrilla movements and harm efforts to end 
466 To highlight the scale of the problem Hallain and Preston ( 1997) note that in Dominica, for example, 
the banana industry is the only legal crop cultivated year round, and it supports 30% of the workforce 
directly and 70% indirectly (Hal I ain and Preston 1997). 
4(, 7 This viewpoint was also expressed bN officials in the European Commission (in US) and in the UK 
Foreign Office. 
168 See also Daih, Telegraph 1999. 
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civil conflict. Increased violence in Columbia, in turn would undermine EU and US 
efforts to end conflict through the hefty financial aid that has poured into the region. 
469 
Indirectly, both the EU and the US have played the role of bully as the 
domestically influenced decisions taken by each has had a negative impact on smaller 
states caught in the crossfire. The implication for the transatlantic decision-makers is 
clear: disputes between the two largest trading partners risk damaging their external 
relations with other states. Furthermore, the banana dispute threatened both 
transatlantic and multilateral frameworks for international co-operation. 
The Effect on the NTA Relationship 
The banana dispute had the capacity to undennine the NTA process in two. respects. 
The interest here is first, in how the banana dispute interfered with the overall process 
of co-operation. Did the banana dispute actually block co-operation under the NTA 
process? Second, the interest is in the 'perceived' damage of the banana dispute. 
Aaron etal (2001: 3) argue that transatlantic trade disputes have 'polluted the 
atmosphere, stifling a productive discussion about the larger relationship'. To what 
extent did the banana dispute do so? Ultimately, the test for NTA institutions is how 
effectively they managed the banana dispute. 
Most would agree the banana dispute specifically had some impact on the NTA 
process. Despite the existence of the Early Warning System and institutions such as 
the SLG and TEP Steering Group, the banana dispute raged on for almost a decade. It 
was on the EU-US Summit agenda for over three years. However, while EU and US 
officials conceded that the banana case had a negative impact on the relationship, they 
469 
See also Wilson 200 1. 
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also argued that it did not impede the overall structure of transatlantic 
institutional isation or the facilitation of further co-operation. 470 
In general, one Commission official explained that disputes 'take away from 
meetings where other issues could be discussed' . 
47 1 The banana dispute was blamed 
for overshadowing EU-US Summits. However, while the dispute provided a diversion 
at intergovernmental and transgovernmental meetings, it did block the NTA process 
from producing a number of deliverables, most notably the MRAs, the SouthýEastern 
Europe Stability Pact, the AIDS initiatives in Africa and even the TER While the 
dispute may have interfered with increased co-operation, the whole NTA structure 
survived. As one Commission official argued, 'conflict in one field does not break 
apart in other areas. ' 472 
The most structural damage caused by the banana dispute was to the 
Transatlantic Economic Partnership. One Commission official observed that, 'TEP ran 
parallel to bananas, hormones, an d Helms Burton. These disputes have had counter 
influence. ' A representative from the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels 
agreed that these disputes damaged the TEP. 473 The argument follows that the . period 
in which the TEP stalled (most of 1999) coincided with the most hostile yea r in the 
banana dispute. But, the banana dispute was a setback rather than a stopper. In 2000, 
the TEP was back on track, while the banana dispute raged on. One USTR official 
argued that, 'the banana dispute did not prevent any positive developments. If we. both 
wanted something it went ahead even through the dispute. 474 
170 Interview with Commission. Council Presidency, USTR officials. September (1999), October (2000) 
(5,9.15,57-9). 
4"1 Interview, Commission official, September 1999, Brussels (9). 
112 Interview, Commission official, September 1999, Brussels (6), 
1733 Interview, US Chamber of Commerce Brussels, September 1999 (19). 
174 Interview, USTR official, (via telephone) 2000 (58). 
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Disputes, like that over bananas, interfere with transatlantic co-operation, 
because they occupy time and resources of the negotiators on both sides of the 
Atlantic, but the actual damage in terms of overall trade is overshadowed by the larger 
trading relationship. European interviewees often argue that bananas affect less than 
1% of trade but 95% of media attention on transatlantic relations. One USTR official 
agreed, noting that, 'Disputes do not offset everything else. There is $300 million 
involved in disputes and $300 billion in trade. Journalists focus on news, that news is 
not that the US and the EU are trading swimmingly on $300 billion in trade. ' 
Thus, despite talk of a transatlantic trade war, the EU and US remain partners 
within the NTA structure. A major shortcoming of this structure, however, was its 
failure to minimise 'surface' or superficial damage to the relationship that resulted 
from mishandling the dispute. The structure did not stop EU and US officials from 
having a public 'war of words' over bananas. Despite the established dialogue 
structure, EU and US officials took to what Prodi has characterised as 'megaphone' 
rather than 'telephone' diplomacy. 475 
Without underestimating the real damage to the EU-US partnership, it can be 
argued that the perception of damage did more to undermine the partnership. The EU's 
failure to design a WTO compatible regime led to harsh criticism in the US where for 
example USTR Barshefsky argued that the EU was forcing 'a major confrontation in 
transatlantic trade' (USTR 1998). The key factor was the US decision to impose 
sanctions in March 1999. Special trade negotiator Peter Scher maintained the time had 
come, 'for the EU to bear some of the consequences for its GATT and WTO 
476 obligations' , while Conimissioner Brittan argued that the USs 'politically unwise' 
47ý Prodi commented after the June 2000 EU-US Summit, 'We decided that megaphone diplomacy 
would be replaced by telephone diplomacy'. Financial Times (2000) New Tactbut EU-US disputes 
rernain, I June. 
476 press Release, USIS 3 March 1999. 
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decision to take unilateral sanctions was risking damage to the WTO and EU-US 
relations over a minor economic issue' 
477 
.A 
Council Secretariat official accused the 
US of 'taking hostages' . 
478 And, the UK Minister for Trade and Industry stated that, 'I 
deplore the action which the United States has taken ... 
it is completely unauthorised by 
any WTO procedures. ' 479 
The hostility of the banana dispute was most apparent among domestic actors 
who lacked direct access to transgovernmental networks. The dispute fuelled anti- 
American sentiment in certain Member States' governments and negative reactions to 
the EU in Congress 490 . In particular, 
US sanctions alienated one of its greatest allies 
within the EU, leading one UK official to accuse the US of being 'irrational' and 
'unacceptable'. 481 
The dispute had a disproportionate effect in Congress, where politicians have 
482 
little knowledge and even less interest in the NTA or the TEP . In 
Congress, the 
perceived 'stalling' of the EU in the WTO process generated perceptions that the EU 
was not 'playing fair'. While Congress argued it had taken quick action to change US 
tax laws after the WTO's ruling in the Foreign Sales Corporation Case, the EU had not 
made significant changes to its banana regime. One House staff member argued that 
'In 5 months we were able to pass a major change to tax law, (to) respond quickly by 
law. Yet, the EU has failed to comply with WTO rulings in either the beef or the 
banana case in almost ten years. ' 483 
477 Commission Press Release (1998) No. 96/98,10 November. 
478 Interview, Council Secretariat, September 1999 Brussels (3) 
-179 Quoted by Buerkle ( 1999) in the International Herald Tribune. 
Barnabv Mason ar-ued in BBC News. for example. that the bitter dispute over bananas added to 
tension mounted by American exports of genetically modified crops. the acquittal of the American 
military pilot whose plane killed 20 people in Italy, and disagreement over Cuba, Iran, Iraq and Kosovo 
(1999) Transatlantic Tensions Deepen, 5 March. 
"' BBC News, 3 May1999. 
482 Interview, Staff Member. Committee on Trade, Washington DC September 2000 (5 1). 
4931 Interview. Staff Member, Comm ittee on Trade, Washington DC September 2000 (5 1). 
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To summarise, the banana dispute did increase tension in the relationship and 
contributed to the general negative atmosphere prompted by trade disputes in EU-US 
relations. Its hard to determine the exact impact of these negative perceptions, but a 
USTR official stated that, 'When you are throwing insults at each other- it is. hard to 
kiss and make up. ' Still, the dispute was not as detrimental to the NTA process as it 
was perceived to be. What is more damaging to the reputation of the NTA, is that it 
did not have a major impact on the banana dispute. The banana dispute highlights the 
inability of the NTA process to 'manage' diverging interests on either side of the 
Atlantic (see also Aron et al_2001). 
The Multilateral Trading System 
Arguably the most important consequence of the banana dispute is the failure of the 
EU and the US to resolve the conflict through the WTO. Both sides have accused the 
other of breaking multilateral trading rules, and of jeopardising the multilateral trading 
system. The unilateral nature of US sanctions and the EU failure to bring the regime in 
line WTO rulings have called into question the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
international rules. 
First, unilateral sanctions and the introduction of Carousel Retaliation led EU 
officials to question the compatibility of US domestic trade legislation with the WTO. 
European institutions united around the view that the timing of US sanctions 
threatened the sanctity of the WTO. Sir Leon Brittan warned that: 'My message to the 
United States is a simple one: use the WTO. 484 The UK Trade Minister Brian Wilson 
argued, 'It is at this point that the Americans appear to have pulled the plug on the 
4s '4 Quoted in CNN 20 November 1998. 
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(WTO) procedures and acted unilaterally' . 
485 Corm-nissioner Lamy accused the US of 
making up its own rules. 486 
Arguably the US did 'break the rules' because the DSB concluded that it had 
acted too early in imposing sanctions. Nonetheless, it approved the sanctions and 
upheld the legality of Section 301 and Carousel Retaliation. The timing of the US 
request for retaliation exposed a 'loop' in WTO law. The US argued that the timing of 
the sanctions was dictated by Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) Article 22, 
which states that the complaining party must retaliate within 20 days after the 
ýreasonable time' deadline for implementation, in this case I January 1999. However, 
Article 22.6 requires the DSU to grant authorisation for retaliation within 30 days of 
the expiration period. This left a small window of opportunity - 21 January to 31 
January- for the US to request retaliation. US officials argued (under Article 22.7) that 
if retaliation was not made within that time period, the 'negative consensus' rule 
would lapse, and the DSU would have to rule under 'positive consensus', which would 
allow any country, including the EU, to block retaliation. 487 The US requested. a panel 
th for DSB authorisation on January 14 1999, and the panel was scheduled for the 25 , 
within the 'window of opportunity' (see also Komuro 2000; Vallen and McGivern 
2000; Ziedaliski 2000). 
On the other hand, the EU requested the re-establishment of the DSB panel, 
which reconvened on 12 January 1999, under Article 21.5. The EU argued that th e US 
could not retaliate until the Article 21.5 procedures had finished, or until the new EC 
banana regime was found to be inconsistent with WTO rules. Commissioner officials 
moved to suspend the US's request for a panel decision on sanctions, claiming it was 
Quoted in McSm ith and Fraser (1999). 
486 See Giles, W (2000) Carousel Deepens Row over Banana Trade, In Financial Times, 9 July. 
487 See Surnmary of U. S. Legal Position on Dispute in WTO on EC Banana Regime, USTR Press 
Release 12 January 1999, available on US Mission website (http: //www. useu. be). 
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invalid until a Article 21.5 decision was made. The US in turn accused the EC of 
'blocking tactics'. USTR Barshefsky argued, 'The EU today took the extraordinary 
step of shutting down the work of the WTO. 488 
The dispute over Articles 21 and 22 highlighted a problem with the legal 
framework of the DSU. Article 21 makes no reference to the right to retaliation in 
Article 22 and Article 22 makes no reference to 21. The EU argued that Article 21 
took precedence over Article 22. The US argued that the EU's reading of the 
relationship between Article 21 and Article 22 would render Article 22 inoperative 
because the 30 day deadline for negative consensus (under Article 22) would expire 
before the 90 day deadline for a DSB ruling (under Article 21.5). The US argued that 
the EU actions had invoked an 'endless loop of litigation. ' 
In this case, the timing conflict between Article 21 and 22 procedureS489 was 
reconciled by the DSB's request on 2 March for more time to gather information, 
which merged the deadlines for both Article 21 and 22 DSB decisions. The conflict 
over these articles, however, drew attention to deeper problems in the DSU 
framework. The 'contradictory' drafting of Articles 21 and 22 and the 'ambiguous' 
language of the DSU has subsequently arisen in other cases, including the Canadian- 
Australian salmon dispute (see also Vallen and McGivern 2000; Komuro 2000: 32). 
Second, the EU failure to comply with the WTO ruling was heavily criticised, 
especially in Congress where the EU was seen to be undermining the credibility of the 
WTO. One USTR representative observed that the pressure coming from Congress 
was renewed after dispute settlement proceedings. He argued, 'After you battle and 
win, well you played the multilateral game the way the Europeans said you should and 
488 . Ambassador Barshevsky Expresses Dismay at European Union Blockinta, Tactis in WTO' USTR 
Press Release 25 January 1999. 
181) The Article 22 procedures required the DSB decision by March 2,1999, but the Article 21 
procedures were not due to be completed until 12 April 1999. 
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now they are not implementing! " He added that 'Europeans are thumbing their, nose at 
(the WTO)'. For USTR this was a tough position because they had fought hard for 
Congressional support of the WTO on the grounds that the new system would be a 
serious medium for dispute resolution . 
490 The message from Congress was clear: the 
EU needed to comply with the ruling. A Senate Finance Committee spokesperson 
argued thatl 'We have lost many cases but we have always complied. ' 
The WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism, however, does not require the EU to 
change its banana regime. Rather, it authorises sanctions to compensate the challenger. 
A Trade Committee staff member noted that, ' Europeans have made little effort to 
comply, but they are entitled to do this. ' Adding ironically that, 'Congress made sure 
that Uruguay would allow us to accept retaliation the same! ' Thus, the banana* dispute 
exposed another loop in the WTO system. Gleason and Walther (2000: 16) argue that 
the WTO suffers from implementation problems including, 'inadequate safety checks, 
incentives, and/or sanctions to encourage the promptest-possible, good faith 
implementation. ' 
For many who supported the EU's banana subsidy regime the WTO ruling 
raised questions about the legitimacy of a trade policy which protects untamed 
liberalisation. The banana case fuelled the mobilisation against globalisation as 
NGOs, including TACD representatives, argued that the WTO should promote fair, if 
not always free trade. 491 The WTO was further questioned by Congresswoman 
Maxine Waters who expressed outrage at the WTO decision to sanction the European 
banana regime claiming. 'It is time for the WTO to begin listening to concerns of 
490 A USTR official argued, 'We promised them that the WTO would not be a General Agreement on 
'Falk and Talk. ' Interview, via telephone, June 2001 (58). 
; 91 It should be noted that Ralph Ives has argued that. 'The WTO does not require free trade', because 'a 
WTO consistent regime doesn't inean no preferences. ' (USIS Press Release, 'US Officials Stress 
Interest in Resolvin- EU Banana Dispute' 12 September 1998. 
284 
small farmers, labour union members, environmentalists, consumer advocates and 
human rights activists'. 
The banana dispute was an important case because it was one of the first cases 
tested by WTO. While the banana case is a classic dispute, many more up and coming 
disputes will be more difficult to manage given their predisposition to scientific (beef), 
cultural (gmos) and legal (FSCs) differences between the EU and the US. What links 
these disputes is the fact that that strong domestic political lobbies and internal 
pressure will continue to ensure that EU and US interests clash, and that trade 
negotiators will find themselves in direct conflict between domestic and WTO 
interests. 
Conclusion 
To summarise, this chapter sought to explain which factors could explain EU. and US 
decision making in the banana dispute. It was argued that domestic and external 
factors influenced both EU and US decisions in the dispute, and the banana deal, can 
only be characterised as a balance of interests or the 'least worst option'. 
What was also notable in the banana dispute is the way in which the dispute 
was handled. While many civil servants and private actors were involved in the 
dispute, transgovernmental and transnational networks were not prevalent. Rather the 
banana case was negotiated in traditional diplomatic style by high ranking, often 
intergovernmental, officials. Unlike the MRA or trafficking in women cases, 
transatlantic institutions were not instrumental in reaching an agreement on EU banana 
subsidies. Although the NTA institutions cushioned the impact of the dispute and kept 
officials talking, the dispute was not 'managed' through the NTA process, EU-US 
Summits or the early warning systern. Institutionalisation did not, and some argue 
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could not, prevent the banana dispute because the case demonstrated the classic clash 
of EU and US economic and political interests. In this respect the banana case study 
differs dramatically from both the trafficking information campaigns and the MRAs 
where transatlantic institutions facilitated co-operation on a technical level. 
The case also highlighted the dilemma posed by conflicting international and 
domestic interests. Because these will always exist, the real test for transatlantic 
relations is in the capacity of the EU and the US to manage disputes in a way which 
minimises the damage to bilateral and multilateral institutions. The negative 
atmosphere created by the banana dispute highlights the need to strengthen dialogue 
structures that can deal with conflict as well as co-operation. The way in which the 
dispute was handled also risked undermining the legitimacy of the WTO. In short the 
banana dispute exposed weaknesses of both the bilateral structure of the NTA and the 




This thesis raised a number of questions about the roles of institutions, actors, 
dialogue, and policy co-ordination in the process of EU-US relations. First, and 
foremost it asked: do institutions matter and if so why do they matter? It considered 
the capacity of the EU and the US not only to manage the relationship but also to 
exercise governance through transatlantic institutions. Second, this thesis focused not 
only on inStIlt I .y on i ons, 
bUt also on the actors who participate in them. it sought to gauge 
[Utl 
the extent to which the process of transatlantic institutional] sation allowed different 
categories of actors to engage in different types of decision making. In short, it asked: 
who governs in the process and how? 
The 'process' of transatlantic relations was dissected by specifying and 
analysing multiple types of decisions in EU-US policy-making and the role of multiple 
types of actors. Three hypotheses were set out in chapter one to help us analyse how 
the process works. First, it was argued that the TAD, the NTA and the TEP have 
created transatlantic institutions and that transatlantic actors perform functions of 
governance through these institutions. Second, it was hypothesised that under that 
institutional framework, a decentralisation of decision-making powers had been 
allocated to transgovernmental actors who perform both 'setting' and 'shaping' 
functions in the policy process. Finally, this thesis explored the role of trarisnational 
actors in transatlantic policy making. It tested the hypothesis that there has been a 
decentralisation of decision shaping to not only state. but also to non-state actors. 
Specifically, it explored the capacity of the TABD, the TACD and the TAED to 
influence transatlantic policies. 
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This chapter summarises the evidence presented throughout this thesis in 
relation to the three hypotheses. More generally, it asks what we have learned about 
EU and US relations from studying the relationship in the 1990s. The underlying 
argument is that the new transatlantic institutions do matter. Section I examines the 
extent to which the relationship has been institutional i sed under the TAD, the NTA 
and the TER It argues that the agreements have established a structure for transatlantic 
governance by creating a framework for policy making and building institutions, 
which serve as decision-making structures. 
The thesis also examined how these governance structures have altered the 
scope for actor input into decision making. Section 2 addresses the evidence presented 
for the purpose of testing the second hypothesis. It argues not only that 
transgovernmental networks have been institutional i sed, but that their policy setting 
and policy shaping capacity points to a decentralisation of policy making by state 
actors. 
Section 3 summarises the role of non-state actors in the transatlantic policy 
process. It specifies the varied 'shaping' capacity of the formal transatlantic dialogues 
and well as the wider impact that corporations, interests groups and other non-state 
actors have in shaping transatlantic decisions at both a trarisnational and a national 
level. Each of these sections outlines evidence presented in the case studies, both in 
support of and at odds with the three hypotheses. 
Finally, the purpose of this thesis was not only to categorise the role of 
institutions and actors in transatlantic policy making, but also to question the 
implications of the iiistitutionalisation. decentralisation and privatisation of 
transatlantic decision making. What do these recent developments tell us about EU- 
US relations and international relations more broadly? Section 4 recaps a number of 
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themes that have been addressed throughout the thesis, particularly the dilemma facing 
policy makers seeking to strike a balance between effective governance and legitimate 
governance. It suggests the need for future research on the long-term affects of 
transatlantic institutional i sation and the implications of the de-politicisation of 
transatlantic foreign policy making. 
1) The Institutionalisation of Transatlantic Relations 
This thesis took on three main analytical tasks: 
* It sought to establish whether and how the relationship has been institutionalised. 
9 In the context of theoretical debates about the EU-US relationship and international 
relations in general, it questioned why the EU and US chose to institutionalise the 
relationship. 
& It asked whether and why the institutional i sati on of the transatlantic dialogue 
matters? 
The thesis presented evidence to support the hypothesis that the relationship had been 
institutional i sed into a structure of transatlantic governance. Chapter 3 explo'red the 
creation, through the transatlantic agreements, of formal structures for decision 
making and a policy framework for governance. The TAD and, particularly, the NTA 
and the TEP outlined policy areas where European and US leaders committed 
themselves to co-operation. The NTA Action Plan and TEP Action Plan specified the 
scope for policy co-ordination under the new transatlantic dialogue. The TAD 
institutional i sed contact between heads of states via the biannual EU-US summit 
meeting. It also established a ministerial level dialogue as well as a political dialogue. 
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The density of different transatlantic institutions and dialogues is striking. 
EU-US decision-making structures developed through the NTA and the TEP with the 
creation of institutions such as the SLG, the NTA Task Force, the TEP Steering Group 
and the TEP Working Groups. The NTA and the TEP also encouraged the creation of 
the TABD, the TACD and the TAED. We are left, in this chapter, to try to come to a 
final judgement about whether these agreements and the dense layers of formal 
dialogue they created at many different levels, have complicated or simplified the 
process of EU-US co-operation, generally, and policy co-ordination, specifically. Is 
co-operation easier to achieve when more voices are heard in the policy process? Or 
does allowing new 'toddlers into the policy playpen' amount to expanding the number 
of actors wielding vetoes over co-operative agreements? 
The TAD, the NTA and the TEP are products of intergovernmental 'history 
making decisions. ' The motivation for these high level political decisions can be 
explained by rationalist rationale. in other words it is argued throughout the thesis that 
the EU and the US chose to 'institutionalise' their relationship because it was in their 
interest to do so. As the Cold War period began to fade in 1989, both sides recognised 
that common ideas, values, culture and multilateral institutions could not hold the 
transatlantic partnership together as the common security threat of the Soviet Union 
had throughout the Cold War. However, the EU and the US identified mutual interest 
in maintaining the partnership, particularly in response to new soft security. threats, 
such as the economically and politically unstable CEE and the Middle East, and in 
light of bilateral economic disputes over. for example bananas, beef and milk 
hormones. The EU was keen to demonstrate its capabilities as a foreign policy actor, 
and the US welcomed the prospects of burden sharing in light of its growing need to 
be a -superpoxver on the cheap'. 
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The NTA arose out of fears that the TAD structure was not doing enough to 
narrow the gap between the partners. It sought more effective co-operation on policy 
areas where the EU had growing competence under the Maastricht Trepty. For 
example, Justice and Home Affairs issues, such as migration and international crime, 
made it onto the transatlantic agenda under the global challenges chapter of the NTA. 
The TEP also demonstrated mutual interest in getting more concrete economic results 
from the transatlantic partnership, including further market opening agreements and 
the containment of trade disputes. 
Institutional] sation has had two broad implications for transatlantic relations. 
First, the creation of so many new and varied decision-making forums means that the 
decision making process now has multiple tiers and multiple stages. The different 
institutions created by the transatlantic agreements point to the institutional ised -role of 
intergovernmental actors (through the EU-US Summit), transgovernmental actors 
(through, for example the SLG, TEP Steering Group) and transnational actors (through 
the TABD, TACD, TAED). Throughout the thesis, we have seen the capacity of 
intergovernmental actors to 'make' the high level political decisions which establish 
institutional change and policy expansion, but also of transgovernmental and 
transnational actors to 'set , and 'shape' policy. 
Second, the institutionalisation of the dialogue exposes the different purposes 
served by the different transatlantic institutions. Intergovernmental decisions highlight 
the commitment of the EU and the US to fostering dialogue, and where possible policy 
co-ordination and conflict management. 49" Specifically it can be noted that the 
intergoveriu-nental decisions to include trafficking in women in the NTA global 
challenges chapter and the MRAs in the economic chapter (and later in TEP) are the 
492 The overall impact of the institutions is discussed in more detail in section 4. 
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decisions that established the scope for these transatlantic policies. Both decisions 
represented a broad commitment to policy co-ordination. Their inclusion in the 
transatlantic policy framework put trans governmental actors in charge of producing 
substantive results. The agreements also committed the EU and the US to manage 
disputes through continued dialogue. In the case of the banana dispute, it can be 
argued that the institutional structure cushioned the impact of conflict between the 
partners. The institutions, at least, kept people talking. 
The point is that the institutionalisation of the transatlantic relationship 
changed the way that actors operated within the system. While it is difficult to gauge 
just how the behaviour of social actors is shaped or altered by transatlantic institutions, 
institutions at least created the opportunity for actors with different interests to 
formally participate in the policy making process. Sections 2 and 3 discuss, in more 
detail, how these actors operate with these decision-making structures. 
2) The Decentralisation of Decision Setting and Shaping 
The first hypothesis posited that the institutional i sati on of the dialogue resulted in the 
creation of not only intergovernmental but also transgovernmental and transnational, 
institutions. Chapter 4 explored the dense level of contacts that were forged between 
high and low level civil servants under the three transatlantic agreements. It 
questioned the extent to which intergovernmental actors had created room for 
transgovernmental actors to influence the process through the creation of economic, 
political and NTA institutions. and a specified early warning process. To test the 
second hypothesis - that power to make joint policies had been effectively 
clecentralised from the intergovernmental level 'downwards' -- the thesis sought to 
make clear the functions of transgovernmental institutions in the process of 
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transatlantic decision making. The thesis sought to uncover evidence that 
transgovernmental actors had both 'set' and 'shaped' transatlantic policy. 
The underlying question, for many scholars., is whether transgovernmental 
actors act independently of their political bosses or if they simply follow 
predetermined paths in transatlantic policy making. In other words, does dialogue 
between transgovernmental actors result in preference convergence? It was argued 
throughout the thesis that intergovernmental actors maintain control of the'policy 
process by 'making' the decisions, which establish the scope for policy co-ordination. 
To an extent transatlantic agreements, particularly the NTA and the TEP, created a 
mandate for transgovernmental actors to work within. 
However, there is also evidence to suggest that transgovernmental actors 
exercise some control over the process, albeit within certain boundaries. For example, 
chapter 4 established that a range of transgoverni-nental actors, at the ministerial level 
and at the agency level, had effectively acted as policy 'setters' by signing agreements, 
producing declarations or co-ordinating policies. Gauging the capacity of actors to 
'shape' policy is more difficult. Unlike 'setting' decisions, written records of 'shaping' 
decisions often do not exist. Furthermore, a wide variety of actors have the capacity to 
act as transatlantic policy shapers through, for example, the SLG, TEP Steering Group, 
NTA Task Force, TEP and Troika working group meetings. That interviewees went to 
great lengths to discuss the roles of these institutions suggests that they play a role in 
the process, but what role exactly? It was argued that these actors effectively helped 
decide not that the EU and the US would co-operate, but how they could co-operate. 
Trans govern in ental actors fulfilled a number of important shaping functions. 
First, transgovernmental actors helped shape the initial policy agendas of the NTA and 
the TEP bý identifynig, areas NNhere co-operation might be feasible. Once 
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intergovernmental actors decide that co-operation should be pursued, 
transgovernmental actors continue to shgýpe the policy agenda by outlining specific 
issue areas, within policy sectors, where the EU and the US could reach consensus. In 
short they identify 'policy options'. 
Trans governmental actors also establish 'policy details' once the 
intergovernmental actors 'make' the decision to pursue a policy, in a variety of ways. 
Institutions like the SLG provide political oversight and establish time frames for co- 
operation in the early stages of policy formation. They also establish potential 
language for 'setting' decisions. In the case of trafficking in women for example, the 
concept of an information campaign and the details of the transatlantic project were 
derived at the working group level. Effectively the dialogue was set by foreign 
ministers at a ministerial level dialogue, where ultimately the decision to co-ordinate 
that policy rested. However, a dialogue between US Mission, US State Department, 
DG Justice and Home Affairs and DG External Relations officials determined key 
details of the transatlantic anti-trafficking policy including: 
0 where to target transatlantic efforts, 
9 how to technically co-ordinate the anti-traffic king plans and 
* who should implement the transatlantic campaigns. 
The transatlantic anti-traffi eking campaigns were also shaped by the NTA Task Force 
and the Senior Level Group who were charged with overseeing the policy 
development, keeping it on the NTA agenda and acting as a problem solving forum, 
for example over funding problems. 
The role of trans governmental actors in the MRA case was somewhat easier to 
document and more significant given the higher profile and domestic implications of 
the agreements. The USTR and Cornmissioner for Trade publicly *set' the transatlantic 
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regulatory policy by signing the MRA agreement. Many more actors played a role in 
shaping the policies. While trade officials exercised control over the overarching 
framework agreement, domestic regulators shaped the policy details in each of the 
individual annexes. Transatlantic institutions played a key role in pushing 
negotiations ahead and striking a balance between trade and regulatory authorities. 
The Joint Committee and Joint Sectoral Committee tried to strike a bargain between 
regulators and trade officials. The SLG and the TEP Steering Group monitored the 
process, helped identify achievable goals on a sector by sector basis and kept the 
negotiations to a time schedule by establishing and monitoring deadlines. 
In some ways, at least, the wide range of policy shapers in the process of 
transatlantic decision making complicates the policy process because it makes . the task 
of consensus reaching laborious. The NTA institutions seek to reach a consensus 
among policy shapers before decisions can be set. At the same time the MRA case, in 
particular, demonstrates the capacity of the NTA institutions to facilitate co-operation 
by forging compromise among a wide range of actors with different interests and with 
different levels of access to the policy process. In particular transatlantic institutions 
were credited with managing, but not overcoming, the differences between the trade 
camp and the regulatory camps. The banana dispute also highlighted the capacity for 
domestic actors to shape transatlantic policy decisions. In that case, however, the NTA 
institutions did not serve as decision-making forums. Rather, actors sought to shape 
policy by lobbying domestic institutions. 
In both the trafficking in women and MRA case studies, intergovernmental 
actors indicated an interest in joint co-operation. Overall, the *shaping' capacity of 
transgovernmental actors demonstrates that decentralised transatlantic institutions also 
serve as policy making mechanisms, in addition to acting as forums for the exchange 
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of dialogue, information and ideas. The capacity of transgovernmental actors to act as 
policy shapers sheds some light on the rationalist-constructivist debate outlined in 
chapter two. Although ultimately the scope for policy co-ordination is determined by 
self-interest, the policy details are derived from the transgovernmental dialogue. 
Arguably the institutions are more than just talking shops. 
However, there is less evidence to suggest that these institutions are effective 
where the EU and US political leaders' interests do not coincide. As one Council 
Presidency official argued, 'where there are disputes, our hands are usually tied at a 
political level. 493 This argument is consistent with Slaughter's argument on 
transgovernmentalism: mainly that transgovernmental networks can gradually achieve 
politicial convergence, but they are less likely to contain serious political or economic 
conflict (Slaughter 1997: 196). In the banana case, for example, the NTA process kept 
up dialogue between the leaders and sheltered the rest of the policy agenda from the 
dispute, but transgovernmental inst itutions did little to manage or resolve the dispute. 
The broader argument is that decision-making powers are less decentrallsed 
where high political interest is involved. Nonetheless, decentralised dialogue has been 
deemed an important part of the conflict management process. The creation of the 
Early Warning System and the Biotechnology Forum demonstrates an interest in 
fostering dialogue at lower levels to prevent conflict, where possible. The idea that 
disputes can be managed from the bottom up is illustrated by one Commission 
official's comment that, 'closer contact and more consultation slowly breeds more 
broad understanding. ' 494 While the potential for transgovernmental conflict 
management exists. the institutions are still at an early stage of developing the capacity 
to manage diSPLItCS. 
Interview, Finnish Council Presidency, Brussels, 1999 (5). 
N4 Interview, Commission official, Brussels. September 1999 (6). 
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3) Policy Shaping by Non-state Actors 
The institutional i sation of the transatlantic relationship extends to the private, as well 
as the public sector. The development of transnational dialogues such as the TABD, 
the TAED, the TACD and the TALD, was another focus of this thesis. It questioned 
why these dialogues were created by the EU and US governments under the NTA, 
how they became institutionalised, and the extent to which they have fostered 
communication across the Atlantic. Subsequently, we looked for evidence to support 
the hypothesis that decision shaping powers had been delegated to non-state actors 
under the NTA. The emphasis, thus, was not only on the existence of transnational 
networks or of transnational dialogue, but also on the capacity of these dialogues to 
'shape' transatlantic decisions. 
Chapter 5 outlined evidence to support the idea that an institutional isation of 
the TABD, the TACD, the TAED (before its suspension) had occurred. Each of these 
dialogues established some type of organisational structures to facilitate consensus 
between European and American counterparts. Dialogue between these groups has 
resulted in a process of policy learning as American and European businesses and 
NGOs exchange information, share strategies and seek consensus. In particular 
American consumer and environmental NGOs have learned from European groups, 
who have more experience operating in policy networks and influencing the European 
Commission. The TALD was the only case examined that cannot be considered to be a 
serious dialogue structure. As such, the failure of the TALD means that labour actors 
have no institutionalised right to shape transatlantic policy. 
The other dialogues established regular high level and working level dialogues 
,, vith the US Administration and the Commission. It is clear that groups involved in 
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these dialogues communicate with (especially transgovernmental) networks of 
officials. But how effectively do they shape transatlantic policy? 
The business, consumer, environmental (and even labour) dialogues were 
encouraged by EU and US officials to develop into policy shapers. The US 
administration was convinced that the TABD would support the US negotiating 
position. Generally, the EU and the US both had an interest in encouraging civil 
society participation to balance the power of the TABD. The Commission also 
believed that the TACD and TAED would become an ally in negotiations with the US 
over food safety and privacy. The TEP congratulated the TABD for its role in 
securing transatlantic agreements and encouraged consumers and envirom-nentalists to 
make a constructive contribution to policy making. The dialogues' members, business 
and NGOs alike, have argued that the dialogues could not continue without concrete 
policy results. 
It was noted throughout the thesis, however. that the transatlantic dialogues 
have had a varied shaping capacity. The TABD is the only dialogue to have had a 
visible impact on the policy process. It is widely praised by EU and US officials for 
helping find consensus on a range of policies. A high percentage of TABD 
recommendations have been addressed. It is credited with helping to facilitate the 
MRAs. On the other hand the social dialogues have not achieved similar results. 
Neither the TACD nor TAED claims to have had any impact on the process and the 
future of all of the civil society dialogues depends on their willingness and capacity to 
secure private funding. One NGO observed that, 'they are telling us what they are 
doing. rather than taking our advice. We have access but we don't learn specifics. 
298 
TAED participants argue that US officials seem to be just going through the motions. ' 
495 
The argument made in chapter 5 was that while the TABD case strongly 
supports the hypothesis that a decentralisation of decision shaping has been delegated 
to private actors, the TACD, TAED and TALD do not. The TACD, as the most 
organised dialogue, has the potential to be a future policy shaper. However, time will 
tell if the Commission's sponsorship of the society dialogues will prove useful in 
future debates on food safety, data protection and waste management. 
Chapter 7 also demonstrated the shaping capacity of the TABD, but-not the 
TACD or TAED, in the MRA negotiations. Many officials argued that both TABD 
recommendations and the lobbying action of TABD members had a major influence 
on the process. A major advantage of the TABD is that it has managed to concentrate 
on a number of policy sectors where common goals are held by the EU and US, most 
notably the facilitation of trade liberalisation as a major component of the New 
Transatlantic Marketplace. On the other hand the TACD and TAED have an interest in 
and have focused on areas where the EU and US disagree. 
The banana case also demonstrated the capacity of private actors to shape 
transatlantic policy. However, the influence of private actors centred around national 
rather than 'transatlantic' policy makers. Chiquita corporation invoked US domestic 
legislation and lobbied Congress to influence US policy. Transnational consumer and 
development groups and banana operators were able to influence the EU's policy on 
bananas. Unlike the MRA case, however, the existence of transatlantic business 
consensus was blocked by the lack of common economic interest. The power of 
ýJqs Interview. American NGO, Washinaton DC, October 2000 (24). 
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business' interests over 'fair trade' supporters was also demonstrated in the banana 
case. However, it was WTO, rather than transatlantic rules that created-the bias. 
In areas where EU and US business consensus exists, the TABD has started to 
play a role in transatlantic conflict management. By identifying early warning system 
issues, the transnational business group has tried to resolve and prevent transatlantic 
disputes that would have negative effects for industry. For example, the Corm-nission 
demurred from creating a new trade dispute on metric labelling on the 
recommendation of the TABD. 
Chapter 6 also examined the role that non-state actors play in political sectors 
examined by the NTA. First, the rise of transnational criminals created the need for 
transatlantic co-operation on trafficking in women. It was noted that a wide range of 
NGOs have worked with governments at the international and national levels to 
combat the problem of trafficking in women. This case demonstrates the capacity of 
the private sector to perform functions of governance because NGOs have the capacity 
to provide administrators with practical policy solutions, particularly at the local level. 
Yet, the trend in the anti-trafficking policy sector is one of moving away from directly 
utilising NGOs for the information campaigns, and instead working with an 
international organisation. That said, NGOs play an important role as they are 
subcontracted out by the International Organisation on Migration. It was also argued 
that further decentralisation of the trafficking dialogue and better private-public co- 
operation, through something like a transatlantic anti -trafficking dialogue, could. be a 
way to achieve effect, 'privatised' governance in this sector, of a sort which resembles 
that which exists in other sectors examined by this thesis. 
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4) Effective and Legitimate Transatlantic Governance? 
The transatlantic institutions that have been the focus of this thesis could plausibly be 
viewed as fulfilling their basic purpose: to inject new focus into transatlantic relations 
and keep both sides committed to the pursuit of a true partnership. As one 
Commission argued, 'the NTA became the new "glue" in transatlantic relations ,- 496 
However, the thesis was concerned more specifically with the impact that the 
transatlantic agreements had not only on transatlantic relations but on the process of 
transatlantic governance, It was argued that the institutionalisation of the new 
transatlantic dialogue created a formal structure for collective transatlantic 
governance. 
The institutionalisation of different levels of transatlantic dialogue arguably 
facilitated co-operation and increased the capacity for consensus reaching among 
transatlantic actors. The institutions created by the transatlantic agreements have 
increased the opportunity for dialogue, deliverables, and debate. The decentralisation 
of the trans governmental dialogue has fostered a more sustainable habit. of co- 
operation between the EU and the US. For example, the anti -trafficking infon-nation 
campaigns, while certainly rather modest policy actions, are the first step in forging 
co-operation on migration issues and other global challenges. The MRAs have helped 
build confidence between regulators that will effect EU-US regulatory co-operation 
more broadly. 497 Transatlantic mechanisms may also prove useful in both the 
prevention and management of conflict. If the early warning system works, in practice, 
it could prevent some future trade disputes. While transatlantic mechanisms have been 
less successful at 'n-ianaging' system friction in highly political disputes, such as the 
496 Interview. Commission Official, DG External Relations, Brussels 1999 (6). 
497, It is perhaps revealing that after the dramatic blocking of the merger between General Electric and 
H one ywe II (both US -headquartered firrils) by the EIJ Commissi on in 2001. after the merger had been 
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banana case, the decentralisation of transatlantic policy co-ordination has, nonetheless, 
ensured that co-operation in other areas continues. 
Most notably, the dense levels of contact established by the transatlantic 
agreements have been utilised to facilitate 'governance' between two systems where 
decision-making competency is shared between many different actors. The 
mechanisms created by the transatlantic agreements endeavour to compensate for the 
institutional rivalry among domestic actors, which is ever-present in multi-level 
systems of governance. This thesis has portrayed both the EU and the US as multi- 
level systems and argued that one effect of the sharing of power across multiple levels 
of governance is to place stark limits on EU-US cooperation. Witness, for example, 
the recent proposal of Gordon Brown, the UK Chancellor, for the EU-US equivalent 
of the study that preceded the launch of the EU's single market programme in the 
1980s. On the US side, the administration of George W Bush gave no official 
response, as it struggled to win trade negotiating authority from Congress for a new 
WTO round. Both the White House and Congress were lobbied by US manufacturers 
of products with high duties, such as textiles, clothing and footwear, to reject Brown's 
proposal. Meanwhile, Brown's proposal received a cool reception at the WTO in 
Geneva, particularly among developing country delegates who naturally feared that z: l 
the transatlantic partners were looking for alternatives to a new trade round. And, in 
Brussels, a senior Commission official dismissed Brown's idea as 'one of a number of 
balloons' being floated, and stressed that it could only proceed if backed by the 
Commission and other EU Member States. 498 
Thus, barriers to entry into new realms of EU-US cooperation are high. I 
However, transatlantic institutions created in the 1990s act to protect existing realms 
cleared by US anti-trust authorities. both the Commission and the George W Bush administration 
agreed to explore an upgrade in cooperation on competition matters to avoid such outcomes in future. 
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of cooperation from atrophy or backsliding. The sub-summit decision-making 
procedures essentially put lower level civil servants in charge of 'managing' the 
dialogue and increasing the international awareness of domestic actors. As Frellesen 
(200 1) argues, the process gives experts a dose of 'transatlanticism. ' 
The institutionalisation of transgovernmental as well as intergovermental 
contacts is one way to compensate for the capabilities-expectations gaps incurred in 
both the EU and US systems, because transgovernmental actors have a joint mission to 
establish precisely how co-operation can be pursued. For example, transgovernmental 
contact between JHA, DG I and US officials enabled actors to establish how the EU 
and US could co-operate in a policy sector where the EU is widely perceived to be 
incapable of strategic action. In the MRA case, transatlantic institutions helped 
overcome the capabilities-expectations gap which arises from the sharing of 
competency between US trade officials and domestic regulators. Thus, - the 
transatlantic dialogue is designed not only to facilitate consensus between the EU and 
US, but among domestic actors as well. 
Above all, the transatlantic governance process is pragmatic. It is designed to 
facilitate policy 'deliverables' Where the EU and the US have common interests. The 
transatlantic system of governance is 'efficient' not only because it brings possibly 
contentious actors into the dialogue process, but because it avoids them where 
possible. As bureaucratic agreements, not treatiesl the NTA and the TEP de-politicise 
the process of governance. The decentralisation of decision-making to the expert, or 
working level, is a way to take many issues out of the political debate and into the 
technocratic arena. The privatisation of decision shaping, in the case of the TABD, is 
"" Quoted in Financial Times, 26 July 200 1 (available from www. ft, com). 
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also a way for the government and the business community to reach consensus on a 
range of liberalisation policies. 
Yet, it is impossible to avoid wondering whether this effective mode of 
transatlantic governance comes at a price. Again, the question of how transatlantic 
decision-making fares in the debate on technocratic governance needs to be addressed. 
The debate is significant given the role of the EU-US decision making process as a 
case study for transnational governance more generally. 
While the de-politicisation of policy making increases the threshold for co- 
operation, it also raises questions about the legitimacy of transatlantic governance. A 
number of concerns were raised throughout the thesis about governance through 
bureaucratic networks. First, the bureaucratic control over the NTA process has been 
criticised, by for example civil society groups, who argue that legislators should -have 
a more important role in the process. The weak nature of the TLD compounds the 
problem, and it was argued in chapters 4 and 5 that more parliamentary dialogue could 
increase domestic acceptance of the NTA process. 
Second, the decentralised and de-politicised policy-making process may 
undermine the transparency of transatlantic governance. NGOs, in particular, have 
argued against the incorporation of regulatory policy in the TEP generally and. against 
the MRAs specifically. The transatlantic partners, led in particular by the US 
administration, have continually argued the need for more open decision making 
proceedings and have attempted to make the process more transparent by introducing 
Joint Guidelines for Regulatory Co-operation. They have also invited wider public 
participation through the cj%Til socicty dialogues. The TACD and TAED were brought 
into the NTA process to legitimise the TER Furthermore, the guidelines on dialogue 
participation were established to ensure equal access for the dialogues. However, the 
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unequal capacity of private and NGO actors to engage in effective decision shaping 
highlights another problem with transatlantic decision making. 
However, the relative shaping capacity of business groups over other'civil 
society groups is not specifically a transatlantic problem. The statement made by one 
MEP, that: 'they (consumer and environmental groups) will never have the same 
499 influence. They do not have the same money or clout' , could 
just as easily describe 
domestic and EU politics. The problem for transatlantic policy makers however, is 
that the impact of the TABD has become a focus of anti -global isati on groups who are 
part of larger international social movements aimed at controlling the transfer of 
'governance' away from the nation state. As the civil society dialogue, particularly the 
TACD, continues to develop policy makers face the task of practically balancing the 
interests of different actors. Decision-makers will have to weigh the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the transatlantic dialogue in the context of wider debates about the 
access and impact of environmental, consumer and labour movements at the WTO, the 
G-8, and the EU. 
In conclusion, the NTA process has been criticised for being only a limited 
process of governance that fails really to deliver in terms of policy output. The 
limitations of the new transatlantic dialogue were highlighted throughout the thesis. 
However, it was argued that many deliverables have been first rather than final steps, 
and that the transatlantic institutions fulfil necessary functions in the process of 
governance. If Leon Brittan (1998: 2) is to be believed, *the results may sometimes be 
relatively unglamorous, but they are certainly not insignificant. ' In particular it is 
argued that, 'the NTA has fostered a habit of contact and dialogue across broad areas 
499 Interview. ELlropean Parliament, BrUssels. September 1999 (17). 
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of our administration, which might otherwise not have been brought to talk to each 
other. ' 
Interviewees agreed that the NTA managed the daily relationship and got 
bureaucrats talking about ways to co-operate in a range of areas where EU and US 
civil servants would not necessarily have had contact. That dialogue is, arguably, the 
most important deliverable of the process. As one Commission official argued, 'the 
logic of the NTA is similar to the thinking behind the EU. If we are constantly talking, 
it is less likely that we will be fighting. ' 500 
While the 'staying' power of transatlantic institutions is not guaranteed, the 
commitment of both sides to the process of institutionalisation in the 1990s was not 
merely symbolic. We have seen that institutions- intergovernmental, 
transgovernmental and transnational - were continually developed in the years after 
the Transatlantic Declaration was unveiled in 1990 and that current discussions are 
underway to make transatlantic institutions more effective. The potential for further 
decentralisation over decision making to institutions such as the SLG and the NTA 
Task Force, is being discussed by the Commission (2001). US and European 
governments have also encouraged future participation from non-state actors including 
the TABD, the TACD, the TAED and the TALD as well as, for example, anti- 
trafficking NGOs (see EU-US Summit 2001; Warnath 1998). In the end, the 
institutionalisation of the transatlantic dialogue is best viewed as an ongoing process. 
Further research will be needed to assess the long term development of transatlantic 
institutions and the process of transatlantic governance more widely. 
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Research Notes 
This research was primarily interview driven. In total sixty-four elite interviews were 
conducted (between July 1998 and June 2001) with a wide range of members of the 
following institutions in Brussels, Washington D. C., London, and Budapest: the US 
Mission, the Commission, the Council Secretariat, the European Parliament and 
Parliament Secretariat, the US State Department, USTR, US Commerce Department, 
US Federal Drug Administration, Congressional staff, European Environmental 
Agency, members of the TABD, the TACD, TAED and TALD and their secretariats, 
Anti-Slavery NGOs, UK Foreign Office, US Embassy London, European Commission 
Delegation DC and the International Organization of Migration (see attachment). 
The idea was to obtain both public and 'behind the scenes' information about 
the input of different types of actors in the decision making process in a range of 
policy sectors. Intergovernmental actors' input in the process was determined mainly 
from EU-US Summit statements, . press releases and speeches, as access 
to these 
officials was not feasible. Policy output at the intergovernmental level is well 
documented, because the NTA process is driven by the desire for 'deliverables'. 
However, assessing information about meetings where disputes were discussed was 
more problematic, as EU and US press releases tend to re-enforce their individual 
positions rather than the content of joint dialogue. Many official documents were 
obtained from the US Mission, EU Delegation to the US, State Department, USTR, 
and Transatlantic Information Exchange Services (TIES) websites. 
ý()() Interview, Commission Official. Brussels, May 2000 (29). 
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Interviews were needed to determine 'who does what' at the transgovernmental 
level, where meetings are conducted with less transparency. It proved difficult to piece 
together formal, let alone informal meetings, from public records, but elite interviews 
proved indispensable for these purposes. A vast range of people work on the topics 
covered by the thesis. A number of factors influenced the selection of interviewees. 
Mostly civil servants working on specifically 'transatlantic' issues were approached, 
except in the policy sectors covered by the case studies, where the opinions of people 
working in domestic, transatlantic and international forums was sought. In most cases 
the number of people working on specific topics, for example on the Summits or on 
the TLD or the TABD or TACD and on a specific policy sectors, such as trafficking, 
MRAs and bananas, was limited. The project was based on the input of both high level 
officials and specified policy 'experts', often lower level civil servants. The selection 
of high level interviews was determined in most cases by access to. officials, which 
proved more problematic. The strategy in most cases was to aim high and settle for 
who was willing and available to discuss the project. Many officials failed to answer 
letters, faxes, emails or telephone messages. Scheduling also proved problematic as 
many high level officials were unavailable or had to cancel appointments. The cost of 
travelling to Washington D. C. and Brussels meant that interviews, conducted in 
person, had to fall within limited windows of opportunity. A number of unavailable 
high level officials instructed members of their staff to meet with me in their place. A 
number of key people in the US Mission, EU Delegation to the US, DG External 
Relations North America Unit. to remain anonymous here, provided invaluable 
assistance in bridgino contact to other officials and generally offered advice. Many 
other interviewees also suggested people I should contact for subsequent interviews. 
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Members of the TABD, TACD, TALD and TAED were generally willing to 
meet and were more available for scheduled appointments. The TABD, TACD, TAED 
secretariat websites proved useful in identifying people and secretariat staff often 
directly contacted members on my behalf. I also acted as an observer at a number of 
meetings. I attended the May 2000 TAED meeting as well as a number of informal 
meetings that were attended by TABD members. I was invited to observe the 2001 
TACD meeting in Brussels., however was unable to attend given prior commitments to 
the US ECSA conference. I made two attempts to attend the annual TABD meeting in 
Berlin in 1999 and Cincinnati in 2000. However, I was told that I would have limited 
(press core) access to press conferences but not working groups meetings, in which 
case I determined that the cost of attending the meeting would outweigh the benefits. 
A relatively small sample of active TABD, TACD, TAED and TALD members was 
interviewed. The possibility of conducting a wider questionnaire was discussed with 
the dialogue secretariats. However, I was warned against doing so. It was argued that 
member responses would be more sincere in person or by telephone or email, and that 
many businesspeople and NGOs would consider themselves too busy to take the time 
to answer a questionnaire. 
While the main focus on transnational actors was with these structured 
dialogues, a number of other private actors showed shaping capacity throughout the 
thesis. In particular, US Mission, Commission and IOM officials suggested I contact 
NGOs working on the problem of trafficking in women. A number of NGO websites 
were also regularly consulted. In addition, regarding the banana dispute, contact was 
made with European Banana operators, for whom Atlanta corporation offered a 
spokesperson. Dole. Delmonte and Chiquita Corporations refused to com. ment but 
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their web-sites and those of Fyffes, the US Beef Cattlemen association and the 
Caribbean Banana Exporters Association provided useful information. 
The reluctance of interviewees to go 'on the record' was determined very early 
on in the interviewee process. State Department and Commission officials were 
particularly concerned about anonymity. In order to allow interviewees to speak 
freely, all interviews for the project were conducted on a strictly non-attributable basis, 
without a dictaphone. Most interviewees were offered, and many insisted on, obtaining 
a list of questions in advance of our meeting. Many interviews were followed up with 
email and telephone contact, and in some cases second interviews. 
Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured method. Interviewees were 
divided by policy sector and where possible by 'rank', and asked a number of identical 
questions. Each interviewee was also asked specific questions relating to their role in 
the policy process, as well as questions sparked by interviews with other officials. 
The methodology employed in this thesis was strictly qualitative. The 
introduction to the thesis noted that other studies on the NTA have attempted to 
measure policy output in quantitative terms. This thesis did not try to present a 
quantitative measure of what has been achieved under the NTA, for a number of 
reasons: It was difficult to establish a causal relationship between institutions and 
policy output, because institutions cannot be eliminated from the equation. In addition 
official documents provide only part of the picture, particularly as transatlantic policy- 
makers have a tendency by transatlantic policy makers to 'recycle' and 'repackage' 
their announcement of policy successes. The interest in the thesis was not only in 
substantive policy output but also on the perceptions of actors who participate in the 
policy process. Measuring 'perceptions' quantitatively proved impossible given the I Z-- 
xvide range of ansvers retUrned by interviev, -ees and in most sectors the very small 
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sample of interviewees, as dictated by access to officials and also the often small 
number of people involved in individual policy sectors. 
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